

Daily News and the *Daily Chronicle* published them.⁴¹⁶

Harriette's biggest newspaper scoop came in 1892. The Zulu Exiles sent to the Queen a letter of condolence and 'lamentations' when the Duke of Clarence died. Knutsford commented sourly on Miss Colenso's having arranged this letter, but Harriette was delighted when it was acknowledged on behalf of the Queen. The Exiles, she quipped, 'had been received at Court'. After consulting L.H. Courtney she sent the letter and acknowledgment to the press, and they were widely published. Harriette had successfully exploited a royal occasion.⁴¹⁷

This was exceptional. Generally speaking, newspaper support was disappointing. Among the bigger national newspapers the *Daily News*, described by Koss as 'the semi-official organ of Radical Nonconformity',⁴¹⁸ was probably Harriette's best hope and the political editor, P.W. Clayden, an old supporter of her father. Harriette wrote asking him to use his influence to get coverage, but his replies were not very encouraging.⁴¹⁹ In June 1891 Harriette sensed the indifference of the press:

'The good little *Star* had published my ... letter. I don't expect any of the others have. They are too busy playing baccarat & then the strike ...'⁴²⁰

Interestingly Harriette seems to have learnt how to handle newspapers. In June 1891, for example, when quarrelling with Fox Bourne, she had copies of her 'ultimatum' made by hand, in case newspapers, on receiving a printed version, should think they might be copying from each other in publishing what she sent.⁴²¹ Friends helped keep Natal newspapers informed of Harriette's activities. *Inkanyiso*, the mission-inspired newspaper

416. N.A., Col.Coll: G.D. Collett to H.E. Colenso, 22 Feb.1891; H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 31 Dec.1891. *The Daily Chronicle* emerged in 1897 as a development of the *Camberwell News* and was characterised by a 'vigorous, radical and reforming spirit'. According to P. Gibbs, *The Daily Chronicle* and the *Daily News* appealed to, and educated, the spirit of the times. See P. Gibbs, *The Journalists' London* (London, 1942), pp.118-20. The *Star*, a halfpenny paper, founded in 1889 by T.P. O'Connor, attracting a 'galaxy of talent', was a forerunner of new journalism. See Gibbs, *Journalists' London*, p.99.

417. N.A., Col.Coll: L.H. Courtney to H.E. Colenso, 11 Apr.1892; T. Davis to H.E. Colenso, Apr.1892.

418. S. Koss, *Non-Conformity in Modern British Politics* (London and Sydney, 1975), p.40. Labouchere bought a quarter-share in the paper in 1889.

419. N.A., Col.Coll: P.W. Clayden to H.E. Colenso, 7 Aug.1890 and 18 Sept.1892.

420. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 10 June 1891. 'Baccarat' refers to the scandal about cheating at cards which resulted in the Prince of Wales appearing as a witness in court proceedings.

421. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 3 June 1891.

for blacks, published at least one report of a lecture by Harriette, but the *Natal Witness* was not always interested.⁴²² Newspapers abroad gave Harriette some attention, but it was neither foreigners nor expatriates that Harriette really wished to reach.⁴²³

Officials noticed what newspapers said about Harriette and about her campaign. They were provoked into seeking to thwart or answer her. Mitchell's reaction to the *Pall Mall Gazette* report is an example of a move to thwart her: the mention of a 'half-promise' to send a teacher to the Exiles provoked his telegraphed protest against the 'notorious Magera' being sent to St Helena.⁴²⁴ When in July 1890 Harriette's letter alleging famine conditions in Zululand was published, the Colonial Office felt that it was necessary to refute what she said. Fairfield remembered uneasily that there had been some needless raiding until this had been put an end to by Havelock; but he thought nevertheless that they must get official refutation that could be published in a Blue Book. Knutsford agreed.⁴²⁵

Periodicals

In April 1890 *The Universal Review* published 'The Case for Dinuzulu'. The article was ascribed jointly to Fox Bourne and Harriette. Fox Bourne had a fluent pen, was a journalist, and had written and published articles on South African topics before. The most recent was the article in which he took issue with F. Mackarnass, a writer who held the A.P.S. responsible for the maladies of South Africa.⁴²⁶ Fox Bourne's skill perhaps ensured a readable and acceptable article, but the public partnership between Harriette and himself hid recrimination. Harriette objected to some statements in the original article and harassed and vexed the editor of the *Universal Review* by wishing to withdraw her name. He told her sharply that no one had ever before given him so much trouble over an article.⁴²⁷ It was an illustrated article which presented a smooth flowing narrative of events, of course from the uSuthu point of view. Reprinted as *The Story of Dinuzulu* by the Zulu Defence Fund, it became part of Harriette's literary equipment.⁴²⁸

422. *Ibid.*, (Old Ref: Box 1909): newspaper reports, not dated, but evidently post August 1891.

423. *Ibid.*, A. Raphael to H.E. Colenso, 26 Dec.1890.

424. See above, p.202; C.O.427/8/4828: Mitchell to C.O., telegram, 15 Mar.1890.

425. C.O.427/10/13616: H.E. Colenso to *Daily News*, 12 July 1890, circulated by direction of Knutsford. Minutes by Fairfield, 12 July 1890, and Knutsford, 14 July 1896.

426. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

427. N.A., Col.Coll: H. Quilter to H.E. Colenso, 7, 12 and 14 Apr.1890.

428. A copy of the reprinted version *The Story of Dinuzulu* is available in the Don Library, Durban.

The *Journal of the Manchester Geographical Society* published the text of Harriette's lecture in its journal. It was entitled: *Zululand Past and Present* and, given the membership of the Society, would have had a fair circulation.⁴²⁹

In February 1892 *The Contemporary Review* published an article by Harriette Colenso and Alice Werner. Once more Harriette had the help of a journalist in achieving publication. She had, too, in P.W. Bunting⁴³⁰ a sympathetic editor. She appealed to him personally, and he, a friend of F.W. Chesson, accepted the article because, as he told her, 'it came in well with other colonial subjects.'⁴³¹ Entitled *White and Black in Natal*, the article pleaded that the eve of the grant of Responsible government was an opportune time for critical scrutiny of the despotic powers claimed for the 'Supreme Chief' and of the whole character of Natal native policy. In Natal, so the article argued, poorly paid magistrates of low calibre administered native law badly. They did not understand it. Ignorant of the regional variations of native law as they moved from one district to another, they consulted not with 'the grey beards of the tribe' but with the 'boy who blacked their boots'. Neither the codification of Native Law in 1878, nor that of 1891, had improved the situation. Both codes were vitiated by the false assumption that in native law the Supreme Chief was an irresponsible despot. This was a crucial error that should be faced. The problem in Natal was not whether the Supreme Chief should be responsible to the colonists or to the Colonial Office. Rather, there was the need to eradicate arbitrary power and to ensure that no body wielded it. The authors posed the question.⁴³² As a critical comment in *South Africa* pointed out,⁴³³ they did not pursue the question of how to eliminate the Supreme Chief. They left it to their readers to infer that blacks should participate more in their own government, and thus restrain the despotism of authority. It was not easy to get this article published. There were at least two rejections, and presumably some revision before the article was accepted. Harriette seems to have bungled and delayed the approach to the editor of *The New Review*,⁴³⁴ while Knowles of *The*

429. H.E. Colenso, *Zululand: Past and Present, Address to the Members of the Manchester Geographical Society*, 1 October 1890.

430. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

431. N.A., Col.Coll: P. Bunting to H.E. Colenso, 4 Feb.1892.

432. Colenso & Werner, *White and Black*.

433. *South Africa*, 6 Feb.1892.

434. N.A., Col.Coll: Archibald Grove (editor of *New Review*) to H.E. Colenso, 13 Nov.1890 and 20 Jan.1891; H.E. Colenso to Grove, 28 Jan.1891.

Nineteenth Century considered but turned down an article. He made it clear that he was not interested in any proposed revision of it.⁴³⁵ Harriette told Katie Giles that it took a year to get *White and Black in Natal* published.⁴³⁶

The Colonial Office could ignore the periodical articles. They could not avoid Harriette's leaflets and pamphlets. How the Colonial Office reacted to these depended on the timing and the circumstances of their appearance. Only some of her pamphlets were intended primarily for the Colonial Office. She clearly hoped to distribute some at her meetings either before, during, or after her address and to use others as circulars to MPs or editors. Sometimes her leaflets or pamphlets were direct responses to a Blue Book; sometimes they were intended to arm sympathetic but busy MPs in anticipation of a debate. A number of her leaflets were sequels to parliamentary debates. For example, *Mr Bradlaugh on the Zulu Question*, and the reprint of the report in *South Africa* of a parliamentary exchange were designed to give wider currency to a pro-uSuthu exchange. It was headed *Baron de Worms Forgets Himself*.⁴³⁷

Her publications prior to a parliamentary debate are of particular interest. Twice she published a single page leaflet entitled *England and the Zulus*. Both preceded debates on Supply. The earlier version, that of 23 July 1890, found its way to the Colonial Office. It was accompanied by a letter from Harriette to MPs appealing to them to be in their places when Mr Hanbury raised a debate on the Zulu issue.⁴³⁸ The later sheet, dated June 1891, preceded the debate of July 1891, which Harriette found a 'beautiful little debate'.⁴³⁹

Her correspondence with the Colonial Office over the Ndwandwe demarcation she

435. *Ibid.*, J. Knowles (of *Nineteenth Century*) to H.E. Colenso, 25 Oct. and 5 Nov. 1890 and 26 Mar. 1891.

436. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 28 Jan. 1892.

437. See bibliography for full list of Colenso publications.

438. C.O.427/10/14756: Leaflet and circular to MPs, 23 and 24 July 1890 with minute by F. Graham, 15 Sept., indicating that they were found in Mr Fairfield's room. The leaflet states that the pamphlets could be obtained from Miss Colenso of 21 Cavendish Road W (Frank Colenso's address). The revised version of the copy of the leaflet in the Killie Campbell Africana Library lists publications by Frances Ellen Colenso as well as E. Durnford's *Memoir of a Soldier's Life and Work*, Statham's *Zulu Iniquity*, Cox's *Life of Bishop Colenso* and *The Remonstrance of Escombe and Dumat*. Harriette later submitted a copy of this leaflet to the Lagden Commission, vol.5, Appendix E, pp.ii-iii. See bibliography for full details of the publication.

439. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 15 July 1891.

published in two forms: *Fresh Trouble in Zululand* was the title of one, *Fresh Troubles* was the title of the other.⁴⁴⁰ In the debate on Zululand of 18 March 1892 de Worms referred to the circular sent to MPs and accused her of acting 'with the freedom and recklessness of absolute irresponsibility'. According to the report in *South Africa*, he waved his own copy of *Fresh Troubles in Zululand* in exasperation as he speculated on how damaging it would be in Zululand once translated into Zulu.⁴⁴¹ In the Colonial Office he and others realised that, given the attitudes revealed in the debate and the statements that he had been cornered into making, it was impossible to allow Zibhebhu to move from the Eshowe district to the Ndwandwe, while there was opposition on both sides of the House to the return northwards even of the unarmed followers of that chief.⁴⁴²

Having thwarted a projected return of Zibhebhu, Harriette next turned to renewed attacks on Osborn. While on leave in Britain in 1891 he was in direct contact with the Colonial Office.⁴⁴³ He subsequently resumed his duties as Resident Commissioner for Zululand, to the dismay of Harriette Colenso - and of others.⁴⁴⁴ During Osborn's stay in Britain *South Africa* published an interview with him,⁴⁴⁵ and this stirred her into action. She wrote to Lord Knutsford in July 1891 and sent him a copy of the *South Africa* interview. Her letter, which was printed, presumably for wider circulation, was a criticism of Osborn and of the proceedings of the Court of the Special Commissioners. She wanted to vindicate the loyalty of the uSuthu to Britain and, in doing this, she denied that Dinuzulu sought to act as an independent king. She stressed that the word 'inkosi' was capable of a number of diverse translations.⁴⁴⁶ De Worms' defence of Osborn in the debate of 18 March 1892 provoked her into anti-Osborn pamphleteering. *Is Mr Commissioner Osborn Impartial in Zulu Affairs?* she asked in one pamphlet, and she replied in the facts summarised on the single sheet of which it consisted. She enlarged her indictment of Osborn into the twenty page pamphlet of 14 July 1892. In it she told her readers of *Mr Commissioner Osborn as*

440. See bibliography.

441. British *Hansard*, 4th Series, vol.2, cols 1250-68, especially col.1259, 18 Mar.1892: *Baron H. de Worms Forgets Himself* (reprinted from *South Africa*).

442. C.O.427/13/5082: Mitchell to C.O., 15 Feb.1892. Minutes by H. de Worms, 11 Apr.1892 and Knutsford, 5 Apr.1892.

443. See below, fn.590.

444. See above, fn.415 and below, fn.446.

445. 'The Zulu Iniquity', *South Africa*, 30 May 1891.

446. H.E. Colenso to My Lord (i.e. Knutsford), July 1891, printed letter. Photocopy from K.C.A.L.

one Cause of Confusion in Zulu Affairs.⁴⁴⁷ After the Liberals had come to power, Harriette sent this pamphlet to the Colonial Office in September 1892.⁴⁴⁸

The change of government seems to have changed the purpose of Harriette's pamphleteering to some extent. After the Liberals took office, her pamphlets were designed to educate them as to what had happened during the period of Conservative power. This was the intention of her pamphlet entitled *The Zulu Impeachment of British Officials in 1887-1888 Confirmed by Official Records in 1892*. When Harriette wrote to Ripon on 27 August 1892 'craving the favour' of an interview, she enclosed twelve printed pages. A few days later, she sent him an amended version of these twelve pages, together with fifteen more. The title had been lengthened too. The phrase *and Other Results of the Boundary Commission* was added to the title. In the pamphlet Harriette drew on the new material made available through the publication of the Blue Book which contained the report of the boundary commission.⁴⁴⁹

She provoked a hostile minute from F. Graham which denied that the uSuthu, 'descendants [sic] of the bloody Tshaka', had any claim to special consideration. Fairfield defended Osborn. He pointed out to the new political heads of the Colonial Office that Osborn dated from a time 'when every official was bound to act on the principle of pulverizing the uSuthu'; but Fairfield also acknowledged that the time had come for Osborn to retire with honour. The Colonial Office began a reply to Harriette, then thought better of it, and did not send it.⁴⁵⁰ She was, however, granted an interview, although it was not until November that she saw Ripon.⁴⁵¹

The pamphlets which Harriette sent to the Liberal Colonial Office were not distinguished for clarity or ease of comprehension. She worked rapidly. Sensing that important decisions

447. See bibliography for details of the pamphlets.

448. C.O.427/15/17595: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 5 Sept.1892, with two pamphlets enclosed.

449. C.O. 427/15/17243: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 29 Aug.1892, enclosing shorter version of *Zulu Impeachment*, and C.O.427/15/17595: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 5 Sept.1892, enclosing the lengthened version of *The Zulu Impeachment of British Officials in 1887-88 Confirmed by Official Records in 1892 and the Results of the Boundary Commission and Mr Commissioner Osborn as one Cause of Confusion in Zulu Affairs*. C.6684 was the Blue Book.

450. C.O.427/15/17243: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 27 Aug.1892. Minute by F. Graham 30 Aug.1892; C.O.427/15/17595: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 5 Sept.1892. Minute by Fairfield, 28 Sept.1892 and Ripon, 8 Oct.1892.

451. See above, p.212.

were being taken, she wanted to be sure that a pro-uSuthu statement was submitted. In addition she seems to have appreciated that she was preaching to the half-converted. After all, in the last months of the Conservative government, a Colonial Office man had described her as 'a working member of Her Majesty's opposition'.⁴⁵² Perhaps she expected that those on her side would be more willing to give close scrutiny to the detailed data which she presented.

In February 1893 Harriette was once more printing another pamphlet as fast as she could. Newspapers reported that Ripon was to consult with Sir Charles Mitchell, then visiting Britain, and she assumed that the consultation would not be only about the imminent change to Responsible government in Natal. Zululand would also be discussed.⁴⁵³

Again she sent the first few pages ahead of the completed pamphlet. Thirteen pages arrived very early in March, with the full 32-page pamphlet following about a week later. This was the *Present Position of the Zulus with some Suggestions for the Future*.⁴⁵⁴ In it Harriette advocated the speedy return of the Exiles. Such a return could serve the best interests of both Zululand and the British government. Officials were appalled at the structure of the pamphlet. Fairfield thought it 'jumbled'. Sidney Olivier remarked that Miss Colenso had no idea how to write an effective pamphlet. She would do her cause more good if she could interest a couple of journalists in the evening press. Buxton took comfort from the thought that not even a member of the opposition could 'enthuse' over Harriette's pamphlet; but Harriette gave the Colonial Office personnel no respite.⁴⁵⁵

When the Colenso women left England in the middle of 1893, Harriette was still in a flurry of pamphleteering.⁴⁵⁶ The retirement of Osborn and the appointment of Sir Marshal Clarke opened at last the prospect of favourable change.⁴⁵⁷ Harriette was now

452. C.O.427/13/5434, no.19: Mitchell to C.O., 22 Feb.1892. Minute by Fairfield, 25 Mar.1892.

453. C.O.427/15/24671: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 29 Nov.1892. Minutes by Fairfield, 9 Jan.1893 and Ripon, 11 and 22 Mar.1893; C.O.427/17/3490: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 1 Mar.1893.

454. See bibliography. C.O.427/17/3490: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 1 Mar.1893 and C.O.427/17/3907: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 7 Mar.1893.

455. C.O.427/17/3490: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 1 Mar.1893. Minutes by S. Olivier, 2 Mar.1893, with undated comment by Buxton, and by Fairfield, 7 Mar.1893.

456. C.O.427/17/13345: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 5 Aug.1893 enclosing *Cases of the Six Usutu*; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne (*Grantully Castle*, 'passed St Helena yesterday'), copy, 25 Aug.1893; H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 20 Sept.1893.

457. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

sure that she would not damage the interests of the uSuthu who, she believed, were still held prisoner in South Africa. She took up their case. The result was her August 1893 pamphlet: *The Cases of Six Usutu Other than the Exiles at St Helena Punished for Having Taken Part in the Disturbances of 1888*. This is as congested and as tortuous a piece of writing as ever any Colenso perpetrated. It assumed on the part of the reader a devotion comparable to that of the writer. Fairfield was dismayed. He thought it showed Harriette's 'unreasoning fanaticism' that she should be the advocate of three of the prisoners for whom she pleaded. Buxton was appalled. Earlier, he had suggested to Harriette that she should submit, in writing, facts for the consideration of the Colonial Office, but he had not expected from the 'mouse' of his suggestion the 'mountain' of Harriette's pamphlet. But the pamphlet, for all its faults, bore fruit. Buxton sent it to Hely-Hutchinson who was to read it on his way out to Natal to succeed Sir Charles Mitchell, and was to investigate the cases.⁴⁵⁸

A week later Harriette issued another pamphlet. This was *The Prospects of the Three Zulu Chiefs Still in Exile at St Helena*. Harriette, on the point of departure, dated it from the *Grantully Castle*. This was designed to keep up interest in England, as Harriette herself departed for Natal. Harriette was intent, too, on frustrating what would be to her 'a wicked plan': the unwelcome compromise proposal that only Dinuzulu himself, and not his uncles, should be restored to Zululand. Harriette expected Fox Bourne, somewhat to his chagrin, to see to the printing and distribution of the pamphlet, with Frank 'worrying him a little' to see that it was done.⁴⁵⁹

The Colonial Office knew of Harriette's grass roots campaigning. Resolutions were sent in to the Colonial Office from some of the meetings.⁴⁶⁰ Harriette herself sent in copies

458. C.O.427/17/13345: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 5 Aug.1893. Minutes by Fairfield, 8 Aug.1893 and Buxton, 8 Aug.1893 with draft letter, confidential, to Hely-Hutchinson, 31 Aug.1893.

459. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, copy, 28 Aug.1893; H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 20 Sept.1893.

460. For example: C.O.427/10/24614: B. Greaves, forwarding resolution passed at Sheffield meeting called by the Mayor and presided over by him to C.O., 12 Dec.1890; C.O.427/12/2023: A.E. Peppercorn, Secretary of the Deptford Women's Liberal Association, forwarding resolution passed on 26 Jan.1891 to C.O., Jan.1891. C.O.427/12/5204: J.A. Stevenson, Secretary of Markham Square Mutual Improvement Society, to C.O., 12 Mar.1891; C.O.427/12/18386: S.E. O'Dell, of the Pioneer Reform Association to C.O., 14 Sept.1891; C.O.427/12/22855: Kate Rigby of the Women's Liberal Association, Southport to C.O., 25 Nov.1891; C.O.427/15/22217: Charles Schwann, chairman of the North Manchester Women's Liberal Association, forwarding resolution passed at meeting in the Gladstone Hall, 15 Nov.1892; C.O.427/15/22458: S. Unwin,

of her pamphlets, some of which were written primarily for the benefit of the Colonial Office. What bothered the Colonial Office more was the realisation that she had parliamentary backing. The evidence for this lay in the questions that were asked in the House of Commons and the occasional discussion on supply that was precipitated.

3. Campaigning for Parliamentary Support

Harriette timed her arrival in England in support of the Zulu people and chiefs⁴⁶¹ to precede the opening of parliament because she realised that the only kind of criticism a reluctant Colonial Office was likely to heed was parliamentary criticism.⁴⁶² Harriette soon decided to abandon Privy Council proceedings and on 14 February 1890 called on the legal firm of Loughborough and Gedge so to instruct them. This decision made parliamentary support all the more crucial.⁴⁶³ The MPs who helped Harriette had a far more important role than their small number suggests: they were Harriette's only hope, and what is more, their actions had consequences. They were a heterogeneous group who represented different political allegiances, widely varying attitudes to religion, and scattered constituencies.

Bradlaugh, Harriette's foremost 'Zulu MP' until his death in January 1891, was a rationalist, an atheist, and a supporter of Indian nationalism.⁴⁶⁴ He was a whole-hearted champion of freedom of thought who, although he did not indicate how, acknowledged that he was indebted to Bishop Colenso.⁴⁶⁵ Frank, who appealed to him in 1889, thought a man so branded by respectable belief must have an indefinite amount of good in him.⁴⁶⁶ He was one of the representatives for Northampton and, in London, he was a neighbour of Frank Colenso. During his last illness Harriette and Agnes called at his home each day to enquire after him.⁴⁶⁷ Mr Hanbury, who later held cabinet rank in Conservative administrations, had a Quaker name, although he may not have been a

Women's Liberal Association of Tunbridge Wells, n.d., probably 18 Nov.1892.

461. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Mitchell, 15 Dec.1889.

462. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 2 Nov.1889.

463. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. Zululand G.12/6, vol.IV, A.P.S 1889-1893, item 3: account (presented as a chronicle) of Loughborough and Gedge re applications to the Privy Council.

464. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 21 July 1891. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

465. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 4 Nov.1890.

466. *Ibid.*, F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 7 Mar. and 26 Sept.1889; F.E. Colenso to C. Bradlaugh, 22 Aug.1889.

467. *Ibid.*, 7 Oct.1889; H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 22 Jan.1891.

Quaker himself. He was MP for Preston.⁴⁶⁸ Mr J.A. Picton, who took over the leading role in Zulu affairs after Bradlaugh's death, was a Lancashire man by birth and early upbringing. He was a Congregationalist minister whose views, however, veered increasingly to secular rationalism. He was MP for Leicester.⁴⁶⁹ In May 1891 Sir R.N. Fowler died. Harriette was much less enthusiastic about Fowler than about Bradlaugh, but Sir Robert had been a staunch A.P.S. man. Like others, he was originally a Quaker but had accepted the Anglican Church. A Conservative, and twice Lord Mayor of London, he represented the constituency of Tower Hamlets in the Commons, where he often voted for humanitarian views.⁴⁷⁰ Mr Bryce, early a distinguished Oxford scholar and author, and president of the Imperial League in Oxford, was Liberal MP for Aberdeen South.⁴⁷¹ Dr G.B. Clark, MP for Caithness, was one of the 'Celtic fringe' in British politics. He visited South Africa in 1887 and spoke frequently on South African affairs, sometimes on pro-'native', sometimes on pro-Boer lines. He had already asked questions in the House of Commons, on Frank's advice.⁴⁷² Of somewhat smaller note the radical MP, Mr Conybeare, had the wrong ideas about the Chartered Company, but the right ideas about Zululand. He was MP for Nottingham.⁴⁷³ Mr A. Webb was a Quaker and a supporter of Home Rule for Ireland. He was active on Harriette's behalf when the Liberals were in opposition, but when the Liberals came to power, he was at first too engrossed in the Home Rule for Ireland issue and then too disappointed at its outcome to be of much further use.⁴⁷⁴ Most of Harriette's supporters were Liberals. Mr G. Osborne Morgan, for example, had been a Liberal Under-Secretary for Colonies when Granville presided at the Colonial Office. He approved the general direction of Harriette's attacks on colonial policy in regard to Zululand.⁴⁷⁵ Another Welshman was Tom Ellis. He was Liberal MP for Merionethshire and a kind of forerunner of Lloyd George as

468. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

469. *Ibid.*, N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 20 May and 14 Oct.1892.

470. *Ibid.*, 26 May 1891; F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 30 May 1889.

471. *Ibid.*, Miss Bryce (sister) to H.E. Colenso, 3 June 1891; Bryce to H.E. Colenso, 10 July 1891; E.M. Bryce (wife) to H.E. Colenso, 29 Dec.1891, 26 Feb., 2 Apr., 2, 23, 26 and 27 Aug., 3 Nov.1892 and 12 Mar.1893; H.E. Colenso to Mrs Bryce, 31 July 1892. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

472. N.A., Col.Coll: G.B. Clark to F.E. Colenso, 19 Aug.1888; F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 12 July 1888. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

473. *Ibid.*, Conybeare's sister became a close collaborator with H.E. Colenso. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 21 July 1891; C.A.V. Conybeare to H.E. Colenso, 23 Mar.1892.

474. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

475. N.A., Col.Coll: G. Osborne Morgan to H.E. Colenso, 29 Feb no year, possibly 1892 (date is difficult to decipher; may be July); Emily Osborne Morgan to H.E. Colenso, 17 June 1891. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

champion of Welsh nationalism. He was a frequent questioner in 1888 and 1889, and a supporter of Harriette in 1891. In 1892 Ellis became a junior Lord of the Treasury and subsequently Liberal Chief Whip. His early death in 1899 cut short the promising career of a supporter.⁴⁷⁶ At least one of Harriette's parliamentary backers had a colonial background. This was Mr A. McArthur who was an Irishman by birth. He had, however, spent a long and fairly distinguished spell in Australia before returning to Britain, where he became MP for Leicester. He was an A.P.S. man and a member of the General Committee of Management of the Methodist Society.⁴⁷⁷ Mr Thomas Burt was a coal miner's son who had been brought up a primitive Methodist. He was a prominent Trade Unionist, and became Liberal MP for Morpeth. Harriette met him. She called him 'Mr Bradlaugh's friend, the working man's MP'.⁴⁷⁸ She was in touch too with Mr Cunninghame Graham, the Scots socialist MP.⁴⁷⁹ Asquith was evidently approached by C.E. Maurice but did not involve himself. In 1906 Asquith showed a limited concern for Dinuzulu to which Harriette may have contributed.⁴⁸⁰ H. Cobb and John Ellis were among the MPs whose support is reflected in letters,⁴⁸¹ while John Morley was sympathetic and at least acknowledged a pamphlet.⁴⁸² Charles Schwann was evidently recruited through his clever and charming wife.⁴⁸³ Lloyd George expressed interest.⁴⁸⁴

Leonard Courtney was an old associate.⁴⁸⁵ Like Colenso, he was a Cornishman, and had Natal associations. In fact, John Robinson claimed him as a friend.⁴⁸⁶ Harriette 'dressed new from Peter Robinson's', called to see Courtney for breakfast shortly after her

476. N.A., Col.Coll: J.Bryce to H.E. Colenso, 16 July 1891.

477. *Ibid.*, I.P. Brown to H.E. Colenso, 8 Mar.1890. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

478. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 13 June 1891.

479. *Ibid.*, Cunninghame Graham to H.E. Colenso, 17 Mar.1892.

480. *Ibid.*, H.H. Asquith to C.E. Maurice, 15 Feb.1891; C.E. Maurice to H.E. Colenso, 16 Feb.1891. K.C.A.L., Dinuzulu File 13680, no.16: E. Renaud, 27 July 1936, typescript.

481. N.A., Col.Coll: H. Cobb to H.E. Colenso, 2 and 6 May 1892; Mrs John Ellis to H.E. Colenso, 24 Aug.1892.

482. *Ibid.*, J.H. Pease to H.E. Colenso, 29 May 1893.

483. *Ibid.*, C. Schwann to H.E. Colenso, 27 Mar.1893; A.M. Colenso to K. Giles, 5 May 1893.

484. *Ibid.*, A. Webb to H.E. Colenso, 18 Feb.1893. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes for individuals mentioned in this paragraph.

485. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/190 a-d: J.W. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 23 July 1875 (Natal association) and C.131/104: J.W. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 4 Mar.1877. London School of Economics, Courtney Papers, vol.IV, item 29: J.W. Colenso to L. Courtney, 7 Aug.1881. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

486. Shepstone Papers, Box 19: J. Robinson to T. Shepstone, 9 May 1877.

arrival.⁴⁸⁷ Courtney was Deputy Speaker at the time, and this may account for his not participating in the debates that arose. But he made possible the debate of March 1892. It was his ruling that enabled Mr Picton to claim the attention of the House for the affairs of Zululand.⁴⁸⁸ At the end of 1892, when Harriette was perplexed by the feeling that the Colonial Office was still prejudiced against her, she was interested in Courtney's views.⁴⁸⁹ He wrote to Ripon urging the need for care and a new beginning in Zululand. He suggested in his letter that Melmoth Osborn be replaced by Sir Marshal Clarke. Of Sir Marshal, he wrote that he had undone the bad business wrought by Sir Bartle Frere in one territory (Basutoland) and might do the same in another.⁴⁹⁰

Leonard Courtney was on good terms with John Westlake,⁴⁹¹ the eminent international jurist and Cambridge lawyer, who was also a long-standing Colenso friend.⁴⁹² His association with the Colensos dated, he recalled, from his boyhood and the hey-day of Colenso's ecclesiastical controversy. Westlake was not a Gladstonian Liberal. He stood, unsuccessfully, as a Unionist candidate in 1890;⁴⁹³ but he had himself actively supported Colenso over Langalibalele. He gave Harriette affection and advice on ecclesiastical and political affairs and counselled her on the ways in which the political mechanisms of the day worked.⁴⁹⁴ It was he, for example, who warned her that in the Colonial Office the permanent officials were not without influence.⁴⁹⁵

Harriette was in touch too with the prominent humanitarian, James Stansfeld. He was a man who may have sacrificed his own personal career by his championship of the abolition of the Contagious Diseases Acts. He, like other Liberals, counselled Harriette after the Liberal victory, by urging her to approach Lord Ripon directly.⁴⁹⁶

One MP whose support Harriette would have valued was Joseph Chamberlain. He had

487. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 27 Mar.1890.

