

Cetshwayo and of his son and heir, Dinuzulu.²⁵⁵ What mattered was the survival of the Zulu as a coherent people held together by a common sense of identity. To ensure this survival what was needed was the preservation of the land the Zulu people claimed and the continuance of the royal dynasty in a context where it was free to draw to itself the loyalty of the people. The role of the white authority should be that of guiding and influencing the indigenous ruler while itself benefiting from his counsel and advice, as the Zulu people moved into the next phase of their history. These aims - or illusions - give consistency to all the Colenso actions and attitudes towards the Zulu. They would not accept arguments that presupposed a division of interest between the Zulu king and the Zulu people.²⁵⁶ They had angry contempt for the Wolseley settlement of 1879.²⁵⁷ They did all they could to rehabilitate the reputation of Cetshwayo and to bring about his restoration.²⁵⁸ When the Zulu king did return in January 1883, the Colensos were dismayed at the terms of the 'mock restoration'. Cetshwayo was deprived of territory, wealth, and prestige. He was inhibited from accepting the allegiance of followers and confronted by the hostility of officials and their proteges. To the Colensos it was clear that the beneficial effects of the restoration would flow only when these wrongs were redressed.²⁵⁹ To achieve that end it was necessary that injustices should be made known. Bishop Colenso was, therefore, concerned to have William Grant recognised by Cetshwayo as a reliable means of communication, independent of Fynn, the 'official' resident with the Zulu king.²⁶⁰ It is one of the ironies of the Colenso story that, in the sequel, they bitterly regretted their support of William Grant. They deplored his role in the negotiations between the freebooters of the New Republic and the uSuthu, believing that he misused the trust which the uSuthu, the Colensos and the A.P.S. all reposed in him.²⁶¹ Within a short time the rhythm of apparent success resulting in disappointment

255. The ideas are evident in all the Colenso publications, i.e. C. Vijn, *Cetshwayo's Dutchman* (edited by J.W. Colenso); F.E. Colenso, *History of the Zulu War and its Origin*.

256. Guy, *The Heretic*, pp.282 and 298, quoting H.E. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 13 June 1880; Cox, *Life*, vol.2, p.483.

257. F.E. Colenso, *Ruin*, vol.2, pp.142-43; Cox, *Life*, pp.531-32.

258. Guy, *The Heretic*, Chapters 18-21, especially pp.300-01, 310-12; Cox, *Life*, vol.2 pp.544-46, 550-51, 552-53, 566-77, 582-89.

259. Guy, *The Heretic*, pp.327-33; F.E. Colenso, *Ruin*, vol.2, Chapter V, pp.266-70, 273; H.E. Colenso, 'Eshowe Trials No.1' and 'Eshowe Trials No.5', *Women's Penny Paper*, 10 Aug. and 7 Sept.1889; Cox, *Life*, vol.2 pp.606, 608-26.

260. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; Cox, *Life*, vol.2 pp.605-06.

261. For a clear summary of this contorted and thickly documented dispute see H.C. Swaisland, 'The Aborigines Protection Society and British Southern and West Africa' (D.Phil., University of Oxford, 1968), pp.124-38. See below, pp.78-80.

re-asserted itself.

Throughout, what the Colensos objected to in the local officials was their determination to prevent the kind of regeneration of the Zulu people which, in the Colenso view, first Cetshwayo and then Dinuzulu could effect, if only each in turn was left free to act.²⁶² Avowedly the supporters of the uSuthu, the Colensos nevertheless gave the term 'uSuthu' an elastic meaning. Certainly it meant the immediate and the closest following of the Zulu royal house; but it was also potentially a synonym for the Zulu people as a whole.²⁶³ The Colensos were from the beginning implacably opposed to the pretensions of Zibhebhu and the Mandlakazi faction, and to those officials who wished to foster and use the strength of the Mandlakazi.²⁶⁴

Bishop Colenso died in June 1883,²⁶⁵ shortly before the great uSuthu defeat at oNdini (Ulundi).²⁶⁶ This disaster resulted in the deaths of many prominent Zulu leaders, the flight of Cetshwayo, his refuge in the Nkandla, and his death at Eshowe whither he had been half-coaxed and half-coerced.²⁶⁷ Suspicions of poisoning cluster about the death of Cetshwayo, but they do not seem to have been given public expression by the Colensos.²⁶⁸ The family was as powerless to prevent these things as they were helpless to prevent the intrusion of white freebooters that followed. This led in turn to the 'Boer'/uSuthu negotiations in which Grant played, at best, a questionable role.²⁶⁹ The consequent battle of Etshaneni brought no joy. It was an uSuthu triumph, but a triumph

262. F.E. Colenso, *Ruin*, vol.2 pp.127, 207, 280 and 215; cf. H.E. Colenso, *Mr Commissioner Osborn as One Cause of Confusion in Zulu Affairs* (London, 1892) and other pamphlets attacking the local officials, in particular, Osborn, Resident and then Resident Commissioner and Chief Magistrate in Zululand; Guy, *The Heretic*, p.303; J. Laband, *The Rope of Sand* (Johannesburg, 1995), p.348.

263. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. File 28: Note in H.E. Colenso's script on meaning of uSuthu (int.ev., 1883?). H.E. Colenso, 'Eshowe Trials No.1' and 'Eshowe Trials No.3', *Women's Penny Paper*, 10 and 24 Aug.1889; Edgecombe, *Bringing Forth Light*, pp.46-47 and p.147 fn.19; C.5892, p.60, enclosure: Havelock to Knutsford, 10 Sept.1888, communication from John Knight, n.d.

264. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. For a discussion of the ancestry of Zibhebhu and the origins and early meanings of the term *Mandlakazi* see C. Hamilton, 'Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power in the Early Zulu Kingdom' (M.A., University of the Witwatersrand, 1985), pp.219-23.

265. Cox, *Life*, vol.2 pp.628-32; Guy, *The Heretic*, p.344; Guy, *Destruction*, pp.198-99.

266. Guy, *Destruction*, pp.201-03; Laband, *Rope of Sand*, pp.360-65.

267. Guy, *Destruction*, pp.207-09; Laband, *Rope of Sand*, pp.367-78.

268. R.H.L., Br. Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.130/62: Fr.El. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 13 Oct.1886. Guy, *Destruction*, pp.208; Laband, *Rope of Sand*, p.367.

269. Guy, *Destruction*, pp.197-98; Laband, *Rope of Sand*, pp.370-72.

secured by Boer help and accompanied by cession of territory so vast as to make a mockery of the Boers' anointing of Dinuzulu as king.²⁷⁰ To the Colensos the 'Ruin of Zululand' - both actual and impending - was an indictment of both the political parties of Britain, for both had held office when, in theory, they could have acted to save the Zulu kingdom.²⁷¹ Neither party had fulfilled British responsibilities to the Zulu. What the Colensos emphasised was that the Zulu were as much the victims of British indifference as of 'Boer' unscrupulousness. What officials emphasised was that negotiating with the Boers had made the uSuthu the authors of their own misfortune. Ironically both Colensos and officials saw part of the truth.²⁷²

To protect themselves from humanitarian criticism officials argued, too, that the uSuthu had been encouraged in their disastrous course by the connivance, if not the active advice, of purported friends: William Grant, the A.P.S. and the Colensos. Such allegations were damaging to the uSuthu/Zulu cause.²⁷³ Heeding this, Harriette attempted to refute the charges. She was involved in public recrimination in which the uSuthu, William Grant, the A.P.S., F.R. Statham, and the Colensos were all concerned.²⁷⁴

The questions of whether or not Grant was the 'agent' of the A.P.S. and whether or not, as Statham, the pro-Boer and sometimes pro-Zulu newspaperman, alleged, the A.P.S. had prior knowledge of the 'Boer' intrusion,²⁷⁵ were not the only issues in the tangle of disputes that arose over Grant's role in Zululand. For Harriette, a much more crucial issue was whether or not Grant had explained adequately to the uSuthu leaders how extensive was the land they had allegedly ceded in the negotiations with the 'Boers' in August 1884. The uSuthu leaders argued that they had assented in ignorance; Grant maintained that he had explained adequately. Given the uncertainties and pressures in Zululand in 1884, it is impossible to say whether Grant had misled the Zulu or, perhaps, as Swaisland suggests,

270. Guy, *Destruction*, pp.225-27; Laband, *Rope of Sand*, pp.373-77.

271. Cox, *Life*, vol.2 pp.541-42, but cf. p.543.

272. Swaisland, 'Aborigines Protection Society', p.146.

273. F.E. Colenso, *Ruin*, pp.246-48; Guy, *Destruction*, p.198; Swaisland, 'Aborigines Protection Society', pp.127 and 146.

274. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; Swaisland, 'Aborigines Protection Society', p.128 citing H.E. Colenso to Editor, *Natal Witness*, 2 Apr.1886. See below, Chapter Three.

275. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 6 May and 11 Nov.1886, and to Fr.El. Colenso, 1 and 9 Sept.1886; Swaisland, 'Aborigines Protection Society', p.128.

he had himself been misled by an interpreter.²⁷⁶ For Harriette, what mattered was that the uSuthu claims should be championed as energetically and effectively as possible. The curious tug-of-war over a tin box was one of the episodes in this period of recrimination.

The story is not an easy one to discern. The box, apparently the property of William Grant, was evidently brought from Zululand by Dabulamanzi and Ndabuko, who left it with Harriette Colenso.²⁷⁷ Grant, possibly because, as Chesson suggested, his 'dander was up', wanted it.²⁷⁸ Harriette would not give it up.²⁷⁹ She consulted with F.W. Chesson and W.Y. Campbell.²⁸⁰ Letters were exchanged and the dispute dragged on. In Pietermaritzburg Henry Bale believed that he had arranged for the box to be opened in the presence of representatives of both parties,²⁸¹ but this proposed resolution was a little delayed. Shingana, the uSuthu *umNtwana*, who was in Pietermaritzburg in November 1886 to complain of the partition Havelock had arranged, was not allowed to stay on for an appointment with the Master of the Supreme Court, presumably about the tin box.²⁸² Harriette wanted passes for other Zulu representatives to come to Pietermaritzburg to be present when the box was opened.²⁸³ Grant obtained a court interdict to prevent the removal of the box.²⁸⁴ It was eventually opened. It contained the Blue Book setting out the conditions of Cetshwayo's restoration and Grant's diary for 1884. The contents were divided.²⁸⁵

276. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 17 June 1886; Swaisland, 'Aborigines Protection Society', p.137. See below, Chapter Three.

277. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref: Box 145): Statement of Siziba re tin box (1886 or 1887, int.cv.); R.H.L. Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/11: H.E. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 18 May 1886.

278. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 19 Aug.1886.

279. R.H.L. Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/185: H.E. Colenso to Goodricke, 19 July 1886.

280. *Ibid.*, C.131/14: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 30 May 1886; C.131/20: 12 July 1886; C.131/2: 20 July 1886. N.A., Col.Coll: Campbell to H.E. Colenso, 27 May 1886. See below pp.78-80.

281. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; N.A., Col.Coll: H. Bale to H.E. Colenso, 27 July and 11 Nov.1886.

282. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Master of Supreme Court, 12 Nov.1886 and to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13 Nov.1886.

283. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Secretary of Native Affairs, 13 Nov.1886.

284. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to G. Browne, 17 May 1887; R.H.L. Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/27: Statement of H.E. Colenso, 26 Oct.1886.

285. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref: Box 145): Statement of Siziba about the tin box (1886 or 1887, int.cv.); R.H.L. Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/14: H.E. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 30 May and 8 June 1886; C.131/286: Affidavit of 26 Oct.1886; C.131/41: H.E. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 20 Nov.1886; Recs, *Colenso Letters*, p.412, S.F. Colenso to K. Lyell, 29 Nov.1886. See below, Chapter Three, pp.78-80.

On 22 October 1886 Sir Arthur Elibank Havelock,²⁸⁶ some months after his arrival as Governor of Natal and Special Commissioner for Zululand, succeeded in concluding an agreement with representatives of the New Republic.²⁸⁷ This was the self-proclaimed independent state which had been set up in territory gained from the Zulu in much the same way, and roughly contemporaneously, with the establishment of Stellaland and Goshen to the west of the Transvaal.²⁸⁸ Governments in Britain were distracted by domestic issues and the crises over Home Rule for Ireland. Havelock, during 1886, received instructions from both a Liberal and a Conservative Secretary of State.²⁸⁹ The Zulu leaders, through their representatives and spokesmen, protested and appealed persistently, but Boer spokesmen held firm and were particularly obdurate in July 1886.²⁹⁰ It was clear that the British government would not use force against them.²⁹¹ In September 1886 Dabulamanzi, half-brother of Cetshwayo and prominent uSuthu leader, was murdered by Boers. This happened in the Reserve, *i.e.* the area in southern Zululand not returned to Cetshwayo in 1883 and placed under British influence.²⁹² Since there was clearly urgent need to settle Zulu disputes, the agreement of 22 October followed. In concluding this arrangement Havelock negotiated only with Boer representatives: no Zulu were present.²⁹³ Placed as he was in a 'crippled position' and working under 'iron conditions', Havelock yielded far more to the Boers than the friends of the Zulu thought justifiable.²⁹⁴ Natal colonists, for their own reasons, were also indignant. Already angered at the stringent financial proposals of

286. See Appendix 2, Biographical note.

287. Laband, *Rope of Sand*, p.375.

288. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 15 Jan. and 30 July 1885; Guy, *Destruction*, p.221.

289. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. (or Fr.El.) Colenso, 15 Feb. and 23 Apr.1885, and 9 Dec.1886; Sir F.A. Stanley (Conservative) was Secretary of State for the Colonies from June 1885 to Feb.1886; Earl Granville (Liberal) was Secretary of State for the Colonies from Feb.1886 to Aug.1886; Hon. Ed Stanhope (Conservative) was Secretary of State for the Colonies from Aug.1886 until Jan.1887 when a cabinet reshuffle brought Sir Henry Holland (later Lord Knutsford) to the Colonial Office until the Conservative government lost power in 1892.

290. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Digest* Series 4 and 5, *passim*; N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to Miss Colenso, 30 July and 6 Aug.1885.

291. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. ? (*i.e.* Miss) Colenso, 25 Sept.1884, 11 Oct.1884, 7 May 1885, 16 Aug. and 11 Nov.1886; to Fr.El. Colenso 9 and 11 Oct.1886.

292. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 10 Nov.1886; to H.E. Colenso, 11 Nov.1886; C.T. Binns, *Dinuzulu: the Death of the House of Shaka* (London, 1968), pp.86-88.

293. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref: Box 144): H.E. Colenso to (unidentified), draft letter, Dec.1886; Laband, *Rope of Sand*, pp.376 and 378 (map).

294. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 11 Nov., 9 and 23 Dec.1886.

Havelock, they believed Natal's future interests were jeopardised by the cession of Zulu territory to the New Republic.²⁹⁵ The Colensos condemned an agreement which sacrificed the interests of the Zulu people by yielding to the New Republic sovereignty over much territory (and its Zulu inhabitants) while allowing more white land claims in the Proviso B area that was not part of the New Republic. Since the Colensos consistently rejected the view that the Zulu people were already fractured beyond hope of re-integration, they found the October 1886 agreement abhorrent because it endangered the national existence of the Zulu people.²⁹⁶

At the end of 1886 Harriette wrote a number of letters expressing her protest. Those to the Governor were forwarded to the Secretary of State, while those to the A.P.S. were used by Chesson to get what publicity he could.²⁹⁷ She objected that the Zulu had not been party to the negotiations. She insisted that the Zulu had stated their case as strongly as they could on previous occasions and that they relied on British justice. If the Boers had been allowed to acquire land claims in Zululand, the fault, she argued, lay not with the Zulu but with British. It was wrong that the Zulu should have to pay for the omissions of British policy.²⁹⁸ To her, the surrender of the emaKhosini district to the New Republic was a national insult to the Zulu. Here were the graves of the early Zulu kings and of prominent royal women.²⁹⁹ She objected that the proposed boundary would place some of the most loyal adherents of the royal house, notably the abaQulusi, under the government of the New Republic. Denying that the Zulu accepted the agreement, or the boundaries it denoted, she hoped that vigorous protest would result in modification.³⁰⁰ To some it seemed that she was urging the Zulu to resist by force the agreement which Havelock had made.³⁰¹ Chesson received vigorous letters from both Harriette and Frances Ellen, and he protested that they expected far more from the A.P.S. than it could perform.³⁰² Though the Society was clearly worried and made

295. *Ibid.*, F.W. Chesson to H.E. ? (i.e. Miss) Colenso, 31 Jan. and 28 Oct.1886; E.H. Brookes & C. de B. Webb, *History of Natal* (Pietermaritzburg, 1965), p.165.

296. *Ibid.*, p.155; Laband, *Rope of Sand*, p.382. See below, Chapter Threc.

297. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 16 Dec.1886 and 10 Feb.1887; to H.E. Colenso, 23 Dec.1886, 25 Jan. and 10 Feb.1887.

298. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Digest* Series 5, 6 and 7, *passim*.

299. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 16 Mar.1887. See below, pp.87-88.

300. See above, fn.298.

301. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 7 Mar.1887.

302. *Ibid.*, F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 17 Mar.1887; and to Fr.El. Colenso, 31 Mar.1887.

representations to the Colonial Office, *inter alia* about the emaKhosini District (where the graves were situated) and the position of blacks in the New Republic,³⁰³ Chesson clearly believed that the Colensos would best serve the interests of the Zulu by soothing their indignation and, in the end, counselling their acceptance both of the partition of October 1886 and of the establishment of British rule over the rest of Zululand.³⁰⁴ This occurred in two stages: first the form of protection in February 1887, then the form of full sovereignty in May 1887.³⁰⁵

The Prospects

By 1887 the Colenso record of endeavour was already immense, their tangible achievement minimal. Given the increasing burden of failure, it is the continuance of their effort that requires explanation. Most of this explanation lies in the Colensos' concept of duty, but part is also to be found in the circumstances that at least prevented their efforts from being smothered in total failure.

In their conflicts with officials the Colensos were confronted by the mosaic of sometimes conflicting and changing attitudes which made up the 'official mind' and a comparable kaleidoscope that entered into the calculations of politicians.³⁰⁶ Those whom the Colensos criticised shared in the normal human characteristic of preferring to think their own actions 'right', of wishing to avoid or answer criticism, and of preferring applause to opprobrium. The British imperial system of government at the end of the nineteenth century and the political assumptions of British and colonial society cushioned officials from much - but by no means all - criticism. Between a Secretary of State and his colonial subordinates the relationship was a complex one which imposed obligations and responsibilities upon each level of authority. Convention and, in some circumstances, expedience, or even conviction, obliged a Secretary of State to defend his subordinates. The man-on-the-spot, particularly rich in experience and local knowledge, was entitled to respect for his views. The Secretary of State would need good reason before acting against

303. *Ibid.*, F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 4 Nov.1886 and 10 Feb.1887; to Fr.El. Colenso, 25 Feb.1887.

304. *Ibid.*, F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 26 May, 24 Nov. and 10 Dec.1887.

305. Laband, *Rope of Sand*, pp.377 and 379.

306. Attempts to discuss and explain the attitudes of those who wielded power and/or influenced decisions include J.A. Hobson, *The Psychology of Jingoism* (London, 1901); R. Robinson & J. Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism* (London, 1974) and Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism'.

the advice that he normally solicited from official subordinates.³⁰⁷ But, in the last resort, a Secretary of State carried far greater responsibilities than any local official, however sagacious or experienced the latter might be.

The Secretary of State might be mocked by colonial politicians with some measure of impunity, but he had to be obeyed by colonial officials. The Secretary of State was the highest servant of the British colonial empire, but he was also more. As a minister of the Crown and a politician, he was obliged to take into account the attitudes and reactions of cabinet colleagues and the parliamentary position of the government of which he was a member. Policies likely to arouse strong opposition in cabinet or parliament were best avoided, particularly if cabinet cohesion was weak, and a parliamentary majority small.³⁰⁸ Even when the position of a government was strong, there was wisdom in obtaining cabinet approval of a decision that was likely to encounter opposition in parliament. Usually, but by no means always, the fact that the current Secretary of State was at once part of the non-official, as well as the official world, favoured the Colensos. He dared not close his ears to all criticisms that they directed at officials. Whether or not he would heed these criticisms depended on circumstances which the Colensos could not control. But, when a Secretary of State was obdurate, it was possible for the Colensos and their associates to hope that a change of government would lead to a change of policy and of the personality at the helm.³⁰⁹

Unlike others who campaigned for humanitarian causes, the Colensos did not have the backing of a prominent missionary society or specific commercial interest. In this regard both John Mackenzie and Frederick Lugard were more fortunate. In his concern for the Tswana, John Mackenzie had the backing of the London Missionary Society, while Lugard's 1892 campaign for Uganda was supported by chambers of commerce and the Church Missionary Society.³¹⁰ What the Colensos did have was the backing of the

307. J. Benyon, *Proconsul and Paramountcy in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg, 1980), p.8.

308. See below, Chapter Seven.

309. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 17 Mar.1887.

310. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. For Mackenzie and the Tswana see Swaisland, 'Aborigines Protection Society', p.372 and J. Sillery, *John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland, 1835-1899* (Cape Town, 1981), p.73; for Lugard and Uganda see M. Perham, *Life of Lord Lugard*, 2 vols. (London, 1956-60), vol.1 pp.421-31, especially p.425.

A.P.S. The effectiveness of this Society with its small membership and limited budget³¹¹ depended very largely on the calibre of its secretary. For the Colensos it was unfortunate that F.W. Chesson should have died in April 1888. A man of exceptional commitment, wide sympathies, and great sagacity, he had over the years come to know the Colensos well. Neither of his two successors, Charles Hancock, who had a brief tenure, and H.R. Fox Bourne, equalled his stature.³¹² Nevertheless, it was primarily to the secretaries of the A.P.S. that the Colensos looked for support. There was sometimes divergence of opinion. Harriette Colenso and the A.P.S. differed, for example, about the annexation of Zululand to Britain in 1887,³¹³ about the role of the Chartered Company north of the Limpopo in the early 1890s,³¹⁴ and about the annexation of Zululand to Natal in 1895.³¹⁵ But the A.P.S. had behind it a half-century of experience in seeking to protect indigenous people who were subject to, or affected by, the British Empire, and it was to the Society's offices that the Colensos directed their steps when in London and addressed their frequent letters and flimsy sheets printed on the Bishopstowe press. Through the Society, the Colensos hoped to reach both the British national press and parliament. Neither Chesson nor Fox Bourne was ever a member of parliament, but both had strong newspaper links, while members of the Society and its committee included MPs who might be willing to take up a humanitarian issue.³¹⁶

Neither colonists nor officials liked the A.P.S., but they dared not ignore it. Letters from local correspondents and, sometimes, the exchanges between the Society and the Secretary of State were published in the *Aborigines Friend*.³¹⁷ This had only a small readership and only intermittent and delayed publication. It was not a major threat to officials. More important was the space which the secretaries of the society might obtain in the national press.³¹⁸ Moreover, the Colonial Office sometimes included the correspondence with

311. For general discussion of the A.P.S., see the theses by Edgecombe and Swaisland, previously cited, and listed in bibliography.

312. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

313. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 6 Aug.1885 and 8 June 1886; to Fr.El. Colenso, 9 and 11 Oct.1886; Swaisland, 'Aborigines Protection Society', p.9 notes that Frank accepted the inevitability of annexation far more readily than his sisters.

314. See below, pp.190-91.

315. See below, pp.331-32 and 340.

316. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 15 Feb.1887.

317. *The Aborigines Friend* or *Colonial Intelligencer* was published irregularly but fairly frequently.

318. For example, N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 10 Nov., 16 and 21 Dec.1886; and to H.E. Colenso, 16 Dec.1886; unidentified newspaper cutting citing *Manchester Examiner*, 29 June 1889.

the Society in the parliamentary Blue Books, partly in self-defence.³¹⁹ Sometimes the prospect of such publication led to letters which scored minor debating points and tended therefore to deflect interest from major issues.³²⁰

The A.P.S. and its sister society, the Anti-Slavery Society, were both products of the movement for the emancipation of slaves of earlier decades, itself one of the manifestations of a growing humanitarian outlook. Not all humanitarians fought against slavery and the oppression of aboriginal people. Some addressed the appalling plight of the vulnerable in British society. However diversely expressed, the humanitarianism of the nineteenth century drew its inspiration from apparently contradictory trends of the eighteenth century: the emphasis on reason and the power of the human intellect to identify and eradicate wrongs on the one hand, and, on the other, the religious reawakening of the time. Both impulses flowed together to create the humanitarianism of the nineteenth century.

In other areas, the impact of 'reason' and 'religion' was varied and often divisive. Some who consciously defined their position chose to be wholly secular in outlook. They were the 'free thinkers' and the 'infidels' who were so mistrusted by the devout. Others tried to be more comfortable in their religion by emphasising only what was rationally comprehensible or acceptable. This was the Unitarian position. The more conventional non-conformist chapels, e.g. Baptist and Methodist, offered the appeal of emotional fervour and moral intensity. Some Christians turned to the Roman Catholic faith for its ritual, authority, and symbolism. Quakers, by contrast, valued the essential simplicity and opportunity for individual spiritual expression they found within their own community. Anglicans were pulled in different directions. Some left the Church to become Roman Catholic; some moved in the opposite direction to become Unitarians. Within, the Church offered the rich panoply of ceremony and ritual. Many rejected this. They wished to see the Anglican Church courageous enough to confront the challenges of new perceptions and to tolerate diversity of opinion among its members. This was the Broad church movement.

319. Examples abound. See *i.a.* C.4587, p.10, no.12: A.P.S. to C.O., 22 Jan.1885 and p.13, no.16: C.O. to A.P.S., 28 Jan.1885.

320. Examples abound. See *i.a.* C.4645, p.21, no.19: H. Bulwer to Secretary of State, 15 Aug.1885, transmitting report of Osborn on letters of A.P.S. and Dillwyn.

To its critics it verged on a Unitarian position which denied the divinity of Christ.³²¹

By the late nineteenth century diversity of religious attitudes and allegiances and the challenge to them of secularism had been emphasised by the excitement and long-term implications of the work of Sir Charles Lyell and of Charles Darwin.³²² As Harriette and her siblings grew up, Bishop Colenso's biblical criticism contributed to the ferment. He aroused intense antagonism from those less confident than he that the cause of 'true' religion was best served by identifying and discarding what was unacceptable to reason.

The religious diversity, the product of previous decades - and, indeed, centuries - was part of the context in which Harriette made her appeals on behalf of the Zulu people. Many in the Church of England had been outraged by Colenso, but there were some sympathisers too.³²³ Non-conformists were very prominent among humanitarians. The insistence of the Non-conformist conscience that 'policies' must be 'moral' was identical to the Colenso standpoint, although interpretations might well vary about which 'policies' mattered and about what was 'moral'.³²⁴ Many of the leading figures in the Anti-Slavery Society and in the A.P.S. were Quakers who were prominent, too, in the Peace Society which denounced the actions of the government over the Langalibalele affair. No Colenso could quarrel with the essential Quaker belief that 'there was that of God in every man' - or woman.³²⁵ Like the Unitarians, Quakers accorded women a higher status and larger role than other denominations and this, too, seems to have influenced Quaker dealings with Harriette.³²⁶ Rationalists welcomed Colenso's attack on religious obscurantism, although their standpoint was certainly not that of Colenso. The Bishop does not appear to have denounced deists, rationalists, or free thinkers, but he certainly did not

321. The two previous paragraphs distil the essence of much reading over many years of teaching. For specific denominations please see F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone (eds), *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* (Oxford, 1974). For humanitarianism see T. Gilby, 'Humanitarianism' in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion* (Washington, 1978). For Unitarian tenets see D. Young, *F.D. Maurice and Unitarianism* (Oxford, 1992), p.39.

322. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

323. *Ibid.* See also Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.194, S.F. Colenso to Mrs Lyell, 18 Nov.1868.

324. R. Ensor, *History of England 1870-1914* (Oxford, 1949) p.185; C. Binfield, *So Down to Prayers: Studies in English Nonconformity 1789-1920* (London, 1977), Chapter 1.

325. Cox, *Life*, vol.2 p.359; Binfield, *So Down to Prayers*, Chapter 11, p.232.

326. J. Hannam, *Isabella Ford* (Oxford, 1989), p.17 fn.32; J. Rendell, *The Origins of Modern Feminism. Women in Britain, France and the United States* (London, 1985), p.315 fn.95.

join them.³²⁷

There was at least one Unitarian who was a member of the A.P.S., F.S. Newman, brother of the more famous cardinal. It was not, however, for that reason that Harriette received so warm a welcome from Unitarians. What mattered more was the sympathetic interest which many Unitarians had taken in Bishop Colenso's biblical criticism and its implications. Many of the Colensos' close associates and friends had Unitarian backgrounds. His solicitor, William Shaen, was a Unitarian, while the Colensos had enjoyed the friendship of Frances Power Cobbe, a leading crusader for reform and women's rights who was often in Unitarian pulpits. The leading Unitarian, P.H. Wickstead, admired Colenso.³²⁸ Like other Unitarians he regretted that Colenso had not joined them.³²⁹ There were occasions when the Colenso family were incensed at suggestions that the Bishop should have resigned his see, but Harriette acknowledged gratefully the help she received from Unitarians.³³⁰ That help came at a time when Unitarianism appears to have flourished. While it is difficult to determine how influential any religious group was in terms of its size and the role of its members, it is clear that many leading figures in British politics had Unitarian backgrounds.³³¹ Unitarianism may perhaps be seen as an attempt to accommodate the dictates of reason to some, at least, of the key tenets of Christianity. The absence of dogma and ritual may well have been welcomed by those who could not ignore the rationalist criticisms of Christianity but who wished to remain members of a religious community. In the course of the late nineteenth century 'ethical societies', 'fellowships', 'socialist clubs' or associations provided for their followers the sense of social cohesion and, perhaps, commitment associated with membership of a church community. They reflected the growing secularism of society, while their presence added to the number of audiences Harriette might reach.³³²

327. See *Agnostic Review*, 23 Sept. 1905, article by W.S. Ross recalling a hearsay account of Colenso's attending a meeting (photocopy from Dr Nan Albinski). Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.249, S.F. Colenso to K. Lyell, n.d.

328. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

329. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.377.

330. *Sheffield Telegraph*, 25 Nov. 1891, H.E. Colenso letter under heading 'Miss Colenso on her Mission to England'.