488. See below, pp.255; British *Hansard*, 4th series, vol.2, cols 1249-1265, 18 Mar.1892.

489. N.A., Col.Coll: J. Westlake to H.E. Colenso, 7 and 8 Dec.1892.

490. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43636 ff.253-256: L.H. Courtney to Ripon, 13 Dec.1892.

491. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

492. He was secretary of the Colenso Fund of 1865. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: *The Bishop of Natal: List of Subscribers*, printed (London, 1865).

493. N.A., Col.Coll: J. Westlake to H.E. Colenso, 7 Apr.1890.

494. *Ibid.*, 20 Feb. and 10 Mar.1890.

495. *Ibid.*, 8 Dec.1892.

496. *Ibid.*, J. Stansfeld to H.E. Colenso, 12 Sept.1892.

expressed sympathy for the uSuthu in 1888, but he had evaded Frank's approaches in 1889.⁴⁹⁷ Though he conferred with Lord Knutsford, he declined to take up the uSuthu cause in public. Harriette's contacts with Unitarians in Birmingham prompted an approach to Chamberlain on her behalf, but the response was not favourable.⁴⁹⁸ When Harriette wrote herself to Chamberlain, he replied by returning to her the map of the Ndwandwe district which he had been sent. He told her, somewhat hesitantly but primly, 'I have decided on the whole it is my duty to support Lord Knutsford's policy.'⁴⁹⁹

Information about members of the House of Lords and their interest in Zululand is meagre. Dumat approached Lord Aberdeen in 1889, but with no apparent success.⁵⁰⁰ Harriette recorded having 'bagged two MPs and a Lord' at a huge 'crush' shortly after her arrival, and mentioned specifically that she had met Lord Herschell.⁵⁰¹ He showed some interest. In April 1890 Knutsford knew that he was working up the case, and, later on, Fairfield recorded that Herschell had once given notice that he was studying the voluminous evidence. But since he had not brought on a debate on the main issue, Fairfield assumed that he had been satisfied with Lord Knutsford's action.⁵⁰² In addition, there was Lord Kimberley who, as Secretary of State, had decided on the restoration of Cetshwayo. The Colensos thought well of him and credited him with good intentions that had been spoilt when he left office. They appealed to him intermittently, and Harriette approached him in 1892. She sent him a pamphlet and called to see him, but seemed, apparently, to receive no more than the promised 'kind reception'.⁵⁰³ Harriette might have expected some sympathy from the ageing Earl Grey. He had written on Zulu affairs, and he had supported the Zulu Defence Committee. But his family links with the Chartered Company probably pushed him outside the range of Harriette's interest or

497. See above, pp.112-13. *Mr Chamberlain on the Zulu Question* (excerpts from his speech in House of Commons, 23 July, 1888). N.A., Col.Coll: F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, enclosing letters of J. Chamberlain, n.d., and W.B. McLaren, 25 Feb.1889.

498. *Ibid.*, W.H. Ryland to H.E. Colenso, 24 and 28 Jan.1892.

499. *Ibid.*, J. Chamberlain to H.E. Colenso, 10 Feb.1892 and H.E. Colenso to J. Chamberlain, 20 Aug.1895.

500. *Ibid.*, F.C. Dumat to H.E. Colenso, 16 Aug.1889.

501. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 12 Mar.1890.

502. C.O.427/8/6141: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 3 Mar.1890. Minute by Knutsford, 5 Apr.1890; C.O.427/14/16322, no.62: Mitchell to C.O., 16 July 1892. Minute by Fairfield, 20 Aug.1892.

503. N.A., Col.Coll: Kimberley to H.E. Colenso, 3 Mar., 31 May and 8 July 1892.

hope.⁵⁰⁴

Parliament gave much less attention to the affairs of Zululand than it had done in the previous two years. Then, the minor crises of confrontation had aroused some interest. Now, Harriette had to campaign in a thick fog of indifference. That she gained any parliamentary support is a tribute to her determination. What is more, the displays of parliamentary interest, however slow to come, brief in duration, and flickering in intensity, had perceptible repercussions on policy. Zululand might be peripheral in the interests of the British parliament, but the fact that there was a British parliament was by no means irrelevant to the history of Zululand.

What parliamentary interest there was took two forms: firstly, questions were asked; secondly, there were short debates when the House of Commons was considering the Colonial Office estimates. These short debates allowed for some exchange of views between the critics of the government and its representatives and members. The questions asked are considered first, and separately from the debates precipitated.

The parliamentary questions that were posed in 1890 and the Colonial Office reaction to them show clearly that Harriette had made herself felt. In February 1890, for example, Sir R.N. Fowler asked questions about the publication of papers relating to the Court of the Special Commissioners.⁵⁰⁵ This had involved the long discussion in the Colonial Office about the Blue Book C.6070 and the 50 copies of the Notes of Evidence by the President of the Court of the Special Commissioners made available in the libraries of parliament.⁵⁰⁶ On 13 February Mr A. McArthur asked whether Her Majesty's Government had sanctioned the embarkation of the chiefs for St Helena, which he called an 'aggravation' of their sentences.⁵⁰⁷

In early March McArthur raised the issue of modifications of the sentences on the other

504. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. H.R. Fox Bourne, *The State Trials in Zululand. Correspondence between the Aborigines Protection Society and the Colonial Office, to which is added a Letter by Earl Grey* (London, 1889).

505. *British Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.341, col.303: question by R.N. Fowler, 14 Feb.1890.

506. C.O.427/10/2745: question by Sir R. Fowler, Feb.1890. Minutes by R. Herbert and Fairfield, 12 Feb.1890.

507. *British Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.341, cols 192-93: question by A. McArthur, 13 Feb.1890.

uSuthu. In his reply, after Colonial Office consideration, de Worms said he would show McArthur the despatch about the modification of sentences later. He would not do this immediately, because the despatch had not yet reached Natal. In the Colonial Office, Herbert thought that Harriette was behind the questions and asserted that she would make public use of anything Mr McArthur told her.⁵⁰⁸

In May 1890 Hanbury showed that he had studied the Blue Books. He asked about the omission of an allusion to the undesirability of 'a forcible removal' of Dinuzulu to Zululand from Natal in telegrams between the Governor and the Colonial Office in the immediate aftermath of the January Privy Council decision.⁵⁰⁹ In his reply de Worms was able to show that the phrase had not been used in a sinister way and its omission was inadvertent. He announced what was now the Colonial Office's position in regard to the removal of Dinuzulu from Natal to Zululand: Dinuzulu's grievance was technical and his injury nominal, for the Colonial Office had been advised that a valid warrant for his removal could have been issued under the Fugitive Offenders Act.⁵¹⁰

In June 1890 Mr A. Webb wanted to know about famine relief in Zululand.⁵¹¹ On 3 July he asked about the conditions in Eshowe gaol⁵¹² and, a little later, about reports that Yamela, the *induna* of Osborn, was to be rewarded with cattle taken as fines.⁵¹³ The question prompted the Colonial Office to instruct that, if the reward had not been paid, Yamela should not receive captured cattle. From London the Colonial Office pronounced piously that it was not government policy to reward followers with captured cattle, especially if the man were a public servant. How 'followers' were to be induced to fight alongside government forces without the prospect of taking the enemy's cattle was not at the time an immediate consideration.⁵¹⁴

508. *Ibid.*, col.1642: question by McArthur, 3 Mar.1890; C.O.427/10/3820: House of Commons, 28 Feb.1890 (for 3 Mar.1890). Minute by R.G.W. Herbert, 1 Mar.1890.

509. *British Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.344, col.1573: question by Henbury, 22 May 1890.

510. C.O.427/10/9488: question by Mr Hanbury for 22 May 1890. Minutes by Fairfield and Knutsford, 20 May 1890.

511. *British Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.345, col.510: question by A. Webb, 10 June 1890.

512. *Ibid.*, vol.346, col.656: question by A. Webb, 3 July 1890, on Eshowe gaol.

513. *Ibid.*, vol.347, col.1164: question by A. Webb, 29 July 1890. C.O.427/10/14494: question by Mr Webb, 25 July 1890. Minutes by Fairfield and Bramston, 26 July, and de Worms, 29 July 1890.

514. For Yamela's later fortunes see Edgecombe, 'The Influence of the A.P.S.', pp.206-07.

After the publication of the Blue Book C.6070 which dealt with the trials and the revision of the sentences imposed by the Special Court, Mr Hanbury asked a question about the return of Zibhebhu.⁵¹⁵ By early August Harriette was 'quite satisfied' with Hanbury.⁵¹⁶ His question was a useful reminder that the officials should not count on parliamentary amnesia if they tried to restore Zibhebhu. In this case de Worms acknowledged that the Governor had recalled Zibhebhu from an unauthorised return and indicated that no decision had been taken about his future location.⁵¹⁷ There was more attention to Zibhebhu a few days later, which resulted in his continued sojourn in the Eshowe area.⁵¹⁸

There were no questions directly concerned with Zululand in 1891, but Mr Picton, Harriette's ally, asked in April 1892 whether it was true that Zibhebhu, although not himself living in the Ndwandwe, controlled his followers who were located there.⁵¹⁹ This, as will be shown, followed on a crucial debate in the previous month.⁵²⁰ Although an official in the Colonial Office had remarked, perhaps with relief, a little earlier, 'We do not now present Zulu papers,'⁵²¹ the fuss Harriette made about the demarcation resulted in the compilation and publication of the Blue Book C.6684 about the demarcation of boundaries in the Ndwandwe district.⁵²²

After the change of government, the questions asked were not all hostile. On 2 May 1893, a Conservative, Commander Bethell, and a Liberal, Mr Schwann, both raised the question of policy in regard to the Exiles. In reply, Buxton indicated that there had been careful consideration but that an early decision was unlikely. He also announced that Osborn was about to retire on pension.⁵²³ There were reports in the press that Buxton had stated to Fox Bourne, the A.P.S secretary, that the Exiles in St Helena were to be released

515. British *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.347, col.220: question by R.W. Hanbury, 18 July 1890.

516. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 6 Aug.1890.

517. British *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.347, col.220: de Worms' answer to Hanbury's question, 18 July 1890.

518. See below, pp.249-250 for the debate of 12 and 13 Aug.1890.

519. British *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.4, col.1559.

520. See below, pp.253-56.

521. C.O.427/12/19255, no.97: Mitchell to C.O., 29 Aug.1891. Minute by Fairfield, 1 Oct.1891.

522. C.6684 Zululand. Correspondence Respecting Certain Boundary Questions in Zululand, presented to both Houses of Parliament, May 1892.

523. British *Hansard*, 4th series, vol.11, cols 1738-39: questions by Bethell and Schwann, answered by Buxton, 2 May 1893.

shortly. When taxed with this on 19 May by Commander Bethell, Buxton denied that he had made the statement. While conceding that the chiefs would have to return in due course, he insisted that the government was taking great care about the timing and the conditions of that repatriation. They would await the appointment of the new administrator.⁵²⁴ A few days later de Worms, the former Parliamentary Under-Secretary, asked again about the statement Fox Bourne was reported to have made at the annual meeting of the A.P.S. In reply Buxton, while discounting reports of what Fox Bourne had allegedly claimed that he (Buxton) had said, announced the appointment of Sir Marshal Clarke as successor to Osborn.⁵²⁵ In November 1893 James Picton, on behalf of Mr C. Hopwood, a Liberal backbencher with a noted interest in prison reform, asked about the six uSuthu prisoners to whom Harriette had drawn attention in one of the 1893 pamphlets.⁵²⁶

In August 1890, in July 1891, and in March 1892 debates on the Colonial Office estimates gave rise to discussions about Zululand and presented more opportunity for critical comment.⁵²⁷ In August 1890 the Colonial Office prepared for debate. Both the permanent staff and Knutsford thought that de Worms might need some help, although the Under-Secretary himself was sure he could defend policy adequately. What he doubted was whether there would be a debate. He had heard that neither Hanbury nor Bradlaugh intended a move.⁵²⁸ Harriette was eager. Agnes waited into the early hours of the morning for her sister to return from the House of Commons.⁵²⁹ There Harriette had already circularised MPs and distributed her pamphlet *England and the Zulus*.⁵³⁰ Harriette was in the Ladies' Gallery. The debate came on the second night of her waiting.⁵³¹ In every way except that it happened it seemed an anti-climax. The hour

524. *Ibid.*, vol.12, cols 1416-17: question by Commander Bethell, 19 May 1893.

525. *Ibid.*, vol.13, cols 181-82: question by Baron H. de Worms, 5 June 1893.

526. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. C.O.427/17/19328: Hopwood's question of 27 Nov.1893 and reply by Buxton. N.A., Col.Coll: W.A. Jones to Fox Bourne, 22 Dec.1893. By Feb.1894 four of the six had been released. See below, fn.581.

527. *British Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.348, cols 789-802: 12-13 Aug.1890; and vol.355, cols 949-62 and 1061-70: 10 and 13 July 1891; 4th series, vol.2, cols 1249-68: 18 Mar.1892.

528. C.O.427/9/15162: Mitchell to C.O., 8 July 1890. Minutes by Fairfield, 5 Aug.1890; by de Worms and Knutsford, 7 Aug.1890.

529. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso (with short comment from A.M. Colenso) to K. Giles, 14 Aug.1890.

530. C.O.427/10/14756: H.E. Colenso, *Circular Letter to MPs*, dated 24 July and pamphlet, *England and the Zulus*, 23 July 1890.

531. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso (with short comment by A.M. Colenso) to K. Giles, 14 Aug.1890.

was late. The House was thin. The session was at its 'fag end'. With Hanbury ill, Bradlaugh had to play the main role on his own. Perhaps conscious of Harriette's presence, he paid tribute to Miss Colenso. Then, while expressing esteem for the President of the Court of the Special Commissioners, he condemned the proceedings of the tribunal. He thought the House should be given the opportunity of discussion before anything further was done to worsen the situation. He notified colleagues that he intended to take an early opportunity next session to bring the whole case before the House. There were others who added their words of criticism. Sir R.N. Fowler, although he expressed reservations, was among them. Dr Clark, Mr Conybeare and Mr Webb all had criticisms to make. De Worms tried to defend official policy and to appease critics of that policy. He argued that action against the uSuthu was justified because they had committed murders. With a blinkered naivety, probably shared by his audience, he produced the argument that the permanent officials had devised: the health of Zululand finances was indirect refutation of Miss Colenso's extreme views, and proof that all was well in Zululand. But he assured the House:

'The Government will consider carefully the statements that have been made this evening with the resolve to prevent injustice and secure peace and order in Zululand.'⁵³²

Harriette was jubilant over the experience and busy thinking what the next move should be.⁵³³ The prospect of this debate impelled the Colonial Office to suggest even more generosity to some uSuthu leaders still in prison. These were Somkhele and the coast chiefs whose imprisonment had been commuted to fines, but who were still in custody, because they had not been able to pay the cattle-fines. The Colonial Office suggested that they be given leave of absence from prison to collect the cattle.⁵³⁴ But the man who felt most the repercussions of parliamentary activity was Zibhebhu. In Natal, Mitchell was very keen to secure his return to the Ndwandwe, and a telegraphed request from Mitchell was being considered in the Colonial Office when the debate came on. Knutsford waited for the debate before replying to Mitchell's telegram of 6 August. Fairfield anticipated that members of the House of Commons would ask the government to state clearly that

532. British *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.348, cols 789-802: 12-13 Aug.1890.

533. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 14 Aug.1890.

534. C.O.427/9/15162: Mitchell to C.O., 8 July 1890. Minutes by Fairfield, 5 Aug. and de Worms, 7 Aug.1890.

Zibhebhu was not to be restored.⁵³⁵ De Worms avoided such an explicit assurance on this occasion, but he might just as well have given it.⁵³⁶ Knutsford decided that Zibhebhu's return to the Ndwandwe should not be risked. Instead he was to be treated with full generosity in the Eshowe district where personal adherents as well as members of his family might join him.⁵³⁷ By early December 1890 the Colonial Office was informed that Zibhebhu had been placed in a temporary location in the Eshowe district.⁵³⁸

The Colonial Office remained concerned about a debate. Sometimes this was needless. On 16 March 1891, for example, there was a reference to 'to-night's possible debate';⁵³⁹ but Zululand was not mentioned that day. In fact, Harriette had to wait rather longer for the next short parliamentary discussion. She created it by visiting MPs - the Hanburys in October - publishing and circularising a pamphlet, lecturing, lobbying at the House of Commons,⁵⁴⁰ and by securing the active interest of Bryce, who did as she asked in 'getting up a debate'.⁵⁴¹ On 10 and 13 July 1891 Harriette's parliamentary friends spoke out.⁵⁴² Alfred Webb won Harriette's praise as 'the man who had the courage to start our capital debate',⁵⁴³ by placing a motion before the House. In the discussion, de Worms made some sharp comments about Harriette but he was cornered into a reluctant assurance about Zibhebhu. MPs exclaimed in protest at his attack on Harriette. Some defended her vigorously. Bryce, for example, thought it would be a great misfortune for the British Empire if, in those areas where Britons came into contact with 'native' races, there were not such persons 'whom the right honourable gentleman calls "agitators"'. Mr Cunninghame Graham from Lanark reminded de Worms, who was of Jewish origin, that his own race was in some areas the oppressed: would the Baron not welcome in south Russia the kind of action Miss Colenso was taking in South Africa? Tom Ellis regretted

535. C.O.427/9/15401: Mitchell to C.O., telegram, 6 Aug.1890. Minute by Fairfield, 11 Aug.1890.

536. British *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.348, cols 789-802: 12-13 Aug.1890.

537. C.O.427/9/15401: Mitchell to C.O., telegram, 6 Aug.1890. Minutes by Fairfield, 11 and 13 Aug.1890.

538. C.O.427/9/23880: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 11 Nov.1890. Minutes by Fairfield, 9 Dec. and Knutsford, 14 Dec.1890.

539. C.O.427/11/5290, no.25: Mitchell to C.O., 13 Feb.1891, forwarding Resident Commissioner's Report. Minute by Fairfield, 16 Mar.1891.

540. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 18 Sept.1890; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 4 June 1891.

541. *Ibid.*, J. Bryce to H.E. Colenso, 10 July 1891.

542. British *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.355, cols 949-62 and 1061-70: 10 and 13 July 1891.

543. N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso to K. Giles, 26 Feb.1892.

the little attention which parliament gave to the Zulu question. If full attention were given, members would come to the same conclusion as Bradlaugh had done: that the only wise policy was to liberate the chiefs. Others drove home the argument in favour of generous treatment. The appeal, commented Osborne Morgan, was from both sides of the House. Bryce warned de Worms not to shelter too happily in the fact that the Privy Council had rejected the appeal in July 1889. Bryce, whether from confusion or from wisdom, implied that a differently argued appeal would have been successful. In reply de Worms reasserted the government's attitude but with some diffidence:

'... the Government are not actuated by any vindictive spirit in the matter ... There is no immediate intention of remitting the sentences, and though I cannot say what may be done in the future I can give no pledge for the present.'⁵⁴⁴

Webb's motion was defeated by 145 votes to 103 but he was nevertheless pleased with the outcome of the debate. He argued that it pinned the Liberals to reversing policy when they came to power.⁵⁴⁵

What the debate did not do was lead to any remission of sentences for the Exiles. In Natal, Mitchell read the statements of de Worms with concern. Recognising that the parliamentary pressure for the release of the Exiles would continue, he suggested that Dinuzulu should be sent to England for education. Knutsford deferred decision: he would wait to see if there was more pressure next year and then appease critics with the suggestion that Dinuzulu be brought to Britain.⁵⁴⁶

In fact, the debate of July 1891 seems to have underlined the need for caution and delay in the Colonial Office. After it, and perhaps because of it, the demarcation of 'tribal' locations in the Ndwandwe district absorbed attention as the local officials - Mitchell, Cardew, the acting Resident Commissioner, and Osborn, who resumed duties in August 1891 - turned their minds to this issue. Such demarcation seemed a necessary preliminary to any further decision.⁵⁴⁷

544. British *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol.355, cols 949-62 and 1061-70: 10 and 13 July 1891.

545. N.A., Col.Coll: A. Webb to H.E. Colenso, 14 July 1891.

546. C.O.427/12/20501: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 22 Sept.1891. Minute by Knutsford, 24 Oct.1891.

547. C.O.427/12/16066, no.84: Mitchell to C.O., 14 July 1891 enclosing report of F. Cardew, 10 July 1891. Minute by Knutsford, 13 Aug.1901. C.O.427/12/19255, no.98: Mitchell to C.O., 29 Aug.1891.

It was not until March 1892⁵⁴⁸ that Harriette achieved another brief episode of parliamentary interest in Zulu affairs. This, when it came, was the result of her agitation on hearing reports from Zululand via Bishopstowe of the actions of officials in regard to the Ndwandwe.⁵⁴⁹ She thought these actions were a serious threat to the interests of the uSuthu and the stability of Zululand and that they portended the triumph of Osborn's anti-uSuthu ideas. One of the points that agitated her was the news that Mitchell's visit to Zululand had coincided with Osborn's return. True, as officials emphasised, she was wrong in saying that Mitchell had *accompanied* Osborn to Zululand,⁵⁵⁰ but Harriette was probably right in sensing that the Governor's presence in Zululand to greet Osborn would make the uSuthu fear that the old Osborn policy was to be revived with the sanction of higher authority. Even in the Colonial Office there were misgivings about the way in which Mitchell had suggested the imminent return of Zibhebhu in announcing the commission to assembled headmen, and de Worms was alerted in case of criticism.⁵⁵¹

Harriette regarded the question of the Ndwandwe demarcation as important enough for vigorous contention.⁵⁵² Why she should have done this becomes clear when one realises two things. The first is that there were three sets of official attitudes and expectations about the Ndwandwe demarcation: that of Cardew, that of Mitchell and Osborn, and that of the Colonial Office. The second important point is that Harriette had reason to be opposed to all three.

Cardew genuinely believed that a careful delimitation of locations was an essential preliminary to any settlement in the Ndwandwe. The settlement he envisaged was one which would permit the return of both Dinuzulu and Zibhebhu while allowing for the separation of intermediate groups. He did not envisage any special status for Dinuzulu. In the future, magistrates would govern Zululand through appointed headmen, and uSuthu lambs and lions would lie down with their Mandlakazi counterparts, and all would *konza*

548. British *Hansard*, 4th series, vol.2, cols 1249-68: Mar.1892, *Baron de Worms Forgets Himself*, leaflet, reprint of report of the debate in *South Africa*.

549. H.E. Colenso, *Trouble and Troubles*.

550. C.6684, p.74, enclosure in no.25: Osborn to Mitchell, 27 Apr.1892.

551. C.O.427/12/19256, no.98: Mitchell to C.O., 29 Aug.1891. Minute by Fairfield, 1 Oct.1891 and H.W. Just, 5 Oct.1891.

552. See her pamphlets, viz. *Fresh Trouble in Zululand* (1891) and *Fresh Troubles in Zululand* (1892).

to the *induna* i.e. the official or nominee of the government.⁵⁵³ Harriette objected to his proposals and conducted a vigorous exchange of letters. She held up to Cardew the model of Basutoland as one which could be copied in Natal;⁵⁵⁴ but he warned her that Natal would not permit the kind of polity she favoured.⁵⁵⁵

Osborn and Mitchell agreed with Cardew that demarcation was essential.⁵⁵⁶ But for them, the desired sequel was clearly the return of Zibhebhu. Periodic visits lengthening into permanent abode was the idea they favoured early in 1891.⁵⁵⁷ Osborn's report for October 1891 mentioned that a detachment of police was stationed near the main Mandlakazi *umuzi* in the Ndwandwe district, and Mitchell made explicit the opposition to Dinuzulu's return.⁵⁵⁸ In November 1891 the Colonial Office would not give Harriette an explicit assurance that they were not prepared to entertain the restoration of Zibhebhu at present.⁵⁵⁹

What the Colonial Office hoped was that they could cross their bridges as they reached them: i.e. authorise the demarcation without committing themselves to the next step, whether the restoration of Zibhebhu or the return of the Exiles. Indeed, for the Colonial Office, part of the advantage of appointing the commission was that it deferred difficult decisions. When the time came for them to be made, the decision-makers would be better informed than in the past. Colonial Office letters to Harriette and to the A.P.S. did not refer either to the repatriation of the Exiles or the return of Zibhebhu to the Ndwandwe district.⁵⁶⁰

None of these official attitudes matched the fundamental Colenso view of what should be

553. C.O.427/11/14079, no.72: Mitchell to C.O., 13 July 1891, enclosing report of F.E. Cardew for May 1891. Minute by Fairfield, 16 July and Knutsford, 17 July 1891. Cardew's ideas are apparent in his letters to Harriette and in comments in Colonial Office files, viz. N.A., Col.Coll: F.E. Cardew to H.E. Colenso, 9 and 19 Dec.1892 and 30 June 1893.

554. *Ibid.*, F.E. Cardew to H.E. Colenso, 25 Nov.1892 and 30 June 1893.

555. *Ibid.*, 9 Dec.1892.

556. C.O.427/12/19255, no.97: Mitchell to C.O., 29 Aug.1891 with enclosure.

557. C.O.427/11/7950: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 20 Apr.1891.

558. C.6684, p.49, enclosure in no.3: Osborn's report for Oct.1891; p.57, no.14: Mitchell to Knutsford, 11 Jan.1892.

559. C.O.427/12/22970: H.E. Colenso to C.O., 28 Nov.1891, deletion in draft reply and marginal comment by J. Bramston, n.d.

560. C.6684, p.51, no.7: C.O. to H.E. Colenso, 23 Dec.1891; p.59, no.15: C.O. to H.E. Colenso, 16 Feb 1892; p.52, no.8: C.O. to A.P.S., 29 Dec.1891; p.53, no.10: to A.P.S., 25 Jan.1892; p.56, no.13: to A.P.S., 5 Feb.1892.

the future of Zululand. While Harriette argued the rights and wrongs of the particular proposals that were made, it seems likely that, as Osborn saw and said, she - and the uSuthu - were basically opposed to any division of the Ndwandwe.⁵⁶¹ Such divisions assumed the recognition of rival allegiances, whereas Harriette hoped for the reconciliation of all Zulus to Dinuzulu's restoration and pre-eminence. She remembered the precedents of the past. Demarcation of locations had been associated with the restoration of Zibhebhu, and discrepancies about what land was to be restored to him had aggravated turmoil both in 1883 and 1888.⁵⁶²

For Harriette, a by-product of the demarcation was the fact that the report of the commission, published in the Blue Book C.6684, enabled her to claim that the contentions of the defence in 1888-1889 had now been vindicated. This was the theme of her pamphlet on *The Zulu Impeachment of British Officials Confirmed by Official Records*,⁵⁶³ in which she found evidence of large scale evictions in 1888. She thought the report of the commission a tremendous signed confession from Osborn of the acts of which the defence team had accused him in the past. But Harriette's use of the Blue Book containing the report, when it was published in 1892, also demonstrates the Colenso resilience in argument. It did not mean that Harriette welcomed the idea of delimitation. The Colonial Office probably did not deserve the reproaches and suspicions over the demarcation. Its intentions were good. Arguably in authorising the demarcation it demonstrated that it had learned from past experience how important it was to consider carefully the extent of tribal claims. But Harriette's suspicions are eminently understandable.

As the Colonial Office had long since foreseen, Harriette now campaigned vigorously against the restoration of Zibhebhu. She wrote and circularised her pamphlets on *Fresh Trouble(s) in Zululand*.⁵⁶⁴ She called upon and wrote to MPs.⁵⁶⁵ She arranged and

561. C.6684, p.4, enclosure in no.17: Minute by Osborn to Mitchell, 5 Feb.1892.

562. H.E. Colenso, *Trouble*.

563. H.E. Colenso, *The Zulu Impeachment*. Here she used a term - impeachment - to evoke memories and associations with an old constitutional procedure which, Westlake had told her, no longer had validity in parliamentary procedure. See N.A., Col.Coll: J. Westlake to H.E. Colenso, 9 Mar.1890.

564. See bibliography.

565. N.A., Col.Coll: i.a. A. Webb to H.E. Colenso, 25 Feb.1892.

attended a meeting of MPs in the House of Commons.⁵⁶⁶ The debate came on 18 March 1892 on the initiative of Mr Picton. On that day de Worms, who already had a copy of her pamphlet, minuted that, in view of Miss Colenso's circular, it would be impossible to allow Zibhebhu to make even a temporary visit to the Ndwandwe.⁵⁶⁷ De Worms 'impertinent and unmanly' attack won Harriette sympathy.⁵⁶⁸ But Harriette's MPs needed coaching and were not always clear and consistent about what it was that they were demanding. Mr Picton's words, for example, leave one unsure whether he wanted to prevent all Mandlakazi from returning to the Ndwandwe, or whether it was only of Zibhebhu and his armed retainers that he was thinking.⁵⁶⁹ The Colonial Office decided that it was best to impose a blanket prohibition and telegraphed its views, insisting that Osborn be informed.⁵⁷⁰ On 11 April, for example, de Worms responded unfavourably to Cardew's suggestion that unarmed retainers be allowed to 'dribble' back to the Ndwandwe. The Under-Secretary urged delay because there was strong feeling on both sides of the House.⁵⁷¹ Picton remained watchful. After a *Natal Witness* report that the Mandlakazi had been allowed to return to the Ndwandwe, he wanted to know what steps the Colonial Office had taken to implement the assurances given in parliament the previous month.⁵⁷²

Using the telegraph, the Colonial Office banned the return of Mandlakazi to Ndwandwe. Until Mitchell received further orders from London, he was to prevent the return to the Ndwandwe district of all Mandlakazi.⁵⁷³ As far as the Colonial Office was concerned in April, Zibhebhu was to be denied even the triumph of a slow imperceptible migration of his people to the Ndwandwe district (although this seems to have taken place).⁵⁷⁴ Harriette remained watchful. Later Knutsford wanted to relent. This was after he had

566. *Ibid.*, sending message from Picton and enclosing notice to MPs meeting to be held on Tuesday 1 March (1892) at 2.30 o'clock.

567. C.O.427/13/4552: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 9 Feb.1892. Minute by de Worms, 18 Mar.1892. H.E. Colenso, *Baron de Worms Forgets Himself*.

568. N.A., Col.Coll: E.P. Mathers to H.E. Colenso, 28 Mar.1892.

569. C.O.427/13/5082, no.17: Mitchell to C.O., 15 Feb.1892. Minute by Fairfield, Apr.1892. *British Hansard*, 4th series, vol.2, col.1266.

570. C.O.427/13/4552: C.O. to Mitchell, 26 Mar.1892.

571. C.O.427/13/5082, no.17: Mitchell to C.O., 15 Feb.1892, marginal comment by de Worms, 11 Apr.1892.

572. *British Hansard*, 4th series, vol.3, cols 1559-61.

573. C.O.427/13/11500: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 10 May 1892. Minutes by *inter alia* F. Graham, 8 June and Fairfield, 9 June 1892.

574. C.O.427/15/16749: Ripon to Mitchell, 14 Oct.1892. *Zululand. Land Delimitation Commission*, p.284.

received Mitchell's protests in a private letter as well as her confidential despatch. But Knutsford's subordinates, Graham and Fairfield, showed the Secretary of State that he could not waver. The prohibition that had been pronounced and promised was a comprehensive one. If, as Graham feared, they had been entrapped into doing a great injustice to the Mandlakazi, this, as Fairfield said, could not be helped for the moment. The only official modification of the total prohibition against Mandlakazi moving to the Ndwandwe was to allow individuals to visit the district.⁵⁷⁵

According to Colonel Cardew, local officials had an exaggerated idea of Miss Colenso's power to stir troubles in Zululand. Fairfield recorded that he had accused Mitchell of 'having Miss Colenso on the brain'.⁵⁷⁶ Whatever her influence in Zululand, Harriette clearly did possess the power to stir trouble in parliament at some times and over some issues.

While the Conservatives were in power Harriette worked hard but expected little. She could get some support in parliament, but little sympathy from the Colonial Office. That she had parliamentary support gave her some leverage, which became more effective as the Conservative government grew more and more afraid of parliamentary defeat and loss of office. Harriette was able to achieve some things: she had thwarted the return of Zibhebhu and thus prevented the situation from getting worse. She had therefore kept open the possibility of favourable change. A government of which she approved might yet implement the policy she advocated.

When the Liberals came to power in mid-1892, this did much more than simply affect Harriette's relations with individual MPs. It made the whole situation more favourable and enhanced the chances of Harriette's success. As Agnes wrote:

'HEC says we must not count our chickens before they are hatched, but so far the present nominations to the ministry are 'auspicious', & (sic) lead one to hope that something may be accomplished without Parliament.'⁵⁷⁷

575. C.O.427/13/11500: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 10 May 1892. Minutes by F. Graham, 8 June; Fairfield, 9 June; Knutsford, 11 June; Graham and Fairfield, 15 June 1892. C.O.427/15/11321: Mitchell to Knutsford, private, 27 Apr.1892.

576. C.O.427/15/11321: F. Cardew to C.O. Minute by Fairfield, 28 May 1892.

577. N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso to K. Giles, 19 Aug.1892.

This transformation took time, and discussion of the broad implications of the change of government is therefore deferred to Section E. Here only the more direct change in Harriette's dealing with MPs is noticed.

In the main there was less chance of a 'brisk little debate' on the Zulu question in the British parliament. Harriette's supporters among the Liberal party remained sympathetic, but for them the Zulu question was no longer a convenient stick with which to beat the government, nor did they think parliamentary agitation the best way of helping Harriette's ends. Bryce, for example, told her that he did not advise a deputation, in which he could anyway not participate, because he was now the head of another department of government. He advised her to approach Ripon directly, and read through her letter to the new Secretary of State for the Colonies.⁵⁷⁸ A. Webb, although he suggested Osborn's promotion - and exit - in March 1893, was engrossed in the prospects of Home Rule for Ireland.⁵⁷⁹ Now it was Captain Bethell, a Conservative, and de Worms, Harriette's former antagonist, who asked about Zululand.⁵⁸⁰ A Colenso-inspired query arose in November 1893 several months after Harriette had sailed for Natal, when Mr Picton posed a question on behalf of Mr Charles Hopwood.⁵⁸¹ The question was about the fate of the six uSuthu whom Harriette had discussed in her pamphlet. It did not unduly embarrass the government, but the Colonial Office thought it wise to correct and amplify the initial House of Commons answer.⁵⁸²

Arguably it was as much a sign of hopefulness as indifference that Liberal sympathisers should wish to let the Zululand questions rest awhile as far as parliament was concerned. Responsibility for decision lay now with the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, and he was justifiably credited with good intentions.

In fact, when Harriette left England in mid-1893, it seemed likely that the changes in Britain, the changes for Zululand, and the changes imminent in Natal would all contribute to a triumphant vindication, acceptance, and application of her ideas. Yet, in time,

578. *Ibid.*, J. Bryce to H.E. Colenso, 31 July 1892.

579. *Ibid.*, A. Webb to H.E. Colenso, 9 Aug.1892, 18 Feb and 23 Mar.1893.

580. See above, pp.248-49.

581. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. N.A., Col.Coll: W.A. Jones to Fox Bourne, 22 Dec.1893. British *Hansard*, 4th series, vol.18, col.1809: 27 Nov.1893.

582. See above, p.249 and fn.526.

Harriette was to find that even such optimism as she had allowed herself in mid-1893 was misplaced. What needs investigation here is why she should have expected favourable change, and what were the signs, even in mid-1893, that optimism might be misplaced.

First of all there was the fact that there was now a Liberal government. Little could be expected of W.E. Gladstone. Old, obsessed with Ireland, and perhaps already despairing of South Africa, he had in the past fended off appeals on behalf of the Zulu with murmurs of sympathy.⁵⁸³ But Ripon and Buxton were at the Colonial Office and were well regarded in humanitarian circles. Ripon was described by one of Harriette's correspondents as 'that just & considerate & sympathetic old man'.⁵⁸⁴ Ripon's sympathy was soon evident. In January 1893 Harriette thought it possible that the retirement with honour of Osborn, and the release of the Exiles, might both be effected by the Queen's birthday.⁵⁸⁵ That was too optimistic. In fact, the Colonial Office had to correct a misleading announcement of the Exiles' release.⁵⁸⁶ Ripon proceeded slowly. However important the members of the A.P.S. and, however strong Harriette's claims for sympathy and courtesy, Ripon was now the head, and Buxton the spokesman, of a hierarchy of officials. These roles imposed their own obligations, and officials within the Colonial Office reminded their new political masters of what these obligations were, as they explained the complexities of Zulu issues.⁵⁸⁷ Of Miss Colenso, Fairfield minuted:

'[Miss Colenso] has been the great thorn in the side of the British Govt. (sic) in Zululand and her messengers of encouragement to the Usutus, and constant prophesying that the British Gvt. would be upset and that Sir Charles Mitchell and Mr Osborn would go to the wall with the Cabinet has prevented things from settling down. It would be well that Her Majesty's Govt. should come to some understanding with her and her friends on the whole question. I dare say she will prove to have no designs of making Dinuzulu "king" again, but his power must be limited perhaps more than she would like ...'⁵⁸⁸

To meet the expectations of officials and of their humanitarian critics, Ripon steered a

583. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. See above, pp.111-12.

584. N.A., Col.Coll: C. Impey to H.E. Colenso, 11 Mar.1893.

585. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.78: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 20 Jan.1893. cf. N.A., Col.Coll: J. Cobden-Unwin to H.E. Colenso, Dec.1892.

586. British *Hansard*, 4th Series, vol.12, cols 1416-17: question by Bethell, answered by Buxton, 19 May 1893.

587. See, for example, C.O.427/14/16322. no.62: Mitchell to C.O., 16 July 1892. Minute by Fairfield, 20 Aug.1892.

588. *Ibid.*

skilful course in developing a new direction in policy. It was clear that, while consulting Buxton and the officials, Ripon would seek to give every party to the Zululand issues their due and insist on determining for himself what was the wisest policy. He had no intention of 'installing Miss Colenso and the A.P.S. in Zululand',⁵⁸⁹ but, nevertheless, his refusal to be bound to the *status quo* necessarily raised the question of Osborn. During his leave Osborn had told Fairfield that he would prefer to go, if the Exiles were to return.⁵⁹⁰ It followed that, if Ripon were to have a free hand, Osborn must go. But Fairfield's urgings were heeded, and Ripon did not 'throw Osborn to the lions',⁵⁹¹ nor did he 'allow Miss Colenso to dance on everyone'.⁵⁹² He agreed that Osborn should not be made the scapegoat for the policy of 'pulverising' the uSuthu and he decided to confer with Mitchell when he came to England.⁵⁹³ Some months passed before Ripon responded to early letters from the A.P.S. and Harriette. In the letter to the Society Ripon discussed in some detail the removals from the Ndwandwe and assured the Society that the Colonial Office was seeking some way of minimising the inconvenience and distress of removals. But he defended Osborn. Osborn, according to this view, had loyally carried out the policy of the past, and Ripon could not condemn him as partial or prejudiced, unless he were to fail to carry out the policy on which Ripon determined. He sent a copy of this letter to Mitchell with a very careful covering despatch. He drew Mitchell's attention to his defence of Osborn, but he also intimated clearly that change was coming.⁵⁹⁴ He warned too that he expected from subordinates a reciprocal sense of obligation, and willing and intelligent support in developing the principles of policy which the Secretary of State favoured. Ripon spelt it out:

'It is the duty of the Secretary of State to take the burden of responsibility on himself for those who serve under him, and he has a right to expect from them not only that they will give an implicit obedience to the text of his instructions, but that they will willingly and intelligently second and develop the principles of policy which are laid down by him.'⁵⁹⁵

589. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43556 ff.203-04: R. Meade to Ripon, 22 Feb.1893.

590. C.O.427/14/16322, no.62: Mitchell to C.O., 16 July 1892. Minute by Fairfield, 20 Aug.1892.

591. C.O.427/14/18470, no.71: Mitchell to C.O., 18 Aug.1892. Minute by Fairfield, 20 Sept.1892.

592. C.O.427/15/16749: A.P.S. to Ripon, 22 Aug.1892. Minute by Fairfield, 28 Sept.1892.

593. C.O.427/14/21124, no.87: Mitchell to C.O., 5 Oct.1892. Minutes by Fairfield, 1 Jan. and 27 Mar.1893.

594. C.O.427/14/16322, no.62: Mitchell to C.O., 16 July 1892. Minute by Ripon, 24 Oct.1892.

595. C.O.427/15/16749, Ripon to Mitchell, 14 Oct.1892.

In the meanwhile, Osborn's pension entitlement was considered⁵⁹⁶ while private letters from Meade to Mitchell stirred the question of Osborn's retirement. One private letter, drafted by Fairfield and revised by Meade, was intended to be shown to Osborn. It sweetened for Osborn the inducements of retirement. He was to be eased out with the offer of money and honours. In another private letter, this one intended only for Mitchell, Meade made it plain that Osborn was considered to have stayed in his place too long:

‘The time has come for healing past animosities, and you will probably agree with me that a new man, not identified with past transactions & [sic] disputes will be more likely to succeed in the task.’⁵⁹⁷

The reply to Harriette Colenso took the form of the long awaited interview.⁵⁹⁸ By December 1892 the Colonial Office knew that Osborn had decided to accept the ‘graceful’ and ‘liberal’ retirement.⁵⁹⁹ As his successor the Liberals appointed Sir Marshal Clarke.⁶⁰⁰ He had been held in great esteem for several years. In 1887 the *Natal Mercury* suggested him as a possible successor to Osborn.⁶⁰¹ As a servant of the Crown Clarke had successfully placated Basutoland after the Gun War and effected its transfer from the administration of the Cape Colony to that of the Crown. He had won high praise in the Colonial Office.⁶⁰² More recently L.H. Courtney, after Harriette's visit to him, wrote a private note to Ripon in which he suggested the appointment of Sir Marshal.⁶⁰³ The appointment of Sir Marshal showed at least two things:

- (a) The Colonial Office thought the Zulu issue an important one. It merited the attention of its top man, even though the transfer of Sir Marshal was not intended to be permanent, and he expected to return to Basutoland.
- (b) By appointing Sir Marshal the Colonial Office implied an expectation that he would adapt to the context he found in Zululand the principles of government that he had applied in Basutoland.

596. C.O.427/14/17056: Mitchell to C.O., 26 Aug.1892. Minute by Fairfield, 26 Aug.1892.

597. C.O.427/12/7479: i.e. drafts of private letters, R. Meade to Mitchell and Osborn, filed with M. Osborn to Secretary of State, 13 Apr.1891.

598. C.O.427/15/17595: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 5 Sept.1892. Minute by Ripon, 8 Oct.1892. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43553 ff.13-16: Buxton to Ripon, 10 Oct.1892.

599. C.O.427/15/17056: Mitchell to C.O., telegram, 26 Aug.1892. Minute by Buxton, 30 Aug.1892. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43553, ff.73-80: Buxton to Ripon, 28 Dec.1892.

600. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

601. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/79: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 9 Nov.1887.

602. C.O.427/12/16067: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 15 July 1891. Minute by F. Graham, 25 Aug.1891. D.R. Burton, ‘Sir Godfrey Lagden, Colonial Administrator’ (Ph.D., Rhodes University, 1989), p.74.

603. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43636 ff.253-256: L.H. Courtney to Ripon, 13 Dec.1892.

Harriette would have described that policy as one of governing with, not against, the indigenous institutions.⁶⁰⁴

Sir Marshal was preferred to Colonel Cardew who had acted as Resident Commissioner during Osborn's leave of absence and whose name was sometimes suggested as a possible successor.⁶⁰⁵ Clarke had a glowing reputation and the advantage of being a new man to Zululand. Ripon wanted from Clarke a careful and unhurried report on the condition of Zululand. He was to report on the uSuthu-Mandlakazi rivalry and on the form of government which he would recommend for the future administration of Zululand. He was to deal, too, with the question of the return of the Exiles from St Helena. The Colonial Office hoped for a full report in seven months.⁶⁰⁶

Here, at length, was some fulfilment of the old plea that there should be full and impartial enquiry into the affairs of Zululand. But the Liberal approach, even on this, was cautious. Clarke was asked not to let it be generally known that he was acting as a one man commission of enquiry.⁶⁰⁷ It was, however, inevitable that rumours of return should again circulate in Zululand, although Buxton thought that 'Miss Colenso is probably at the bottom of it!'⁶⁰⁸

The Colensos welcomed the news of Sir Marshal Clarke's appointment. He was an old associate of the Colensos, and Harriette had already extolled his attitude and achievement in Basutoland.⁶⁰⁹ Harriette made sure Sir Marshal knew what were her views. Before he left Maseru she sent him copies of her pamphlets and she visited him in Zululand soon after her return to Natal. She was in an amiable and co-operative mood.⁶¹⁰

604. *cf.* N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to (addressee not named), 13 Sept.1896.

605. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.131/77: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 26 Oct.1887 and C.131/79: H.E. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 9 Nov.1887. C.O.427/12/18561, no.96: Mitchell to C.O., 21 Aug.1891. Minute by R. Meade, 19 Sept.1891.

606. C.O.427/16/6899: A. Haden to C.O., telegram, 27 Apr.1893. Minute by R. Meade, 28 Apr.1893 and Ripon to M. Clarke, draft of despatch, 2 June 1893. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43561, ff.129-132: Ripon to M. Clarke (with endorsement re letter to H. Loch), 24 Mar.1893.

607. *Ibid.*, Add.Mss.43561, ff.129-32: Ripon to M. Clarke, 24 Mar.1893.

608. C.O.427/17/15161: Haden to C.O., 4 Aug.1893, enclosing report of Osborn, 26 July 1893 and of the acting R.M. of Ndwandwe, 19 July 1893. Minute by Buxton, 5 Sept.1893.

609. N.A., Col.Coll: F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 26 Jan.1894.

610. Lagden Papers: M. Clarke to G. Lagden, 13 Sept. and 22 Nov.1893.

There was cause for caution as well as congratulation in Clarke's appointment. The Colonial Office had moved slowly and deliberately. It had removed Osborn, but it had also honoured him. It had appointed Sir Marshal to investigate, but it had not publicly capitulated to the old humanitarian plea for a 'full impartial investigation' into the affairs of Zululand.⁶¹¹ Harriette worried lest the Colonial Office make poor decisions about Dinuzulu *i.e.* to separate him from his uncles, to reduce his status among the Zulu people, and/or to delay his return unduly.⁶¹²

What Harriette failed to appreciate adequately was the parliamentary difficulties of the Liberal government. She had electioneered in 1892 for D. Naoraji, a Liberal candidate, and she welcomed the Liberal success.⁶¹³ She also remarked that she was pleased that they had not won by too big a majority. The remark was at once astute and naive. It was astute in recognising that all governments, and especially insecure ones, have to take their backbenchers into account. It was naive in assuming that the backbench Liberals, who had been friends of the uSuthu in the past, would always accept Harriette's view of what was in their best interests.

As usual, the Liberal party was in a minority in the House of Lords. In the House of Commons they, with their Irish Nationalist allies, had a majority of only forty.⁶¹⁴ Tight cohesion within the party might have mitigated the lack of an adequate parliamentary edge, but this the Liberal party conspicuously lacked. At best, they were a conglomeration of divergent groups which desperately needed the elasticity of good will or the buoyancy of hope, if they were to hold together. But good will and hope were eroded quickly. Predictably, the Home Rule Bill was rejected in the House of Lords. Predictably, the final retirement of Gladstone early in 1894 left rivalry and resentment over leadership rampant within the party.⁶¹⁵ Predictably too, there were other areas of Africa which claimed more urgent attention than Zululand. Lugard called upon his countrymen to assert their faith in Britain's capacity to do good by urging the establishment of British control over

611. See above, fn.607.

612. C.O.427/15/21063: H.E. Colenso to Buxton, 28 Oct.1892.

613. N.A., Col.Coll: A.L. Browne to H.E. Colenso, 12 July (1892, int.ev.); H.E. Colenso to K. Giles, 8 July 1892.

614. R. Ensor, *England, 1870-1914* (Oxford, 1949), p.208.

615. *Ibid.*, pp.209-16.

Uganda, and the proposal had the sympathy of Gladstone's successor Rosebery.⁶¹⁶ Then in 1893, as Harriette withdrew from England to Natal, the Ndebele and the Chartered Company experienced their first major confrontation north of the Zambezi. It was by no means certain that a Liberal government could act decisively in regard to Zululand.⁶¹⁷

As the Liberal party became more divided, disappointed, and distracted, so the hold of the Liberal government on power grew more precarious. Like the Conservatives, but to an even greater extent, the Liberal ministers dared not risk alienating their own backbenchers. Fear of loss of support from within had already halted the Conservatives in regard to Zibhebhu. A little later, the Liberals abandoned the projected return of the Exiles from St Helena because this proposal became enmeshed with what their backbenchers abhorred: the annexation of Zululand to Natal.⁶¹⁸ An astute political observer might have foreseen that the Liberal party had too weak a grip on power to be sure of fulfilling good intentions. Harriette did not. She had some worries and doubts when she left England, but concern about the relatively weak parliamentary position of the Liberal ministry was not one of them. There was more hope than worry in her attitude in mid-1893.

Harriette was hopeful, too, about the constitutional changes that were impending in Natal. The colony was on the verge of Responsible government. To rid the Home government of responsibility for Natal's loans to finance feverish railway construction, the Colonial Office agreed to grant Responsible government, once it was satisfied that this was wanted not only by the legislative council of Natal but also by the white electorate. Electoral contests were close but, after a second election on the Responsible government issue, initial results in two constituencies were successfully challenged, and a majority of the specially elected Legislative Council supported the change. The bill which inaugurated Responsible government was accepted in London. The change was scheduled for October 1893. Wrangles between Pietermaritzburg and London - over 'native' policy, the Natal Native Land Trust, the question of who was to control the Supreme Chief, and over the amount of money to be set aside annually for 'native' purposes - were now over. Where

616. A. Low, *British Public Opinion and the Uganda Questions. October to December 1892*. Photocopy available in Cory Library, Rhodes University.

617. R.I. Rotberg, *The Founder* (New York & Johannesburg, 1985), p.435.

618. See below, Chapter Seven.

settlement was not reached, its absence was glossed. The problem, for example, over who was to control the governor as Supreme Chief was transferred to the future.⁶¹⁹ In the Colonial Office, among some members of the House of Commons, and among some Natal colonists, there was concern about the position of the blacks under Responsible government, but this had not prevented the change.⁶²⁰ The usual rationalisation, that enlightened self-interest among the whites could prevent injustices to the blacks, seems to have operated to counteract humanitarian concern. This was not Shepstone's view and it proved to be sadly misplaced.⁶²¹ Among some whites, there was genuine fearfulness about their own safety, given the black majority among whom they lived. Doubts of this kind were lessened by the concession that an imperial garrison was to remain in Natal for five years after the change.⁶²²

When Harriette returned to Natal, optimism among both blacks and whites seemed uppermost. Black views in favour of Responsible government appeared in the columns of *Inkanyiso*, the small mission-inspired newspaper attached to St Alban's College.⁶²³ Harriette shared the optimism. Perhaps some Colenso influence spread to its pages, for Magema Magwaza taught for a time at St Albans and contributed to *Inkanyiso*'s columns. It was natural that Natal blacks should want change for the better, and understandable that they should have hoped that Responsible government would give it to them.⁶²⁴ Amongst the whites who favoured the change there was an eager expectation of benefit for Natal. Responsible government would strengthen the hands of the Natal government in regard to negotiations over railways and customs, and in regard to territorial expansion. Some foresaw the incorporation of Zululand.⁶²⁵ The stigma of constitutional inferiority to the Cape Colony would be removed. Natal would fare better in its rivalry with the Cape

619. The Colonial Office Natal files, C.O.179, are thick with correspondence and controversy over the constitutional change.

620. C.O.179/179/23789, no.257: Mitchell to C.O., 12 Nov.1890, with enclosure.

621. For later indictment of the impact of Responsible government on the black people of Natal, see *Report of the Natal Native Commission 1906-1907* (Report dated 25 July 1907), para.22.

622. See also *Natal Witness*, 18 Sept.1897, speech of Harry Escombe in relation to imperial garrison in Zululand.

623. *Inkanyiso*, leader, 24 Mar.1893.

624. K.C.A.L., Dinuzulu Correspondence: letters by M.M. Magwaza to the Exiles, sometimes on his own behalf, sometimes on behalf of Zulu messengers.

625. C.O.179/169/1692: F.W. Chesson to C.O., 26 Jan.1887, forwarding letter from Escombe, 13 Dec.1886.

and its dealings with the Republics.⁶²⁶ Harriette, a white colonist to whom Natal, not England, was home as well as a self-styled 'white uSuthu', was caught up in the general optimism. Absence from Natal, ignorance of official correspondence, and of the anxious deliberation in the Colonial Office, veiled from Harriette the tensions and irreconcilable contradictions between black hopes and white aspirations.⁶²⁷

SECTION E: Hopes High But Fragile

One of the reasons for caution that Harriette failed to appreciate was the way in which white pressure for land, both in Natal and in Zululand, would affect the black population in both these colonies. Petitions for the opening to whites of land in Zululand were sent to the Governor and to the Colonial Office. Discussion in the Colonial Office of the petitions and of the attitude of the white officials to them show London officials and some colonial servants more alert at this point to the strength of white pressures than Harriette was. What imperial officials foresaw was that more blacks would be concentrated on the land left available to them in Zululand. This would result either from the introduction of white settlement in Zululand, which Mitchell seemed to favour, or it would come as an indirect consequence of Responsible government in Natal. Responsible ministers, so the Colonial Office anticipated, would evict Natal blacks from Crown lands in Natal, and such 'ousted squatters' would need to find refuge in Zululand if the peace of Natal were to be assured.⁶²⁸ Harriette, in the early 1890s, did not think about these things. It was a curious omission on her part. In 1886 she had known well enough that Natalians were involved in the filibuster drive which carved the New Republic from Zululand.⁶²⁹ It is a parenthetical paradox that Osborn, the man Harriette so vehemently attacked, was far more explicit about his conviction that Zululand should be kept as a 'native reserve' and that whites should be excluded, although he would presumably have allowed for the entry

626. The constitutional changes are discussed in E. Brookes & C. de B. Webb, *A History of Natal* (Pietermaritzburg, 1965), Chapter XVIII, pp.168-88. For more detailed discussion see J. Lambert, 'Sir John Robinson and Responsible Government, 1865-1897' (M.A., University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1975), and C.J. Talbot, 'Harry Escombe and the Politics of Responsible Government' (M.A., University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1974).

627. B.M. Nicholls, 'Harriette Colenso and the Issue of Responsible Government in Natal'. Paper presented at the Workshop for Natal Historians, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1993.

628. C.O.427/11/11095, no.57: Mitchell to C.O., 4 May 1891. Minutes by Fairfield, 6 and 23 June 1891, by J. Bramston 10 June 1891, by R.G.W. Herbert on 11 and 30 June 1891, and by Knutsford 12 June and 1 July 1891.

629. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Prof. Kuenen, 7 Nov.1886.

into Zululand of refugee - or favoured - blacks from Natal.⁶³⁰ Cardew, too, recognised how fraught with danger for the Zulu was the grant of Responsible government to Natal.⁶³¹

Harriette's support for Responsible government sets her apart from humanitarians of the John Mackenzie stamp.⁶³² Though he had earlier supported the Colenso efforts, John Mackenzie believed that black salvation lay in effective imperial intervention and imperial control. Harriette did not. Her lack of faith in the imperial connection was quite crucial in its effect on her endeavour. Probably the most decisive factor in making Harriette a supporter of Responsible government was her disenchantment with the 'native policy' and the decisions about Zululand of the pre-Responsible government era. The Colensos had clashed sharply with the pro-consuls *par excellence* who seemed to represent the dominance of the imperial factor: Wolseley and Frere. Later Sir Henry Bulwer allowed, and identified with, the continued ascendancy and dominance of the Shepstone-dominated official elite in Natal. He had certainly become bitterly hostile to the Colensos.⁶³³ In their eyes Havelock had proved a disappointment, although they remained on friendly terms.⁶³⁴ If Responsible government could dislodge the old official despotism, it was to be welcomed. Buttressing this thinking was Harriette's present trust in Escombe's attitude and intentions and in her father's judgment.⁶³⁵ As Harriette saw Escombe in the early 1890s, he had more than redeemed his reputation by his vigorous and generous defence of the uSuthu in 1888-89 and he had confirmed her support for Responsible government. Even before then, her father, as Harriette recalled, had not been opposed to Responsible government. Harriette had willingly accepted Escombe's insistence that the defence of the uSuthu must be seen not as a defence of blacks against whites, but as an attack by colonists against officials. Frank supported her in this.⁶³⁶ Like their father in the 1870s, Frank and Harriette in the 1890s, and even later, retained confidence in the

630. See above, fn.628, especially minute by Fairfield, 23 June 1891.

631. N.A., Col.Coll: F.E. Cardew to H.E. Colenso, 20 Mar.1893.

632. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

633. For Harriette Colenso's attitude, see Nicholls, 'Harriette Colenso and Responsible Government'.

634. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to S.F. Colenso, 16 Nov.1887; A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 22 Feb.(1895?).

635. Nicholls, 'Harriette Colenso and Responsible Government'.

636. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 17, 24 and 26 Mar.1889.

white colonists of Natal.⁶³⁷ Though Harriette agreed with Alice Werner in 1893 that the 'whites did need talking to - all of them', it was on the action of officials that she concentrated her criticism.⁶³⁸

Harriette's attitude to her fellow colonists seems to have been based in part on past experience, in part on wishful thinking. Most Natalians had been proud of their Bishop in the 1860s, when he defied the Bishop of Cape Town. There had been some slight support from within the colony for the Bishop in the 1870s over the Langalibalele episode, when Sanderson of the *Natal Colonist* backed him.⁶³⁹ Harriette generously acknowledged how much she owed to Escombe.⁶⁴⁰ When her father died, colonial grief was genuine⁶⁴¹ and, when Bishopstowe was burnt, subscribers to the Colenso Sympathy Fund had shown spontaneous sympathy, even though they had not wished to support the political stand of the Colensos.⁶⁴² In addition, there was, of course, support from within the colony for the Church of England in Natal, although some of its leading supporters were hostile or ambivalent to the Bishop's beliefs and/or actions, whether in theology or politics.⁶⁴³ As Natal moved to Responsible government, Harriette persuaded herself and others that some at least of her fellow colonists - those who represented 'New Natal'⁶⁴⁴ - were a potential source of support. If her expectations were exaggerated, this was understandable: she so desperately needed some support to succeed in her aims. This links with another dimension to her thinking. Harriette was sure that in due time the black people of Natal, like those of the Cape, would be enfranchised. What, she asked, was the alternative? This remained her attitude in the early years of the twentieth century. To her the granting of Responsible government to Natal with its small white electorate was not incompatible with the extension of the franchise to the black people of Natal. She rejected the argument that Responsible government should be delayed

637. See, for example, her reference to the improved feeling of 'uncoloured Natal', in Schreiner Papers, f.1319: H.E. Colenso to W.P. Schreiner, 28 Aug.1908.

638. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.80: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 9 June 1893.

639. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, pp.285 and 312.

640. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref: Box 145): H.E. Colenso to S.F. Colenso, May 1889.

641. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Z.258: Fr.El. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, n.d., comment on 'universal ... grief', although her mother pointed to the 'malignant joy' of the enemy. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.374.

642. N.A., Col.Coll: F.E. Colenso to Fr.El. Colenso, 12 Nov.1884; F.R. Statham to H.E. Colenso, 14 and 17 Sept.1884.

643. Theophilus Shepstone and J.R. Saunders are the best examples. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

644. See references in later pamphlets e.g. *Zululand, the Exiled Chiefs, Natal and the Colonial Office* (London, 1895), p.21 for disparaging comments on the 'old Natal'.

until there was a significant black vote in Natal.⁶⁴⁵

How the grant of Responsible government to Natal would affect the future of Zululand was one of the uncertainties.⁶⁴⁶ Curiously, what Harriette feared in 1893 was the suggested separation of Zululand from Natal into a colony with its own governor, who, it was rumoured then, would be Osborn. She protested against such a separation;⁶⁴⁷ and did not fear the incorporation of Zululand into Natal.⁶⁴⁸ Whether or not the grant of Responsible government would accelerate or delay such incorporation remained to be seen. Opposite prophecies were implied or expressed. Escombe at the end of 1886 linked advocacy of Responsible government with the annexation to Natal of Zululand, and Natalian criticism of Havelock's 1886 negotiations had implied that Responsible government for the colony would ensure expanding frontiers.⁶⁴⁹ On the other hand, Knutsford had stated firmly his view that it was inexpedient to link together the issue of the incorporation of Zululand into Natal and the grant of Responsible government.⁶⁵⁰ In the negotiations for Responsible government, the issue of Zululand was soft pedalled, but it was soon evident that the Responsible ministers wanted Zululand for Natal. Zululand, they insisted, should not be handed over to any other white government. In addition, they wanted themselves to determine when they would acquire Zululand. The risks of acquisition had to be weighed against the advantages. Finally, their aim was to ensure that, when Natal did annex Zululand, the Natal government would be free to determine what kind of policy should be pursued there.⁶⁵¹

In mid-1893 it did not dismay Harriette that the Responsible ministers of Natal would seek to annex Zululand. There were two reasons for this. She believed that the advent of Responsible government in Natal, by breaking the old official despotism, would transform

645. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.70: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 2 Oct.1891.