331. Among others Joseph Chamberlain, James Stansfeld, and David Lloyd-George.

332. Notably the South Place Ethical Society. See S.K. Ratcliffe, *The Story of South Place* (London, 1955).

Although Harriette did not campaign for women's rights, she was, of course, the daughter of Bishop Colenso and her activities naturally interested women in England who, at the time, were promoting claims to greater recognition and a wider sphere of activity. Harriette's allies among women were certainly not all ardent campaigners for women's rights. Some simply accepted and found fulfilment in the accustomed role of women. They helped their husbands and they presided at drawing room functions. Harriette corresponded with the womenfolk of politicians and, at least once, wished she had a wider acquaintance among them.³³³ She was also, in the early 1890s, very well supported by members of the Women's Liberal Associations which, like their counterparts on the Conservative side, had been called into being to canvas for party candidates after the enactment of the Corrupt Practices Act.³³⁴ Though this involved a kind of 'indirect' political activity, there were some who demanded, with varying insistence, that women should also themselves participate in the process of government. They should be entitled to serve on the institutions of local government³³⁵ while the campaign for the parliamentary franchise was also gathering momentum.³³⁶ Harriette approved of this. She thought the enfranchisement of women, when it came, would be 'a great step forward out of priestly domination'.³³⁷ Many of the politically active women admired Harriette greatly, but there was not complete identity of interest between them and her. For them the Zulu issue was not the main question; for her part, Harriette would not be deflected from her commitment in order to participate in the politics of the women's movement.³³⁸ Harriette's most active allies were Anne Cowen of Nottingham and Miss Conybeare, but she also met Isabella Ford, staunch advocate of women's rights, trade unionism, and

333. N.A., Col.Coll: M. (sister of James) Bryce to H.E. Colenso, 3 June 1891; H.E. Colenso to Mrs Bryce, 31 July 1892; to S.F. Colenso, 12 June 1891; to A.M. Colenso, 16 June 1891, 3 May 1895 and 2 Jan.1896.

334. See below, p.197. P. Hollis, *Ladies Elect: Women in English Local Government* (Oxford, 1987), pp.57-58; J. Kamm, *Rapiers and Battleaxes: The Women's Movement and its Aftermath* (London, 1966) pp.137-38; L. Tickner, *The Spectacle of Women* (Chicago, 1988), p.5; L.L. Shiman, *Women and Leadership in Nineteenth Century England* (London, 1992), Chapter 13; M. Pugh, *The Tories and the People* (Oxford, 1985), p.67.

335. Hollis, *Ladies Elect*, discusses in detail the role of women in local government.

336. Gladstone Papers, Add.Mss.44514 f.234: W. Lawson to W.E. Gladstone, 6 May 1892. For an account of debate about the relative importance of party loyalty or 'women's rights' see *Women's Herald*, 30 Apr. and 21 May 1892.

337. On 7 July 1897 Labouchere succeeded in 'talking out' a Woman's Suffrage Bill that had reached its second reading in the Commons, see G. Shaw, 'The Letters of Edmund Garrett to his Cousin, 1896-98, edited with an introduction' (M.A., University of Cape Town, 1983). p.171 fn.4; N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 21 Apr.1892.

338. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 7 Dec.1890, and to A.L. Browne, 9 June 1896.

international cooperation. Some women gained an added importance because they, like Harriette, were the daughters of eminent fathers: Jane Cobden-Unwin, Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner and even the tragic Eleanor Marx (Aveling, as she would have hoped).

Political activity and the demand for rights was one thing; but it was also important that more and more women were brought into the public eye for what they achieved, sought to accomplish or represented. Though the use of pseudonyms like George Eliot, Ralph Iron or even Atherton Wylde warns of a lingering sense of impropriety, many women were known as distinguished writers. George Eliot, the Brontës, even Olive Schreiner for her *Story of an African Farm*, were household names in the 1880s. Other women were demanding access to professions, as Elizabeth Garrett did in regard to medicine. Some were known for their journalism. They include Lady Florence Dixie, who was the correspondent of the *Morning Post* during the Anglo-Zulu War, and Flora Shaw who became head of the colonial department of *The Times*. Travel and adventure brought Mary Kingsley and Gertrude Bell into public view, while Sarah Heckford, if less well-known, certainly followed a life style of vigorous self-help. Josephine Butler devoted her life to the cause of securing the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Act which discriminated against women by insisting that women suspected of prostitution should be subject to compulsory medical examination. Octavia Hill was a housing reformer. Emma Cons hoped to promote temperance. Some women, thinking ahead towards the future role of women, became the pioneers of women's education. Colleges were opened at both Cambridge and Oxford. Alice Werner, the life-long friend of Harriette Colenso, studied briefly at Newnham in the late 1870s, while Harriette was invited to lecture at Somerville College in the 1890s. In fact, it was no longer so unusual for women to speak in public. Frances Power Cobbe preached and other women as preachers are mentioned in the *Women's Penny Paper*, while a friend of the Colensos, Miss Pryke of Norwich, gave lectures on the Zulu issues before Harriette arrived in Britain.³³⁹

One of the first printed interviews with Harriette which appeared in Britain in early 1890 was published in the *Women's Penny Paper*. This was a remarkable enterprise which

339. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. For Miss Pryke see N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 21 Mar.1888; for the lecture at Oxford see below, pp.436-37; for women preachers see *i.a.* *Women's Penny Paper*, 29 Nov.1890.

proudly boasted that it was the only paper entirely printed, published, and written by women. Harriette had become known to its readers ahead of her arrival. It had, during 1889, published a series of articles by Harriette on the Eshowe Trials. Her brother, Frank, brought her cause to the attention of the editor. What appeared in the *Women's Penny Paper* was noted by an MP who took a prominent role as an ally of Harriette. This was Mr Alfred Webb, of whom Swaisland interestingly notes, that he was not a member of the A.P.S.³⁴⁰ The women of England, with their own causes to pursue, could not ensure that Harriette would win her own campaign, but they certainly helped her gain public attention.

Harriette sought an audience for what she said and readers for what was written. Operating in a literate society of newspapers, journals, and pamphlets, she wished to make as much use of these as possible. Her efforts were persistent, but editors were not always co-operative,³⁴¹ and even when she succeeded in producing a pamphlet, she could not guarantee that it would be read, let alone heeded. Like politicians, editors had their own priorities and readers their own preferences. Although this is difficult to prove, it seems likely that the public appeal of the Zulu cause was, from the beginning, weakened by such facts as these; unlike the Tswana leader, Khama, Dinuzulu was not - despite rumours -³⁴² a convert to Christianity; however undeservedly, the Zulu had a history of enmity with the British, for it was against them that one of the most formidable of Queen Victoria's 'little wars' was fought. The tale of imperial wrongdoing certainly did not appeal to patriotic fervour in a decade which began and ended with royal jubilees. There was more of accusation than flattery in this story, and the defiant and critical patriotism of the Colensos was more than many could take.³⁴³ It seems significant that the MPs who did take up the Zulu cause were notable backbenchers like G.B. Clark, notorious

340. The letterhead claimed *Women's Penny Paper: the only Paper Conducted, Written, Printed and Published by Women* (Photocopy from Professor Nan Albinski); N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, Tuesday (1889?).

341. N.A., Col.Coll: J.T. Knowles to H.E. Colenso, 13 Feb. and 26 Aug.1891.

342. The rumours were denied. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 1 Mar.1895; set of newspaper extracts (dated by H.E. Colenso, 11 July 1908) viz. *Natal Witness*, 14 Sept.1895 and 4 Apr.1896.

343. F.E. Colenso, *Ruin of Zululand*, vol.1, Preface dated June 1884, '... it is amongst the first duties of every loyal, patriotic Englishman, ay, *and woman*, too, to learn the truth about these matters' (my italics); and vol.2, Preface dated Nov.1884, 'If patriotism is to love and honour one's own nation and fatherland above all others ... and to be willing ... to suffer for her sake, then I claim ... the name of Englishwoman. But if it means the determination to ... hide and deny her faults ... and to glory in her success when she is in the wrong, then, indeed, I am no patriot at all.'

radicals like Charles Bradlaugh, or Irish nationalist MPs. Sometimes such interest was merely tactical; but it was genuine, if limited, in Alfred Webb, who probably saw in the Zulu an oppressed nationality which, like the Irish, was struggling to be free.³⁴⁴

Increasingly during the decade the Zulu issues became less and less topical. After all, in Zululand the war was over, the scramble finished. Interest focussed on other areas and issues. Yet, for all that, the Colensos were always able to draw some attention to the Zulu issue, even as they themselves were drawn into closer association with critics of empire. What attention they gained diminished over the decade but, in conjunction with the Colenso commitment to duty, it was enough to sustain the Colenso endeavour.

344. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

CHAPTER TWO

THE uSUTHU EXPERIENCE 1887-1888
Annexation and Subjugation

At the beginning of 1887, when annexation was being considered, the uSuthu leaders were men whose willing acquiescence the imperial authorities wished to secure. By November 1888 uSuthu leaders were among prisoners at Eshowe arraigned before a specially constituted court on a number of grave charges, including alleged high treason against the British sovereign.¹ For the Colensos the tragic sequence of disappointments continued, as they failed to counteract the strong anti-uSuthu emphasis in British policy. Both the uSuthu and the Colensos hoped that sufferings, sacrifices, and efforts would change the pattern of official decisions in Zululand. The Colensos wanted a fresh approach to the problem of governing Zululand and thought they would achieve this by exposing the wrongs inflicted on the uSuthu, thus winning reparation for them.

Six phases can be distinguished in the uSuthu experience during these years:

1. The partition of Zululand through the agreement of October 22 1886 between Her Majesty's Special Commissioner for Zululand and the representatives of the New Republic.²
2. The British annexation of Zululand in May 1887. The prelude to this was the establishment of 'protection' over the area, while its sequel was the appointment of magistrates and the publication of the Laws and Regulations for the Government of Zululand of 21 June 1887.³
3. Attempts were made to secure acquiescence and to avert active resistance. Messages were exchanged between the uSuthu leaders and the Governor who

1. C.4980, p.56, no.41: Stanhope to Havelock, 24 Nov.1886; for the later trials, see *Court of the Special Commissioners for Zululand* (London, 1890) (henceforward C.S.C.Z.); A.J. van Wyk *Dinuzulu en die Usuthu Opstand van 1888* (Archives Year Book, Pretoria, 1983), Chapters 4 and 5, pp.107-168; B.M. Nicholls, 'Zululand 1887-1889: The Court of the Special Commissioners for Zululand and the Rule of Law', *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, Vol.15, 1994/5, pp.41-63.

2. C.4980, pp.30-31, no.22: Havelock to C.O., telegram, 22 Oct.1886; and p.36, no.29: C.O. to Havelock, Tel, 2 Nov.1886; van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, p.24; J. Laband, *Rope of Sand: the Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century* (Johannesburg, 1995), p.376.

3. C.5143, p.41, no.22: Havelock to C.O., telegram, 14 May 1887; van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, p.50; C.T. Binns, *Dinuzulu, the Death of the House of Shaka* (London, 1968), pp.93-103; Laband, *Rope*, pp.377 and 379.

travelled to Eshowe where the uSuthu were summoned to meet him.⁴

4. An interlude of hesitation (and of threatened confrontation) as Sir Arthur Havelock (Governor of Zululand and of Natal) attempted to control some of the consequence of the return of Zibhebhu to the Ndwandwe district.⁵
5. Months of confrontation between the British forces and the uSuthu.⁶
6. The final phase of subjugation which included the surrender and the arrest of the uSuthu leaders.⁷

This chapter discusses each of these phases in turn. These phases are not sharply divided from each other. The methods, role, and impact of the Colensos in championing the uSuthu cause through the process of conquest are discussed in the following chapter.

Phase one: Partition

When Havelock negotiated a partition of Zululand in October 1886 many were dissatisfied. White Natalians, indignant that so much land was handed over to the New Republic, were even more distressed when the New Republic opted for union with the South African Republic and not with Natal.⁸ Individual white filibusters were disappointed that they did not receive more land.⁹ For their part, the uSuthu leaders were clearly very aggrieved. They lost both land and people to the Boers,¹⁰ and paid a very high price for the 'Boer' alliance which, in May 1884, helped give them their triumph at the battle of Etshaneni, when, avenging past defeats, they trounced Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, head of the rival Mandlakazi and drove him from the Ndwandwe district.¹¹ The uSuthu leaders had conceded land in return for Boer recognition of Dinuzulu as king and Boer help against Zibhebhu but they did not anticipate the clamour for sweeping land grants that followed, as whites poured into Zululand from different parts of South Africa. Convinced that far

4. C.5143, p.44, no.27: Havelock to C.O., 11 May 1887 and pp.53-54, no.30: 25 May 1887.

5. C.5522, p.11, no.6: Havelock to Stanhope, enclosing messages, 30 Mar.1888; Binns, *Dinuzulu*, pp.117-22.

6. van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, Chapter 3, pp.99-168; Laband, *Rope*, Chapter 33, pp.415-23; Binns, *Dinuzulu*, pp.122-30.

7. Binns, *Dinuzulu*, pp.133-43; Laband, *Rope*, Chapter 33, pp.415-22 and pp.424-25.

8. C.O.179/169/1692: F.W. Chesson to Secretary of State, 26 Jan.1887, enclosing letter from Escombe, 13 Dec.1886. C.4980, pp.118-121, no.61: Havelock to C.O., 10 Nov.1886 with enclosures; p.155: no.78: Havelock to C.O., 20 Dec.1886.

9. C.5331, p.20, no.3: Havelock to Holland, 28 June 1887.

10. C.4980, p.53, no.35: Havelock to Stanhope with enclosure, 18 Oct.1886; Z.G.H.701/371/1886: statement of Shingana, Sibamu and Mtyupana (Mjwaphuna), 11 Nov.1886.

11. Laband, *Rope*, pp.373-74.

too much land was being claimed for far too many people, they appealed constantly for British help.¹² The British annexed St Lucia Bay,¹³ but then waited as ministries in England came and went. In Natal, the authorities blamed Harriette Colenso for instigating uSuthu pleas. While this probably exaggerated her influence, she certainly argued the uSuthu cause vehemently, and tenaciously publicised the uSuthu representations.¹⁴ At much the same time, 43 British MPs petitioned the Secretary of State for intervention.¹⁵ As a result, Sir Arthur Havelock, Bulwer's successor as Governor of Natal and Special Commissioner for Zululand, was eventually authorised to intervene effectively.¹⁶ He negotiated with Boer representatives who came to Pietermaritzburg, made the agreement of October 1886, and arranged the partition of Zululand. In return Boers gave up their claim to exercise a Protectorate and agreed to cut back their more extreme land claims. As in many parts of Africa during the 'scramble', negotiations *with* the indigenous people were superseded by negotiations *about* them.

Havelock did not allow the New Republic to have all that its representatives demanded, but he certainly yielded far more than the uSuthu thought fair. Ardent uSuthu supporters, the abaQulusi, were left within the borders of the New Republic.¹⁷ What is more, Havelock himself was dismayed to find that a topographical error had included within the New Republic the emaKhosini district where Zulu royal graves were located.¹⁸ To allow the discontented uSuthu adherents to move from the area of the New Republic into British Zululand gave cold comfort, for it was hard to move from familiar terrain, old sites, and growing corn into areas where competing claims already existed. In addition, whites were not ousted from what became British Zululand. Proviso B in Article 1 of the agreement of October 1886 demarcated the future Entonjaneni area, or the kwaMagwaza district as it was originally known, as an area of white occupation where whites could remain. In

12. *Ibid.*, p.376.

13. *Ibid.*

14. See, for example, N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 11 Nov.1886.

15. *Ibid.*, F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 4 Nov.1886.

16. Laband, *Rope*, p.376. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

17. abaQulusi were the people who had originally clustered around Makabayi, sister of Senzangakhona. See H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Digest*, Series 1, part 2 (K.C.A.L. pagination) p.370 fn; and W.P. Schreiner, Speech in Defence of Dinuzulu in 1908, in *The Trial of Dinuzulu on Charges of High Treason in Greytown 1908-9* (Pretoria, 1969), p.57.

18. Laband, *Rope*, p.376-77; Binns, *Dinuzulu*, pp.272-73, appendix VII. While both Laband and Binns imply that the whole area of the royal graves, emaKhosini, lay within the Proviso B area, Blue Book evidence indicates that the older graves fell within the New Republic.

time, they might obtain freehold tenure.¹⁹ The uSuthu were dismayed and angered at an agreement which Harriette Colenso fiercely denounced. An unhappy Havelock contrasted her voluble denunciations of the agreement of October 1886 with her silence - at least to Havelock - over Grant's proceedings in 1884.²⁰

In Harriette Colenso's view, Britain was responsible for the acquisition of land claims by the Boers and it was 'immoral' to satisfy these claims at Zulu expense, to the ultimate cost of the Zulu people. Certainly the uSuthu had lost far more than they would willingly yield, and the suggestion that the Zulus themselves should be asked to provide the funds that would be necessary to 'buy out' the whites in the Proviso B district was transparently a tactic to turn humanitarian criticism away from the actions of the British Special Commissioner. An arrangement that the Zulu graves should be properly cared for seems to have been equally futile.²¹

The uSuthu protested vigorously against the partitioning of Zululand both before and after the agreement between Havelock and Boer representatives. Envoys were sent to Pietermaritzburg. In May 1886 Ndabuko and Shingana, the brother and half-brother of Cetshwayo, came to Pietermaritzburg to appeal for British intervention.²² The uSuthu continued to dispute the justice of the partition even when newer grievances added to their woes. At the time when Havelock was negotiating with the Boers, there was much bitterness about the murder of Dabulamanzi, the warrior leader of the uSuthu, who was killed in the Reserve in September 1886.²³ The uSuthu did not readily participate in the proceedings of the demarcation commission in Zululand²⁴ and, when British protection and then annexation was proclaimed in February and May 1887, the uSuthu reaction to

19. Proviso B; Laband, *Rope*, p.376; Binns, *Dinuzulu*, p.111 fn. The Anglican mission station, kwaMagwaza, lay within the Proviso B area.

20. Z.G.H.824: Havelock to Stanhope, 2 Jan.1887.

21. For Harriette Colenso's criticisms of the agreement of October 1886, see *i.a.* C.4980, pp.74-75, enclosure in no.50: H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 1 Nov.1886; pp.134-35, enclosure in no.63: H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 13 Nov.1886; pp.166-65, enclosure in no.86: H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 23 Dec.1886; pp.180-89, enclosure in no.98: H.E. Colenso to Secretary of State, 31 Dec.1886.

22. N.A., Col.Coll: R.J. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 14 May 1886. C.4913, pp.77-97, no.50: Havelock to C.O., with enclosures, 23 May 1887.

23. Binns, *Dinuzulu*, pp.86-89.

24. C.5143, pp.9-25, no.7: Havelock to C.O., 8 Feb.1888 with enclosures, including Journal of Boundary Commission. See especially entries for 2, 3 and 4 Jan.1888; Laband, *Rope*, p.377.

loss of authority was also coloured by their grievance about the loss of land.²⁵ A little later the repatriation of their arch-rival, the Mandlakazi leader Zibhebhu, to the Ndwandwe district added to the uSuthu resentment.²⁶

The October 1886 agreement to partition Zululand concluded between Havelock and representatives of the New Republic once more thrust Colensos and local officials into sharp opposition. The Colenso aim was to publicise Zulu discontent in the hope that argument and agitation would secure redress of grievance. When officials in the Colonial Office considered reports and pleas about Zululand, they realised that the Zulus had lost much but felt that Havelock had achieved the best possible bargain,²⁷ and looked to him to introduce direct British rule in Zululand smoothly and effectively. It was a formidable task for Havelock, who now became Governor of Zululand, shedding his earlier title of Special Commissioner, and the protests and criticism which the Colensos kept alive made his work more difficult.²⁸ He was sometimes forced into undignified and disingenuous self-justification as he tackled an urgent and unavoidable duty.²⁹ The annexation of Zululand unequivocally committed Britain to the maintenance of peace, order, and good government in Zululand, and the responsibility for this rested on the shoulders of the Governor.

Phase 2: Annexation

Despite Britain's reluctance to fill the power vacuum created in Zululand by the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, she could not avoid the annexation of Zululand in 1887. Already there were white filibusters in Zululand and signs that more whites - even in Natal - were eager to grab land and dig for gold.³⁰ There was still the possibility of rival European interest

25. Laband, *Rope*, pp.382-89. C.4980, pp.177-80, no.97: Havelock to C.O., 9 Jan.1887, with enclosures; C.5143, pp.44-49, no.27, with enclosures: Havelock to C.O., 11 May 1887; C.5331, pp.51-52, enclosure in no.35: statement of Ndabuko, 4 Nov.1887.

26. Laband, *Rope*, p.388.

27. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 9 Dec.1886 but *cf.* C.5143, p.1, no.1: F.W. Chesson and R.N. Fowler to Holland, 22 Feb.1887; C.5143, p.37: F.W. Chesson to *The Times*, 19 Mar.1887; C.4980 p.80, no.57: Stanhope to Havelock, 11 Dec.1886; C.5143, pp.46-48, enclosure in no.27: message of Governor to Dinuzulu, 3 May 1887.

28. Laband, *Rope*, p.379.

29. Z.G.H.824: Havelock to Stanhope, confidential, 2 Jan.1887.

30. *Ibid.*, Havelock to Stanhope, 21 Nov.1886 and 22 Feb.1887.

in the coastline of southern Africa.³¹ The Zulus could not be left to maintain an independent existence against such pressures, and the only practicable way for Britain to avoid having non-British white rule established over the whole of Zululand was to make part of the territory a Crown Colony.

Three steps were taken to impose British rule. A Protectorate was announced in February 1887 and this was changed into full annexation in May.³² In the following month came the proclamation of the Laws and Regulations for Zululand about which Havelock had consulted Melmoth Osborn and other key local experts in the persons of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the former Secretary of Native Affairs who wielded much influence, and Sir Michael Gallwey, the Chief Justice of Natal. Their advice to Havelock differed and, unfortunately for the uSuthu, Shepstone's views prevailed. What emerged was a form of government that allowed no special position for the representatives of the House of Shaka. The uSuthu leaders, like all other chiefs in Zululand, were to have some authority, but only over their own followers, not over the followers of other chiefs. All chiefs were denied jurisdiction over witchcraft and murder, while their decisions in other cases could be overruled by resident magistrates. The intention was clear: to abolish the Zulu dynasty and to place control in the hands of white officials.³³

The uSuthu were, therefore, in a plight very different from the situation they had hoped for when they appealed to Britain. They had expected that her intervention would protect their land, safeguard their ascendancy over other Zulus, and allow them a wide measure of autonomy under British superintendence. None of these expectations was fulfilled. They were to live under Laws and Regulations devised by their arch-enemy Sir Theophilus Shepstone and enforced by resident magistrates under Melmoth Osborn who now became the Resident Commissioner and Chief Magistrate in Zululand.³⁴ The uSuthu believed they had experienced animosity from both these men in the past: from Shepstone since

31. For a discussion of competing interests local and international in regard to Zululand, see D. Schreuder, *The Scramble for Southern Africa (1877-1895). The Politics of Partition Re-appraised* (Cambridge, 1980), pp.95-103, 134-35, 137-49 and especially p.156.

32. C.O.179/170 SC.23/87: Special Commissioner to C.O., 21 Feb.1887. Minute by E. Fairfield, 22 Mar.1887; C.5143, p.49, no.28: Havelock to Stanhope, 14 May 1887.

33. For Proclamation 11 of 1887, see *Zululand Proclamations*; C.5143, p.53, no.29: Havelock to Stanhope, 25 May 1887; Z.G.H.703/117/1887: memorandum of Theophilus Shepstone, 23 Apr.1887 and memorandum of Michael Gallwey, n.d.; Laband, *Rope*, pp.381-82.

34. Laband, *Rope*, pp.379-80.

October 1877 when his ruling in favour of Boer claims to land in the disputed Blood River area provoked uSuthu anger;³⁵ and from Melmoth Osborn since 1879 when, as British Resident in Zululand, he was expected to monitor and stabilise a situation fraught with tension under the Wolseley settlement. Melmoth Osborn played a key role in the experience of the uSuthu, and the Colensos condemned him roundly for his anti-uSuthu bias.³⁶ As Resident Commissioner in the British Crown Colony of Zululand, he had a clear claim to authority and he was determined to supersede uSuthu power. For the proud but perplexed uSuthu the annexation immediately created a harsh situation, and there were signs that it would become harsher. For example, in 1887 hut tax was paid only in the former Reserve, the southern area of Zululand with Eshowe at its centre where hut tax had been demanded for several years; but in 1888 it was to be levied over the whole of Zululand.³⁷

The situation in 1887 was uneasy. The uSuthu were watchful, if not hostile, clearly anxious to avoid formal acknowledgment of British sovereignty and of the changes that had been made. At times the uSuthu leaders drew together for mutual support; at others they differed anxiously among themselves about how they should react to the new dispensation. Osborn accused them of passive opposition, while Havelock alleged that there were mischief-makers at work.³⁸ British officials were disquieted. There was real danger of confrontation, and they were quick to suspect the revival of a Boer-uSuthu alliance, knowing as they did that some Boer neighbours were inclined to seek gain for themselves from the troubles of Zululand immediately after the annexation, and that there was still pressure from whites for land in Zululand.³⁹

A trial of strength between the British officials and the uSuthu leaders was probably unavoidable, but for the time being there was strain and tension rather than outright

35. J.J. Guy, *Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom* (London, 1979), p.46.

36. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes, and bibliography for expressive titles of Harriette's pamphlets.

37. Laband, *Rope*, pp.383, 389 and 403.

38. See, for example, Entonjaneni magisterial correspondence. Circular, 14 Sept.1887 on uSuthu embassy. See Z.G.H.701/372/1886: memorandum of H. Shepstone, 16 Nov.1886; Z.G.H.702/35/1887: memorandum by H. Shepstone, 3 Feb.1887; Z.G.H.704/161/1887: memorandum by H. Shepstone, 18 Apr.1887. C.5143, p.39, no.18: Havelock to Holland, telegram, 5 May 1887.

39. Z.A.6/765/1888: Havelock to Osborn, 15 May 1888; Laband, *Rope*, p.384. C.5892, p.102, enclosure in no.66, telegrams exchanged between Smyth and Stabb, 8, 9 and 10 Jan.1888.

conflict. In this atmosphere, the immediate duty of officials was to make British authority effective by informing the Zulus of the fact of annexation and persuading them to accept subjection. At the same time they had to keep a watch over the white inhabitants of the Proviso B district, some of whom wanted even more land, and to avert any threatening fresh intrusion of whites into Zululand. Troops at military outposts were available to support local officials, and there was also a force of native police, under European officers, commanded by George Mansel.⁴⁰ Zululand was divided into six magisterial districts, each under a resident magistrate, who was assisted by a clerk and had a small staff of messengers and police. Ceremonies were staged to announce annexation,⁴¹ and officials decided to move promptly to assert power. Despite some ambiguity about his legal right, Osborn was quick to assert his own claims to authority when Dinuzulu intervened in cases that ostensibly involved faction fighting and witchcraft.⁴² For the uSuthu there was further disquiet when official stipends were offered,⁴³ for some chiefs accepted eagerly what was offered, while others were cautious or proud.

The uSuthu experienced much uncertainty and many dilemmas. No uSuthu leader could easily decide whether or not to obey an official summons, or even how to respond to other proposals, whether for consultation with fellow uSuthu or some kind of joint action. In addition, no-one could be sure how the inhabitants, black and white, of the neighbouring New Republic would react to the annexation of Zululand. Not surprisingly, divisions arose among the uSuthu chiefs, with some defecting and others wavering. Ziweru and Mnyamana, many of whose followers now lived in the New Republic, had representatives among the messengers who went to Osborn in August 1887, but they did not join the other uSuthu in the truculence and turmoil of the following year.⁴⁴ A gesture of compliance, like the acceptance of a stipend, did not always pledge loyalty. Shingana's is a case in point. Uncle of Dinuzulu, he had felt most acutely the dilemmas and strains of the 1880s and he had frequently visited Pietermaritzburg as uSuthu spokesman. After the partition of October 1886, the emaKhosini district, where he and followers lived, fell within the

40. Laband, *Rope*, p.389. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

41. Laband, *Rope*, p.379.

42. *Ibid.*, p.383.

43. *Ibid.*, pp.382 and 385.

44. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. Z.G.H.804/161/87: minute of M. Osborn, 14 June 1887; See C.S.C.Z evidence of Tshanibezwe for an account of the reasons for Mnyamana's defection. Defence lawyers suspected that Tshanibezwe was coached by officials.

New Republic, and he moved away into British Zululand. Here he accepted the stipend that was offered to him, but he and his people were involved in a confrontation with British forces in the following year, and he was arraigned before the Court of Special Commissioners. It counted against him then that he had previously received a stipend from the British.⁴⁵ The case of Somkhele shows that an assurance of loyalty from a chief did not guarantee that there would be peace and amity between himself and the local magistrate. Somkhele, chief of the most important tribe of the Lower Mfolozi, assured the magistrate, A.L. Pretorius, that he was loyal, but the magistrate levied a heavy cattle fine against him, and he was subsequently tried before the Court of Special Commissioners on the same charge as that for which he had already been fined.⁴⁶ Mnyamana is one of the most interesting of the uSuthu leaders at this time. A key uSuthu figure in the past, he separated from other leaders in 1887 and 1888 when he attached himself firmly to the side of the British officials. Age, poor physical health, and, perhaps, the shrewd perception that British rule over part of Zululand was preferable to Boer rule over all of it, may have contributed to his decision. But his son, Tshanibezwe, was in communication with the uSuthu, and it seems that even Mnyamana wished to keep his options open, since the partition of October 1886 placed some of Mnyamana's people within the boundaries of the New Republic. While it is not immediately clear how this affected his decisions, it seems likely that, while wishing to avoid offending the Boers, he preferred dependence on the British lest further negotiations with the New Republicans result in his losing even more land to them. Whatever his reasons, Mnyamana had defected from other uSuthu by 1888 when they raided his cattle, and his men assisted the British forces in Zululand against Dinuzulu's followers.⁴⁷

Phase 3: Conciliation

Havelock went to Zululand twice in 1887: in May to consult Osborn;⁴⁸ in November to overcome recalcitrant leaders by personal intimidation. Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo and Ndabuko kaMpande were summoned before the Governor. Both uSuthu leaders came to Havelock, but after some delay in each case. For them it was, after all, less humiliating

45. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; Laband, *Rope*, pp.376 and 389; Binns, *Dinuzulu*, p.143.

46. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. Z.G.H.707/278/1887: Osborn to Havelock, 13 Nov.1887; Laband, *Rope*, pp. 301, 227, 286, 415, 420 and 421.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Z.G.H.824: Havelock to Sir H. Holland, 30 May 1887.

to come to the Governor than to obey a summons from subordinate officials, whether Osborn at Eshowe (the main centre of British administration) or Richard ('Dick') Addison,⁴⁹ the Resident Magistrate and Assistant Commissioner in the district of Ndwandwe, a crucial area where uSuthu *imizi* were concentrated and where uSuthu and Mandlakazi claims to land overlapped. The Governor was supported by troops, Zululand police, officials and, perhaps less wisely, a troop of Hlubi's 'Basuto'. He came to Zululand because he wanted to avoid confrontation, but he came to dictate not to negotiate. He had received renewed reports of uSuthu dealings with 'Boers'. He insisted that protest was futile; the new regime must be accepted, and the House of Shaka had been superseded. For several months officials had dunned the uSuthu for the payment of cattle as restitution for cattle raided and as payment of fines. Now Havelock imposed a further fine of fifty head of cattle for their disobedience to an earlier summons from Osborn. He offered them the payment of stipends and told them that, if they were loyal, they would be welcome to visit him in Pietermaritzburg. But the loyalty of the uSuthu to the British was suspect, for Havelock had heard reports of renewed Boer-uSuthu negotiations, and what blighted all prospect of conciliation was his announcement of the return of Zibhebhu to the Ndwandwe. Since their victory at Etshaneni, for which they had been obliged by 'the Boers' to pay so dearly, the uSuthu had at least had the satisfaction of the expulsion of Zibhebhu from the Ndwandwe area. Havelock's announcement struck this way.⁵⁰

A few months earlier, in May, Havelock had refused Mandlakazi requests,⁵¹ but when he met the uSuthu leaders in November, Havelock made it quite plain that Zibhebhu had the approval and backing of the British authorities. The Governor lauded Zibhebhu's loyalty, announced his immediate return to the Ndwandwe, and stated that he qualified immediately for the payment of a generous stipend.⁵² This was Havelock's response to the reports of renewed uSuthu negotiations with the Boers and to the re-assertion by the New Republic of its claim to a protectorate over the whole of Zululand. The Zulus, it now transpired, had not formally agreed to the withdrawal of the Boer protectorate, and the British officials had lost sight of this omission.⁵³ Although he was reluctant to do so,

49. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

50. Laband, *Rope*, pp.387-38. C.5522, pp.51-72, nos.35-37: Havelock to Holland, 18 and 22 Nov.1887, with enclosures.

51. C.4913, pp.108-09, no.64: Havelock to Granville, 19 June 1886, with enclosure.

52. Laband, *Rope*, p.388.

53. van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, pp.38-39 and p.39 fn.140.

the Secretary of State had already given Havelock permission to use his own discretion about Zibhebhu, and the Governor decided to follow the advice of subordinates who favoured the Mandlakazi.⁵⁴ If Dinuzulu and the uSuthu looked to the Boers, the British would look to Zibhebhu and the Mandlakazi. Havelock thus sanctioned the return of Zibhebhu to the Ndwandwe district, and this was a disastrous decision. He underestimated difficulties and accepted far too readily the slightly contradictory assurances of his advisers: that there would be no disturbances as a result of the repatriation of Zibhebhu and that his presence in Zululand would avert a black white confrontation. Drawing on his Natal experience, Shepstone saw a restored Zibhebhu playing in Zululand the sort of role that had been played in Natal by appointed chiefs: his presence would throw the balance of power into the hands of the British. Osborn thought the uSuthu would not resist Zibhebhu once they realised that his restoration was authorised by the government.⁵⁵ In addition, Havelock did not insist on adequate preparation for Zibhebhu's return. Officials gave little advance attention to the problem of where precisely Zibhebhu and his followers were to be located, a crucial matter for which the British were clearly responsible. Havelock insisted that Zibhebhu was to return as a British subject. Osborn assured the Governor that there was ample room, but the constantly repeated and varying phrases - 'tribal lands' or 'his country' and 'sites of former homesteads' - were vague and misleading, for Zibhebhu's claims had varied over the years. Before the Zulu War the Mandlakazi lands were the network of areas which Mpande had assigned to Maphitha, the father of Zibhebhu; in 1879 Zibhebhu had received land and authority as one of Sir Garnet Wolseley's thirteen kinglets; on the return of Cetshwayo the British had assigned him land to the north of the area where Cetshwayo was located, but there was ambiguity even about that;⁵⁶ and Zibhebhu's claims grew after his triumph over Cetshwayo in 1883 and before his own nemesis at the battle of Etshaneni. Ignorant of all this latent confusion, Havelock underestimated uSuthu-Mandlakazi hatred and overestimated Zibhebhu's capacity for loyal and subservient obedience to the officials who favoured him, while Osborn exaggerated the strength of pro-Mandlakazi feeling in the area. Following the advice of Theophilus

54. C.5331, pp.23-29, no.9: Havelock to C.O., 3 Aug.1887, with enclosures, viz p.25, minute by H.C. Shepstone, 26 Apr.1887; pp.26-27, report by Osborn, 22 July 1887, and pp.27-29, memorandum by T. Shepstone, 31 July 1887. van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, p.45, fn.194 citing Z.G.H.707/238/87: Holland to Havelock, 2 Sept.1887.

55. C.5331, pp.27-29, enclosure in no.9: Osborn to Havelock, 22 July 1887.

56. Laband, *Rope*, p.391. For Colenso criticism of earlier uncertainty or confusion, see Fr.El. Colenso, *Ruin of Zululand*, vol.2, pp.381, 383, 395-96.

Shepstone, Havelock hoped that the situation in Zululand would stabilise with power firmly in the hands of officials. In London, the Secretary of State shared his hope and praised his actions. The decision to repatriate Zibhebhu was a triumph of hope over misgiving: it ended in disaster.⁵⁷

On 25 November Zibhebhu moved out of the former Reserve area and headed northwards. He led a force of about 700 men and a few women, and he was accompanied by F. Galloway and four policemen, a circumstance which indicated that Zibhebhu had the approval of the British government.⁵⁸ It was obvious that Zibhebhu was expected to live off the land, for no commissariat arrangements had been made, and this invited trouble and disaster.⁵⁹ On their way to the north the Mandlakazi were accompanied by the followers of Sokwetshatha, an ally and associate of Zibhebhu. Since their earlier defeat at the hands of the uSuthu, Sokwetshatha and his followers had been living in the Reserve.⁶⁰ They were now destined for the Lower Mfolozi District where the resident magistrate, first Arthur Shepstone and then Andries Laas Pretorius, was responsible for their location.⁶¹ Chiefs already in the region, Somopho and Bhejana (a chief who had asserted his authority before) resented their intrusion and fell foul of the magistrates as a result.⁶² Simultaneously, Mandlakazi adherents who had taken refuge in Swaziland after the 1884 defeat returned to the Ndwandwe under Sikizane.⁶³

The return of Zibhebhu confronted the uSuthu with new dilemmas. Dinuzulu may have counselled his people not to resist in the hope that the white authorities who allowed Zibhebhu to return would also restrain him. But it was hard for the uSuthu to hold back as Zibhebhu raided uSuthu adherents, swooped down and evicted them from land which the uSuthu regarded as their own, despoiled them of stored grain, and ravaged growing crops. The uSuthu appealed to the white authorities, as uSuthu adherents living on land which Zibhebhu claimed decided whether or not they would *konza* (*i.e.* submit) to him,

57. van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, pp.44-45; Laband, *Rope*, p.381.

58. C.5331, p.77, enclosure in no.46: Osborn to Havelock, 18 Dec.1887.

59. Laband, *Rope*, p.391.

60. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*

63. Laband, *Rope*, p.392.

and thousands were evicted to make room for the Mandlakazi.⁶⁴ The Mandlakazi were triumphant and taunting, the uSuthu angry and resentful.⁶⁵ At the Ndwandwe magistracy Mandlakazi and uSuthu, some apparently destitute, presented themselves to Addison, the magistrate, as though engaged in a form of corporate taunting or *jiya-ing*. Troops moved towards the trouble spots, and the uSuthu capitulated. There were fears of major clashes in January and February 1888, but these crises passed.⁶⁶

Phase Four: The Interlude of Hesitation and Impending Confrontation

Havelock was quickly disillusioned both with Zibhebhu and with the Zululand officials. This was evident in January 1888. Havelock conceded that the uSuthu were hostile to Zibhebhu rather than the government. He told his subordinate, Osborn, and acknowledged to his superior, the Secretary of State, that more care and greater discretion could have been used in effecting the repatriation and that its risks had been underestimated. He directed that Addison should intervene actively in the dispute, clamoured for information and urged that the uSuthu should be compensated for the grain that had been taken from them.⁶⁷

If the Secretary of State urged just dealing and conciliation,⁶⁸ local officials in Zululand continued to favour Zibhebhu. This was evident in the demarcation of Zibhebhu's boundaries. Addison was initially too generous, while the modifications effected by J. Knight, the Resident Magistrate at Entonjaneni, were inadequate. Fierce in their hatred of Zibhebhu and suspicious of the officials who relied upon him, the uSuthu were angered by the evictions and turmoil consequent on Zibhebhu's return. Knight's boundary redefinitions left two proud uSuthu in particular resentful and defiant. They were Msutshwana of the Mdletshe, some of whose people were placed upon Zibhebhu's location, and Mthumbu of the Hlabisa who, with all his people, was placed under Zibhebhu.⁶⁹

64. H.E. Colenso, *The Zulu Impeachment of British Officials in 1887-8 Confirmed by Official Records in 1892* (London, 1892).

65. Laband, *Rope*, Chapter 31.

66. *Ibid.*, pp.393-95.

67. C.5331, pp.84-85, no.53: Havelock to Knutsford, 18 Jan.1888.

68. *Ibid.*, p.83, no.50: Holland to Havelock, telegram, 4 Feb.1888. Laband, *Rope*, p.395.

69. Laband, *Rope*, pp.393, 395-56, 397-98. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

In the distraught confusion of Zibhebhu's return, the uSuthu reacted in different ways to the uncertainties of the time and they sought help from wherever they hoped to find it. Adolph Schiel, who had served earlier as Dinuzulu's secretary, rejoined them. This disconcerted the British officials because they saw Schiel as representing the pro-Boer and pro-German tendencies in the uSuthu reaction.⁷⁰ Subsequently, there were reports that the uSuthu leaders had crossed into Republican territory. In March 1888 uSuthu representatives came to Pietermaritzburg, and Havelock sent them back with conciliatory words,⁷¹ but when they returned to the Ndwandwe Dinuzulu was away visiting the Republic.⁷²

Havelock's well-intentioned reception of the uSuthu representatives in March 1888 was encouraged by Harriette Colenso. She would have liked Havelock to receive Dinuzulu in Pietermaritzburg, but kind words and wise directives from Pietermaritzburg could not control the anger and contention in the Ndwandwe district.

Still, the period of hesitation, when confrontation was a threat rather than a reality, lasted from January to April 1888. During these months the Governor's policy towards the uSuthu was clear but inconsistent. He promised redress to the uSuthu for their grievances against Zibhebhu but he insisted that the uSuthu submit unequivocally to British authority. That authority was represented by magistrates who regarded Zibhebhu as their ally.

Phase Five: Confrontation

Magistrates grew increasingly alarmed and frustrated as the uSuthu maintained protests and ignored their instructions. In the end, this withheld submission precipitated conflict. Dinuzulu, grudgingly, paid the fine of fifty head of cattle imposed by the Governor, but he was very reluctant to pay fines demanded by Havelock's official underlings.⁷³ The truculent among his supporters followed his lead. When the authorities took to raiding cattle to enforce their decisions, this exacerbated the situation. uSuthu followers threatened with eviction and/or at odds with a magistrate looked to their leaders and took refuge with

70. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; Laband, *Rope*, p.399.

71. C.5522, pp.18-19, enclosure in no.6: Havelock's reply to Mtokwane and others, 20 Mar.1888; Laband, *Rope*, p.397. See below, Chapter Three, pp.101-03.

72. Laband, *Rope*, p.399.

73. *Ibid.*, pp.392 and 394.

them. Anarchy threatened. At the end of April the local authorities in Zululand tried to deal with the uSuthu problem in two ways: by cattle raids on 25 April which were carried out,⁷⁴ and by challenging the authority of the uSuthu leaders. Warrants of arrest were issued against four men who had taken refuge at the uSuthu *umuzi* where Ndabuko, in Dinuzulu's absence, was in charge. The attempt to enforce these warrants on 26 April failed. Ndabuko refused to surrender the men, the uSuthu were in an ugly mood, and Sub-Inspector Osborn, son of the Resident Commissioner, withdrew his police force. Later, in retrospect, the British authorities regarded this event as the beginning of the disturbances.⁷⁵

After this incident the British decided to coerce the uSuthu into submission. For his part, Ndabuko withdrew from the uSuthu *umuzi* to join Dinuzulu at Ceza. This became their refuge and rallying point. Height, dense bush, and rocky terraces protected them at Ceza, which may also have had a spiritual significance for the uSuthu. Although the military commander, Colonel Stabb, doubted whether it could withstand a heavy bombardment, it was certainly an adroitly chosen refuge for it lay right on the border of republican territory. The uSuthu could escape easily into the neighbouring state, while the British could - or, at least should - not risk a territorial violation by encircling the uSuthu. Ironically, the British were thus handicapped by the results of their own concessions of Zulu territory to the Boers.⁷⁶

Although Havelock hoped that the uSuthu leaders could be persuaded to surrender voluntarily, the chances of conciliation between the uSuthu and the British had now almost disappeared. If official authority was to be vindicated, the warrants once issued must be enforced. In addition, Dinuzulu was known to have re-visited the Republic while the uSuthu declined the offered payment of compensation for their destroyed crops.⁷⁷ Then came the reports of uSuthu cattle-raiding on the chiefs Mnyamana and Ziweddu, both of whom took refuge at or near the police post at Nkonjeni.⁷⁸ Havelock now agreed with

74. *Ibid.*, p.401; cf. Z.G.H.712/394/88: W.S. Tatham to Osborn, 6 July 1888.

75. Z.G.H.711/2249/1888: Osborn to Havelock, enclosing report of Sub-Inspector Osborn, 26 Apr.1888; Laband, *Rope*, pp.396, 401.

76. *Precis of Information Prepared by the Intelligence Division, War Office*, March 1895. Captain Baden-Powell: Report on Keza; Laband, *Rope*, pp.402-03; van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, pp.109-18.

77. C.5522 p.25, no.13: Havelock to Knutsford, 25 Apr.1888.

78. *Ibid.*, p.49, no.33: statement to Resident Magistrate, Ndwandwe, 16 May 1888; Laband, *Rope*, p.403.

Osborn that firm action was necessary and he authorised the British advance on Ceza of 2 June 1888⁷⁹ for the arrest of Dinuzulu on a charge of cattle theft and of Ndabuko on a charge of attempting to disturb the peace. Troops under E.G. Pennefather were to support the Zululand police under Mansel.⁸⁰

The result was a confused and controversial fiasco, since the British lacked cohesion and definite purpose.⁸¹ The force that advanced consisted of police, soldiers, and contingents of 'loyal' (*i.e.* anti-uSuthu) 'natives'. It was not clear whether the British were engaged in a police action or a military expedition, and it was therefore uncertain whether Mansel or Pennefather had overall control. In fact, what began as a police matter turned into a military operation once shots had been exchanged. The British were not really prepared for this and fared badly. It seems likely that neither side really wished to precipitate conflict. Skirmishes occurred and, to avoid encirclement, the police and native auxiliaries withdrew, with Pennefather directing attacks on the pursuing uSuthu to keep them at bay. In the *melée* and confusion of the withdrawal, two uSuthu messengers were assaulted by native auxiliaries.⁸²

The encounter at Ceza was an uSuthu success, but it made their eventual subjection inevitable. In Zululand law and order broke down. More and more tribesmen rallied to the uSuthu, while white officials set about raising a native contingent in the Eshowe and Nkandhla districts. White alarm increased as uSuthu flocked to Ceza, while Shingana and his followers took refuge at Hlophekhulu.⁸³ White traders were caught in the anarchy and some were murdered.⁸⁴ In the Lower Mfolozi district the resident magistrate, A.L. Pretorius, thought that he and his ally, Sokwetshatha, were threatened. Although the half-hearted attack on the magistracy on 30 June was repulsed, Pretorius believed that he was cut off from white help.⁸⁵

79. Laband, *Rope*, p.404.

80. W.J. Clarke, *Notes on Zululand Affairs since the Restoration of Cetshwayo compiled from Blue Books* (Pietermaritzburg, 1898), pp.16-18; H. Escombe and F.C. Dumat, *A Remonstrance on Behalf of the Zulu Chiefs* (London, 1889, reprinted Pietermaritzburg, 1908 and 1989), pp.19-23, especially p.22. C.5522, p.26, no.15: Havelock to Knutsford, telegram, 4 June 1888.