646. N.A., Col.Coll: Extract from *Pall Mall Gazette*, 17 Mar.1893 (pasted into cover of *Present Position of the Zulus*).

647. C.O.427/12/16067: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 15 July 1891. N.A., Col.Coll: Extract from *Echo*, n.d., pasted into cover of *Present Position*; C.E. Schwann to H.E. Colenso, 27 Mar.1893; Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43561, ff.193-98: H. Loch to Ripon, 17 July 1893.

648. See, for example, C.O.427/11/5291, no.26: Mitchell to C.O., 17 Feb.1891. Minute by R.G.W. Herbert, 17 Mar.1891; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers, Mss.Afr.S. 1286(i), ff.234-35: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 21 Sept.1893.

649. R.H.L., Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.133/157: Escombe to F.W. Chesson, 13 Dec.1886.

650. C.O.427/11/11097: Mitchell to C.O., confidential, 4 May 1891. Minutes by Fairfield, 2 June 1891; J. Bramston, 10 June 1891; R.G.W. Herbert, 11 June 1891 and Knutsford, 14 June 1891.

651. See below, Chapter Seven.

Natal's 'native' policy. Given that confidence, her opposition to annexation of 1886-87 had become anachronistic, and she was prepared to abandon it. In addition she was confident of Escombe's personal friendship and political fellowship. She thought of consulting him about a newspaper post in South Africa for Alice Werner,⁶⁵² and appreciated the hospitality of the comfortable Escombe home when the Colenso women arrived in Durban from Britain in September 1893.⁶⁵³ Harriette hoped and believed that Escombe as a minister in a Responsible ministry in the 1890s would secure the adoption of the kind of policy which he had advocated in 1888-89: reparation to the uSuthu, the return of the uSuthu leaders, and the recognition that a central position for Dinuzulu was both what he merited and what would best serve the interests of the Zulu people, Natal, and Britain.⁶⁵⁴

In her speaking and writing in Britain in the years 1890-93 Harriette had been too intent on the question of Zibhebhu, the Exiles, and the Ndwandwe to give much direct attention to the merits and demerits of Responsible government. But she had not spoken against it. In fact, in criticising so much what had been done to blacks by white officials who did not need to consider local white opinion, Harriette contributed to a general undermining of the humanitarian confidence in the imperial connection as a means of safeguarding the interests of blacks. On occasion, she was quite explicit about her views. They served to lessen opposition in Britain both to the grant of Responsible government to Natal and to the incorporation of Zululand with Natal.

What gave Harriette confidence in the future was the buoyant expectation that Sir Marshal Clarke's recommendations would correspond not only with her own ideas but also with the kind of policy for Zululand that Escombe favoured, and which would therefore be adopted by the new Responsible ministry in Natal. In her mid-1893 view, the consequences of the change of government in Britain in mid-1892 and the consequences for Zululand of the change of regime in Natal in 1893 were likely to merge in harmony and prove beneficial for the Zulus. She did not foresee a situation in which the consequences of the grant of Responsible government to Natal would militate against the

652. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.75: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 3 June 1892.

653. *Ibid.*, Dd.65: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 21 Sept.1893.

654. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Escombe, 6 Dec.1895; C.O.427/15/21063: H.E. Colenso to Ripon, 28 Oct.1892.

consequences of the advent to power of the Liberals in Britain.

In mid-1893 the changes, even of the immediate future, were obscure. Among the imminent changes in Natal was the long-rumoured change of governor. Mitchell was not an enthusiast for Responsible government⁶⁵⁵ and it made good sense that a new man should preside over a new regime. Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson took over from Mitchell both as Governor of Natal and Zululand. As Governor of Natal, he was 'clothed in all the majesty of constitutional government'; as Governor of Zululand he was responsible, in theory, solely to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. Hely-Hutchinson was not a particularly self-reliant man; he relied on his ministers in Natal. He relied on Sir Marshal Clarke in Zululand. In any situation he indulged in a profusion of private letters to his superiors. He was incapable of a lonely stand on principle. In retrospect, he was a good man for Natal; a poor choice for Zululand.⁶⁵⁶

With all these changes accomplished and pending, Harriette decided that it was time to go. On the initiative of Fox Bourne, supporters and admirers gathered to wish her well.⁶⁵⁷ She had Sir Marshal Clarke to see in Zululand⁶⁵⁸ and Bishop Baynes to contend with in Natal.⁶⁵⁹ With Zulu affairs moving in the right direction,⁶⁶⁰ Harriette believed it her duty to concentrate on matters ecclesiastical, *i.e.* 'the quarrel of the chiefs who had separated themselves from Sobantu'.⁶⁶¹ The Colenso party reached Bishopstowe in mid-September 1893.⁶⁶²

655. Granville Papers: Mitchell to Antrobus, 17 May.1886.

656. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. There are numerous letters, some of them anxious and ingratiating, in both the Ripon and the Chamberlain Papers.

657. N.A., Col.Coll: Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, 17 and 18 Aug.1893.

658. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to S.F. Colenso, from Eshowe, letters of Nov. and Dec.1893, *viz.* 17, 19, 21, 22, 26, 28 29 and 30 Nov; 2 and 9 Dec.

659. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

660. William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand: W. Carter to Algernon West, 4 June 1893. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, pp.427-29, S.F. Colenso to K. Lyell, 14 Sept.1893 and 30 Nov.1893.

661. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Exiles, 6 Dec.1894.

662. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, pp.427-29, S.F. Colenso to K. Lyell, 14 Sept. and 30 Nov.1893.

CHAPTER SIX

**ANGLICANS AT LOGGERHEADS: THE CHURCH CONTROVERSY IN
NATAL, c.1883-c.1897**

Purple Petticoats, Pugilistic Parson(s) and a Pugnacious Female*

For Harriette Colenso the 'sacred duty' she inherited from her father was both secular and ecclesiastic. In the secular arena the main emphasis was on the defence of the black people of Zululand and Natal; but this did not absorb all her efforts. As the daughter of Bishop Colenso she inherited the ecclesiastical struggle - the fight for survival of those Anglican churches in Natal that had continued to accept Colenso as Bishop and had not joined the Church of the Province of South Africa.¹ The latter was the collective name assumed by the churches that followed Bishop Gray and whose representatives debated and accepted a constitution in 1870, while their opponents in Natal continued to call themselves the Church of England in Natal. A discussion of the Colenso role which ignored the ecclesiastical dimension of Harriette's efforts would be an over-simplification of the Colenso endeavour. It seems appropriate to insert this discussion at a point when, as far as the narrative of Harriette's political activity is concerned, the circumstances that existed for a year and a half after the return of the Colenso women to Natal in 1893 gave her some respite from intense political argument and activity.

Two important themes are explored. One consists of the efforts of the Church of England to survive, and perhaps grow stronger, in the years that followed Colenso's death on 20 June 1883, the impact of these efforts and the opposition they aroused. The second is the role of the Colenso family in the ecclesiastical disputes. Here Harriette Emily Colenso is the most important figure. She was, so her mother claimed, the 'most energetic' of all the Church of England role players. She enjoyed also the support of her sister Agnes and her brother Frank. Some attention is given to the way Harriette's concern with church matters interacted with her political activities.

* These phrases were used in contemporary controversy.

1. Published works which deal with the controversy include P. Hinchliff, *The Anglican Church in South Africa* (London, 1963); John William Colenso (London, 1964); B. Burnett, *Anglicans in Natal* (Durban, 1953); J.J. Guy, *The Heretic: a Study of the Life of John William Colenso* (Johannesburg, 1983). W. Rees, *Colenso Letters from Natal* (Pietermaritzburg, 1958).

The two themes indicated above are by no means identical. Some Church of England supporters objected to Bishop Colenso's theological position, some to his political activities, and some to both. The best example of a prominent Church of England layman who was opposed to Colenso's political exhortations was Theophilus Shepstone. Though born of Methodist missionary stock, Shepstone was evidently drawn into the Church of England by his early friendship with Colenso.² Even after friendship ended, Shepstone remained a member of the Church of England until his death, despite the strong animus against him of members of the Colenso family.³ The Colensos themselves remained absolutely loyal to their father's teachings in regard to both religion and politics. They republished his sermons to emphasise his teaching;⁴ and they continued his championship of the House of Shaka to demonstrate their acceptance of his political legacy. Convinced that the survival of the Zulu people depended on co-operation between the uSuthu leaders and British officials, the Colensos were bitter critics of official policies which led to hostility.⁵ While there were occasions of good will and courtesy between the Colenso daughters and Shepstone, hearty co-operation on Church affairs was impossible. There was a sediment of mistrust among members; sometimes they pulled in different directions.⁶ J.R. Saunders, prominent Natal sugar planter and politician, father of the later Sir Charles, was another leading layman whose views differed markedly from the Colensos. As the spokesman of the Church of England Defence Association he explicitly and publicly objected to the way Church of England supporters were regarded as Colenso-ites or followers of Colenso, and accused of his heresies. He reiterated the point made earlier by another layman R. Acutt.⁷ Clergymen like the Revd Reynolds shared the objection to

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2. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. R. Gordon, *The Shepstone Family* (Cape Town, 1968), pp.208-16.
 3. Gordon, *The Shepstone Family*, pp.301 and 303.
 4. For example, J.W. Colenso, *Three Sermons Preached in St Peter's Pietermaritzburg* (Pietermaritzburg, 1883) and *Address to Candidates for Confirmation by the late Right Revd John William Colenso D.D. Lord Bishop of Natal, 21 October 1880. Reprinted in 1894 as a Christmas gift to members of the flock who have been recently confirmed* (Pietermaritzburg, 1894).
 5. See i.a. S. Marks, 'Harriette Colenso and the Zulus', *Journal of African History*, vol.IV, 3 (1963); B.M. Nicholls, 'Frances Ellen Colenso and the Anglo-Zulu War' (unpublished conference paper, 1979).
 6. Shepstone Papers: Diary entry, 4 Dec.1885; N.A., Col.Coll.: H.E. Colenso to Shepstone, 10 Nov.1885, and 8 July 1887.
 7. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. N.A., Col.Coll. Index entry: H.E. Colenso to J.R. Saunders, 6 Jan.1891; J.R. Saunders, *Lecture on Church Affairs in South Africa* (printed as a supplement to the Church of England magazine, 1891) pp.18-19; Report of Church Council Meeting, *Natal Witness*, 30 May 1888; R. Acutt, *Church of England in Natal. History of the Church from its First Establishment under Bishop Gray to the Present Time Forwarded to the Archbishop of*

Colenso's political role.⁸ For these and other reasons the Colensos did not find it easy to work with clergy and laity of the Church of England: they did not approve of those too ready to reach an understanding with the Church of the Province of South Africa; they were hostile to those indifferent to missions; and Harriette remonstrated when the Church levied excessive rents on the black inhabitants of its estates.⁹ In addition, there was long term friction between Harriette and the Curators, *i.e.* those responsible for the financial affairs of the Church of England. Over the years, Harriette continually claimed that a sum of £450 was owing to her father's private estate.¹⁰

While such matters drove a wedge between the Colenso family and members of the Church of England, they did not prevent all co-operation. The Colensos and other Church of England folk in Natal were drawn together by a shared animosity to the Church of the Province of South Africa. By the mid-1880s this was partly a matter of traditional animosity, but it was rooted in conviction. To the Colensos and other adherents of the Church of England, the Church of the Province was unacceptable because it was a High Church despotism: its ritual was Romanised, while its metropolitans in Cape Town, first Gray and then West Jones, were intent on establishing a 'Colonial papacy' which would stultify the intellectual freedom of clergy and laity alike.¹¹ Of course, this was not how the adherents of the Church of the Province of South Africa saw the situation. To them,

Canterbury by Leaders of the Church Council in the Diocese of Natal (Durban, 1883); W.K. Macrorie and A.K.D. Edwards, *Correspondence between Bishop Macrorie of the Church of the Province of South Africa and the Rev A.K.D. Edwards ... in the Diocese of Natal* (Durban & Pietermaritzburg, 1890), introduction by G. Goodricke, on behalf of the Church of England Defence Association, December 1889; and Vigilans, *The Case for the Church of England in Natal*, 5 Dec.1889 (reprinted Natal, 1902).

8. Shepstone Papers: Reynolds to Shepstone, 28 Nov.1883.
9. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 18 Feb.1885 and S.F. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 30 Oct.1885; F.E. Colenso to Chesson; N.A., Col.Coll. Letterbook III: H.E. Colenso to Ikin, 19 Oct.1888 and 5 Nov.1888; Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.424.
10. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Ikin (copy), 14 June 1885; N.A., Col.Coll: Goodricke to H.E. Colenso, 31 Mar.1886 and 17 May 1888; opinion of W.B. Morcom, 28 July 1897; Shepstone Papers: Memorandum by A. Ikin (copy), 16 Sept.1889; Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.397.
11. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Editor, *Natal Witness*, 3 July 1894; Benson Papers: Theophilus Shepstone to Benson, 10 Nov.1884 and W.H. Middleton to Benson, 17 Nov.1887; Church of England Defence Association, Publication No.8, n.d., *Hear Both Sides. Addresses by Counsel against the late 'Church Properties Bill ... Delivered before a Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly of the Colony of Natal*, 1903, p.55 statement of R.J. Harrison; R.A.C. Kearns, *The Church of England and the Church of the Province of South Africa. How the Latter Seceded* (Johannesburg, 1913), p.33 for view of Revd Newnham; *Letters and Articles on the Judgement in the Case of Dr Colenso ... with Introductory Remarks by the Dean of Cape Town* (1865), pp.66-67, statement from Record; Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.422.

what was involved was the freedom of the Church from lay domination. They were opposed to those who wished to 'convert the Church of Christ to a Department of State'. They were concerned for its continuing spiritual life. Believing that Colenso had denied the divinity of Christ, they objected that the decisions of the courts of the state had enabled him to remain in Natal and propagate his views.¹² But, however righteous both sides might feel, neither was happy about the existence of schism. Partly for this reason there were recurring attempts to bring about ecclesiastical harmony, and one of the interesting features of the period is the alternating rhythm of 'reconciliation' and 'assertion'. Often an unsuccessful or incomplete move towards reconciliation provoked a counter move, renewed recrimination, and/or a more vigorous assertion of separate existence. In addition, after 1891, there was a marked change of emphasis: moves for union grew stronger, while the separatist drive, though by no means dead, was in the long run less effective. Harriette Colenso was always on the side of those who wished to ensure the continued existence of the Church of England in Natal. She insisted on the 'essential difference' between the Church of England and the Church of the Province.¹³

Two events of the early 1880s introduced a new phase in the ecclesiastical controversy. One was the judicial decision in the Merriman-Williams controversy. The other was the death of Bishop Colenso in June 1883.

The ruling of the Cape Supreme Court concerned the cathedral in Grahamstown, but it affected the position in Natal as well. De Villiers' judgment in the Cape Supreme Court was upheld in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1882, and it therefore had a wider relevance than simply to the Cape Colony.¹⁴ In his judgment, de Villiers ruled on the question of property. Whatever the rights and wrongs of doctrinal dispute or claims

12. Benson Papers: Benson to T. Shepstone, (private), copy, 2 Oct. 1884; *A Statement Relating to the Facts which have been Misunderstood and the Questions which have been Raised in connection with the Consecration, Trial and Excommunication of the Right Reverend Dr Colenso by the Bishop of Cape Town*, 2nd ed. (London, 1867), p.33; L. Rivington, *Witness to Truth* (Bombay, 1882), pp.3-4.

13. H.E. Colenso to Editor, *Natal Witness*, 29 Apr. 1886.

14. E.A. Walker, *Lord De Villiers and His Times* (London, 1925), pp.178-79; J.P.G. Eksteen, 'Some Grahamstown Litigants of the 1880s', in *Grahamstown Historical Society Annals*, 1980, pp.7-8; *Extracts from Judgments of the Highest Courts of England and Other Opinions and Statements on the Identity of the Church of England in Natal with the Mother Church: Privy Council Judgment*, 28 July 1882 (Durban, Oct. 1889); M. Goedhals, 'Nathaniel James Merriman Archdeacon and Bishop 1840-1882: a Study in Church Life and Government' (Ph.D., Rhodes University, 1982), pp.383-90, 405 and 407-10.

to spiritual authority, the law was clear on the issue of property. De Villiers found that the Church of the Province of South Africa was a body distinct from and different from the Church of England. He ruled that, where there were two religious bodies which both claimed to be Anglican and each asserted its right to the same property held in trust for the Church of England, then the claim of the body called the Church of England was to be preferred to that of the Church of the Province. The reason was the existence of the Third Proviso in the Constitution of the Church of the Province as adopted in the synod of 1870. By that Proviso the Church of the Province declined to be bound in matters of faith, doctrine, and discipline by decisions of any ecclesiastical tribunal other than those created or recognised by itself. In effect it rejected the authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and spurned the repercussions of its decisions. In Natal, it was quickly realised that the judgment in the Merriman case, as the binding judicial interpretation of existing law, vindicated the claim of the Church of England to property in dispute between itself and the Church of the Province. Only a new legislative act could change this position.

One of the last actions of Colenso as Bishop was to summon a meeting of the Church Council of the Church of England in Natal in 1882. This was a meeting of the clergy of the diocese and lay representatives of the congregations who met in one body. It took stock of the position of the Church of England in Natal. In doing this it expressly accepted the authority of the Privy Council and incorporated this acceptance into the Rules and Regulations which it issued. These considered, too, the question of responsibilities and procedure when a vacancy should occur in the see. They stipulated, *inter alia*, that the Church Council must satisfy itself that the succeeding Bishop would maintain the principles of the Church of England.¹⁵

When Colenso died a few months later, the Church of England in Natal was in fact confronted with the problem of securing a successor to Colenso. It was a crucial problem. No episcopal church could survive indefinitely without at least one and, preferably, three

15. J.W. Colenso, *Address Delivered by the Right Reverend J.W. Colenso D.D., Lord Bishop of Natal at the Seventh Session of the Church Council of the Diocese of Natal ... together with the Rules to be Observed in the Diocese of Natal, as Revised at the Said Session* (1882); R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Natal Witness (copy), 21 Apr.1884.

bishops. One bishop at least was necessary if new members were to be confirmed and new clergy ordained. In addition, many argued that canon law required the attendance of at least three bishops at the consecration of a new bishop. Thus the Church of England in Natal could not create its own clergy nor could it make anyone a bishop. All it could do was seek to obtain the services of men who were already ordained as clergymen. As far as another bishop was concerned, members of the Church of England could hope that their need might be met either by ensuring that men already bishops would consecrate a bishop for them or, alternatively, that a man already a bishop might minister to them. For spiritual matters the Church of England needed the help of others.¹⁶ In regard to some temporal matters it was able to make fairly adequate arrangements. In September 1884 the Supreme Court of the colony set up a board of curators to administer the property of the see. To provide general supervision and leadership there was the Church Council and the Standing, or executive, Committee it created. There were also the two archdeacons, Garde in Durban and Colley in Pietermaritzburg.¹⁷

On the death of Colenso, West Jones, the metropolitan of the Church of the Province in Cape Town, and Shepstone in Natal were among those who hoped that schism might soon end. They, together with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Benson, once a sympathiser of Colenso, concurred in believing that Macrorie's resignation would accelerate union.¹⁸ Shepstone warned that more than Macrorie's resignation would be needed. He did not share the optimism Colenso himself had expressed a decade previously, viz. that with both Colenso and Macrorie out of the way, 'there would be no difficulty at all' in effecting reconciliation.¹⁹ Many realised that Macrorie was much too closely associated with the controversies of the past to be able to introduce an era of reconciliation, but Macrorie disagreed. He seems to have assumed that, with the death of Colenso, his own see, 'Maritzburg, had superseded the see of Natal.'²⁰ He maintained that, if he resigned, he

16. Hinchliff, *The Anglican Church*, p.225.

17. *Ibid.*, p.106; Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.336.

18. Benson Papers: Benson to T. Shepstone, Private (copy), 12 Oct.1884; Macrorie Papers: West Jones to Macrorie, 12 Oct.1883, Benson to Macrorie, 18 Oct.1883 and 1 Jan.1884; A.H. Baynes, *South Africa* (London, 1908), p.181; A.C. Benson *Life of Edward White Benson* (London, 1900), vol.1, p.229.

19. Benson Papers: T. Shepstone to Archbishop of Canterbury, 10 Nov.1884; Macrorie Papers: West Jones to Macrorie, 12 Oct.1883; D.A.L: J.W. Colenso, Autograph letters, 9 Dec.1872; J.W. Colenso to William Shaen, 9 Dec.1872.

20. *Crockfords Clerical Directory 1887*. The See of 'Maritzburg' is described as 'formerly the See of Natal'.

would simply create fresh difficulties and appear to acknowledge that his had been an untenable position.²¹ In addition, there was the question of where he was to go, if he left 'Maritzburg. He did not, in 1883, find the prospect of becoming Bishop of Bloemfontein adequately alluring but, by 1891, he had let it be known that he would regard 'a call home' as 'a call from God'. When Macrorie announced his resignation in 1891 he seems to have expected to become a suffragan bishop in England. He left 'Maritzburg in 1892 and became a canon of Ely.²²

For the Church of the Province of South Africa, a crucial question was what they were to do about the Third Proviso. For the Church of England, a crucial question was what they were to do to get a bishop.

Arguments about the Third Proviso meshed with two overlapping discussions, each of tremendous significance. One discussion wrestled with the age-old problems of the role of 'Caesar' and 'God', and of the spheres of 'lay' and 'spiritual' power. The other debate was closely related to contemporary trends. Given the fact that the Anglican Church, even in England, was no longer coterminous with 'society' or the 'state', what should the Church do? In England, more and more Englishmen were not members of the established Church, and there were more and more who were not members of any Christian Church. Non-Anglians, in fact non-Christians, voted for members of parliament, and themselves sat in parliament as, for example, Charles Bradlaugh did.²³ In this situation, the Church of England had two options: it could become more defined and exclusive, firmly repudiating any dilution of doctrine, waning spirituality, or permeating rationalism; or it could attempt again the old solution of comprehension. The required comprehension might absorb all the hues of Protestant Christian belief and include even some forms of secularist and ethical Christianity. The dilemma of how the Church should respond to the pressures of its own age was not confined to Britain. To the Church of the Province of South Africa the Third Proviso was the guarantee of the continued spirituality of the Church. To the Church of England it was the obstacle which prevented the comprehensiveness it favoured.

21. Benson Papers: West Jones to Archbishop of Canterbury, 8 Oct.1883; M.H.M. Wood, *A Father in God, the Episcopate of William West Jones* (London, 1913), p.222; Benson, *Life of E.W. Benson*, vol.2, p.491.

22. Macrorie Papers: West Jones to Macrorie, 12 Oct.1883; Benson Papers: Benson to West Jones, 26 Jan.1891.

23. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

To some, notably adherents of the Church of the Province of South Africa, the Third Proviso was the rock on which their Church was built. To others, notably members of the Church of England, it was the rock on which hopes of genuine reconciliation were wrecked.²⁴ Admittedly there were some who, like Archbishop Benson himself, took a contrasting view and belittled the importance of the Third Proviso.²⁵ It was unimportant to doctrine and in strict law, so it was argued, it was valueless. The Privy Council could not be an ecclesiastical court because it had lost this role even in England. On the other hand, no proviso in the constitution of a voluntary association, such as the Church of the Province, could deprive a British subject of his right to appeal to the Privy Council in a civil matter. But these attempts to diminish the significance of the Third Proviso gained little support. Each side was obstinate. Proposals to rescind the Third Proviso failed, while the Church of England would not abandon its opposition to the proviso. While both sides were equally intransigent, attempts at reconciliation were bound to fail.²⁶

Equally doomed, to all appearance, were the attempts of the Church of England to obtain a bishop in succession to Colenso. Frequent attempts were made between 1883-1891, all of which were thwarted by the attitude of the episcopal hierarchy in England. The fact that many of Colenso's criticisms of the literal or historical accuracy of the Old Testament had simply been absorbed into the accepted wisdom of the Church did not create adequate sympathy for the Church of England. Broadly speaking, the English bishops took the view that schism was to be deplored, that the weaker party should give way to the stronger, and that, in Natal, the weaker party was the Church of England. Members of the Church of England protested strongly against these views.²⁷ There was voluminous correspondence between Natal and England. Church of England supporters applied first to the Secretary of State in July 1883, then twice to a panel of English bishops: the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and the Bishops of Manchester, Exeter, Worcester and Liverpool. The Secretary of State replied that the Crown could no longer appoint a Letters Patent

24. N.A., Col.Coll (Old Ref: Box 190): Correspondence of Martineau, Cox and McDonald on the formation of a new national church, 1886-87; Macrorie Papers: R. Acutt to Macrorie, 25 Apr.1884; Shepstone Papers: Diary entry, 2 May 1891.

25. Macrorie Papers: Benson to Macrorie, 18 Oct.1883. Shepstone Papers, v.59: pp.134-38; Canon Barker to T. Shepstone, 12 Aug.1891. Macrorie & Edwards, *Correspondence*, p.4: Edwards to Macrorie, 30 Aug.1889, and Macrorie to Edwards, 31 Aug.1889. Benson, *Life of E.W. Benson*, vol.2, pp.504-05, Benson to T. Shepstone, 7 Jan.1893. Wood, *A Father in God*, p.194.

26. *Ibid.*, p.181 fn. and pp.187-92.

27. Benson Papers: T. Shepstone to Archbishop Benson, 10 Nov.1884.

Bishop, but would issue a mandate if the Archbishop of Canterbury applied for one. But neither the Archbishop nor the other prelates would assist the Church of England by selecting and consecrating a bishop. They replied, '... we cannot think that such a step would be conducive to the welfare of the Church of Christ in South Africa.'²⁸

To the Church of England it was clear that the prelates in England expected them to join the Church of the Province of South Africa, and this they would not do. Their dilemma, was acute: they would not accept Macrorie and they could not have their own bishop without the co-operation of men already bishops. But they were not prepared to accept either defeat or perpetual stalemate. They decided to go a step further and themselves to nominate the man they would like to have as their bishop. This was the course which Harriette had advocated in 1884 but which had been opposed by Shepstone. In 1886 she won her point. In August 1886 the Church Council unanimously elected Sir George Cox as their bishop designate, and it subsequently appealed to the Crown requesting the issue of a 'mandate' for the consecration of Cox.²⁹ A mandate would not in itself make him a bishop but it would encourage consecration. But again, the Crown would not act, except at the prompting of the Archbishop, and the Archbishop would not take the initiative.

Until 1891 neither the Church nor the State would help the bishop-less Church of England adherents. It was constitutionally impossible for the Crown to appoint another Letters Patent Bishop of Natal, since the grant of semi-representative government to Natal in 1856 made Letters Patent invalid.³⁰ Even if it had retained such powers, the Crown would probably have been unwilling to exercise them in the tangled Natal situation. There were attempts to argue that the Crown still retained some responsibility to the Church of England. In appointing Colenso by Letters Patent the Crown had created 'a corporation sole with perpetual succession' which, so it was argued, the Crown was obliged to see

28. *Church of England in Natal, Election of a Bishop*, 4 and 5 Aug.1886, Appendix, Letter of Six Prelates, 6 Feb.1885; Benson, *Life of E.W. Benson*, pp.499-500. For convenient summary, see N.A., Col.Coll: *The Dutiful Petition of the Standing Committee*, 7 Jan.1888; Benson Papers: Knutsford to Benson with enclosures, 2 May 1891 and Havelock to Stanhope, confidential (copy), 4 Nov.1886; Benson, *Life of E.W. Benson*, pp.484-511.

29. Benson Papers: Cox to Benson, 12 and 23 Aug.1886; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: cutting from *Guardian* on election of Cox, 15 Sept.1886; *Church of England in Natal, Election of a Bishop* (Pietermaritzburg, 1886).

30. Papers presented as return to an address of the House of Commons, 7 July 1868; Judgments of the Natal Supreme Court in case of *Bishop of Natal vs The Rev J. Green*, 9 Jan.1868.

continued.³¹ But the Church of England abandoned such arguments and found, too, that it could not persuade the Secretary of State to 'instruct' or in any way compel the Archbishop of Canterbury to consecrate. Later, when Sir George Cox realised that neither the Archbishop of Canterbury nor the Archbishop of York would consecrate him, he raised the possibility of applying to the courts for a writ of *mandamus* which would coerce consecration. Legal advisers murmured that, since the Archbishop by refusing to consecrate was virtually suppressing a see, there might be some ground for appeal, but the idea of litigation was not pursued. On 7 January 1888 the Standing Committee of the Church Council once more petitioned the Crown. It alleged a denial of right and suggested that the Crown should refer to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the Archbishop of Canterbury's refusal to apply for a mandate. This too was unavailing.³² It became increasingly plain that, so long as Macrorie remained in 'Maritzburg', the Archbishop would not consecrate another bishop for work in Natal.³³ In addition, successive Secretaries of State had made plain their attitude. Derby and Holland both replied adversely to Church of England petitions. Replies in parliament made it clear that the Secretary of State would not move counter to the Archbishop's wishes and would act only on his prompting.³⁴ There is ample evidence that the Church of England enjoyed some sympathy both in the Colonial Office and in parliament, but this was not enough to counter the hostility of Lambeth to the idea of creating a successor to Colenso.³⁵

Harriette Colenso was not indifferent to ecclesiastical affairs; but church matters did not monopolise her attention. She worked under disadvantages. Her activity in Zulu affairs

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31. Benson Papers: Fowler to Archbishop and telegraph reply, 17 Aug.1887.
 32. Shepstone Papers: Cox to William Shaen (copy), 13 Mar.1887; Frank Colenso to Shepstone, 31 Mar.1887 and Colonial Secretary to Shepstone, 15 Mar.1887; Macrorie Papers: West Jones to Macrorie, 19 Aug.1886; N.A., Col.Coll: Archbishop of York to Cox (copy), 25 Feb.1887 and Reynolds to H.E. Colenso, 5 Apr.1887; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Frank Colenso, 17 Apr.1887; and see fn.26.
 33. See *i.a.* *Natal Witness*, Colley to Editor, publishing letters from Archbishop of Canterbury, 13 Apr.1886.
 34. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: Frank Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 6 June 1886; N.A., Col.Coll: *Petition of Standing Committee*, 7 Jan.1888; Benson Papers: printed reported re Mr Summers' question and Holland's reply, 10 Aug.1887 and report of question by Mr Summers and reply by W.H. Smith, 19 Aug.1887; C.5489, presented to parliament, Aug.1888, *passim*.
 35. C.O.179/171: Havelock to Secretary of State, 18 Jan.1888. Minutes by J. Bramston, 10 Mar.1888 and R.G.W. Herbert, Feb.n.d. and 13 Mar.1888; C.O.179/173: Archbishop of Canterbury to Secretary of State, 27 Mar.1888. Minute by R.G.W. Herbert, 3 Apr.1888; C.O.179/174: Havelock to Secretary of State (15 Jan.1889). Minute by R.G.W. Herbert, 13 Mar.1889; C.O.179/176: question by H. Kimber and miscellaneous minutes, registered 19 Aug.1889.

alienated some white opinion and took up much of her time and energy. Harriette did not have any firm position within the Church of England from which she could act. She was a missionary and she was her father's daughter. She was neither bishop nor priest. Her father had disapproved of the view that:

'any Christian man - aye or any Christian woman - may take upon himself the office of ministering God's word and Sacraments ...'³⁶

and her role was limited. As a woman, she could not vote at meetings of the church in the way that laymen of the Church of England could do. She could and did advise, exhort, persuade, appease, and protest. She tried to resolve the disputes that were referred to her.³⁷ In later years, she considered herself justified in baptising babies, recognising that to the people 'some memory of my father does hang about my hands.'³⁸ But she found it difficult to persuade clergy to come to the black congregations to take communion and to perform marriage services.³⁹ Some aspects of the way the Church of England was administered troubled Harriette. Until they were invited to continue, there was an initial worry that the Colenso women, whatever their own inclinations, might not be allowed to stay on at Bishopstowe.⁴⁰ They received no income from the Church of England. The money collected for them after the Bishopstowe fire in the Colenso Sympathy Fund was from colonists rather than Church of England people.⁴¹ Shepstone's appointment to the Standing Committee bothered Harriette, but his standards of behaviour included chivalry towards women, and they did not then need to fear expulsion.⁴² Criticism they could expect. Subscribers to the Colenso Sympathy Fund made it clear that they did not approve of Colenso's view, however much they might sympathise with the plight of his widow and daughters, homeless after the fire.⁴³ For

36. J.W. Colenso, *A Sermon Preached at Pietermaritzburg on Sunday September 25th, 1855 at the Admission of a Deacon to the Order of Priesthood* (Durban, 1855), pp.8-9.

37. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: Ikin to H.E. Colenso, forwarding correspondence of Colley and Ikin, copied by H.E. Colenso, Feb.1887.

38. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref: Box 145): H.E. Colenso to Col. Luard, n.d.

39. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Cox (copy), 8 Mar.1887; N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Agnes Colenso, 16 Oct.1896.

40. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.381.

41. *Evidence Given Before the Natal Lands Commission 1900, 1901 and 1902, with Appendix* (Pietermaritzburg, 1904), p.23. Evidence of H.E. Colenso, 7 Jan.1901; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: postscript of H.E. Colenso on 25 Sept.1884, W. Jones to H.E. Colenso.

42. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to Frank Colenso, 4 Aug.1883; and cf. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.386.

43. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Frank Colenso, enclosing (copy), 15 Dec.1884; E. Owen (mayor of Pietermaritzburg), E.R. Vause (mayor of Durban) and H. Bale (secretary of the Colenso Sympathy Fund) forwarding £557.17.3, 11 Dec.1884; N.A., Col.Coll: Mrs Colenso to Gentlemen, viz. Messrs Owen, Vause and Bale, 17 Dec.1884.

a time, Harriette stopped using the Bishopstowe press to print instalments of the *Zulu Digest*. She was now responsible to the Standing Committee for the use of mission property and could not simply assume their approval.⁴⁴

Harriette did not approve of the early steps taken by the Church of England to fill the vacancy after Colenso's death. She thought the Church of England should itself select a successor and by a vigorous show of strength secure his consecration. Once their earlier moves had failed, the Church Council was willing to do as she suggested. Since 1884 Harriette had recommended Sir George Cox to be the successor of her father and backed him, despite the scepticism of her brother Frank and the reservations of her sister Frances Ellen.⁴⁵ The Church Council selected him at a meeting in August 1886. Archdeacon Colley, who should have presided, absented himself from the meeting on grounds of illness and Shepstone's attitude was ambiguous. He seconded the nomination of Cox but he was alarmed when he heard subsequently that the Colenso family had chosen Cox to be their father's biographer. He warned Cox that 'Colenso' was not a name to conjure with inside the colony.⁴⁶ Later on, Church of England supporters were to claim that they had not known of Cox's heretical views when they elected him.⁴⁷ Clergy of the Church of the Province did not mince words about him in letters to one another. To one he was a 'book worm absorbed in the solar myth fad' whose leadership could only bring the Church of England to 'ridiculous disaster'. An adviser to the Archbishop suggested that Cox should be 'got at' and 'told not to be an ass'.⁴⁸ Attempts to secure the consecration of Cox failed. The Colensos found it easier to make Cox a biographer than to make him a bishop. What recommended him to Harriette, that he admired her father and accepted his teachings, aroused the suspicion of others.

44. R.H.L. Br. Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.130/201: H.E. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 16 Apr.1884 and cf. Frank Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 28 June 1884.

45. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.380; N.A., Col.Coll: F.E. Colenso to Ikin, 31 Mar.1886; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 14 Jan.1884, S.F. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 26 Apr.1884 and 17 May 1884, Fr.El. to F.E. Colenso, 18 Aug.1885 and 14 Oct.1885; R.H.L. Br. Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.130/151: F.E. Colenso to Chesson, 28 June 1884; C.130/210: H.E. Colenso to Chesson, 4 Aug.1884.

46. Shepstone Papers, 14: T. Shepstone to G. Cox, 14 Nov.1886 and 20 Sept.1886; *Election of a Bishop*.

47. Saunders, *Church Affairs*, p.19.

48. Macrorie Papers: Beresford Hope to Wirgman, 16 Sept.1886; Benson Papers: Colley to Archbishop Benson, see note by R.J.W., 6 July 1886.

The election of Sir George Cox marked a high point in Harriette's influence on the Church Council.⁴⁹ Thereafter, until 1894, her influence declined. Church of England supporters grew more and more disappointed with the results of their having chosen Sir George Cox, and Harriette became increasingly committed to the Zulu cause. In addition, until 1888, the energies of the Church of England were strained and absorbed by contention with Archdeacon Colley. Shortly after the death of Colenso, Macrorie wrote that Miss Colenso and Colley were competing for control of the Church of England.⁵⁰ This was exaggerated. While Harriette opposed Colley's views and participated vigorously in the controversy over his actions, she did not dominate that controversy, especially in the later stages.

Archdeacon Colley was a relative newcomer to the colony.⁵¹ When Colenso died, Colley in Pietermaritzburg and Archdeacon Garde in Durban assumed that it was for them to lead the Church of England, and believed they would be able to lead it into reconciliation with the Church of the Province of South Africa.⁵² What helped make this seem feasible was the willingness of the Church of the Province to allow congregations to join as 'special trusts'.⁵³ This guaranteed to congregations that they would continue to have services in the form sanctioned by the Church in England and they would thus be protected from 'Romanish' innovations. But more was at stake than this, and it was a premature hope. Some of the laity were antagonised by the moves, and by 1886 Garde had already left the colony.⁵⁴ Colley was the more determined and still extremely active. He had admired Colenso greatly, but did not approve the actions of the Church Council in electing Sir George Cox and in persisting in attempts to secure his consecration.⁵⁵ Colley thought these actions virtually defiance of the expressed wishes of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the other bishops to whom the Church of England had appealed. In lengthy and repeated letters to men in high places, Colley did all he could

49. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: Mrs Colenso to Frank Colenso, Oct.1886.

50. Benson Papers: Macrorie to 'My dear Brethren', 22 Sept.1883.

51. Macrorie Papers: printed sheet, correspondence with Bishop of Worcester, 1879; Temple Papers, 19, f.110: Colley to Temple, with copy of appointment by Colenso, 19 Sept.1898.

52. *Correspondence Macrorie and Edwards*, p.52.

53. B. Burnett, *Anglicans in Natal* (Durban, 1953), pp.112-13.

54. Gladstone Papers, 44500 ff.297-298: Colley to W.E. Gladstone, 11 May 1887.

55. T. Colley, *The Late Right Reverend John William Colenso: A Funeral Sermon Preached in the Cathedral, Sunday evening 24th June, 1883*.

to discredit the Church Council and thwart Cox's consecration.⁵⁶ Probably his efforts were redundant. Ecclesiasts in England could find other reasons for refusing to consecrate Cox than those with Colley advanced. At most they found it convenient to buttress their refusal by referring to Colley's attack on the constitutional standing of the Church Council, the orthodoxy of its members' beliefs, and even on their Christian faith. But, when Church of England supporters realised that Colley had deliberately undermined their petition, there was a surge of righteous wrath. They spurned Colley. They would not follow his lead and they wanted him out of the colony.⁵⁷ Harriette shared the indignation. Colley, she wrote, had become a 'worse and worse incubus' and in private she referred to him as 'that villain' or even a 'Judas Iscariot'.⁵⁸ She was particularly annoyed by Colley's communication to John Westlake, the long-standing friend of Colenso and distinguished jurist who had been responsible for bringing Colley to the colony. Colley tried to manoeuvre Westlake into sending to the colony the telegraphic advice that they should 'submit'. Harriette congratulated Westlake on avoiding the trap by telegraphing the phrase 'coercion impossible' rather than 'submit', and proceeded to explain to him that Colley was antagonistic to every principle her father held dear.⁵⁹

Colley was eventually ousted from the office of archdeacon, from St Peter's and from the colony. But the process took time. At one point, the long-standing tension and animosity between Colley and the parishioners of St Peter's erupted into an 'undignified scuffle'.⁶⁰ A tussle for control of the vestry between Colley and the church wardens led to verbal

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56. Gladstone Papers 44500 ff.300-301: (Proposed) Address by Ven. Archdeacon Colley, President of the Church Council of Diocese of Natal at its Twelfth Session, 5 May 1887; C.5489 Enclosure in No.2: T. Colley to Secretary of State, 14 Feb.1888; E.W. Benson and Church Council of Natal: *Correspondence between the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Church Council in the Diocese of Natal*; a special supplement to the March number of the *Church of England Magazine* (1892) p.4.
 57. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: S.F. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 1885? and H.E. Colenso to Fr.El. Colenso, 17 Apr.1887; N.A., Col.Coll: Reynolds to Shepstone (copy), 23 Mar.1887; Benson Papers: Church Council to Benson, 11 Jan.1886.
 58. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 17 Apr.1887 and 1 June 1887, cf. S.F. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, n.d. (1887, int.ev.), and June (possibly Jan. difficult to read) 1885 in which she says, *i.a.* that 'Harrie is heavily burdened'.
 59. Benson Papers: Colley to Archbishop, 2 Nov.1885; Gladstone Papers 44500 ff.300-301: (Proposed) Address of Archdeacon Colley to Church Council, 4 May 1887; N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to John Westlake, 28 May 1887; *The Bishop of Natal. List of Subscribers' Names* (London, 1865), for names of managing committee members.
 60. Shepstone Papers: Diary entry, 4 June 1885; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 30 Aug.1885 and H.E. Colenso to Fr.El. Colenso, 17 Apr.1887; *Natal Witness*, 6 May 1886.

sparks and fisticuffs at a tumultuous meeting during which a church warden, Mr Geere, alleged that they had held Colley back by the nose. The incident had a sequel in the local magistrate's court where Charles Barter found Colley not guilty of the allegation of assault.⁶¹ In the end, the disputes involving Colley and the curators, and Colley and the church wardens, were brought before the Natal Supreme Court. There the parties agreed that, instead of proceeding with the court hearing, they would submit the issues to Sir Michael Gallwey and his arbitration award should become an order of court. As a result, Colley resigned but received generous payment from the church.⁶² He cut an absurdly belligerent figure. One of his last acts was to send a letter to a St Peter's vestry meeting claiming repayment for an illuminated address he had had prepared for the Colenso family at an earlier point of harmony and goodwill. To ask belated repayment was gratuitous spite, and his letter was ignored.⁶³

Once he had left the colony, Colley was a much less important figure than he had been within it. He did not easily accept his defeat and frustration. Later letters showed that he thought himself entitled to vindication, perhaps some kind of reinstatement, or at least the recompense of a good living. He appears to have been disappointed. Men in high places had used his arguments, but they had little use for him.⁶⁴ Colley believed that he had the solution to the church difficulty in Natal. He advocated a kind of *modus vivendi* between the Church of England and the Church of the Province of South Africa. The Church of England should accept that they could not have a bishop of their own and should therefore be willing to accept the ministrations of Macrorie. In Colley's scheme, Macrorie should accept that while Church of England congregations would welcome him to confirm and ordain, they were not prepared to accept his authority or to hand over to him the Church of England property. Colley intended that the property of the Church of England should be divided into glebes, each of which would support a Church of England

61. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Fr.El. Colenso, 17 Apr.1887; *Natal Witness*, 14 and 15 Apr., and 21 May 1887.

62. *Ibid.*, 9, 10 Mar., and 4 Apr.1888; *Natal Mercury*, 12 Mar.1888; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 14 Mar.1888. Gallwey was a Roman Catholic.

63. *Natal Witness*, 5 Apr.1888.

64. See *i.a.* Benson Papers: R.T.W. (?) re Colley 'a thoroughly worthless fellow', Easter 1889, n.d.; Colley to Benson, 2 Apr.1892, and Bishop of Manchester to Colley, 4 Aug.1885; Temple Papers, 19, f.110: Colley to Temple, 19 Sept.1898 and f.121: Baynes to Temple, 20 Sept.1898; Macrorie Papers: Very confidential (War Office) Edgehill to Macrorie, 6 Mar.1888; A.T. Wirgman, *Life of Dean Green* (London, 1909), vol.2, pp.170-71; Benson and Church Council in Natal, *Correspondence*, p.4.

clergyman.⁶⁵ Neither side would accept this compromise. Though Colley believed that his scheme would thwart the growing independence and 'tyranny of vestries', Macrorie condemned it as 'congregationalism', presumably because congregations would not be obliged to accept his authority. For their part, Church of England men believed Colley went too far in accepting Macrorie as bishop, and Harriette was outraged by a proposal which to her was an attempt to appropriate to the use of the white clergy the property of the church.⁶⁶

When Harriette wrote to the press that the sympathies of the entire Colenso family lay with the vestry of St Peter's in their contention with Colley, she earned from West Jones a sneer about her 'episcopal sympathies' and a sour comment that she was 'a pugnacious female'.⁶⁷ Yet Harriette, much as she backed the vestry, had reservations about some of their actions in the course of the dispute. For example, to argue that Colley was not entitled to be archdeacon, some were prepared to impugn the validity of the Letters Patent under which Colenso held office and on the strength of which he had appointed archdeacons. She could have no sympathy with this and declined to hand over the letter from her father appointing Colley. Though she evidently discussed the case with one of the legal men involved, she was to her exasperation not needed as a witness at a court hearing, and Sir Michael Gallwey declined her offer to call to see him.⁶⁸

The Church of England in Natal needed not only a bishop at its head but also clergy in its congregations. This was true even in Colenso's time, and the need grew greater. Clearly there was a financial difficulty. After the breach with Gray, Colenso had received no money from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel for clergy, and, on his death, the income of the see from the Colonial Bishoprics Fund presumably accumulated in the keeping of the Curators.⁶⁹ But finance was not an insuperable problem. In the

65. Gladstone Papers 44504 f.166: Colley to Secretary of State, 16 July 1888, and copy with f.164: Colley to W.E. Gladstone, 31 July 1888; and 44509 ff.283-284: Colley to W.E. Gladstone, 28 Mar.1890.

66. *Ibid.*, K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. File 31 U6 (KCM.50427): H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 10 Feb.1884.

67. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to *Natal Witness* (copy), 15 Apr.1887; Macrorie Papers: West Jones to Macrorie, 19 Apr.1887.

68. N.A., Col.Coll: A.W. Mason to H.E. Colenso, 27 Feb.1888; H.E. Colenso to W.Y. Campbell, 11 Mar.1888; M. Gallwey to H.E. Colenso, 14 Mar.1888.

69. Gladstone Papers 44514 f.104: Tucker, Sec.Col. Bishoprics Fund to W.E. Gladstone, 3 Mar.1892; Benson Papers: K. Saunders to Benson, 2 July 1883; *Natal Advertiser*, Leader, 5 June 1889; Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.410; Benson, *Life of E.W. Benson*, vol.2, p.489.

late 1880s the Church of England laity were able to collect sufficient funds to recruit clergy;⁷⁰ but they still had to contend with the opposition of Macrorie. He did everything he could to prevent clergymen officiating in Natal unless they held his licence as Bishop of 'Maritzburg. When military chaplains conducted Drill Shed services which Church of England folk attended, Macrorie had confidential War Office pressure brought to bear upon them. The two clergy concerned, Soames and Morrison, were obliged either to desist or to accept his licence.⁷¹ When clergymen in England appeared to be willing to come to Natal as Church of England ministers he had them warned off. They were told that it might be difficult for them to obtain posts in England on their return, if they did not have Macrorie's approval. Macrorie denied that he was intimidating clergy, but he let it be known that his influence counted. He claimed that, but for his support, Garde and Colley would have been worse received in England.⁷² When Revd A.K.D. Edwards came to Natal as a Church of England minister, Macrorie treated him with studied suspicion. Edwards arrived hoping for goodwill and reconciliation, but he found himself involved in a lengthy published exchange of recriminating letters.⁷³ Church of England supporters believed that Macrorie wished to starve them out, but in the late 1880s they were still asserting their right to ecclesiastical independence.⁷⁴ In May 1888 the Church Council declined an invitation from the Church of the Province of South Africa to consider proposals for re-union.⁷⁵ At the same time, Harriette believed there was a good chance that, after impending legislation, the Church of England might yet secure consecration from the Archbishop.⁷⁶

Harriette had little to do with the attempts to recruit clergy in the late 1880s. She was very busy with the defence of the uSuthu chiefs in Eshowe and spent much of her time from

70. Shepstone Papers, 56, f.142: Goodricke to T. Shepstone, 22 May 1889.

71. Macrorie Papers: War Office (very confidential) Edghill to Macrorie, 6 Mar.1888, and (confidential) Edghill to Macrorie, 30 Oct.1888; *Natal Witness*, 15 Apr.1887, 3 July 1888 and 3 Oct.1888; *Natal Advertiser*, 29 Dec.1888; *Drill Shed Church. Proceedings of Vestry Meeting* (Pamphlet), 27 Dec.1888; C.O.179/176: House of Commons question (H. Kimber), registered 19 Aug.1888, and miscellaneous minutes; Saunders, *Church Affairs*, p.20.

72. Edwards & Macrorie, *Correspondence*, p.24, Macrorie to Edwards, 13 Sept.1889; C.O.179/176/16345: House of Commons question by Kimber, registered 19 Aug.1889.

73. Macrorie & Edwards, *Correspondence*.

74. *Ibid.*, Preface, p.xix.

75. Macrorie Papers: Shepstone to George Sutton, 29 May 1888; *Natal Witness*, Report of Church Council Meeting, 30 May 1888.

76. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 31 May 1888; and see *Natal Government Gazette*, 10 July 1888.

November 1888 there. In her absence from Pietermaritzburg, Agnes saw to the needs of the Bishopstowe mission, helped blacks involved in a tangled succession dispute, and corresponded with Mr James, the lay superintendent of St Mary's Church, whose black night school pupils had been involved in a fracas with other town blacks.⁷⁷ In 1890 all the Colenso women went to England, where Harriette campaigned with devotion and energy for the vindication of the uSuthu people.⁷⁸ They left one of their printers in charge of the mission school.⁷⁹ While Harriette was away, the Church Council conceded that 'Sir' George Cox would never be consecrated as their bishop. They were grateful to accept his somewhat indirect and reluctant offer to place himself in the hands of the Church Council, and in July 1891 proceeded to the election of William Ayerst as bishop designate.⁸⁰ Harriette at that time, although she had corresponded with J.R. Saunders about Church finances, knew nothing of Ayerst, or of Ayerst Hall of which he was principal, nor whether his address was Cambridge, England or Cambridge, America.⁸¹

The decision to select Ayerst as bishop designate was a turning point in the Church controversy. It precipitated decisions which in turn transformed attitudes, and the old pattern of deadlock was broken. Now there was a new rhythm. What it indicated was that the Church of the Province of South Africa would gradually prevail over the Church of England however vigorous the occasions of resistance might be.⁸²

Shortly before the formal election of Ayerst, the Archbishop of Canterbury decided to take the initiative in Natal affairs. He had no intention of consecrating Ayerst, but he did recognise some responsibility for ending the impasse. The resignation of Macrorie, once secured, gave him more room to manoeuvre. The question for the Archbishop was whether

77. N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso to Harriette, 11 Apr.(1889? int.ev.).

78. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.426, and p.427, fn.1.

79. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref: Box 216): Memorandum on Bishopstowe in script of A.M. Colenso, n.d. (1910? int.ev.).

80. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. C.O.179/181: C.H.B. Mitchell to Secretary of State with enclosures, 11 Aug.1891; N.A., Col.Coll. Index: C.W. Cox to G. Goodricke, 26 June 1888; H.E. Colenso to Saunders, 6 Jan.1891; and H.E. Colenso to Mileman, 23 June 1891; Shepstone Papers: Diary entry, 15 July 1891; W. Ayerst, *The See of Natal* (London, 1902), p.45; *Natal Mercury*, 17 July 1891; *Vigilans, Case for Church of England*, p.27.

81. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Frank Colenso, 7 Aug.1891.

82. For a summary of later stages of controversy see Hinchliff, *Anglican Church in South Africa*, pp.106-10. See also, B.M. Nicholls, 'The Smashing of Bishopstowe'. Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the South African Historical Society, Pretoria, 1991.

he would be able to guide both Anglican communities into amicable unity. This in turn would depend on whether or not both communities were prepared to pay the price of fusion.⁸³

Assured by Knight Bruce, the Bishop of Bloemfontein, that the Archbishop of Canterbury sympathised with them and would help the Church of England people if he could, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who had not been present at the election of Ayerst, took a leading role in the negotiations with the Archbishop. Many letters were exchanged and these featured prominently in later controversy. What emerged was the decision that the election of William Ayerst would simply be left to one side. Though Ayerst did not resign, and simply waited upon events, he was, for the time being, irrelevant.⁸⁴ The Archbishop let it be known that he would accept from both sides a delegation that he should select as a bishop for work in Natal a man whom both would be prepared to recognise, and he did not select Ayerst.⁸⁵ After long delay and some misgivings, Benson chose his own chaplain, Arthur Hamilton Baynes, to be the only Anglican bishop in Natal. Significantly Benson avoided both the old titles, 'of Natal', or 'of 'Maritzburg'. That was left to the future for settlement. Baynes was consecrated in England on Michaelmas Day 1893 and arrived in Natal in November 1893 to be welcomed by gatherings representative of both sides.⁸⁶

Benson's attempt to reconcile led later to recrimination. In retrospect it is easy to see why. All three parties to the supposed agreement hoped for too much, were blind to the ambivalence of their own positions, and cherished expectations which other parties could not fulfil. Benson expected both sides to unite. He wrote a crucial sentence, when, in accepting the delegation, he stipulated that he did so on conditions, *inter alia*:

'If the two separated bodies in Natal agree that the course proposed shall put

83. Shepstone Papers: Diary entry, newspaper cutting ascribed to *Natal Advertiser*, commenting adversely on Archbishop's refusal to consecrate Ayerst, Nov.1891; Macrorie and Edwards, *Correspondence*, pp.3-6.

84. Shepstone Papers, 61, ff.142-44: Benson to Shepstone, 19 Jan.1893.

85. Benson Papers: T. Shepstone to W. Ayerst (copy), 27 Jan.1892; Wood, *Father in God*, p.224; West Jones to Benson, 19 June 1891.

86. Kearns, *Church of England and Church of the Province*, p.42; Baynes, *South Africa*, p.184; Benson, *Life of E.W. Benson*, vol.2, pp.505-06, Benson to Bishop of Cape Town, 17 Feb.1893 and pp.506-07, Benson to Shepstone; Burnett, *Anglicans in Natal*, p.112; *Natal Mercury*, 24 Nov.1893, and 28 Oct.1893 for correspondence on title of new bishop; *Natal Witness*, 27 Nov.1893 and 4 Dec.1893.

an end to their separation, and that they will live brotherly and work as one Church with one Bishop, ...⁸⁷

The Church of the Province of South Africa thought of the desired union as absorption into the Church of the Province. They believed Benson was too favourable to the Church of England and they would not make more concessions than those already made, viz. that of allowing the Archbishop to make the choice, and to consecrate in England.⁸⁸ They would not modify the Third Proviso and they insisted that Baynes acknowledge himself to be a bishop of the Church of the Province of South Africa. For their part, the Church of England men did not intend to accept the authority of a Church of the Province bishop. They warned the Archbishop of their attitude and received from him the assurance that, in agreeing to accept the joint delegation, he had not expected immediate union. He expected each side to retain its own separate existence until both agreed to unite.⁸⁹ Eager to end the schism, Benson had done some altruistic double-thinking. He assumed at one point that the will for union already existed, at another that it was something which would develop in time. Not surprisingly, he was accused of hypocrisy and blamed for the subsequent difficulties of the Church of England. In 1903, for example, a spokesman of the Church of England suggested that the old gladiatorial cry *Ave Caesar, morituri te salutamus* would be an appropriate greeting to the Archbishop of Canterbury.⁹⁰

Baynes had already taken the oath of loyalty to Cape Town, not Canterbury, when he was consecrated in England. When he reached Cape Town, he signed the Constitution of the Church of the Province of South Africa.⁹¹ When he reached Natal, he found an undercurrent of dismay among Church of England supporters. The Church Council had, in April 1893, accepted a resolution of its Standing Committee that, if the new bishop were to sign the Constitution of the Church of the Province, then the Church of England

87. Temple Papers, 19, f.121: Baynes to Temple (quoting Benson), 21 Sept.1898; Benson, *Life of E.W. Benson*, vol.2, p.502, Benson to West Jones, Metropolitan of Cape Town, 27 July 1891.

88. Carter Papers: Carter to A. Wenlock, 25 Oct.1893.

89. i.a. Temple Papers, 19, f.95: J.B. Cottam to Temple, 26 Aug.1898; Cottam to *Natal Witness* (copy with H.E. Colenso's pamphlet, *Reply to Bishop Baynes*), 29 Mar.1895; Benson, *Life of E.W. Benson*, pp.506-07, Benson to Shepstone, 13 Mar.1893.

90. 'Hail Caesar, we who are about to die salute you'. G.A. de Roquefeuil Labistour & R.J. Harrison, *Address by Counsel Against the Late "Church Properties Bill" Delivered before a Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly of the Colony of Natal* (Pietermaritzburg, 1903), pp.18-19.

91. A. Ive, *The Church of England in South Africa. A Study of its History, Principles and Status* (Cape Town, 1966), p.41; cf. N.A., Col.Coll: A.K.D. Edwards to H.E. Colenso, 8 Aug.1893 and A.H. Baynes to H.E. Colenso, 8 Aug.1893.

should retain its existing organisation and leave the administration of the Curators intact. Here was a clear warning. It had been acknowledged by the Archbishop but seemingly ignored by Baynes.⁹² The Church of England leaders decided that they would pass over to Baynes the problem of how to be both Bishop of the Church of the Province of South Africa and Bishop of the Church of England. They would accept Baynes as bishop, only if he signed a Declaration of the Rules and Regulations of the Church of England. In effect, Baynes who had pledged himself to ignore the findings of the Privy Council, was now being asked to commit himself to their acceptance. His dilemma was clear and acute. Baynes postponed meeting a delegation of the Church of England until March 1894. At that meeting and at a later meeting of the Church Council, the conflict became explicit.⁹³ Possibly misunderstanding Benson's wishes, Baynes refused to sign the Declaration.⁹⁴ He protested that the Church of England leaders were introducing a new condition into the arrangement with the Archbishop. Church of England supporters maintained that it was Baynes who had been disingenuous. He was reported to have said that he had come out to South Africa to 'play a game', and he was accused of having 'broken the covenant'. They thought, too, that the Archbishop was not clear of responsibility for the confusion.⁹⁵

Sir Theophilus Shepstone died before the contention over the argument with the Archbishop became vigorous.⁹⁶ It is likely that his death cleared the way for the influence of others to be more effective, notably that of Harriette Colenso who contributed to the intransigence of the Church Council.⁹⁷

The refusal of the Church Council to accept him as Bishop clearly disappointed Baynes,

92. *Ibid.*, (Old Ref: Box 216): Pencilled copy of letter to Baynes, n.d.; H.E. Colenso, *Reply Made on Behalf of the Church Council of the Church of England in the Diocese of Natal to Bishop Baynes' Explanation of March 17th 1894* (Dedicated to the faithful members of the Church Council ...) (Bishopstowe, 5 May 1894), pp.40-42.

93. Benson Papers: Baynes to Archbishop Benson, 17 Mar.1894 and 28 Mar.1894; Labistour & Harrison, *Address by Counsel*, p.23.

94. Benson Papers: Baynes to Archbishop and added note by Archbishop, 9 Mar.1894; Baynes to Archbishop, 17 Mar.1894.

95. Labistour & Harrison, *Address by Counsel*, p.53.

96. A.K.D. Edwards, *Sermon on Death of Theophilus Shepstone*, 29 June 1893 (Durban, 1893).

97. A.H. Baynes, *Primary Charge Delivered to the Diocesan Synod (Diocese of 'Maritzburg of Natal)*, 10 Jan.1894 (Pietermaritzburg, 1894).

but he was not helpless.⁹⁸ There were four courses he could pursue: he could seek to persuade the Church of the Province to abrogate the Third Proviso; he could apply to the colonial legislature to deal with the questions of property; he could insist that the Curators of the Church of England honour earlier commitments to contribute to his income; and he could undermine the Church Council by appealing to the individual vestries of the Church of England congregations and urge them to accept him as bishop. Here Baynes' strongest argument was that, only by accepting him as bishop, could congregations be sure of getting clergy who, by acknowledging him, could themselves be sure of being paid.⁹⁹ It was in the last two courses that he was most successful.