81. C.5522, pp.48-51, no.33: Havelock to Lord Knutsford, with enclosures, 31 May 1888.

82. Laband, *Rope*, p.405, and see fn.81 above.

83. C.5522, p.57, no.36: Havelock to Knutsford, 3 July 1888.

84. Laband, *Rope*, pp.406 and 415; Binns, *Dinuzulu*, p.125.

85. Laband, *Rope*, p.415.

The magistrate at Entonjaneni, J.L. Knight, was also alarmed and had already arrested the chief Qethuka kaManqondo, the father of one of Dinuzulu's wives.⁸⁶ In the Nkandhla Sigananda was arrested, and the magistrate there believed that Mehlokazulu (who had raided Natal in 1878) was stirring trouble.⁸⁷ More troops were sent to Zululand.⁸⁸

In the Ndwandwe area Osborn summoned Zibhebhu to station himself and his warriors in the vicinity of the magistracy, and there Zibhebhu was both attacker and attacked. Addison, the resident magistrate, could not control him - Foxon, Addison's subordinate, may not have tried to do so.⁸⁹ On one of the raids which Zibhebhu launched his men murdered Msutshwana of the Mdletshe tribe, a prominent uSuthu supporter who had been recalcitrant about moving his people to make way for Zibhebhu. His refusal provoked minor clashes, and Addison punished him for it, even though Havelock urged special consideration for his claims. Msutshwana lost his life as Zibhebhu rampaged.⁹⁰ The Mandlakazi were themselves vulnerable to attack, and the onslaught on them came on 23 June 1888. With very little white support, the uSuthu from Ceza sprang a swift assault on Zibhebhu and won a triumph comparable to Etshaneni, if on a smaller scale. In overwhelming and routing Zibhebhu the uSuthu did not attack the magistracy and they sought to avoid conflict with the nearby fort that Addison had built. Here officials, refugee traders, and *nongqai* were sheltering. After the main clash, however, some uSuthu veered towards the fort to raid cattle, and shots were fired from it. Addison used this episode to allege that the uSuthu had in fact attacked the fort, *i.e.* the government whose representative in the district (himself) was then protected by its walls, but his claim arose from his own alarm and vindictiveness and did not necessarily reflect mass uSuthu intention. A relief force from Nkonjeni organised the withdrawal of Addison, the police, and officials from the Ivuna. Zibhebhu reluctantly joined the withdrawal.⁹¹

The clash at Ivuna could not save the uSuthu leaders, but it spoilt Zibhebhu's prospects of returning to the Ndwandwe and therefore disappointed the local officials who hoped to

86. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. Binns, *Dinuzulu*, pp.123-24; Laband, *Rope*, p.416.

87. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; Laband, *Rope*, p.406.

88. *Ibid.*

89. Escombe and Dumat, *Remonstrance*, p.57.

90. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; Laband, *Rope*, p.407.

91. Z.G.H.712/374/1888: Osborn to Havelock, 24 June 1888; Z.G.H.712/381/1888: Stabb to Smyth, 28 June 1888. Escombe and Dumat, *Remonstrance*, pp.64-68; Binns, *Dinuzulu*, pp.126-27; van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, pp.121-29; Laband, *Rope*, pp.408-13 and map, p.400.

use him as a collaborator there. In Natal and Zululand, officials still favoured him, but the Colonial Office would not risk another repatriation. After the arrival of more troops in Zululand in 1888, Zibhebhu and his men formed part of the 'native levies' acting with Colonels Martin and Carrington. Having accompanied the troops to Nkonjeni, Zibhebhu moved on to the Ivuna in the Ndwandwe district once more.⁹² Lord Knutsford the Secretary of State, did not allow him to remain there. Spurning the argument that the British owed Zibhebhu restoration to the Ndwandwe as a matter of justice, Knutsford insisted that the decision about Zibhebhu was simply a political issue. He had allowed the earlier repatriation in 1887 having accepted arguments that this would promote stability, but experience disappointed these expectations. Hence when Zibhebhu's presence unsettled the Ndwandwe district, he was compelled to withdraw.⁹³ During the trials of the uSuthu chiefs, Zibhebhu was also at Eshowe and, though he was not under any restraint, there was a murder charge arising from the death of Msutshwana for him to answer. Local officials eventually quashed that, and they would have liked then to have arranged his return to the Ndwandwe district.⁹⁴ But there was too much criticism of Zibhebhu (much of it Colenso-inspired) for the Secretary of State, whether Knutsford or Ripon, to sanction this. While Zululand remained a Crown Colony, British authorities refused to permit his return to the Ndwandwe, and he remained in the Eshowe district.⁹⁵

Phase Six: Subjugation

After Ceza the policy of the British government was to subdue the Zulu people and to compel the uSuthu leaders to surrender. Havelock wished to distinguish between the leaders and the rank and file. He tried to insist on generous treatment for the populace but he was implacable towards the leaders.⁹⁶ To Havelock's dismay the magistracy at Ivuna was abandoned temporarily, but this certainly did not signify the collapse of British authority in Zululand.⁹⁷ British troops were strengthened. Colonel Stabb came to Zululand from Pietermaritzburg while General Smyth with his nephew and *aide de camp*,

92. C.5802, p.104, no.67: Havelock to Knutsford, 5 Nov.1888.

93. *Ibid.*, p.79, no.50: Knutsford to Havelock, 1 Nov.1888.

94. *Ibid.*, p.255, enclosure 2 in no.169: Osborn to Havelock, 27 May 1889. C.6701, p.50, no.35: Knutsford to Mitchell, 24 June 1890.

95. Z.G.H.825: C.H.B. Mitchell to Lord Knutsford, 11 Nov.1890. Escombe and Dumat, *Remonstrance*, pp.57-60; Laband, *Rope*, pp.427-28.

96. Z.A.6/1216/1888: Havelock to Osborn, 19 July 1888 and Z.A.6/1220/1888: Havelock to Osborn, 22 July 1888; Z.A.7/1356/1888: Havelock to Osborn, 7 Aug.1888.

97. Laband, *Rope*, p.413.

Robert Baden-Powell, moved up from the Cape and summoned reinforcements.⁹⁸ In the meanwhile local officials organised native levies, employing refugee traders as officers.⁹⁹ Havelock warned against, but did not forbid, the use of Zibhebhu in quelling the dispute and he was, in fact, active.¹⁰⁰

Before Smyth arrived in Zululand Havelock, with Smyth's consent, authorised the local commanders Stabb and Mansel, to attack Hlophekhulu where alarmed and malcontent uSuthu, among them Somhlolo,¹⁰¹ had gathered around Shingana. There were delays and Smyth had arrived at Eshowe before the attack took place. The British thought that the uSuthu there endangered the British lines of communication to the north,¹⁰² and they stormed Hlophekhulu on 2 July 1888. Though hampered by poor information and fog, the British forces and their native allies dislodged the uSuthu. Mansel and his *Nongqai* used a bayonet charge to scatter the last of the defenders before cattle were rounded up. Shingana escaped to join Dinuzulu at Ceza.¹⁰³

During July messengers, Sifo and Soni, came from the uSuthu to the Governor and Harriette Colenso implored the Governor, to redress uSuthu grievances.¹⁰⁴ It was, however, difficult for the Governor to work for peace through negotiation when the military authorities had determined on a policy of forceful pacification and intended that this should culminate in the storming of Ceza.¹⁰⁵ Major McKean, with the young Robert Baden-Powell as staff officer, commanded a Hlubi force from the Nqutu district, and he was appointed a magistrate. This gave him greater authority and obviated the need for martial law. He opened up communications with the 'besieged' magistracy in the Lower Mfolozi district, and this was followed by a scorched earth policy that horrified

98. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. Laband, *Rope*, p.416.

99. C.5892, p.99, enclosure in no.66: Report of Colonel H.S. Sparke, 19 Oct.1888.

100. Z.G.H.824: Havelock to Osborn, 6 June 1888. See above fn.93.

101. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. C.5522, p.57, no.36: Havelock to Knutsford, 3 July 1888 and no.37: 9 July 1889.

102. Binns, *Dinuzulu*, p.127.

103. *Ibid.*, pp.127-29; Laband, *Rope*, pp.417-19.

104. See below, Chapter Three, pp.105-09. C.5522, p.102, no.64: Havelock to Lord Knutsford, 15 July 1888. There was no allusion to Zibhebhu in the reply he gave the messengers. cf. p.111 Knutsford to Havelock, 20 Aug.1888. Knutsford indicated that he thought they could have been promised an enquiry.

105. Laband, *Rope*, pp.420-21.

Havelock. McKean advanced again from the Lower Mfolozi to the Ndwandwe.¹⁰⁶ Subsequently the British forces gathered at Nkonjeni, from where the attack on Ceza was to be launched. Havelock insisted there should be a parley, before the attack and ordered a delay while Addison, or his subordinate, opened communications with the uSuthu.¹⁰⁷ But the uSuthu did not wait for either parley, or attack. On the night of 6 August they deserted Ceza. They knew of the advancing troops and they feared an attack by the Boers.¹⁰⁸ Smyth fumed. He blamed Havelock for insisting on parley which had cheated the soldiers of the glory of battle and the capture of Dinuzulu.¹⁰⁹

The friction between Havelock and Smyth was an example of the rancour and bad temper existing among the whites during the operations. This somewhat complicated network of human relations among the men on the spot was part of the context in which the Colensos worked. Unfortunately for the Colensos, some of the tensions cancelled one another out. Havelock was critical of Osborn but he reacted sharply to the rumoured allegation that he was alcoholic because this report emanated from the military.¹¹⁰

Smyth did not linger in Zululand, and his departure in September 1888 ended some months of uneasy shared responsibility.¹¹¹ When he left and the military forces withdrew, Havelock had to cope with the aftermath of the military operations. A key factor was that the uSuthu leaders were still at large. Once they submitted, the phase of confrontation would end. This circumstance gave Harriette Colenso another opportunity to make representations to the Governor on behalf of the uSuthu, and her actions are discussed in the next chapter. What mattered more to the Governor was the South African Republic, for he needed its co-operation to ensure that Dinuzulu was either interned within the Republic or surrendered from it.¹¹²

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- 106. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. C.5892, pp.7-9, enclosure in no.4: McKean to Smyth, 14 July 1888; p.6, no.4: Havelock to Knutsford, 7 Aug.1888. Laband, *Rope*, pp.420-21.
 - 107. T. Jeal, *Baden-Powell* (London, 1989), pp.134-35. Laband, *Rope*, p.412. C.5892, p.20, no.11: Havelock to Knutsford, 15 Aug.1888.
 - 108. van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, p.97.
 - 109. Jeal, *Baden-Powell*, pp.134-35 citing newspaper reports in *The Times*, 12 Sept.1888 and the *Morning Post*, 13 Sept.1888.
 - 110. C.5522, p.98, no.60: Smyth to War Office, 2 July 1888 and p.102, no.65: Havelock to Knutsford, 15 July 1888; van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, pp.76-77, 82-83, 96-97.
 - 111. Laband, *Rope*, p.423; Jeal, *Baden-Powell*, p.138.
 - 112. For a general discussion of 'Boer' relations with Dinuzulu see van Wyk, pp.98-106 and 114-21 including fn.121. van Wyk does not discuss the question of negotiations with the British government first for recognition of the New Republic, then for recognition of the union of the

Discussions about Dinuzulu's flight to the New and/or South African Republic after the affair at Ceza are difficult to interpret. Divided counsels and divergent motives among the Boers contribute to the uncertainties. It seems likely, however, that there were some in government positions in the New and the South African Republic who saw that, for a time at least, the presence of Dinuzulu on republican soil was a diplomatic asset in their dealings with the imperial authorities. At first he was allowed a great deal of freedom in republican territory, but this narrowed in the later months of 1888. Perhaps the reason for this was that, by then, the Boer had obtained all they wanted from the imperial authorities: first recognition of the New Republic and then acquiescence in the union of the New and the South African republics.¹¹³ This involved an extension of the boundaries of the South African Republic, and, in terms of the London Convention, the agreement of the British government was required.¹¹⁴ By mid-July 1888 the consent had been secured. All the formalities in connection with a Supplementary Convention were concluded by 21 September 1888.¹¹⁵ Dinuzulu was no longer a useful diplomatic pawn. His followers were disarmed, and he was placed under some restraint in September. The Republic made it known that all it was prepared to offer Dinuzulu was a farm in the Lydenburg district, while his followers would be dispersed among the black people of the district.¹¹⁶ Giving his Boer 'captors' the slip, Dinuzulu attempted to negotiate with Addison about his re-admission into Zululand. But Addison was adamant that Dinuzulu would be arrested as soon as he returned to Zululand.¹¹⁷ Choosing a different course, Dinuzulu made his way to Natal. He was accompanied by W.P. Meyer, the son-in-law of Jim Henderson the Vryheid advocate, and by some attendants. He travelled from Elandslaagte by train via Ladysmith to Pietermaritzburg.¹¹⁸ The role that may have been played by Harry Escombe in the surrender of Dinuzulu is an intriguing question. He urged that the uSuthu

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- South African Republic and the New Republic.
113. Z.G.H.824: Havelock to H. Robinson, 29 Sept.1887; C.5522, p.100, enclosure 2 in no.61: High Commissioner to Governor, telegram, 13 July 1888. Laband, *Rope*, p.386.
 114. The relevant articles are Article I which defined boundaries; and Article IV which stipulated that imperial approval was necessary to validate any treaty between the South African Republic and another state, except the Orange Free State.
 115. C.5522, p.100, enclosure 2 in no.61: High Commissioner to Governor, telegram, 13 July 1888; C.5892, p.80, no.51: Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 2 Nov.1888; C.5892, pp.71-74, enclosure in no.41: Supplementary Convention between the South African Republic (S.J.P. Kruger) and Her Majesty the Queen (represented by Hercules Robinson) signed June 1888, published in Government Gazette Extraordinary in Cape Town, 21 Sept.1888.
 116. C.5892, p.48, enclosure 1 in no.33: Osborn to Havelock, 4 Sept.1888; p.80, no.53: Havelock to Knutsford, 5 Oct.1888. Binns, *Dinuzulu*, p.133; van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, p.118.
 117. Binns, *Dinuzulu*, p.134; Laband, *Rope*, p.424.
 118. van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, pp.119-23; Laband, *Rope*, p.425. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

leaders surrender voluntarily, and indicated that he would 'defend' them if they did so.¹¹⁹ The role actually played by Jim Henderson, the Vryheid advocate, suggests that some Republicans were content to be rid of Dinuzulu.¹²⁰ The Natal authorities evidently knew that he was *en route* to Natal, but his arrival at Bishopstowe certainly startled Agnes Colenso and caught the Governor unawares.¹²¹

When Dinuzulu arrived in Pietermaritzburg in the middle of November 1888, many of the uSuthu leaders were already in custody, and the Court of Special Commissioners for the trial of cases relating to the disturbances had already gathered at Eshowe.¹²² Some uSuthu leaders, like Qethuka and Sigananda, had been arrested to pre-empt rebellion.¹²³ Some 'submitted voluntarily' to appease pacifiers or test the reaction of the authorities.¹²⁴ Some chiefs sent in to the magistrate those of their followers who were alleged to have been involved in the murder of whites.¹²⁵ Ndabuko arrived at the camp of Colonel Martin in September, hoping to make terms for Dinuzulu.¹²⁶ Shingana returned to Hlophekhulu where he was arrested in November.¹²⁷ Some chiefs evaded arrest for a long time, Somopho and Bhejana of the Lower Mfolozi were among them.¹²⁸

Intermittently during the years of partition, annexation, and confrontation, crises in Zululand aroused the attention of members of the British Houses of Parliament. Disinterested concern for the uSuthu people and for Britain's moral responsibility towards indigenous people converged with other motives to arouse parliamentary interest in Zululand. MPs who wished to express their concern could call on, or write to, the Secretary of State for the Colonies either individually or in association with colleagues. MPs might also ask questions or move resolutions in the British Parliament. Because

119. C.5892, p.105, no.69: Escombe to Knutsford, 6 Dec.1888.

120. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes; van Wyk, *Dinuzulu*, p.119.