Attempts to persuade the Church of the Province to abrogate the Third Proviso took time. He tried to clear the way for this by the creation of another Court of Appeal within the Anglican communion. The 1897 Lambeth Conference would not impose such a court for the whole Anglican communion but agreed that colonial churches could opt to accept as finally binding the decisions of an *ad hoc* tribunal presided over by the Archbishop of Canterbury. The 1898 synod of the Church of the Province agreed to such a tribunal. The Church of England in fact did not. Baynes had been very ill in England in 1897 and was near resignation. In Natal, he had taken preliminary steps to secure legislation that would deal with the question of property, but he abandoned the project. Probably the action of the Church Council showed Baynes that the move would encounter more opposition than he could hope to confront.¹⁰⁰ In fact, later attempts to secure legislation, by the Curators in 1898 and by Baynes' successor F.S. Baines in 1903, ended in failure. It was not until 1910 that the Colonial parliament was ready to deal with the question of the property of the Church of England.¹⁰¹

In his dealings with the Curators and with many of the individual congregations Baynes had more success. He gained control of at least some of the income of the see, though not of its property, and the Curators evidently placed at his disposal the Native Diocesan Fund

98. For Baynes' own account, see Baynes, *South Africa*, Appendix A: Later Stages of the Natal Controversy, pp.171-204. He stated his intention to appeal to individual vestries in the *Primary Charge*.

99. N.A., Col.Coll: Edwards to H.E. Colenso on need for stipends, 8 Aug.1893.

100. Baynes, *South Africa*, Appendix A, pp.171-204.

101. Temple Papers, 19, f.92: Baynes to Temple, 12 Apr. and 17 June 1898; Labistour & Harrison, *Address by Counsel*; *Natal Government Gazette*, 8 Feb.1910, Natal Act No.9 (1910); Nicholls, 'Smashing of Bishopstowe'.

of £700 p.a. of which it had charge.¹⁰² Probably his successes with the congregations aided him in his dealings with the Curators. Among the congregations, St Peter's gave him his most conspicuous success. The vestry of Colenso's old church decided after contention that they would accept him as bishop and welcome as their minister whom he appointed. A letter headed 'Wanted a signature' and signed 'Never Say Die' (possibly Agnes Colenso) protested vigorously against Baynes' alleged failure to deal 'on the square' with St Peter's.¹⁰³ Baynes' most conspicuous failures among white congregations were in Durban. Here St Paul's objected, then accepted, then objected again, while Christ Church Addington, where Dr Ikin officiated until 1911, remained outside the Church of the Province of South Africa until the 1950s. In 1898 the Curators informed Harriette that the office of Superintendent of Native Missions now rested with Baynes. It seems, however, that the 'native' congregations attached to Addington remained outside his control, as did St Mary's 'native' church in Pietermaritzburg.¹⁰⁴ When Baynes left Natal in 1901, his success was by no means complete, while the contentions of his time left bitter memories.¹⁰⁵

Allegations of sharp practice grew from these memories. It was alleged, for example, that the meeting at St Peter's which accepted Baynes and repudiated the stand of the Church Council was a 'packed' meeting. It was alleged that Baynes' sympathisers had removed the Church Roll from St Peter's to a nearby grocery, where signatures were obtained. In addition, the qualification for membership was changed. It was no longer enough simply to declare that one accepted the principles of the Church of England. To vote, one had to be an 'habitual worshipper'. This told against sympathisers with the Church of England whose attendance had been irregular. There was, in fact, enough animosity to impel the Church of England to make another stand in the early twentieth century when, under the guidance of Ayerst, it again sought a bishop; and it resisted vigorously the Church Bill of

102. Temple Papers, 19, f.83: Baynes to Archbishop Temple, 30 Oct.1896; Vigilans, *Case for the Church of England*, p.15.

103. *Natal Witness*, 9 May 1896; Burnett, *Anglicans in Natal*, p.114; Baynes, *South Africa*, pp.194-95.

104. Tatham Collection: Minute Book of the Curators, instruction to secretary at meeting on 17 Nov.1898. Baynes, *South Africa*, Appendix A. Personal information from Mr R.K. Frost, Pietermaritzburg.

105. Address by F.S. Baines to Legislative Assembly, Tuesday 11 Jan.1910 in *Natal Diocesan Magazine*, pp.21-33; *Natal Witness*, 7 Jan.1899; R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: Miss Finlason to Sophie Colenso, 23 Jan.1899.

1903 in the form desired by the Church of the Province.¹⁰⁶

Clearly one factor which aggravated the problems of Baynes was the return of Harriette Colenso to Natal. In England, she had felt that 'the Zulus were more that [she] could manage' but by the end 1893 she was ready to concentrate on Church issues.¹⁰⁷ With the Liberals whom she had lobbied in office in Britain and Sir Marshal Clarke whom she visited in Zululand, she believed that her representations were about to bear good fruit. In England, she regarded the consecration of Baynes as part of an attempt on the part of 'the sacerdotal party' to gain control of the properties.¹⁰⁸ She saw and remonstrated with Baynes before she departed from England; but for a short while after his arrival in Natal, misgivings were allowed to rest.¹⁰⁹ On the Sunday of his enthronement in St Saviour's, the cathedral of the Church of the Province, he preached at St Peter's, the cathedral of the Church of England. He was one of the officiants at the funeral of Mrs Colenso who died in December 1893.¹¹⁰

What withered Harriette's goodwill was the realisation that Baynes did not intend to sign the Declaration required by the Church Council and to endorse the Rules and Regulations of the Church of England. She warned Church of England adherents in Natal that any clergyman who accepted Baynes' licence would become a member of the Church of the Province of South Africa.¹¹¹ Believing that to recognise Baynes would be as much a surrender as the acceptance of Macrorie would have been, she lobbied against him as vigorously as she could. She corresponded with and visited members of the Church Council.¹¹² She mocked Baynes' alleged High Churchmanship. She rejoiced, for example, that no one had turned up for a proposed Communion Service - a 'relic of the dark ages' - in St Peter's on Ash Wednesday, and commented, 'I have suggested that the next step may be to burn a few witches & [sic] I must look out ...' ¹¹³ She talked to

106. Labistour & Harrison, *Address by Counsel*, especially speech by R.J. Harrison, pp.23-26.

107. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.77: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 2 Jan.1893.

108. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Mrs Lyell, 28 Sept.1893.

109. *Ibid.*, A.H. Baynes to H.E. Colenso, 8 Aug.1893; H.E. Colenso to A.H. Baynes, 9 Aug.1893.

110. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 24 May 1894; H.E. Colenso to Grice, 24 Apr.1894 and 28 Apr.1894; H. Acutt to H.E. Colenso, 2 Oct.1895.

111. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.H. Baynes, 8 Aug.1893; A.H. Baynes to H.E. Colenso, 9 Aug.1893; H.E. Colenso to Edwards, 9 June 1893.

112. *Ibid.*, See, too, voluminous correspondence with *i.a.* Grice, Henderson, Egner *et al.* R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 3 Mar.1894 etc.

113. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 8 Feb.1894.

the black pastors and attended a conference, or *isivivane*, where the majority accepted her presence against the objections of one dissident.¹¹⁴ Harriette later described that man as the only political pastor whom she had encountered. She challenged Baynes's authority and would have liked to have seen him denied payment from Church of England sources.¹¹⁵

In the course of her opposition to Bishop Baynes she published pamphlets.¹¹⁶ One was her *Reply to Bishop Baynes' Explanation* In it she used the technique of extensive quotation from relevant documents to set out the objections to Baynes' attitude and his decision not to sign the Church of England Declaration. Issued between Church of England meetings, the pamphlet was obviously intended to equip Baynes' antagonists for controversy. She published, too, her version of the *Correspondence between Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the Archbishop of Canterbury*. This was more extensive than the form in which the *Correspondence* had previously circulated. Evidently she evaded the scruples of others that they should not publish without the Archbishop's consent.¹¹⁷ She included more material and referred to later letters. She did this to counter the idea that, if Sir Theophilus had lived, he would have favoured accepting Baynes' authority. Harriette wished to emphasise the fact that the Archbishop of Canterbury, in reply to a letter from Shepstone, had committed himself to the statement that he did not expect immediate union. She claimed that the publication of these letters was an act of justice to the memory of Sir Theophilus Shepstone; she was obviously willing to use his posthumous prestige to support those views where his thinking coincided with hers. Because she wished to remind young Anglicans of her father's teachings, she republished his *Address to Candidates for Confirmation*. A little later one of Colenso's most moving sermons *On Praying for Rain* was republished. It exhorts readers to pray for the deepening of spiritual

114. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to 'My darling Child' (i.e. Agnes Colenso), 14 Nov.(1894?).

115. *Ibid.*, Petition to Curators signed i.a. and 'unconditionally' by H.E. Colenso and A.M. Colenso, 31 Jan.1894.

116. H.E. Colenso, *Reply to Bishop Baynes*; T.S. Shepstone, *1892-1893 Correspondence with the Archbishop of Canterbury* 15 pp. Private and confidential papers for the use of members of the Church Council (Durban, 1893), and see T.S. Shepstone, *Correspondence with the Archbishop of Canterbury on Behalf of the Church Council of the Church of England in Natal 1892-1894*, 20 pp. Printed by H.E. Colenso in justice to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and as a tribute to his memory (Pietermaritzburg, 1894); J.W. Colenso, *Address to Candidates for Confirmation, October 1880* (Reprinted Pietermaritzburg, 1894).

117. Benson Papers: H.C. Shepstone to Baynes, 5 July 1893.

life in times of affliction.¹¹⁸

Though Harriette and Agnes were not members of either the Church Council or the St Peter's vestry, Harriette 'braced the courage' of the members of both bodies. She tried to influence their composition and to direct their procedure. Harriette and Agnes were present at the meeting of the Church Council on 27 March 1894.¹¹⁹ For the Colenso sisters, rejoicing at the decision of the Church Council was followed by dismay at the actions of the St Peter's vestry. Harriette did what she could to strengthen the will to resist. Though they could not as women vote, Harriette and Agnes attended the crucial meeting of St Peter's vestry. To their dismay, the eventual decision was in favour of F.S. Baines, the nominee of A.H. Baynes. Harriette failed in her vigorous attempts to thwart Baynes over the installation of Baines as incumbent of St Peter's. She applied unsuccessfully for a court interdict. She attempted to rally the dissentients by promoting a memorial. But the attempt to keep Baines from acting as vestry chairman at a subsequent meeting failed.¹²⁰ Harriette at least succeeded in putting her question: did he or did he not accept the authority of the Privy Council? His reply - a cavalier assurance that he did - showed his confidence after a favourable decision, but it was tainted with evasiveness.¹²¹ Harriette wrote of the 'two banes of our existence'.¹²² She regretted that the Church of England had so little support abroad - 'o if there were a strong clergyman to send for ...'.¹²³ F.S. Baines was installed at St Peter's on the eleventh anniversary of the death of Bishop Colenso. Flowers covered the bishop's grave.¹²⁴ On that occasion, Harriette objected silently but publicly by walking out of the church. A few years later, when the Revd Mr Wilson was to be installed, her objection was more emphatic and vocal. Interrupting the proceedings, she stood before the altar to read out her protest. She then walked slowly from the church.¹²⁵

118. See fn.4. *Praying for Rain. A Sermon Preached by the late Lord Bishop of Natal, Right Reverend John William Colenso D.D. in the Cathedral Church of St Peter's Maritzburg on Sunday, November 17th 1878.* Published at special request by his many admirers (1895).

119. Benson Papers: Baynes to Benson, 29 Dec.1893, 26 Jan., 15 Feb., 17 Mar. and 28 Mar.1894.

120. *Ibid.*, 11 May and 25 June 1894. For F.S. Baines, see Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

121. Labistour & Harrison, *Address by Counsel*, pp.24-25.

122. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to Frank Colenso, 21 Feb.1894 and see H.E. Colenso to Sophie Colenso, 29 Apr.1894.

123. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref: Box 145): fragment of letter from H.E. Colenso (addressee not given), n.d., and see H.E. Colenso to Cox, 17 Nov.1895.

124. Benson Papers: Baynes to Benson, 25 June 1894.

125. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: Miss Finlason to Sophie Colenso, 23 Jan. 1899; *Natal Witness*, 7 Jan.1899; Address of F.S. Baines to Legislative Assembly, 11 Jan.1910 in *Natal Diocesan*

Whatever the white congregations might decide to do, there remained the black congregations. Here, especially in Pietermaritzburg and over the Natal Midlands, the Colenso hold was firmer.¹²⁶ It was particularly strong in regard to St Mary's Church. Built - or rebuilt - in 1882 on its then new site in Burger Street with funds donated by an elder sister of F.D. Maurice (once Colenso's mentor), this church was the headquarters of the black congregations in Pietermaritzburg and surrounding areas, for example Albert Falls and Howick. In charge of the church - 'the prettiest in Pietermaritzburg' - was the black catechist Moses Sibisi.¹²⁷ Sibisi refused to acknowledge the authority of Baynes. Once he controlled some of the funds of the Church of England, Baynes was able to stop the payment of a salary to Sibisi, but he did not by so doing oust him from office. Sibisi stayed on, supported by the offerings of the congregation.¹²⁸ He stayed long enough to be remembered clearly in 1981 by Mrs Betty Mbanjwa, once a member of the congregation and a pupil of Harriette Colenso.¹²⁹ St Mary's was never part of the Church of the Province of South Africa. In 1938 it joined the Federation of Church of England Congregations. The building ceased to house a black congregation in 1957, when it was expropriated.¹³⁰

Baynes found Harriette's opposition ubiquitous and unyielding. He blamed her for his difficulties and disappointments. While Harry Escombe, the secular politician, discounted her influence in Natal, Baynes did not do this in ecclesiastical affairs.¹³¹ What troubled him was what he thought was her lack of vision. After the Church Council meeting at the end of March 1894, Baynes and Harriette met at a Government House reception. In a long argument she evidently took her stand on principle, while Baynes urged they must look to the future. He was saddened both by the strength and the shortsightedness of her commitment. She was, he wrote, like a pilot who did not know whether there was land or sea ahead but only that he was steering straight. To Baynes it was a dismal day. He was comforted by Lady Hely-Hutchinson, who invited him to stay on after the other guests and eat oysters at Government House.¹³² For her part

Magazine, 1910, pp.21-33.

126. N.A., Col.Coll: Report on native mission work by A.M. Colenso, 17 Dec.1897.

127. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

128. Rees, *Colenso Letters*, p.97 fn.1; Vigilans, *The Case for the Church of England*, final footnote.

129. Personal information from Mrs Betty Mbanjwa of Mpumoza, Swartkop Location.

130. Personal information from Mr R.K. Frost, Pietermaritzburg.

131. Benson Papers: Baynes to Benson, 20 Apr.1894.

132. *Ibid.*, 28 Mar.1894.

Harriette was convinced she was right, and she would have scorned the thought that wrong action could bring good result.¹³³

By the end of 1894 Harriette felt that she had fought as hard as she could in Natal on ecclesiastical matters. The affairs of Zululand and the exiled chiefs were more pressing. She wrote that she had been delayed in fulfilling her promise to visit St Helena by church questions: the affair of those teachers who separated themselves from Sobantu as she put it.¹³⁴ In Harriette's absence in St Helena and Britain, Agnes remained at ekuKhanyeni (or, little Bishopstowe) to represent the Colenso interest. She continued the mission school. She visited distant kraals. She was hostess to Alice Werner when the future distinguished scholar recuperated at Bishopstowe from her disastrous spell as missionary at Blantyre.¹³⁵ Here Alice Werner learned enough of the Church controversy to be able to write about it in *The Speaker*.¹³⁶ She published pleasing and sympathetic accounts of the missionary work that centred in 'little Bishopstowe'.¹³⁷ While Alice Werner observed and admired, learned Zulu, listened to the tales of black and white informants and noted the customs of the people, Agnes supervised the mission work and the estate and fought for the survival of the Church of England. She guided the conferences of black pastors who gathered at Bishopstowe.¹³⁸ She engaged in fearless controversy with Bishop Baynes. She organised a petition against him from St Mary's.¹³⁹ She apparently published letters in the press under the *nom de plume* Vigilans.¹⁴⁰ She rejected Baynes' suggestions that they should co-operate for the sake of the 'native' church. She made it plain that she did not accept him as Bishop and published the letters they exchanged.¹⁴¹

133. cf. J.W. Colenso, *A Sermon Preached*, 25 December 1855, p.12.

134. N.A., Col.Coll: Letter, H.E. Colenso to Exiled Chiefs (printed sheet), 29 Aug.1894.

135. *Ibid.*, A.M. Colenso to R.J. Colenso, 28 Aug.1897; A.M. to F.E. Colenso, 13 June 1895; (Old Ref: Box 212): A. Werner to H.E. Colenso, 8 Aug.(1895?); *Natal Mercury*, letter from A. Werner on Bishopstowe mission work, 10 Mar.1896; note on ekuKhanyeni by A.M. Colenso, Jan.1896; memorandum on mission work of Church of England by A.M. Colenso, 23 Mar.1896; and report on 'native' mission work by A.M. Colenso (copy), 17 Dec.1897.

136. A. Werner, 'The Church Crisis in Natal', *The Speaker*, 13 July 1895.

137. A. Werner, Letter on Bishopstowe mission work, *Natal Mercury*, 10 Mar.1896; 'Kisimus', *The Speaker*, 24 Dec.1897.

138. N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso, note on ekuKhanyeni, Jan.1896, memorandum on the mission work of the Church of England, 28 Mar.1896, report on 'native' mission work, 17 Dec.1897; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 9 Feb.1897.

139. *Ibid.*, Zulu Petition against Bishop Baynes, post-1896, in A.M. Colenso's script.

140. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 27 Dec.1895.

141. A.M. Colenso, *Correspondence between Miss A.M. Colenso and the Right Revd Bishop Baynes, 7 December 1896 to 20 February 1897* (Pietermaritzburg, 1897).

A copy of this correspondence was forwarded to the Archbishop of Canterbury.¹⁴² Agnes' zeal and resourcefulness won the admiration of her siblings.¹⁴³ She and Harriette sometimes alluded, jokingly, each to the other's 'diocese' or 'province'.¹⁴⁴

While in Britain, Harriette gave some attention to church matters. She consulted Westlake on legal matters.¹⁴⁵ She was in touch with sympathetic Anglican clergymen. These included Archdeacon Farrer,¹⁴⁶ who had known her father; Sir George Cox,¹⁴⁷ whom she visited; Canon Wilberforce, who had become her sister's friend;¹⁴⁸ Canon Benham who suggested that she accompany him to the Archbishop's garden party;¹⁴⁹ Dean Freemantle,¹⁵⁰ and Revd Packard who, Harriette hoped, would come to Natal to minister to Church of England congregations. In the event she could not assure him of an income, and he did not come.¹⁵¹ In 1893 well-meaning friends had encouraged her to meet A.H. Baynes.¹⁵² In 1895 her cousin Constance Bunyon, invited William Carter, the Church of the Province of South Africa Bishop of Zululand, to dinner to meet Harriette. Harriette's account of the meeting indicates some sense of strain.¹⁵³ To strengthen the life of the Church of England congregations, Harriette turned her attention to the publication of material. She and Mubi consulted the Exiles on St Helena about the translation of Bishop Colenso's *Address to Candidates for Confirmation* which was published in both English and Zulu.¹⁵⁴ Harriette was also eager to have the Prayer Book, hymn tunes, and the New Testament published.¹⁵⁵ What occupied Harriette far more was her campaign on behalf of the Zulu Exiles and her condemnation of the British South Africa Company, not only for the Jameson Raid but for 'provoking and crushing

142. N.A., Col.Coll: T. Haley (from Lambeth Palace) to H.E. Colenso, 20 Apr.1897.

143. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 10 Sept.1896.

144. *Ibid.*, 28 Feb.1896.

145. *Ibid.*, J. Westlake to H.E. Colenso, 22 Nov.1896.

146. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 19 Apr.1895; cf. 25 Apr.1895.

147. *Ibid.*, 27 Dec.1895.

148. *Ibid.*, 13 Mar.1895.

149. *Ibid.*, 14 June 1895.

150. *Ibid.*, 30 July 1896.

151. *Ibid.*, 19 Nov., 12 Dec.1895 and 14 Feb.1896; H.C. Packard to H.E. Colenso, letters of 1895-1897.

152. *Ibid.*, E. Maurice to H.E. Colenso, 25 May 1893.

153. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 11 Oct., 22 Nov. and 4 Dec.1895.

154. *Ibid.*, 1 Mar.1895.

155. *Ibid.*, Ivor Novello and Co. to H.E. Colenso, 25 Aug.1896; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 7 and 21 Aug., 2 Oct., 6 Nov.1896 and 6 Apr.1897. Church of England Missions, *Incwadi Yokululeka Njengokuma Kwebandhla las England* (Pietermaritzburg, 1896) and New Testament (see bibliography).

confrontations in Charterland'. Possibly it did not help her own ecclesiastical interests that she, as a humanitarian, so outspokenly condemned the 'heartless sickening silence'¹⁵⁶ of the Christian Church on behalf of the Ndebele and Shona. She remonstrated about this silence with the Bishop of Hereford.¹⁵⁷ Interestingly, Knight-Bruce, first Bishop of Mashonaland, after they had met, wrote to Harriette urging her please to remember that what he had said about officials and 'natives' in South Africa was confidential.¹⁵⁸ Harriette's return to Natal in 1898 saw her once more active in local church affairs and the mission work at ekuKhanyeni.

Probably no one cared more than Harriette for the mission reserves that had been allocated to the Church of England. In Zululand in the 1880s, she fought and lost a stubborn battle for kwaMagwaza.¹⁵⁹ In Natal, with its acute if artificial land shortage, mission reserves, especially those where there was not a great deal of missionary activity, were subject to comment and criticism from whites. Periodically, for example, in 1884-1886 and in 1901, commissions were set up which investigated the position of the black reserves.¹⁶⁰ When this happened, Harriette exerted herself on behalf of Church of England claims. In 1886 she consulted Shepstone in regard to papers concerning Nonoti and Umlazi, which she intended to submit to the Commission. To the charge that the Church of England had done nothing to promote missionary activity on its reserves, her response was that the fault lay not with the Church of England but with those who had failed to meet obligations towards it. Survey and transfer had not always been effected, while the Church of England had been starved of spiritual workers and material resources.¹⁶¹ She was alert to the danger that threatened the missions in 1895. Though Harriette protested against, she could not prevent, the loss of mission lands. Umlazi, or some part of it, was evidently taken over by the government in 1903, while by 1909 Nonoti was in the process of being broken up.¹⁶² Other reserves were dealt

156. H.E. Colenso, 'British Rights and Duties in South Africa', *Islington Londoner*, part 4, 12 Feb. 1896.

157. N.A., Col. Coll: Bishop of Hereford to H.E. Colenso, 20 Oct. 1896.

158. *Ibid.*, Knight-Bruce to H.E. Colenso, 30 Dec. (1896?).

159. See above, pp. 89-90.

160. Natal Blue Books No. 6, 1884-1885; Natal Legislative Council Debates, Vol. 9, November 1886, pp. 258-59; *Report of Natal Lands Commission 1902* (Pietermaritzburg, 1902) and *Evidence Submitted to Natal Lands Commission 1901* (Pietermaritzburg, 1904).

161. R.H.L., Fr. Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 6 Oct. 1885; Shepstone Papers: H.E. Colenso to Shepstone, 11 Apr. 1886; *Evidence Submitted to Natal Lands Commission 1901*, p. 24.

162. *Report of the Natal Land Board 1907-1909* (Pietermaritzburg, 1909), pp. 14-15.

with by the Church Properties Act of 1910. Harriette called it 'the Church of England Spoliation Act'. Mission lands, including Bishopstowe and ekuKhanyeni, passed to the Church of the Province. Curiously, the framers of Act avoided naming the two estates.¹⁶³ The Church of the Province proceeded to expel the Misses Colenso, evict black tenants, divide up the land, and sell it off to German settlers. Agnes wrote that 'they could hardly have done us a worse blow in the eye.'¹⁶⁴ Baynes paid Harriette an unintended tribute. In 1910 he argued that to allow Miss Colenso to remain on the property would retard union: her hold on the 'native' population was strong.¹⁶⁵

There are interesting parallels between the loss of Bishopstowe and ekuKhanyeni in 1910 and the loss of kwaMagwaza twenty years previously. kwaMagwaza was the mission station granted by Mpande to Bishop Colenso in 1859. In the ecclesiastical contentions of the 1860s, the missionary Robert Robertson¹⁶⁶ had followed Gray and Green, and kwaMagwaza had become a mission of the Church of the Province. But mission work was interrupted by the coming of the Anglo-Zulu War and the turmoil of its sequel, and in the 1880s Harriette challenged the claim of the Church of the Province of South Africa to the mission station.¹⁶⁷ She argued with two governors, both before and after annexation, that it was the Zulu interpretation of the land grant that should determine whose claim was successful, and maintained that Mpande had granted the land to Colenso and his heirs for their use until such time as Mpande or his heirs decided to revoke the grant.¹⁶⁸ But the decision went against her. Both in regard to kwaMagwaza and in regard to Bishopstowe/ekuKhanyeni Harriette's efforts were not adequately supported. Shepstone, for example, was at his most equivocal in regard to kwaMagwaza. He would not help Douglas McKenzie, the Church of the Province of South Africa Bishop of Zululand, but he did not give Harriette much help either. He regarded the issue not as a Church of England one, but as the personal claim of 'two lone ladies', Harriette and her mother. Because the Church of England would not act, Harriette was obliged to forward a claim

163. *Natal Government Gazette*, 8 Feb.1910, Natal Act No.9 (1910), (copy of text from R.K. Frost); N.A., Col.Coll: reprint of letters from *Natal Witness*, July 1910.

164. *Ibid.*, (Old Ref: Box 150): Agnes Colenso to H.E. Colenso, n.d., (1909?).

165. *Ibid.*, reprint of letters of Layman (i.e. C. de B. Persse) to *Natal Witness*, letter of 18 Aug.1910.

166. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

167. J.W. Colenso, *Three Native Accounts of a Visit to King Mpande* (1859); H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Digest*, 4th Series.

168. *Ibid.*, R.H.L. Br.Empire Series S.18 A.S.P. C.130/56 and N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Havelock, 12 Feb.1887.

in the only capacity open to her: viz. as the daughter of Colenso, joint executor with her mother of the Bishop's personal estate.¹⁶⁹ In 1910, although there was some brisk discussion in the local press, the general opposition to the Church legislation was nothing like as strong as it had been in 1903 when F.S. Baines' intended Property Bill was thwarted.¹⁷⁰ In both cases too, after much delay, preemptory legislation dealt with a tangled situation. In 1889, after the condemnation of the Zulu exiles at Eshowe, Havelock issued a proclamation which handed kwaMagwaza over to the Church of the Province. In 1910 the Natal Legislature enacted a law which transferred Bishopstowe/ekuKhanyeni with other church property to the Church of the Province of South Africa.¹⁷¹ Once the decision to legislate had been taken, the bill was rushed through the Legislature at a speed which provoked criticism from the local press.¹⁷² It is worthy of comment that both losses came after Harriette had taken a crucial role in the defence of Dinuzulu, and it is likely that those responsible used the animosity which her role had provoked. The parallels do not end here. After the loss of kwaMagwaza, Harriette kept a tenuous presence in Zululand by retaining the use of the huts which had been allocated to her during the trials; and in the 1890s, despite the growing and impressive Church of the Province missionary activity in Zululand under Bishop Carter, Harriette sent her own young teacher Mbulawu, son of Langalibalele, to oSuthu.¹⁷³ Dinuzulu had told both Carter and Harriette that he wanted his people taught.

The black congregations that stood outside the Church of the Province maintained a brave life. Their resolve and resources were strengthened by the Misses Colenso.¹⁷⁴ In 1899 there were 800 'native' signatures to a petition and, in 1902, after receiving an address from Micah Langeni, Chairman of the Conference, William Ayerst observed that there

169. Shepstone Papers, (Old Ref: Box 15): Bishop McKenzie to Shepstone, 18 July (1885?), and Shepstone to Bishop McKenzie (draft), 23 June 1885.

170. Kearns, *Church of England and Church of the Province*, pp.49-51; N.A., Col.Coll: reprint of letters on the eviction of Colenso sisters forwarded by H.E. Colenso to *Natal Witness* in July 1910 and reprint of letters of Layman in the *Natal Witness*, 11 July 1910, 18 July 1910 and 18 Aug.1910.

171. *Zululand. Land Delimitation Commission (1902-1904). Reports of the Joint Imperial and Colonial Commissioners, with annexures and map* (Pietermaritzburg, 1905), p.114, Proclamation of 5 June 1889; *Natal Government Gazette*, 8 Feb.1910, Natal Act No.9 (1910), p.243.

172. Kearns, *Church of England and Church of the Province*, pp.49-51.

173. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 12 Feb.1894; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 13 Dec.1895. Report on Native Mission Work by A.M. Colenso (copy), 17 Dec.1897; K.C.A.L., Col.Coll., Dd.8: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 17 Dec.1893.

174. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 15 Nov.1895.

were 2000-3000 black members of the Church of England, with 400 attending the annual conference. He wrote:

'Their conferences are spread over Natal, but the mission headquarters are at Bishopstowe where the two Misses Colenso daughters of the late Bishop reside. Here is a printing press, a flourishing school and a chapel. Though for want of a Bishop, there are no ordained native missionaries (several being ripe for ordination) there is an admirable staff of most efficient catechists.'¹⁷⁵

Even in 1911, after the breaking up of Bishopstowe, Harriette estimated that there were about 3000 black members of the Church of England.¹⁷⁶ Some of the black congregations had been supervised for a time by Dr Ikin of Christ Church, Addington, but Harriette remained a key figure in the lives of the black congregation.¹⁷⁷ In 1921 Sir George Cory visited the two Misses Colenso in their Sweetwaters home. He wrote of Harriette:

'She is still adherent to the "Church of England" and dead against the Church of the Province of South Africa: i.e. she repudiates all the Bishops and parsons at present in South Africa. At present she is her own Church - she has a number of Zulu "clergy" who go about the country & [sic] preach etc. They seem to be quite independent of everyone except Miss Colenso.'

It was reported, he added, that Miss Colenso gave to the mission most of the pension secured to the Colenso sisters in the Church Property Act.¹⁷⁸

Because Harriette was opposed to the Church of the Province on ecclesiastical grounds, she spurned suggestions that they might be able to co-operate on humanitarian matters. In fact there were sharp contrasts of attitude between Harriette and the Church of the Province leaders on Zulu questions. Thus, for example, in 1887, it was the Church of the Province Bishop of Zululand, McKenzie, who 'thundered' for annexation of Zululand, and thought the restoration of Zibhebhu would open up opportunities for mission work.¹⁷⁹

175. Temple Papers, 51, f.91-93: Address by Revd W. Ayerst, 18 Sept.1901.

176. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Under-Secretary of Department of Interior, 1 June 1911.

177. *Evidence submitted to Natal Lands Commission 1901*, pp.458-59, evidence of Dr A. Ikin, 6 Nov.1901; N.D.A., Letterbook of Curators No.43a: A.N. Natal (sic) to J.A. Millar, 27 Oct.1896, and Minutes of Board of Curators, 26 Nov.1896.