121. *Ibid.*, pp.122-23.

122. Laband, *Rope*, p.425.

123. *Ibid.*, p.416.

124. For example, Ndabuko. See Z.G.H.824: Havelock to Knutsford, 26 Sept.1888; C.5522, p.95, no.55: Havelock to Knutsford, telegram, 1 Aug.1888; p.112, No.70: Osborn to Havelock, 16 July 1888.

125. C.5892, p.16, enclosure in no.9: A.L. Pretorius to Osborn, 3 Aug.1888; enclosure in no.9: C.R. Saunders to Osborn, 9 Aug.1888; C.5892, p.66, enclosure in no.35: return of untried prisoners at Eshowe in Sept.1888. Laband, *Rope*, p.421.

126. *Ibid.*, p.424.

127. *Ibid.*, p.425.

128. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. C.6070, p.46, enclosure in no.30: Osborn to Havelock, 5 Apr.1890. Laband, *Rope*, p.423.

parliamentary attention could be drawn to their actions, local and metropolitan officials were always aware of the possibility of critical scrutiny. When the rules of procedure in the House of Commons were tightened in the 1880s and party discipline grew firmer, government spokesmen probably found the awkward interrogations easier to deal with, but a question that implied criticism was never welcome because it could damage the reputation of the Colonial Office and might in some circumstances endanger the life of a government. Wherever possible, the Colonial Office preferred to avoid parliamentary attention but, failing that, the next option for the Colonial Office was to ensure that it, its local officials, and its policies could stand scrutiny. This had several effects. On the one hand, it persuaded the Colonial Office to insist on full information from subordinates and it spurred officials to ensure that the best possible decisions were made; on the other, it provoked the very natural desire to obscure weaknesses and confuse critics.

The Colenso role in creating the parliamentary interest of the time will be discussed in the following chapter. Here attention is called only to the way awareness of potential criticism affected the sequel to the subjugation of the uSuthu people and the surrender of their leaders. In brief, both Havelock and the Colonial Office distrusted the local officials in Zululand and both wanted to avoid non-official criticism. A structure of courts had been created by Proclamation II of 1887 which placed authority in the hands of the resident magistrates and in the Chief Magistrate at Eshowe.¹²⁹ Some uSuthu had been tried in these courts and the Chief Magistrate had already tried three men for murder.¹³⁰ Of these, two had their sentences changed from death to life imprisonment, while one of the three was hanged early in November 1888.¹³¹ The principle that 'justice must be seen to be done' dictated a different arrangement for the trial of alleged rebels. To minimise the criticism that the magistrates, Osborn and his subordinates, were being allowed to act as judges in their own cause, Havelock proposed to make temporary appointments to supersede Osborn and resident magistrates. The Colonial Office went further by authorising the constitution of a Court of Special Commissioners (selected by Havelock) who would hear the cases against uSuthu leaders arising out of the disturbance of 1888. The ordinary judicial work of Zululand would continue to be administered by Osborn and

129. *Zululand Proclamations*: Proclamation II of 1887.

130. C.5892, p.66, enclosure in no.35: Return of untried prisoners at Eshowe in Sept.1888.

131. *Ibid.*, p.93, no.63: Knutsford to Havelock, telegram, 1 Dec.1888; no.64: Havelock to Knutsford, telegram, 2 Dec.1888. Escombe and Dumat, *Remonstrance*, p.51.

his subordinates.¹³²

The uSuthu leaders and some of the uSuthu who were charged with specific crimes were tried before the Court of Special Commissioners created by Proclamation IV of 16 October 1888.¹³³ Mr Justice Walter Wragg presided over the Court, assisted by J.E. Fannin and G.M. Rudolph, magistrates in the Natal service.¹³⁴ Its procedure was to conform to the pattern of the Natal Supreme Court except that trial by jury was excluded. In addition, as defence lawyers pointed out, a man who made self-incriminatory statements before the Special Court would not be indemnified from subsequent prosecution and punishment.¹³⁵

From the beginning, the uSuthu friends were concerned about how and where the uSuthu leaders were to be tried. They protested vigorously against the composition of this court, and Harriette Colenso, prompted by lawyer associates, formulated their objections.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, the Court began its proceedings in Eshowe on 15 November. On that day, Dinuzulu arrived at Bishopstowe to be received by Agnes Colenso and her mother. Harriette was already at Eshowe. Though she was shaken by an accident to the cart in which she travelled, this did not deflect her.¹³⁷ With her lawyer associates, F.C. Dumat and W.Y. Campbell, she was already in the improvised court-house ready to follow and to challenge the proceedings in the trials of the uSuthu.¹³⁸ On the same day in the British House of Commons, Dr G.B. Clark, the pro-Boer Scots MP who had already shown his interest in Zulu matters, asked a question about the trials in Zululand. In reply Baron de Worms, the influentially connected - but not very highly esteemed - Parliamentary Under-Secretary, sketched the composition of the Court and stated that the sentences would not be carried into effect until Her Majesty's government had had the opportunity to examine the *evidence* (my emphasis). Both Harriette Colenso and her sympathizers in Britain did their best to ensure that the promise thus given was not

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- 132. C.5892, pp.43-4, no.31: Knutsford to Havelock, 8 Oct.1888; p.44, no.32: Knutsford to Havelock, telegram, 8 Oct.1888; p.32, no.24: Havelock to Knutsford, 29 Aug.1888.
 - 133. *Ibid.*, pp.91-92, enclosure in no.61: Proclamation IV of 1888, 16 Oct.1888.
 - 134. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.
 - 135. See below, p.150.
 - 136. C.5892, pp.106-07, enclosure in no.4: H.E. Colenso to Governor, 19 Oct.1888. These were rehearsed again with additions by Escombe and Dumat, *Remonstrance*, pp.2-3.
 - 137. See below, p.119.
 - 138. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

forgotten. Replies to other questions indicated that the decisions of Her Majesty's Government about Zululand officials would be influenced by the evidence presented to the Court of the Special Commissioners.¹³⁹

By the end of 1888 the immediate implications of the partition of Zululand of October 1886 had worked themselves out. For the uSuthu, fears had become facts, but the fight for their political survival was not ended. Arguably the issues had clarified. Officials maintained that the stability of British rule in Zululand depended on the crushing of the House of Shaka.¹⁴⁰ The Colenso view was quite the opposite. For them stability would come to Zululand only when the uSuthu were vindicated, their actions understood, and reparation given them. The Colenso aim was to halt, and then reverse, the current of British policy in Zululand.

139. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. British *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.330, col.1232, 15 Nov.1888; vol.331, cols 309-10, 27 Nov.1888.

140. See, for example, C.5892, pp.44-45, no.33: Havelock to Knutsford, 10 Sept.1888.

CHAPTER THREE

ANNEXATION AND SUBJUGATION:
The Colenso Role 1887-1888

The Colensos worked together in almost everything they did. This was true of the close co-operation of Harriette and Frank in church affairs, during the 1880s and later.¹ It was true of their political activity in its various facets. In the years 1887-88 they were all (except, perhaps, Robert) involved in writing the biography of Bishop Colenso,² although a suggestion that they publish a series of the Bishop's letters did not bear fruit.³ Harriette would have liked to see Robert a medical missionary in Zululand, but this was a forlorn hope.⁴ When Robert tried to make his fortune - and met disaster - on the Rand, he was not entirely on his own. A little family money was entrusted to him in the vain hope that it would multiply. It was left to the other Colensos to help Robert's wife and child and, indeed, Robert himself through his difficulties.⁵ While Frances Ellen lived, she protested about events in Zululand and about misrepresentations of her father,⁶ and her brother Frank always answered perceived calumnies.⁷ After Frances Ellen's death her siblings let it be known that they would maintain her struggle to vindicate the reputation of Anthony William Durnford.⁸ That question, the army issue, faded rapidly. The Durnfords decided, after taking advice, that there was no point in further parliamentary questions or lobbying. Edward Durnford had written and published his own version of the battle of Isandlwana and the memoir of his brother's life and there, it seems, the matter virtually ended.⁹ The Colensos concentrated on the biography of their father. Harriette contributed

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1. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Hathorn, 2 Mar.1888; Sophie (or S.J.) Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 28 July 1887. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 3 and 23 Mar.1894. These are only some of a large corpus of Church correspondence.
 2. W. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, (Pictarmaritzburg, 1958), pp.406-19; 413-15.
 3. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/74: H.E. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 24 Aug.1887. N.A., Col.Coll: F.W. Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 21 Oct.1886.
 4. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/71: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 8 June 1887.
 5. See above, p.5 for Robert's difficulties.
 6. N.A., Col.Coll: Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 21 Dec.1886, 16 and 21 Feb.1887; Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 23 Dec.1886.
 7. Frank engaged in controversy over statements made in some of the reviews of the *Life of Bishop Colenso* and in the biographies of *Sir George Colley* (Butler) and of *Sir Bartle Frere* (Martineau). See, e.g. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: F.E. Colenso to J. Morley, 30 Sept.1888 suggesting that Morley respond to the unfavourable review in *The Times*.
 8. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 1 June 1887.
 9. E. Durnford, *Isandhlwana, 22nd January 1879 a Narrative compiled from Official and Reliable Sources* (London, 1879). This antedated his *A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa 1872-1879. A Memoir of the Late Colonel A.W. Durnford* (London, 1882).

highly. The work went quickly. In February 1888 Sir George Cox's *Life of Bishop Colenso* (2 volumes) was published. Cox and the Colensos were proud of the work,¹⁰ but they were disappointed at its reception. Reviews varied.¹¹ Not many copies were sold,¹² and Frank had to ask K.M. Lyell and, it seems, Uncle Charles for financial help.¹³ But disappointment over the *Life* did not mean that they would abandon their father's causes. As they worked on the biography, so they were involved in further episodes in their continuing efforts of behalf of the people whose cause their father had advocated: the uSuthu or, as the Colensos would insist, the national party among the Zulu.¹⁴

The main burden of this task fell on Harriette, who was in Natal with her mother and sister until November 1888, when she went to Eshowe. The most prominent and active champion of the uSuthu, Harriette, on their behalf, confronted the impact of conquest upon them. As successive phases of the process of subjugation interlocked, so she, without losing sight of previous wrongs,¹⁵ addressed the immediate issues that demanded attention. She supported the uSuthu protests against loss of land resulting from the partition of October 1886 and all that it implied. She understood the resentment of the uSuthu leaders at the loss of authority which first 'protection' and then 'annexation' imposed upon them. She hoped to see established in Zululand a structure of government which would mitigate this loss. In the period of hesitation and uncertainty, when confrontation threatened, she relied upon and sought to encourage the goodwill of Havelock. Her constant concern was to counter the Governor's suspicions of the uSuthu¹⁶ and to bring about conciliation. She was appalled at the restoration - or, as she called it, the re-intrusion - of Zibhebhu in the Ndwandwe district. She tried to prevent confrontations. After these had occurred, she advised the uSuthu leaders to submit in the

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10. N.A., Col.Coll: Sophie Colenso to S.F. Colenso, Feb.1888. G.W. Cox, *The Life of John William Colenso D.D. Bishop of Natal*, 2 vols. (London, 1888).
 11. N.A., Col.Coll: Sophie Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 22 Mar.1888; F.E. Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 30 May 1888; F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 27 June and 15 Sept.1888. The Frank Colenso Papers, in the Rhodes House Library, contain numerous reviews.
 12. N.A., Col.Coll: F.E. Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 30 May and 19 Sept.1888.
 13. See above, Chapter One, especially fn.144.
 14. See Note on Terminology and Orthography.
 15. See, for example, C.4980 pp.180-89, enclosure in no.98: H.E. Colenso to Stanhope, 31 Dec.1886.
 16. When she used words 'restoration' or 'repatriation' Harriette employed inverted commas, see, for example, H.E. Colenso, *Mr Commissioner Osborn as one Cause of Confusion in Zulu Affairs* (London, 1892), p.14.

expectation of enquiry.¹⁷ Then, as the uSuthu chiefs surrendered, she dealt with questions relating to their legal defence.

Discussion of the Colenso endeavour between October 1886 and November 1888 follows the following pattern. Attention is given first to the protests at partition and the loss of land. In this regard the old issue of responsibility for the Boer-uSuthu alliance was not dead, and this meant that the wrangles over Grant, the Aborigines Protection Society and the Boers, although not new, were alive and relevant. So, too, was the more recent contention over the tin box, which Grant claimed but which Harriette would not give up, because, she believed, it contained evidence (Grant's diary) that would vindicate the uSuthu position. The newer, post-October 1886, issues about land were whether or not the uSuthu might regain some part of the Proviso B district and avoid losing to the New Republic the emaKhosini area where the sites of old royal Zulu graves were located. At the same time Harriette did her best to regain control of the kwaMagwaza mission, originally granted to Colenso in 1859.¹⁸ The next question discussed is the closely linked issue of the loss of authority consequent upon the protectorate that was declared in February 1887 and the annexation that was proclaimed in May. This generated much tension. In the uSuthu petitions after February 1887, protests over loss of authority were woven into old complaints of loss of land.¹⁹ In this regard, the Colensos and their associates were the critics of local officials in Zululand who represented the new dispensation. In relation to the events of 1888, the discussion of the Colenso endeavour after the repatriation of Zibhebhu in January 1888 is more plainly chronological.

Harriette's efforts are traced during the period when confrontations threatened, especially in regard to the activities of March 1888; during the period when confrontations occurred, especially in regard to the deputation of July 1888 and her message to the uSuthu leaders; and during the aftermath of confrontation, when she counselled submission and prepared to defend the uSuthu before a court of law, while pleading for full investigation.

17. See below, pp.109-10; C.5892, pp.3-6, no.3: Havelock to Knutsford with enclosures, 6 Aug.1888.

18. J.W. Colenso, *First Steps of the Zulu Mission* (London, 1860), p.1, republished in D.R. Edgecombe (ed.), *Bringing Forth Light* (Pietermaritzburg & Durban), 1982.