178. Cory Library, Mss.97/3: typescript copy of Sir George Cory's notes of a visit to Natal in July 1921.

179. D.M. Schreuder, *The Scramble for Southern Africa 1877-1895. The Politics of Partition Re-appraised* (Cambridge, 1980), p.79 citing C.4913 (LXI 1887), p.48. Schreuder mistakenly attributes to Colenso, McKenzie's plea for annexation; Society for the Propagation of the Gospel

At the time, the Colensos favoured a pro-uSuthu protection, and they feared the anarchy which, they were convinced, Zibhebhu's restoration would bring. Later Harriette was the whole-hearted advocate of the return of the uSuthu prisoners from St Helena while Bishop Carter of Zululand was more doubtful.¹⁸⁰ In 1897 it was Bishop Carter, not Harriette, who protested against the annexation of Zululand to Natal with which policy the return of the Exiles was firmly linked.¹⁸¹ During the South African War, Harriette was aware of the sufferings of the Zulu people, while Bishop Baynes could write of his diocese as though the only blacks within it were khaki-clad kitchen servants.¹⁸² In the agony of the 'Bambatha rebellion', Dinuzulu did not have the sympathy of the leading figures of the Church of the Province: it was Harriette Colenso who had the pivotal role in his defence.¹⁸³

Harriette and her sister Agnes were clearly devout women of firm faith. Without this they could not have endured so much self-sacrifice. But it seems clear too that Harriette was much more concerned with fulfilling the obligations of a Christian believer than with defining her faith or even winning converts to Christianity. The only definition of her doctrinal position that she gave was that she would let her father's position define her own.¹⁸⁴ Like her father, she did not think that a black man had to be a Christian before he was entitled to consideration and justice. In her own teaching, she stressed as basic the fact that all men, black and white, had a common ethical feeling, a sense of right and wrong.¹⁸⁵ As a committed Christian, Harriette naturally gave tangible and visible signs of Christian witness as well as her tremendous moral, legal, and material support for

Archives (henceforward S.P.G.A.): Zululand Letterbook, McKenzie to Tucker (secretary of S.P.G.), 21 Nov.1987.

180. *Ibid.*, Zululand Letterbook, Carter to Tucker, 22 Mar.1893.

181. Carter Papers: Carter to Algernon Wenlock, 17 June 1897.

182. A.H. Baynes, *My Diocese during the War* (London, 1900), *passim*.

183. See *i.a.* L. Swart, 'The Work of Harriette Emily Colenso in Relationship to Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo Culminating in the Treason Trial of 1908-1909' (M.A., University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1967); S. Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion, the 1906-08 Disturbances in Natal* (Oxford, 1970); N.A., Col.Coll: rough memo by H.E. Colenso on statement by Dr Walters on Dinuzulu's health and C. de B. Persse, article on Dinuzulu, 25 May 1908. For criticism of alleged misrepresentation by H.E. Colenso see, F. Roach, letter, 'Miss Colenso's Lecture', *Natal Witness*, 23 Apr.1908. Roach was a C.P.S.A. man.

184. *Sheffield Daily Telegraph*, letter of H.E. Colenso, 25 Nov.1890.

185. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.81: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 17 Dec.1893; *cf.* J.W. Colenso, 'On Missions to the Zulus', a lecture ... to the Marylebone Literary Institution on Tuesday 23 May 1865, reprint from *Social Sciences Review*, June 1864 (sic). Reprinted in D.R. Edgecombe (ed) *Bringing Forth Light* (Pietermaritzburg and Durban, 1982), p.21.

Dinuzulu. There were, for example, services at Eshowe in 1888-1889, where Harriette worked with Paul Mthimkhulu, a Christian convert who, until his death in 1908, shared Dinuzulu's fortunes in freedom and captivity, in Zululand, in St Helena, and in Natal.¹⁸⁶ Although she was suspicious of the High Church tendencies of Revd Barracrough, who tutored Dinuzulu, Harriette was pleased at the reports that Dinuzulu had the friendship of clergymen at St Helena, and that he attended services. But she was contemptuous of a Church of South Africa report that Dinuzulu had become a Christian, and at the attempt to insinuate a false motivation for the alleged conversion.¹⁸⁷ To her, whether or not Dinuzulu was a Christian was a secondary matter. What signified more was whether he would be given the opportunity to lead his people, and whether he would be a worthwhile leader. When her hopes on his behalf had been disappointed, her role at his funeral says much of her attitude. There with Mankulumana, Dinuzulu's key *induna*, she advised about the arrangements, and these included both Christian and non-Christian rites.¹⁸⁸ Harriette was a very remarkable missionary, as well as a formidable antagonist in ecclesiastical affairs as in secular.

186. R.H.L., Fr.Col. Papers: H.E. Colenso to F.E. Colenso, 8 May 1889; M.M. Fuze, *The Black People and Whence They Came. A Zulu View* (Durban, 1979), p.131. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

187. N.A., Col.Coll: Copy (dated 11 July 1908) in H.E. Colenso's script of extracts, including *Natal Witness*, for Dinuzulu's letter to Bishop Carter and *Inkanyiso* comment, 14 Sept.1895, and *Natal Witness*, 4 Apr.1896; Dinuzulu to Bishop Carter (copy), 18 Oct.1895; Bishop Welby to H.E. Colenso, Feb.1896, and (Old Ref: Box 209): Mrs Welby to H.E. Colenso, 6 Dec.(1897?); H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 13 Dec.1895.

188. Viscount Gladstone Papers 46000 f.151 *et seq*: Confidential Memorandum from Native Affairs Department, 11 Dec.1913; N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso (from *KwaNobamba*) to Agnes, 7 Nov.1913.

CHAPTER SEVEN

AN UNWITTING FAILURE AND 'A FOOLISH WOMAN'¹

After more than a year in Natal, spent mainly on Church affairs, Harriette decided in January 1895 to go abroad again and to concentrate on Zulu matters.² The time seemed opportune for the Zulu people to benefit from recent political changes in Natal and in Britain - in Natal the introduction of Responsible government in 1893, and in Britain the change of government after the Liberal success in the elections of 1892. Harriette anticipated advantages from both these changes. She cultivated friendly relations with Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, the new Governor who inaugurated the constitutional change.³ She did not think that Responsible government in Natal necessarily doomed the black population to worse oppression: the Colensos had long mistrusted imperial officials, and Harriette hoped that whites of goodwill and sound sense would ensure justice in Natal.⁴ In Britain she had helped in election campaigning for a Liberal candidate and welcomed the Liberal success of 1892.⁵ But her hopes were disappointed. In Natal more power was given to white politicians chosen by an almost exclusively white electorate, the majority of whom, like most electorates, concentrated short-sightedly on their own selfish interests.⁶ In Natal, as in South Africa generally, white attitudes to the black population were hardening.⁷ In Britain the Liberal government was insecure and proved shortlived. It had a very small parliamentary majority, a highly controversial programme and, especially after the resignation of Gladstone, a very divided leadership.

The months of January and February 1895 were crucial months in the history of Zululand.

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1. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.91-93: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 25 Jan.1895.
 2. C.O.879/41 Africa South 471 (hereafter Africa South 471), p.59, no.84: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 10 Jan.1895.
 3. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.32-33: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 14 Oct.1893.
 4. *Natal Native Affairs Commission*, 1906-1907, p.123: evidence of H.E. Colenso, cf. (F.E. Colenso) 'Gebuza' *Reign of Unlaw in Natal* (London, 1906).
 5. N.A., Col.Coll: D. Naoraji to H.E. Colenso, 11 and 20 July 1892 ; J. Cobden-Unwin to H.E. Colenso, 12 July 1895.
 6. E.H. Brookes & C. de B. Webb, *A History of Natal* (Pietermaritzburg, 1965), pp.178-80; N. Etherington, *Preachers, Peasants and Politics in South East Africa, 1835-1880. African Christian Communities in Natal Pondoland and Zululand* (London, 1978), pp.178, et seq.
 7. C. Bundy, 'A Voice in the Big House. the Career of Headman Mamba'. London University, Institute of Commonwealth Studies. *Societies of Southern Africa Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, vol.11, 1981, p.74.

To understand this one needs to examine three decisions of the British government: first, the decision of October 1894 that Dinuzulu and his uncles should be repatriated to Zululand; second, the decision of January 1895 to suspend arrangements that had been made to effect this return; and third, the decision of March to abandon the policy of immediate repatriation. In what follows these decisions are examined in turn, and attention is given to Harriette's role in relation to each of them.

Repatriation is sanctioned and arranged

The decision taken in October 1894 by the Liberal Secretary of State, Lord Ripon, to return the chiefs had a long prelude of careful preparation. Ripon showed early that he was willing to change British policy in Zululand, but he wanted careful investigation first. He replaced Osborn, the man criticised for outraging Zulu national sentiment, with Sir Marshal Clarke,⁸ the successful administrator who had been highly praised for his achievement in placating tribal sentiment in Basutoland. In his instructions to Sir Marshal, Ripon gave the new Resident Commissioner several months in which to report on what amounted to the three inter-related problems of Zululand - allegiance, authority, and land allocation. He asked Sir Marshal to investigate the existing state of feeling between uSuthu and non-uSuthu. Though the Secretary of State regarded the repatriation of the chiefs more as the return of Exiles than as the release of convicts, he wanted to be sure their homecoming would not endanger tranquillity. Ripon required Clarke's views on whether all the Exiles should be allowed to return simultaneously, and on whether they should be permitted first to visit Britain. Zibhebhu was not forgotten. Ripon obviously wished to be fair to the Mandlakazi leader but he also wished to avoid past mistakes. He asked Clarke whether Zibhebhu should be allowed to return to his old district, and whether his stipend should be increased. Undoubtedly Ripon saw that the question of Dinuzulu's future role in Zululand was both crucial and extremely difficult. In June 1893 he asked Clarke whether Dinuzulu should be recognised as chief only over his own immediate followers, or whether he should be regarded as Paramount Chief.⁹ Later despatches emphasised his continuing concern with this question.¹⁰

8. See above, p.261. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 2 Dec.1893 and 43566, ff.124-28: Ripon to Loch, 22 Mar.1893.

9. Africa South 471, p.1, no.1: Ripon to M. Clarke, 2 June 1893.

10. *Ibid.*, pp.14-15, no.8: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 30 Mar.1894 and *passim*.

Then there was the vexed problem of land allocation. Recalling previous British attempts to sift rival claims and allocate land according to allegiance, Ripon asked Clarke about two problems: whether a government *induna* should be appointed to a district where men of rival allegiance were so intermixed as to be virtually inseparable; and whether the government should abandon the old policy of compelling Zulus to move away from the land they occupied, if they were not prepared to acknowledge the authority of the chief to whom the British assigned the land.¹¹

In December 1893 and in January 1894 Clarke put forward his proposals for change in the administration of Zululand and his recommendations about the Exiles.¹² Both were designed to create in Zululand a harmonious colonial polity in which the best interests of the Zulu people would be served. Interestingly enough, Clarke's criticisms of the existing administration in Zululand supported views which Harriette and Escombe had expressed.¹³ He saw, for example, that arbitrary interpretations of native law by the magistrate in Zululand were creating confusion, and that there was need for closer consultation between the magistrates and acknowledged tribal leaders. What he found in Zululand was a situation in which there were 87 chiefs, all of whom had only petty jurisdiction over their own immediate adherents. Though he postponed the question of giving chiefs criminal jurisdiction Clarke, bolstered the authority of some of these chiefs to whom he assigned the right and the duty of sitting with magistrates when appeals from inferior courts were heard.¹⁴

This was Clarke's way of fostering a kind of self-government in Zululand.¹⁵ When he recommended these proposals to the Colonial Office, Hely-Hutchinson remarked that Clarke was introducing changes quite opposed to the thrust of Natal's native policy: in

11. *Ibid.*, pp.1-3, no.1: Ripon to Marshal Clarke, 2 June 1893.

12. *Ibid.*, pp.4-7, no.2: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 16 Dec.1893, with enclosure M. Clarke to Ripon, confidential, 8 Dec.1893; and p.8, no.3: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 24 Jan.1894, with enclosure M. Clarke to Ripon, 18 Jan.1894.

13. *Ibid.*, p.4, no.2: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 16 Dec.1893.

14. *Ibid.*, with enclosure M. Clarke to Ripon, 8 Dec.1893; pp.15-17, no.9: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 14 Mar.1894, with Proclamation VI of 1894; and p.30, no.24: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 28 June 1894, with enclosures *viz.* Hely-Hutchinson to M. Clarke, minute, 14 June 1894 and M. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson, minute, 22 June 1896. D.R. Edgecombe, 'Sir Marshall [sic] Clarke and the Abortive Attempt to "Basutolandise" Zululand, 1893-1897', *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, vol.1, 1978.

15. Africa South 471, p.10, enclosure in no.3: M. Clarke to Ripon, confidential, 18 Jan.1894.

Natal the chief was subordinated to the magistrate, not associated with him.¹⁶ The remark was more significant than many wished to realise. What it emphasised, by implication, was that while Zululand was British and while Clarke was Resident Commissioner, the long-term aim of government policy would be to create in the territory a community where blacks ruled blacks in association with white officials, rather than a community where blacks were ruled by whites in the interests of a white settler population. Whether or not such a policy was consistently pursued depended largely on who controlled Zulu policy: adherence to it was more likely from a Secretary of State in London than from a white parliament in Pietermaritzburg.

Sir Marshal Clarke recommended the return of Dinuzulu and his uncles to Zululand. He found there was no longer an overt danger of rebellion in Zululand and therefore recommended clemency and oblivion. Though some opposition was likely, especially from those chiefs who had come into Zululand from Natal, Clarke thought such opposition could be quietened. To Sir Marshal it was clear that Dinuzulu could not be recognised as Paramount Chief. The events of the past fourteen years had created divisions, and to make Dinuzulu paramount would alarm those hostile to him. In addition, the Resident Commissioner was not prepared to place Dinuzulu above those chiefs to whom he intended to assign superior jurisdiction. On the other hand it would be wrong to provoke Dinuzulu into asserting himself by giving too little. To make him only one of the more than eighty chiefs of Zululand would have this effect. Young men from different parts of Zululand would join his regiments, while the abaQulusi, his loyal supporters of 1888 who lived now on land that had become part of the South African Republic, would 'do their utmost to make Dinuzulu assert himself'. Clarke warned of Dinuzulu:

'He is not the cause of such discontent as exists amongst the Zulus, but there will be an effort to make him the exponent of such discontentment.'¹⁷

Sir Marshal apparently intended to make Dinuzulu a chief with superior jurisdiction on a par with those chosen from the 87, but he seems to have thought that this would not be enough to guarantee Dinuzulu's loyalty.¹⁸ What Sir Marshal envisaged was a special position for Dinuzulu, who would be placed in close association with the Resident

16. *Ibid.*, p.4, no.2: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 16 Dec.1893.

17. *Ibid.*, pp.9-10, enclosure in no.3: M. Clarke to Ripon, 18 Jan.1894.

18. *Ibid.*, p.27, enclosure 1 in no.22: M. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson, 17 Apr.1894.

Commissioner, but outside the hierarchy of administration of which the Resident Commissioner was the apex. He proposed a kind of informal partnership between the Resident Commissioner and Dinuzulu which would curtail Dinuzulu's ability to do harm but use to the full his capacity to be helpful. Marshal Clarke wrote:

'It seems to me that the best position to assign to Dinuzulu is that of Government induna and adviser. For this he should receive liberal pay (say £500 a year) subject to his loyal behaviour.'¹⁹

Clarke defined his functions thus:

'As Government induna, Dinuzulu should be employed in native affairs which have been referred to or brought to the notice of, the Resident Commissioner, especially land disputes, questions of inheritance, and others on which it is desirable to get independent native opinion.'²⁰

Arguably Sir Marshal came close to proposing for Dinuzulu an essential role in the government of Zululand: he used the phrase 'should be employed', and the questions on which he intended that Dinuzulu 'should be employed' were important concerns in Zulu society. A government which habitually consulted Dinuzulu on such matters would have recognised his possession of substantial power, provided that it accepted his advice. But there was no guarantee that it would do so, for the government was not to be obliged to consult with him.

Not even Sir Marshal could define a role for Dinuzulu that was quite unambiguous, but the Resident Commissioner was at least wise enough to foresee some difficulties. For example, Dinuzulu would need a European-style house, and Clarke proposed that one should be built for him. He recommended that it should be located some miles from Eshowe, arguing that to build it at Eshowe would give the impression that Dinuzulu was under restraint.²¹

Clarke dealt quickly with other specific points he had been asked to consider. He recommended that Ndabuko and Shingana should return with Dinuzulu, but he did not recommend the suggested visit to Britain. On Zibhebhu he was brief to the point of indifference. Zibhebhu should be allowed to return to his old district, but Clarke opposed

19. *Ibid.*, pp.9-10, enclosure in no.3, M. Clarke to Ripon, 18 Jan.1894.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

any increase of stipend. He pointed out that Zibhebhu was the only chief in Zululand who was in arrears with his hut tax. As far as Sir Marshal Clarke was concerned Zibhebhu's days of official favour were clearly over.²²

Hely-Hutchinson endorsed Marshal Clarke's recommendations, and both men were confident that they would be soon accepted.²³ But Ripon had misgivings. He was afraid that they might give Dinuzulu too much power. He doubted whether Dinuzulu would be able to interpret Zulu custom because he was so young, and had experienced so many vicissitudes of fortune. Ripon thought it better to regard Dinuzulu as an investigating officer, rather than a skilled counsellor, and insisted that he should not be consulted on matters which involved the interests of rival chiefs. Significantly, the phrase Ripon eventually used of Dinuzulu's intended role in the government of Zululand was not that he 'should be employed' but that he was 'liable to be employed'. The change implied even more strongly that it would be for the government of the time to decide whether or not Dinuzulu should be consulted at all.²⁴ Clearly Ripon wished to be able to answer all his critics, including those hostile to Dinuzulu.

There were critics in Natal as well as Britain. Ripon was warned of this several months before he decided on the return of the chiefs. In March 1894, for example, Hely-Hutchinson told Ripon that, while Escombe favoured the speedy return of the Exiles, John Robinson, the prime minister, did not. He would be held in check only by his reluctance to divide his ministry. In a separate paragraph Hely-Hutchinson warned that Natal ministers were about to claim the incorporation of Zululand.²⁵ The two issues of the return of the chiefs and the incorporation of Zululand with Natal were already being linked. For the time being, until October, Ripon could lever them apart with the assurance that the return of the chiefs had not been decided upon, but this gave only temporary respite from an acute dilemma.²⁶

Natalians were very conscious of the close links both geographical and historical between

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, pp.4-5, no.2: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 16 Dec.1893; and pp.8-9, no.3: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 24 Jan.1894.

24. *Ibid.*, pp.14-15, no.8: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Mar.1894.

25. *Ibid.*, pp.17-18, no.11: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 31 Mar.1894.

26. *Ibid.*, pp.26-27, enclosure in no.21: Hely-Hutchinson to Sir John Robinson, 12 May 1894.

Natal and Zululand, and they had previously requested the annexation of Zululand to Natal.²⁷ What they feared in the 1890s was that unless they gained formal recognition of their claim, their expectation of getting Zululand would be disappointed. Although geography made this very unlikely, Natalians were afraid that the Cape might even get Zululand.²⁸

Intense railway and customs competition exacerbated long-standing animosity between the two colonies: their railways were racing for the Rand and they were jostling for the biggest possible share in the traffic.²⁹ While this competitiveness pervaded the public mood, Natalians were quick to suspect the schemings and 'earth hunger' of Mr Rhodes, the Cape Premier.³⁰ A report of Rhodes' speech at Kokstad in April 1894, for example, roused fears about Zululand and much ferment.³¹ What inflamed feelings more was the news that Britain had already pledged Pondoland to the Cape Colony. This thwarted Natal's hopes of expansion across her southern boundary and made her even more jealous of claims to Zululand.³² Here gold also glittered: prospectors had been at work in Zululand for several years, and in 1894 some hoped that a second Johannesburg might arise on the white Mfolozi.³³ Not surprisingly, Ripon found the Natal ministers extremely sensitive about the key Zulu questions of the times - the return of the chiefs and the incorporation of Zululand in Natal.

Some thought both the return of the chiefs and the annexation of Zululand to Natal were inevitable. The Zulu chiefs had been sentenced to defined terms of imprisonment, not to indefinite banishment.³⁴ It was therefore quite certain that they would sooner or later have to return. Whether or not Zululand would sooner or later be annexed to Natal was more arguable. Whatever his personal views, Ripon as Secretary of State was more

27. *Ibid.*, p.22, enclosure 1 in no.18: J. Robinson to Governor, minute, 2 May 1894 and enclosure 2 in no.18: Natal's claim to Zululand (summary), n.d.

28. *Ibid.*, p.20, no.15: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram received 3 May 1895.

29. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.40-41: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 16 Nov.1893.

30. *Ibid.*, ff.50-52: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 2 July 1894.

31. Africa South 471, p.20, no.15: telegram, Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 3 May 1894; pp.22-23, no.19: secret, Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 5 May 1894.

32. *Ibid.*, pp.17-18, no.11: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 1 Mar.1894; pp.21-22: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 4 May 1894; cf. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.35-36: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 21 Oct.1893.

33. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.53-56: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 11 July 1894.

34. See above p.154. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.66-70: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 12 Jan.1895.

reluctant than Hely-Hutchinson to concede the inevitability of eventual incorporation of Zululand in Natal.³⁵ Natalians argued vigorously that sooner or later the incorporation must come about.³⁶ Contemporaries might differ about whether both the return of the chiefs and the annexation of Zululand by Natal were inevitable, but all agreed that, if both the repatriation and the annexation were to happen, then their timing was vital, their sequence critical, and their consequences would be far-reaching. At the heart of the matter was the crucial issue of whether decisions about these questions would safeguard and promote the interests of the Zulu people, or those of the white inhabitants in Natal. From her actions it is clear that Harriette Colenso refused to recognise that these were the only options. She believed in the ultimate harmony of the interests of the whites of Natal and the blacks in Zululand; to her the best policy would be one which recognised that justice to the Zulu people was the policy that would best serve the interests of the Natal whites.³⁷

During the months in which he was making up his mind about the repatriation of the chiefs Ripon had a number of representations from Natal to consider. Of these the most important was the Minute of May 1894. In this minute the Natal ministers stressed their eagerness to secure Zululand. They wanted a formal assurance that Zululand would be absorbed into Natal; they urged their willingness to have the Natal legislature act immediately on the question of Zululand: and they stated their conviction that the incorporation of Zululand in Natal should precede the return of Dinuzulu. When Dinuzulu returned, he should do so 'under the wing of the Natal government'.³⁸ Such representations gradually coaxed Ripon into statements designed to appease suspicion and uneasiness among Natal ministers. He quickly denied the rumour that Rhodes was scheming to secure Zululand for the Cape. When allegations about Rhodes and Zululand

35. *Ibid.*, ff.50-52: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 2 July 1894. Africa South 471, p.29, no.23: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 6 July 1894; p.59, no.83: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 5 Feb.1895.

36. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.60-70; Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 12 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.21, no.15: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 4 May 1895, with enclosure, John Robinson to Governor, confidential minute, 2 May 1894; p.61, no.89: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 18 Jan.1895 with enclosure, John Robinson to Governor, confidential minute, 17 Jan.1895; pp.63-65, no.91: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 23 Jan.1895; p.69, no.94: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 31 Jan.1895, with enclosure, John Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, minute no.8, 29 Jan.1895.

37. See the themes of argument in her pamphlets of 1895: titles in bibliography.

38. Africa South 471, p.19, no.24: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 3 May 1894; p.22, no.18, enclosure 1 in Sir John Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, confidential minute, 2 May 1894.

recurred in the following months, they were dismissed by the Colonial Office sometimes as 'silly rumours'.³⁹

Ripon was much more cautious about the annexation of Zululand by Natal.⁴⁰ He could not dodge the question entirely, but he tried to avoid any commitment that did more than defer the issue to an indefinite future. At first he would give only a secret and very vague undertaking. In a secret despatch of 6 July 1894 he wrote that:

'... your ministers may rest assured that, if and when, it appears desirable to remove the administration of Zululand from the immediate control of the Imperial Government, the prior claims of Natal will be recognised.'⁴¹

He allowed the statement to be communicated in writing in October.⁴² In it the only definite point was that Britain would yield direct control of Zululand only to Natal. Ripon did not say when this would happen. In fact the phrase 'if and when' implied a hope that it might not happen at all. Not surprisingly the Natal ministers were not really satisfied. By October they had the secret undertaking recorded officially in a Governor's Minute to Ministers, but it was not a public commitment.⁴³ In addition, they had not pinned the Colonial Office down on the question *when* Zululand was to be annexed to Natal. This was a much more difficult issue and proved to be the crucial one. As late as October 1894 Ripon had still avoided committing himself. Certainly, he had not acceded to the Natal standpoint: that the annexation of Zululand should precede the repatriation of the chiefs.⁴⁴

Though the Natal ministers were clear that they wanted to annex Zululand sooner or later, they were not always sure that they wanted the annexation to be *sooner* rather than later.

39. *Ibid.*, p.54, no.69: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, secret and personal, 29 Jan.1895.

40. *Ibid.*, p.21, no.17: telegram, Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 11 May 1894.

41. *Ibid.*, pp.29-30, no.23: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 6 July 1894; cf. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, pp.50-52: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 2 July 1894.

42. Africa South 471, p.31, no.36: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 17 Sept.1894; p.36, no.32: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 17 Oct.1894, with enclosures, Hely-Hutchinson to John Robinson, confidential minute, no.13, 16 Oct.1894, and John Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, confidential minute, 16 Oct.1894.

43. *Ibid.*, p.31, no.25: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 4 Aug.1894; p.31, no.26: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 17 Sept.1894; pp.36-47, no.32: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 27 Oct.1894; pp.42-43, no.45: telegram, secret and confidential, Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 18 Jan.1895.

44. *Ibid.*, p.22, enclosure 1 in no.18: John Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, confidential minute, 2 May 1894; cf. pp.36-37, no.32: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 17 Oct.1894, with enclosures.

Uneasiness about the way in which Britain was governing Zululand was an argument in favour of the early annexation of Zululand to Natal. Sir John Robinson, the Natal Prime Minister, was afraid that Britain's intense pre-occupation with apportioning land among the black inhabitants of Zululand would leave no scope for whites in Zululand when Natal did take over. He was concerned, too, when Hely-Hutchinson rejected the application of Mkhungu to move from Natal to Zululand.⁴⁵ In Zululand Mkhungu, a son of Mpande and once a potential rival to Cetshwayo, might become a useful collaborator of the white authorities and counterweight to loyalty to Dinuzulu. But there were advantages to Natal in delay. At the time the territories of Zambane and Mbegisa, contiguous to the then boundaries of British Zululand, were the objects of intense dispute between Britain and the South African Republic. The Republic wanted the land to secure access to the sea. The British wished to thwart the Republican aim. Natal was pleased to have the S.A.R. thwarted, but glad that it was the imperial government that did the thwarting.⁴⁶ While Britain was involved in acrimonious correspondence with the S.A.R. over these territories, the Natalians could negotiate more harmoniously with the Republic over railway matters. In their drive to secure an advantage for Natal's railway interests it was vital to avoid the antagonism of the S.A.R.

Ripon did not hurry his October decision to repatriate the chiefs. He consulted further with Sir Marshal Clarke and Hely-Hutchinson about some matters, among them the question of Dinuzulu's future role in Zululand.⁴⁷ Then, imitating Knutsford in reverse, he obtained the assent of cabinet colleagues to the policy of returning the chiefs.⁴⁸ His despatches to Hely-Hutchinson of 30 October 1894 reflect the result of his anxious thinking.⁴⁹

45. *Ibid.*, pp.31-32, no.27: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 27 Sept.1894.

46. *Ibid.*, Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.57-58: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 11 Feb.1894; ff.62-64: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 11 Oct.1895; ff.140-47: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, private, 6 Apr.1895; 43657, ff.49-50: Ripon and Montagu White, memorandum of conversation (pencilled), 12 Feb.1894; C.O.427/20/6907: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 28 Mar.1895. Minute by F. Graham, 20 Apr.1895.

47. See above, pp.261-62 and 271.

48. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.127-28: Ripon to Rosebery, copy confidential, 1 Sept.1894; f.129: Rosebery to Ripon, 2 Aug.1894; f.133: Rosebery to Ripon, 9 Aug.1894; ff.130-31: Ripon to cabinet colleagues, 2 Aug.1894; f.132: Bryce to Ripon, n.d.; and 43526, ff.207-08: Kimberley to Ripon, 2 Aug.1894.

49. Africa South 471, p.33-35, no.28: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Oct.1894; and p.35, no.29: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Oct.1894.

Ripon accepted the recommendations that had been made by Sir Marshal Clarke as they had been defined in later correspondence: the whole St Helena party was to return; Ndabuko and Shingana were to accompany Dinuzulu; and significantly no provision was made for a preliminary visit to Britain. Finally, some paragraphs were devoted to Dinuzulu's future position which Ripon saw as a crucial matter on which the success or failure of the repatriation depended.

The Secretary of State had decided it was wise to diminish the importance of the post by defining more clearly the limitations of Dinuzulu's authority; in subtle ways his description of Dinuzulu's role differed from that given by Sir Marshal Clarke. Ripon expressed appreciation of Sir Marshal's work and welcomed the thought that he would be in Zululand to receive Dinuzulu. Expressing the hope that old feuds would be forgotten, Ripon authorised the return of Zibhebhu to his old district.⁵⁰

Ripon insisted to Hely-Hutchinson that his decisions must be kept secret until preparations were complete.⁵¹ He sent similar instructions to St Helena.⁵² Clearly he wanted to forestall criticisms by achieving a *fait accompli*. In this he did not succeed. It proved difficult to organise, from London, the return to Zululand of Exiles in St Helena - especially as there was no telegraph between London and St Helena. When a date was eventually fixed, it was not earlier than the beginning of February 1895.⁵³ The Admiralty could not provide a man-of-war, and arrangements had to be made with the Union Steamship Company for accommodation on one of their vessels.⁵⁴ Then there was the question of the translation of a statement setting out the conditions of Dinuzulu's return and describing the role he was to have in Zululand. Ripon wanted to be sure that Dinuzulu would not have grounds to do what Cetshwayo had done - namely, to argue that what he had been told in one place differed from what he was told in another.⁵⁵ Ripon set out these conditions of Dinuzulu's return in a despatch to Hely-Hutchinson. He required the material part of this communication to be translated into Zulu in Zululand, and a copy of

50. *Ibid.*, pp.33-34, no.28: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Oct.1894.

51. *Ibid.*, p.35, no.29: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Oct.1894.

52. *Ibid.*, p.35, no.30: Fairfield to Grey-Wilson, secret, 30 Oct.1894.

53. *Ibid.*, p.39, no.39: Ripon to Grey-Wilson, secret, 28 Dec.1894.