19. C.5331, pp.45-46, enclosure in no.30: statement of Siziba *et al*, as recorded by H.C. Shepstone, 11 Oct.1887.

Partition and the Loss of Land

Harriette kept the A.P.S. informed of her views of the agreement of 22 October 1886. She wrote to F.W. Chesson:

'I can only say that this is as bad a business - as disgraceful, as shameless, as was the Zulu War, & [sic] it is on precisely the same lines as Sir Bartle Frere's infamous memorandum, we are to make the Zulus pay for the rights acquired by the lapse of time, for wh [sic] we and not the Zulus are responsible.'²⁰

She told the Special Commissioner, Havelock, that the agreement would 'seal the extinction of the national life of the Zulu'²¹ and described the partition of Zululand as 'wicked as the partition of Poland'.²² Harriette wrote voluminously in support of her views, and the Bishopstowe press, presumably that which she had brought through the good offices of Colonel Luard, produced sheet after flimsy sheet of closely printed documentation recording the Zulu representations to the authorities and Harriette's comments on them. These were despatched to Chesson and he circulated them. Many of his letters were published in the Blue Books.²³

As Harriette moved into the post-partition phase of Zulu controversy, she had still to deal with the flickers of lingering disputes. The personalities involved were William Grant, F.W. Chesson, F.R. Statham, Zulu representatives, and Harriette herself. William Grant was the man who had accepted the tasks of agent and adviser, first with Cetshwayo and then with Dinuzulu, and he was blamed for his role in the Boer-uSuthu negotiations of 1884. F.R. Statham was the controversial newspaper man, often an ally - though not a wholly committed one - of the Colensos in the past. He was currently, once more, editor of the *Natal Witness* in 1887, and subsequently of the *Natal Advertiser*.²⁴ The Zulu representatives were the men sent down from Zululand at intervals during 1886 to seek help in Pietermaritzburg. The issues, which were rapidly becoming less pressing as event

20. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/28: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 1 Nov.1886.

21. K.C.A.L., H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Digest*, Series 5 (K.C.A.L. pagination), pp.936-37, H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 1 Nov.1886.

22. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Editor (unspecified), 3 Nov.1886.

23. *Ibid.*, Forbes-Robertson to Luard, 25 Oct.1885; Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 10 Feb.1887; Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 10 Feb.1887; K.C.A.L.: H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Digest*. Harriette was responsible for part of Series 2, and then, after an interruption, used the press at Bishopstowe to produce Series 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Series 5, 1 Nov.1886 to 10 June 1887 is the most apposite here. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

24. *Ibid.*, See, for example, N.A., Col.Coll: Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 28 Aug.1884.

followed on event in Zululand, all related to the question of who was to blame for the situation in Zululand and for the grievances of which the Zulu messages complained. The questions were: was Grant an agent of the A.P.S: did this Society have foreknowledge of the Boer intrusion; and was Statham responsible for the allegation that the A.P.S. had known ahead of time of the Boer invasion? In addition, there was the matter which concerned Harriette most: were the Zulu representatives correct when they alleged that Grant had failed to explain adequately to them the full extent of the land which the Boers were claiming as a *quid pro quo* for Boer assistance to the uSuthu against Zibhebhu?²⁵

Protests over the partition of October 1886 did not eliminate an older and lively contention over the relationship of the A.P.S. with William Grant and the Boers of the New Republic. Harriette was drawn into the dispute, because it was, after all, through the Colensos that the A.P.S. became involved with William Grant and with the apparently irrepressible, if sometimes irresponsible, F.R. Statham who had much to do with the row. Both the A.P.S. and Harriette denied that Grant had been the agent of the Society. He had certainly not been an employee of the A.P.S. or authorised to act on its behalf. On the other hand, the Society, relying on Colenso's recommendation, had trusted Grant and made use of his letters.²⁶ Reports of the agreement of Boers and uSuthu of August 1884 and questions about Grant's role in that agreement undermined humanitarian confidence in him. Letters exchanged between Harriette and Chesson about the Boer land claims and Grant show that each emphasised a different strand in the tangled controversy. Harriette's main purpose was to support the uSuthu protest and their contention that they had not agreed to the cession of so enormous a tract of land. She believed that Grant had deceived the uSuthu.

25. For the events and negotiations in the establishment of the New Republic and the related controversies see C.T. Binns, *Dinuzulu the Death of the House of Shaka* (London, 1968), Chapter 5, pp.56-57; J. Laband, *Rope of Sand: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century* (Johannesburg, 1995), pp.320-77; H.C. Swaisland, 'The Aborigines Protection Society and British Southern and West Africa' (D.Phil, University of Oxford, 1968), pp.118-38 especially pp.127-28 and 134-36. The correspondence of F.W. Chesson with H.E. and Fr.El. Colenso refers to these disputes, for example, N.A., Col.Coll: Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 27 Aug., 17 Sept. and 5 Nov.1885; to H.E. Colenso, 31 Jan., 25 Feb., 6 May, 8 and 17 June 1886.

26. Swaisland, 'The Aborigines Protection Society', p.119. N.A., Col.Coll: Chesson to Miss Colenso (H.E. ?), 14 Aug., 4, 18 and 25 Sept., 2 and 11 Oct.1884; Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 4 Nov.1886 and 9 June 1887 enclosing cutting from *The Guardian*, 9 June 1887 i.e. her letter to *The Guardian*.

Chesson's primary concern was to deny the imputations that the A.P.S. had known in advance of the threatened 'Boer' intrusion into Zululand and approved it. He asked Harriette to act for the Society in this matter. F.W. Chesson supported Harriette's protest about the loss of land, but he was readier than Harriette and Frances Ellen to believe that the 1886 uSuthu protestations of ignorance in 1884 may have been invigorated by self-interest.²⁷ Harriette did what Chesson requested, for it was clear that officials made use of the allegations against the A.P.S. to blunt the Society's criticism of official pusillanimity in the face of the white freebooters.²⁸ Chesson's disclaimer of prior knowledge of the freebooter intrusion was published in the local press, but this did not end the matter. A comment added in the *Natal Witness* seemed to impugn the integrity of Chesson's denial.²⁹ Chesson blamed Statham for the offending words. Harriette was caught up in the rumpus, which calmed down when Statham explained that it was not he who had written the comment. Chesson accepted this assurance and Harriette, with some reluctance, made it known to Statham that Chesson no longer held him responsible for the allegation against the A.P.S. Statham did not make use of her permission to publish her letter.³⁰ Interestingly, in December 1886³¹ the old accusation of A.P.S. connivance at the pro-uSuthu white intrusion re-surfaced in a letter published in *The Guardian* under the *nom de plume* 'One who Knows'. The author may have been Statham.³² Certainly a few months later, Frank Colenso was polite but hostile towards Statham and refused to invite him into his home.³³ A decade later, when Harriette and Statham were in Britain, they were affable. For different reasons both were critical of the dominant trends of British policy, and this drew them into association.³⁴

Harriette held her ground on the question of the strange story of the contents of William Grant's tin box. As a result of previous court decisions the box was left in her charge, but

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- 27. N.A., Col.Coll: Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 2 Oct.1884, 27 Aug., 7 Sept., 5 Nov.1885, 31 Jan., 25 Feb., 6 and 26 May, 17 June, 19 Aug.1886; and especially Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 20 Sept.1886.
 - 28. *Ibid.*, Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 11 Nov.1886 and 24 Feb.1887.
 - 29. Swaisland, 'The Aborigines Protection Society', pp.127, 128 (especially), 132, 134-37, 139.
 - 30. N.A., Col.Coll: Statham to H.E. Colenso, 26 Jan.1887.
 - 31. *Ibid.*, Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 26 Aug. and 23 Dec.1886; R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/54: H.E. Colenso to Statham, 25 Jan.1887.
 - 32. N.A., Col.Coll: Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 16 Dec.1886.
 - 33. *Ibid.*, Sophie Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 21 Oct.1887.
 - 34. *Ibid.*, Statham to H.E. Colenso, 17 Oct.1895, 10 and 13 Nov.1896, 5 Jan.1897, 9 and 16 Jan.1897 and 12 Aug.1897.

she and the Zulu messengers were forbidden to move it to Zululand. The contents included the Blue Book C.3466 dealing with the restoration of Cetshwayo and part of William Grant's diary which covered his stay in Zululand. Harriette would not surrender these, not even when Havelock gave her a duplicate of the Blue Book. As far as the diary was concerned, she argued that the Zulu people were entitled to the record of Grant's actions in Zululand. She carried her point. After further court hearings the box was opened and its contents divided; Grant's representatives were permitted the box, his coats, a dictionary, a copy of Macaulay's 'Essays' and of Leslie's work *Among the Zulu and the Amatonga*. But Harriette secured the Blue Book, to the relief of the Zulu representatives, and the diary which she probably valued more. The diary remains part of the Colenso collection. What the uSuthu people gained from the tin box tug-of-war is by no means clear.³⁵

Harriette's campaign against partition was many-sided. She wished to establish just how much the partition would cost the Zulu.³⁶ She wrote her own letters of protest to the Governor and to the Secretary of State, with copy to the High Commissioner on one occasion³⁷ and to the very eminent, including the allegedly 'very friendly' Lord Kimberley.³⁸ She helped Zulu messengers when they came to Pietermaritzburg, even though she knew that their staying at Bishopstowe encouraged officials to regard their messages as Bishopstowe-inspired.³⁹ She issued more sheets of the Zulu Digest.⁴⁰

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35. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/14: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 30 May 1886; C.131/20: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 12 July 1886; C.131/21: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 20 July 1886; C.131/27: H.E. Colenso to Supreme Court, copy, 26 Oct.1886. References in N.A., Col.Coll. include: H.E. Colenso to W.Y. Campbell, n.d. (asking his advice); H.E. Colenso to Theophilus Shepstone, 8 June 1886; H.E. Colenso to Secretary of Native Affairs, 13 Nov.1886; Siziba's statement, n.d.; Shingana's statement, 11 Dec.1886; Goodricke to H.E. Colenso, 30 Mar.1885, 5 and 13 Apr., 19 and 25 May, 5 and 12 June 1886 and 7 May 1888; Goodricke to H. Bale, 2 Apr.1887; H.E. Colenso to H. Bale, 7 Apr.1887; Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 19 Aug.1886.
 36. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/43: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 7 Dec.1886; C.131/46: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 15 Dec.1886. N.A., Col.Coll: A. Mason to H.E. Colenso, 11 and 21 Nov. and 11 Dec.1886.
 37. C.4980 pp.74-75, enclosure in no.50: H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 1 Nov.1886; pp.134-35, enclosure in no.63: H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 13 Nov.1886; pp.164-69, enclosure in no.86: H.E. Colenso to Stanhope, 23 Dec.1886; pp.180-89, enclosure in no.98: H.E. Colenso to Stanhope, 31 Dec.1886.
 38. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/28: H.E. Colenso to Special Commissioner, copy, 1 Nov.1886; C.131/39: H.E. Colenso to Lord Kimberley, copy, 16 Nov.1886; C.131/48: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 15 Dec.1886; C.131/57: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 1 Feb.1887.
 39. *Ibid.*, C.131/29: Zulu appeal to the Queen, copy, 11 Nov.1886; N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.P.S., 8 June 1887.
 40. See above fn.23.

Although cautious about Natal intentions,⁴¹ she used what help white Natal could offer: the interest of politicians or the press,⁴² or the legal advice of W.Y. Campbell (Kambula), who knew the Zulu language, of the Durban legal firm of Campbell and Dumat.⁴³ Later, after Campbell's departure for the Transvaal, she was in touch with H. Escombe.⁴⁴ She kept the A.P.S. informed of events in Zululand and, while criticising their attitudes, exhorted the Society to action and involvement.⁴⁵ Her communications were published in *The Times* and in the *Pall Mall Gazette*.⁴⁶ Her efforts were unavailing. Despite all her vehemence and concern, the 'scandalous arrangements' of the 22 October 1886 agreement stood. Attempts were made to alter some of its provisions in accordance with Harriette's plans and the legal advice she secured from W.Y. Campbell.⁴⁷ But these, too, failed.

Harriette's long and frequent letters to the Governor and Secretary of State in November and December 1886 were strongly worded and deeply felt.⁴⁸ They secured a place in the Blue Books and, for the most part, an acknowledgment from the Secretary of State. What Harriette argued was that the agreement of 22 October 1886 endangered both British prestige and the national survival of the Zulu people and that it lowered the standard of public morality. She denied the argument that the uSuthu had been the authors of their own misfortunes. It was the neglect of the British that had placed upon the uSuthu the cruel necessity of turning to the Boers, but it was nevertheless not true that the uSuthu had invited the Boers into Zululand. There was often a deep moral resonance in Harriette's words. Thus, for example, she wrote:

'... It is my (at present most unenviable) position to represent in my father's name, the last shred of reason which the Zulus still possess for

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41. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/38: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 10 Nov.1886.
 42. *Ibid.*, C.131/53: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 25 Jan.1887; C.131/55: H.E. Colenso to Binns, n.d.
 43. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. C.5143, p.55, no.33: Havelock to Holland (Secretary of State in succession to Stanhope), with enclosures, 30 May 1887. N.A., Col.Coll: Campbell to H.E. Colenso, Nov. and Dec.1886, numerous letters.
 44. See, for example, N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Escombe, July 1888.
 45. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/31: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 3 Nov.1886; C.131/34: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 9 Nov.1886.
 46. *Ibid.*, C.131/31: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 3 Nov.1886; N.A., Col.Coll: Chesson to H.E. Colenso, 23 Dec.1886; Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 4 Jan.1887.
 47. See below, pp.87-89. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to D. Pollock, 26 Sept.1908. C.5143, p.58, no.36: Sir R.N. Fowler and other MPs to Holland, 2 July 1887; p.63, no.41: Holland to Fowler, 7 July 1887.
 48. K.C.A.L., H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Digest*, Series 5, 1 Nov.1886 to 10 June 1887. See fns.49 and 51 below.

believing in English good faith and for continuing to appeal thereto by constitutional means ... [T]he English Government and not the Zulus are liable for claims which may have arisen from a lapse of time, against which the Zulus have from the first and continually, protested.'⁴⁹

But there was also the occasional touch of bathos:

'... the action of the Zulu has throughout been no more "deliberate" - praying you to pardon the ugliness of the metaphor - than the struggle of the eel into the fire from the pan in which an inhuman cruelty has set it to writhe.'⁵⁰

She protested vigorously against the allegation that the uSuthu and their friends had failed to use earlier opportunities of protest. Though Harriette's submissions elicited some sympathy on specific points,⁵¹ her letters for the most part failed to convince. In fact, they sometimes stung the Secretary of State to vindicate British policy. Thus, for example, in July 1887 Holland wrote that the conduct of the British government towards the uSuthu had been wanting 'neither in justice nor in generosity' and he commented on the uSuthu:

'never had a tribe done more to disentitle itself to the friendly offices or protection of this country, or been more entirely the author of its own misfortunes'.⁵²

What is more, Harriette's observations were warped into a charge against her. In a communication to the Governor of Natal and Special Commissioner for Zululand, Sir Arthur Elibank Havelock, Harriette had told him of her fears that the Zulu people would be driven to stand at bay and resist.⁵³ With Osborn's help this was twisted into the discrediting allegation that Harriette, by suggestion, had encouraged the Zulus to violent action. Harriette did, in fact, warn that the Zulus might make 'the last appeal - to the assegai'.⁵⁴

In England Chesson was concerned,⁵⁵ for Osborn had sneered a damaging accusation against Harriette by alleging that it was she who was advising the Zulus into a dangerous

49. C.4980, p.135, enclosure in no.63: H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 13 Nov.1886.

50. *Ibid.*, p.169, enclosure in no.86: H.E. Colenso to Stanhope, 23 Dec.1886.

51. *Ibid.*, pp.164-69, enclosure in no.86: H.E. Colenso to Stanhope, 23 Dec.1886.

52. C.5143, pp.59-60, no.37: Holland to Havelock, 5 July 1887.

53. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 25 Jan.1887; Chesson to Fr.El.Colenso, 16 Mar.1887 and to H.E. Colenso, 17 and 24 Mar.1887. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.130/84: Fr.El. Colenso to Chesson, 18 Mar.1887.

54. C.4980, p.135, enclosure in no.63: H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 13 Nov.1886.

55. N.A., Col.Coll: Chesson to Fr.El. Colenso, 21 Mar.1887 citing Blue Book reference of pp.134-36. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.130/84: Fr.El. Colenso to Chesson, 18 Mar.1887.