54. *Ibid.*, pp.37-38, no.33: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 22 Nov.1894; no.34: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 25 Nov.1894; no.35: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 6 Dec.1894; p.39, no.39: Ripon to Grey-Wilson, secret, 28 Dec.1894.

55. *Ibid.*, p.38, no.38: Ripon to Grey-Wilson, secret, 27 Dec.1894.

that Zulu translation to be sent to St Helena to be presented to Dinuzulu before he embarked. Ripon intended that an identical translation should be handed to Dinuzulu when he reached Natal.⁵⁶ His instructions were more or less followed,⁵⁷ though the 'translation' did not catch the first possible mail, which caused further delay.⁵⁸ Paradoxically, Ripon's own caution had made it more difficult for him to achieve what he wanted, because delay endangered secrecy.

Repatriation is Sanctioned and Arranged: Harriette's Role

Comment on Harriette Colenso's role in bringing about the decision of October 1894 is appropriate here. Her association with Sir Marshal Clarke requires first consideration, and then the effect of her representations on Lord Ripon.

While Harriette certainly had a role in preparing the way for Sir Marshal in Zululand, her contribution to his recommendations has been much exaggerated.⁵⁹ Admittedly, her sustained attacks on Osborn helped bring about his eventual retirement and assisted, too, in persuading Ripon to appoint to Zululand a man of the calibre of Sir Marshal.⁶⁰ But, once Sir Marshal Clarke had assumed duty, Harriette's role was much reduced. It was reasonable to expect that Sir Marshal would apply in Zululand a policy of appeasing tribal sentiment comparable to the policy he had followed in Basutoland. But in this he would be guided by his own experience, observation, and estimate of the probabilities of success, not by the 'persuasion' of Harriette Colenso.⁶¹ In fact Sir Marshal's attitude to Harriette, while friendly and courteous, was also cautious and critical. To him her partisanship was as bad as the prejudice of previous officials: both had contributed to the disintegration of the Zulu polity.⁶²

Sir Marshal insisted on this fact of disintegration. To counter it he instituted his hierarchy

56. *Ibid.*, pp.33-35, no.28: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Oct.1894; and p.35, no.29: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Oct.1894.

57. *Ibid.*, p.40, no.41: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 6 Dec.1894, with enclosures no.1, literal translation of Zulu original, and no.2 Hely-Hutchinson to Grey-Wilson, 6 Dec.1894.

58. *Ibid.*, p.38, no.37: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 20 Dec.1894.

59. S. Marks, 'Harriette Colenso and the Zulus', *Journal of African History*, vol.4, no.3, pp.403-11.

60. See above, pp.261-62.

61. Marks, 'Harriette Colenso'.

62. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.46563, ff.91-93: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 25 Jan.1895.

of chiefs but, because of it, he did not recommend for Dinuzulu the sort of crucial, central position that Harriette would have preferred. Harriette insisted against her critics that she accepted the subordination of Dinuzulu to British authority, but she would have welcomed a policy which vindicated the uSuthu over other Zulu, saw them (the uSuthu) as the nucleus of Zulu national feeling, and made of Dinuzulu the essential intermediary between government and all the Zulu people. What Sir Marshal recommended for Dinuzulu in 1894 fell short of that, although he intended far more than Dinuzulu later in fact received.⁶³ In addition he recommended against allowing Dinuzulu and his uncles to visit England - a point which Harriette always urged strongly.⁶⁴

Harriette did all she could to persuade Sir Marshal to take a favourable view of the uSuthu, both the Exiles and the men of lesser rank. She sent pamphlets to him in Basutoland.⁶⁵ She visited him in Zululand in 1893 immediately on her return from England. Perhaps significantly, her visit coincided with that of Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson and was prolonged by heavy rains. The Governor humorously compared the resulting situation to one in which domestic animals and beasts of prey were alike penned upon an island during a flood, but at least Harriette had more time to have her say.⁶⁶ Harriette evidently trusted Sir Marshal. She felt 'comparatively free from anxiety' in relation to Clarke, evidently regarding him as an ally where she had thought of Osborn as an enemy.⁶⁷ When Sir Marshal looked into the cases of the lesser uSuthu for whom Harriette had asked Ripon's attention, and when he recommended and implemented a policy of clemency, Harriette's confidence in him increased. Probably one reason why she concentrated so much on church affairs in 1894 was her conviction that she could leave Zulu affairs in his capable hands. What Harriette failed to see was how wide a gap might develop between herself, the champion and friend of the uSuthu, and Clarke, whose role was that of a distinguished servant of the British Empire. His first obligation was to his official superiors not to Harriette, and his first commitment was to the imperial service not

63. *Ibid.*, ff.148-51: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 12 Apr.1895. Africa South 471, p.8, no.3: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 24 Jan.1894, with enclosure, M. Clarke to Ripon, confidential, 18 Jan.1894.

64. *Ibid.*, pp.23-26, no.20: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 10 May 1894, with enclosure 1, Marshal Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson, secret minute, 5 May 1894. H.E. Colenso, *Memorandum in Reply to Objections against a Visit of the Zulu Exiles to Britain* (London, 1895).

65. N.A., Col.Coll: M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 20 Apr.1893.

66. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.42-45: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 2 Dec.1893.

67. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P. C.150/214: H.E. Colenso to H.R. Fox Bourne, 11 Jan.1895.

to the uSuthu.⁶⁸

Though she did not know of them until too late, Harriette might have claimed some credit for the decisions which Ripon made in October 1894. Her constant activity and representations in previous years had kept the uSuthu cause alive. Though she tried to insist that hers was a national and not a party question, Harriette had been encouraged and supported by Liberal party members, and it had been for the Liberals that she had campaigned.⁶⁹ James Bryce, for example, had argued the uSuthu cause in the British parliament while he was a member of the opposition. When he had become a member of the cabinet in 1892, he had backed Ripon's decision to return the Exiles.⁷⁰ Arguably, this decision of October 1894 was a logical sequel to the earlier step of appointing Sir Marshal Clarke and instructing him to investigate the situation and make recommendations. But there was another side to the coin. Precisely because Zulu issues were so controversial, they were matters which men new to office should handle carefully. As a result Ripon made his decision slowly, and for a time insisted that it should be kept secret. Unfortunately such secrecy was self-defeating, for he only aroused more criticism once it was realised how unforthcoming he had been.⁷¹

Repatriation is Temporarily Suspended

On 18 January 1895 Ripon decided to suspend 'for the present' the return of the St Helena party. He sent a telegram to this effect to Hely-Hutchinson and a secret despatch to the Governor of St Helena.⁷² In making this decision Ripon was thinking primarily of Natal. He did not know whether the Exiles had been told of the plans for their immediate return. In fact it was while Ripon's suspension despatch was on its way that they were informed on 22 January of their intended return.⁷³ Ripon was also unaware of the most recent deputation from Zululand to pray for the return of Dinuzulu. Hely-Hutchinson reported

68. N.A., Col.Coll: M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 24 Apr.1895.

69. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.81-89: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 18 Jan.1895.

70. *Ibid.*, Add.Mss.43516, f.132: Bryce to Ripon, n.d.

71. *Ibid.*, Add.Mss.43653, f.96: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 31 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.53, no.67: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 28 Jan.1895.

72. *Ibid.*, p.43, no.46: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 18 Jan.1895; and no.47: Ripon to Grey-Wilson, secret, 18 Jan.1895.

73. *Ibid.*, p.80, no.107: Grey-Wilson to Ripon, 5 Feb.1895.

this deputation only by ordinary despatch.⁷⁴ What Hely-Hutchinson did telegraph was a warning from Natal. This included the following words:

‘Sir John Robinson informs me that serious agitation is sure to arise here should Dinuzulu be brought back without at least a public assurance that Zululand will be handed over to Natal.’⁷⁵

The issues of the return of the chiefs and the incorporation of Zululand in Natal had therefore been once more linked. As Hely-Hutchinson was hardly the man to stand against colonial politicians and a hostile public opinion, particularly in a colony where anti-Indian feeling caused concern,⁷⁶ he therefore veered sharply from the direction he had taken a year previously and advised the Secretary of State to suspend the return of the chiefs. Ripon complied.⁷⁷

Broadly the Natal reactions showed the same hopes and fears over Zululand that had been evident in previous months. On 9 January the colonial ministers drew up a confidential minute on the matter. After discussion between the Governor and the Prime Minister this minute was temporarily withdrawn, but it was submitted again on 17 January.⁷⁸ A number of further issues revived the old mood of apprehension and anticipation. Once more there was excitement about gold, and the St Lucia coalfields and projected railway line also aroused interest.⁷⁹ Newspapers revived suspicions about Rhodes.⁸⁰ In addition news of yet another deputation from Zululand reminded colonists that Zululand could not be ignored.⁸¹ Harriette made no secret of her intention to visit St Helena and the colonial ministers who knew of this might well have felt concern.

74. K.C.A.L.: A. Werner, ‘Recollections of Harriette E. Colenso’; Africa South 471, pp.44-46, no.50: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 28 Dec.1894 and enclosures 1: M. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson, 24 Dec.1894 (with J.Y. Gibson to M. Clarke, 19 Dec.1894), and 2: M. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson, 27 Dec.1894.

75. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.81-87: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 18 Jan.1895.

76. *Ibid.*, 43516, f.196: Ripon to Rosebery, 30 Jan.1895.

77. Africa South 471, pp.42-43, no.45: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 18 Jan.1895; pp.93-95, no.123: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, confidential, 4 Apr.1895; and p.8, no.3: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 24 Jan.1895.

78. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.66-70: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 12 Jan.1895; and ff.71-74: text of draft minute, 9 Jan.1895.

79. Sutton Papers, Diary Entry: 1 Mar.1895; *Natal Witness*, 1 Feb.1895; *Natal Advertiser*, 17 and 21 Jan.1895 (short leader).

80. Main leader, *Natal Advertiser*, 16 Jan.1895.

81. Africa South 471, p.12,14 no.7: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 24 Feb.1895 with enclosures, viz. M. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson, 17 Feb.1895, translation of statement by Mankulumana, 17 Feb.1895 and Hely-Hutchinson to M. Clarke, 23 Feb.1895.

One cannot be certain what the Natal ministers knew, and what they surmised, at any time. It is impossible to establish whether secret information had been leaked to them. Both Sir Marshal Clarke and Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson knew officially of Ripon's decision to repatriate the chiefs and, in theory, either might have murmured confidential information to the Natal ministers.⁸² Clarke's apparent friendliness with Harry Escombe casts some slight suspicion on him, but Sir Marshal was, after all, in Zululand far more than he was in Natal, and he was so conscious of his position as an imperial official that he is unlikely to have given secret information to a colonial politician.⁸³ Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson was more vulnerable and is more suspect. He was a man of different quality from Sir Marshal and in a different position. His official correspondence and his frequent private letters of self-explanation to Secretaries of State show how acutely he felt the strain of double - even triple - and perhaps inconsistent obligations.⁸⁴ His constitutional position as Governor of a colony with Responsible government meant that he was committed to serving two masters: the Secretary of State in London, and the ministers in Natal with whose advice he was expected to govern Natal. The Natal executive claimed the right to be consulted about Zululand, and its members were well able to exploit the Governor's constitutional predicaments.⁸⁵ Hely-Hutchinson did not like the obligation of secrecy imposed upon him and wanted to be free of it, but he explicitly denied having divulged information.⁸⁶ Yet sometimes the Governor's refusal to give information itself told the Natal ministers more than the Secretary of State might have wished them to know. On 22 January, for example, John Robinson asked Hely-Hutchinson outright whether arrangements had been made for the return of the chiefs. Hely-Hutchinson replied that he as Governor had no authority to make such a statement. The reply obviously invited the Natal Prime Minister to conclude that decisions had been taken, but were being kept secret, and that return was probable. In a letter to Ripon Hely-Hutchinson soothed his own qualms about having tacitly acknowledged that he was pledged to secrecy with the thought that any other reply would have lost the confidence

82. *Ibid.*, pp.33-35, no.28: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Oct.1894; and pp.40-41, no.41: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 6 Dec.1894.

83. *Ibid.*, pp.17-18, no.11: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 31 Mar.1894.

84. These are in both the Ripon and Chamberlain Papers, and see Africa South 471, pp.62-65, no.91: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 23 Jan.1895.

85. John Robinson Papers, File.4, 6/9: John Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, 8 Feb.1895.

86. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.107-12: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 9 Feb.1895; Africa South 471, p.42, no.43: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 10 Jan.1895.

of the Natal ministers '... and once I lose their confidence, I am of no use to you.'⁸⁷ But even if some Natal ministers believed they knew more than they should, others did not. Sutton, for example, was quite ignorant of the Secretary of State's arrangements, and he was very indignant when he did learn how imminent the Exiles' return had been. '... [T]hey are miserable hounds in England,' he wrote in his diary, and 'Lord Ripon is a sneak.'⁸⁸

According to Hely-Hutchinson the Natal ministers did not know officially before 28 January 1895 that the return had been decided upon. But, as has been indicated, surmise was easy. The colonial executive knew that both Sir Marshal Clarke and Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson had recommended repatriation, and it was tempting to speculate that return was close.⁸⁹ On the other hand, according to the wording of Ripon's secret pledge, incorporation remained a distant prospect at best.⁹⁰

January and February 1895 were months of acute dilemma for Hely-Hutchinson. It was becoming increasingly difficult for him to reconcile his triple responsibilities - his role towards the black people of Zululand, his obligations to the Natal ministers, and his duty to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He found it impossible to be a disinterested intermediary and in fact gave most stress to his relationship with the Natal ministers. While, for example, he pointed to the possibility of 'serious agitation' and insisted that black/white goodwill was desirable, he did not accord first priority to Zulu needs or views.⁹¹ His main concern was to avoid a situation in which he would have to confront the Natal colonial ministry as the agent of an unpopular imperial policy. He therefore persuaded the Natal ministers to postpone their first minute, requesting the annexation of Zululand prior to the return of the chiefs, and he then persuaded Ripon to suspend the return of the chiefs.⁹² Thereafter he tried to achieve some sort of *rapprochement*

87. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.89-90: Hely-Hutchinson to Chapelries, London, telegram, 24 Jan.1895.

88. Sutton Papers, Diary Entry: 28 Jan.1895. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

89. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.66-70: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 12 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.53, no.67: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 28 Jan.,1895.

90. Africa South 471, pp.29-30, no.23: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 6 July 1894, and pp.36-37, no.32: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 17 Oct. with enclosures.

91. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.66-70: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 12 Jan.1895.

92. *Ibid.*, Africa South 471, p.42, no.45: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 18 Jan.1895, and p.43, no.46: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 18 Jan.1895.

between the Colonial Office and the colonial executive. In doing this he stood closer to the latter than to the Secretary of State.⁹³ This was not surprising. He was in constant communication with his local ministers and in dealing with them he could supplement official communication with private discussion, comment, and counsel. The nearest he could get to this kind of unofficial relationship with a Secretary of State was through secret telegrams, which were brief, or long private letters, which were slow.

In London Lord Ripon postponed the return of the chiefs because no Secretary of State for the Colonies would knowingly run headlong into conflict with the government and electorate of a Responsibly governed colony, even if the cause of the conflict was a matter relating to a separate Crown Colony whose government was not strictly speaking the business of neighbouring white colonists. Part of Ripon's dilemma arose from his having been told at the last minute that the Natal attitudes were different from those he had believed to exist when he had made his original decision to return the chiefs. Earlier, he had been assured that possible hostility from the whites of Natal could be restrained by the colonial government.⁹⁴ Now, he was told, the Natal government would act in association with popular white opposition.⁹⁵ Earlier, he had believed that this government was divided on its Zulu policy.⁹⁶ Now, he learnt that the disagreement no longer existed. Escombe, the Attorney-General and once the associate of Harriette Colenso, had identified himself with the standpoint of Sir John Robinson: he was now staunch in advocating the incorporation of Zululand to Natal prior to the return of the chiefs.⁹⁷ To his chagrin Ripon realised that he would now have to deal with a united Natal ministry and a potentially hostile white public opinion.

Suspending the return of the chiefs created a position of near deadlock, though there was still a little room to manoeuvre. Neither the Secretary of State nor the Natal ministry was wholly inflexible: each had to consider alternative courses of action. Ripon was annoyed by the Natal opposition and he wanted to repatriate the chiefs. He told Hely-Hutchinson

93. Robinson Papers, File 2, 3.30: J. Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, 29 Jan.1895.

94. Africa South 471, p.20, no.15: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 14 Apr.1894; and p.40, no.41: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 6 Dec.1894.

95. *Ibid.*, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 23 Jan.1895.

96. *Ibid.*, pp.17-18, no.11: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 31 Mar.1894; and pp.22-34, no.19, Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 5 May 1894.

97. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.124-27: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 1 Mar.1895. Africa South 471, pp.42-43, no.45: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 18 Jan.1895.

that if the Natal ministers had allowed Dinuzulu to go quietly back and then made representations for incorporating Zululand 'they would have had more to say for themselves'.⁹⁸ But Ripon was not prepared simply to overrule the Governor's advice and flout the wishes of the colonial ministers. If he sent the Exiles back to encounter vehement hostility among Natal whites, this might lead to unrest in Zululand⁹⁹ and spread anti-imperialist sentiment throughout the white population of South Africa. He was warned that '... It will produce the worst effect on South African politics ...'.¹⁰⁰

On the other hand, Ripon would not simple capitulate to white opinion in Natal by agreeing to incorporate Zululand in Natal. Quite apart from his own convictions, he knew that this would be opposed by British humanitarians. Among these were Liberal Party backbenchers in the imperial parliament, whose support was crucial to the survival of the Liberal government.¹⁰¹ For their part, Natalians had to acknowledge that they could not prevent the return for ever because the sentences imposed on the Exiles would expire in due course.¹⁰²

Though Natal ministers feared an outraged white electorate, there were dangers in being too hostile to the Exiles and too eager for the incorporation of Zululand.¹⁰³ White Natal had critics in Britain. Its Indian franchise policy had aroused humanitarian opinion and incurred 'grave objections' within the British cabinet.¹⁰⁴ Its native policy was suspect.¹⁰⁵ If Natal provoked philanthropical feeling by displaying ill-will to the chiefs, it could well strengthen British opposition to the annexation of Zululand by Natal.¹⁰⁶ Then, too, there was black opinion. At a time when the black people of Natal were probably making up their minds about what Responsible government was likely to mean for them it was not good policy to be seen to break faith with the uSuthu chiefs. Hely-

98. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.79-80: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, copy, 18 Jan.1895.

99. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 23 Jan.1895.

100. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.66-70: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 12 Jan.1895; and ff.165-67: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 20 June 1895. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 23 Jan.1895.

101. N.A., Col.Coll: Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, 25 Jan.1895.

102. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.71-74: Draft minute, Natal ministers to Hely-Hutchinson, 9 Jan.1895.

103. *Ibid.*, ff.66-70: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 12 Jan.1895.

104. *Ibid.*, ff.75-77: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, copy, 14 Jan.1895.

105. N.A., Col.Coll: E.M. Bryce to H.E. Colenso, 14 May 1895.

106. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.66-70: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 12 Jan.1895.

Hutchinson at one stage:

'... pointed out to Sir John that it would be an extremely bad policy for the Government of Natal to adopt to educate the natives in the beliefs that the new responsible Government of Natal advised that such a breach of faith should be perpetrated.'¹⁰⁷

The Decision to Suspend Repatriation: Harriette's Role

Whatever Ripon's hopes and intentions, his decision to suspend the repatriation of the chiefs is a crucial turning-point in the history of Zululand. Because the returned chiefs would have opposed incorporation and pressed for a separate existence like that of Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the extension of their exile reduced sharply whatever chances still existed of averting the annexation of Zululand to Natal, and it therefore helped to deny to Zululand a future different from that which it was to experience as part of Natal and subsequently as part of the Republic of South Africa. Harriette's role in bringing about so crucial a decision is therefore pivotal. Having campaigned so long for the repatriation of the Exiles, she certainly did not knowingly prolong their exile. Her actions, nevertheless, have a place in the elastic interplay of events and attitudes in the early months of 1895 which ended with the chiefs still in exile at St Helena, and the elaborate arrangements for their return aborted.

Assessing Harriette's role in these events requires discussion of four separate episodes:

- i. her notifying the authorities of her decision to go to St Helena
- ii. her conversation with Escombe before 18 January, the date of the Natal minute which caused Ripon to suspend the return
- iii. her telegraphing Fox Bourne on 24 January 1895
- iv. her experiences while *en route* to St Helena and Britain.

Here, where the concern is primarily with Ripon's decision of 18 January, only the first two of these four topics require consideration. The last two are discussed in the final section of the chapter.

At the end of 1894 Harriette was planning her departure from Natal. For some time she

107. Africa South 471, p.48, no.56: Sir Graham Bower to Hely-Hutchinson, 26 Jan.1895; and p.73, no.95: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 31 Jan.1895. *cf.* Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.25-27: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 5 Oct.1893.

had thought rather vaguely of a visit to the chiefs at St Helena. Lord Ripon had no objection, and she had told the Exiles she would come.¹⁰⁸ She would leave Bishopstowe in the charge of Agnes, who would have the company of Alice Werner, and she herself would be accompanied by Mubi Nondenisa, a trusted Bishopstowe man.¹⁰⁹ There were some question marks about Harriette's plans. For example, if the chiefs were about to be returned, there was little point in her going to St Helena; and, if she did go there, she was not sure whether she would then proceed to Britain, or perhaps come back to Natal with the returning Exiles. Hoping to clarify the position, she wrote to Sir Marshal Clarke and to Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson. She told them of her plans and asked them for information. She was particularly anxious to know whether the chiefs were likely to return within the next four months.¹¹⁰ In the meanwhile she ascertained from S.O. Samuelson that Mubi Nondenisa would need only an ordinary, not a special, pass in order to accompany her.¹¹¹

There was little in what Sir Marshal Clarke or Hely-Hutchinson said to make Harriette change her mind. In his letter of 2 January, Sir Marshal commented on the Zulu deputation whose members would 'doubtless' tell Harriette of their errand, and he sent to the Exiles only the message that he 'bore them always in mind'. He asked Harriette to let him know what plans she finalised and added, in a postscript, that he hoped to be able to send her a further letter before she left.¹¹² Sir Marshal claimed subsequently to have given Harriette 'a strong hint to keep quiet'.¹¹³ If she sensed any such 'hint' from these very non-committal statements, she did not take it. His later letter of 12 January was even more firmly reticent. He discouraged her from visiting Eshowe, explained that he and his wife were no longer thinking of visiting Natal, and stated 'I really have nothing to communicate to you ...'.¹¹⁴ In fact Sir Marshal was summoned to Natal on 18 January, and Harriette later saw that it might just have been possible for him to have seen

108. Africa South 471, p.50, enclosure 1 in no.60: H.E. Colenso to Governor of Zululand, 30 Dec.1894.

109. *Ibid.*

110. *Ibid.*, pp.48-50, no.60: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 4 Jan.1895, with enclosure 1: H.E. Colenso to Hely-Hutchinson, 30 Dec.1894 and enclosure 2: Hely-Hutchinson to H.E. Colenso, 3 Jan.1895; and p.59, no.84: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 10 Jan.1895.

111. N.A., Col.Coll: S.O. Samuelson to H.E. Colenso, 12 Jan.1895.

112. *Ibid.*, M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 2 Jan.1895; Werner, 'Recollections of Harriette E. Colenso'.

113. Africa South 471, p.48, no.55: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and personal, 24 Jan.1895.

114. N.A., Col.Coll: M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 12 Jan.1895.

her on 24 January.¹¹⁵ But, by then, after his discussions with Hely-Hutchinson and the Natal ministers, he would have good reason to avoid seeing her.

Harriette's intention to visit St Helena certainly was a problem for Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson. There were two risks about her plan. On the one hand, Harriette - and her supporters - might be angered if she went to St Helena only to find that she was on a fool's errand because the chiefs had already departed, or were about to depart. On the other hand, Harriette's opponents might be outraged if she arrived at St Helena in time to accompany the Exiles to Zululand and give their return the appearance of a Colenso triumph.¹¹⁶ Sir Walter tried to prevent Harriette from leaving Natal. He wrote to Ripon on 4 January suggesting that it was desirable that she should know on what terms the uSuthu chiefs were to return to Zululand. A few days later he telegraphed that Harriette might give up her plan of visiting St Helena if told of the imminent return of the chiefs. He added that, as she was 'unsafe' on confidential matters, the Natal ministers would have to be informed too.¹¹⁷ Ripon refused. On 5 January he ordered that his plans were to remain secret until 10 February, by which date the chiefs would have left St Helena.¹¹⁸ His ban on divulging information evidently continued until 26 January.¹¹⁹

Sir Walter could not prevent Harriette from leaving Natal. He was probably eager to see to it that her movements did not aggravate the clash between Natal and the Colonial Office, and he may well have been among those in Natal who thought they could make use of her to persuade the Colonial Office to accept Natal proposals for annexation. Harriette believed that the Governor had a role in what followed and she was sure that she acted in accordance with his wishes.¹²⁰

During January 1895, when the Natal ministers were defining their attitude to the question of annexation and return, there were many consultations and discussions. Sir Walter Hely-

115. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso, endorsement on M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 12 Jan.1898.

116. Africa South 471, pp.59-60, no.84: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 10 Jan.1895; *cf.* N.A., Col.Coll: Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, 25 Jan.1895.

117. Africa South 471, p.50, no.61: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 26 Jan.1895; and p.42, no.43: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 10 Jan.1895.

118. *Ibid.*, p.42, no.42: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 5 Jan.1895.

119. *Ibid.*, p.49, no.58: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram 2, 26 Jan.1895; and no.59: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram 3, 26 Jan.1895.

120. See below, pp.331-32, 333, 340, 341, 343-44.

Hutchinson conferred with Sir John Robinson, the Prime Minister of the Colony, and with Harry Escombe, the Attorney-General. Sir John Robinson and Harry Escombe discussed the questions with each other, and both the Governor and the Natal ministers consulted with Sir Marshal Clarke.¹²¹ Many meetings were informal, and held in addition to the formal cabinets where ministers decided on their policy and formulated the minutes they presented to the Governor. In addition, there were meetings between Harry Escombe and Harriette Colenso, and these have a highly significant place in this study.¹²² All were trying to decide on their best course of action, and were busy reacting to - and assessing - the likely attitude and decisions of others as well as the probable repercussions of their own. When some of the confusion cleared late in January 1895, there were apparent surprises in the resulting picture: Harriette Colenso had become the public advocate of the annexation of Zululand to Natal,¹²³ and disagreement between Harry Escombe and Sir John Robinson had disappeared.¹²⁴ An illusion of harmony existed, for Harriette believed that her views coincided with those of Harry Escombe and of Sir Marshal Clarke.¹²⁵ Three months later Sir Marshal told her how wrong she had been,¹²⁶ but she would not easily give up her confidence in Escombe.¹²⁷

The roles of Harriette Colenso and Harry Escombe in creating this illusion present difficulties. The relevant questions are whether it was Escombe who persuaded Harriette to advocate annexation, as she later claimed,¹²⁸ or whether it was Harriette who influenced Escombe, as Hely-Hutchinson and John Robinson alleged.¹²⁹ Such questions cannot be answered with certainty, and in the absence of conclusive evidence all one can do is assess the human probabilities of the situation.

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- 121. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.81-87: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 18 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 23 Jan.1895; and pp.65-68, no.92: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 23 Jan.1895.
 - 122. Africa South 471, no.44: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 17 Jan.1895.
 - 123. *Ibid.*, p.48, no.55: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 24 Jan.1895.
 - 124. *Ibid.*, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 23 Jan.1895.
 - 125. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 8 Jan.1895.
 - 126. *Ibid.*, M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 24 Apr.1895.
 - 127. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, May 1895.
 - 128. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, draft (many alterations), 2 Feb.1897.
 - 129. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.91-93: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 25 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 23 Jan.1895.

A convinced expansionist, Escombe was also an experienced colonial politician.¹³⁰ He was therefore likely to appreciate that isolation was dangerous, and that he would do well to identify openly with the predominant attitude of the Natal cabinet, providing he could do this without damaging his personal reputation. Escombe had championed the uSuthu in 1888, and he had since urged the early return of the chiefs.¹³¹ If he changed his views, he could easily be attacked for inconsistency if not crooked dealing; but if he could show that Harriette Colenso agreed with his new political position, he might save his political reputation and, perhaps, salve his conscience. In a remarkable way Escombe in 1895 seems to have been doing again what he did in 1888. When he wanted some relief from the moral commitment to the uSuthu he turned to Harriette and persuaded her to adopt a modified view of the situation. In 1888 when he wished to go to Britain, he had asked Harriette to release him from his promise to defend the uSuthu.¹³² She had replied that it was not for her to release him from a promise made to the Zulu people and not to her; but Escombe had persuaded her it would be in the uSuthu interest for him to go to Britain leaving the local legal defence of the uSuthu temporarily in other hands.¹³³ In 1895 the question was whether or not she should advocate the annexation of Zululand to Natal and whether or not annexation should precede the return of the chiefs. Here again Harriette adopted a viewpoint of which Escombe approved. She abandoned earlier misgivings about the Natal desire to annex Zululand prior to the Exiles' return. Given her high idealism, her deep commitment to the cause of justice to the uSuthu and her diffidence about her own political judgment, Harriette was probably easy to persuade. The outcome of a vexatious succession dispute also encouraged her to have confidence in the Natal ministry.¹³⁴

It was not, after all, a novel thing for a Colenso to be prepared to trust white colonial opinion, and there had been earlier times when Natal criticism of imperial policy coincided with that of the Colensos.¹³⁵ On the other hand there was the precedent of Cetshwayo's return. This was 'a bitter example of what colonial illwill could do', and a repetition

130. J.T. Henderson, *Speeches of the Late Right Honourable Harry Escombe* (Pietermaritzburg, 1904, Preface dated Nov.1903), pp.364-65, Speech of 6 December 1897.

131. *Africa South* 471, pp.17-18, no.11: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 30 Mar.1894.

132. See above, pp.117-18.

133. See above, pp.118 and 124 *et seq.*

134. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P., C.150/214: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 11 Jan.1895 and C.150/215: H.E. Colenso to H.R. Fox Bourne, 18 Jan.1895.

135. See above, pp.37-38.

should be avoided.¹³⁶ She believed the eventual annexation of Zululand inevitable; and its immediate annexation was therefore desirable as a means of strengthening Escombe's friends.¹³⁷ Because she 'was in absolute ignorance' of arrangements already made, she believed too that prompt annexation would bring the chiefs home earlier.¹³⁸ Some in the Colonial Office did not think well of Escombe, but Harriette trusted him.¹³⁹ She accepted that he had to work cautiously because there was 'plenty of jealousy of him', but clearly expected that he would combine support within the colony with pro-uSuthu views.¹⁴⁰ She thought too that Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson supported the argument being put to her, and subsequently charged him with playing both the Colonial Office and herself false.¹⁴¹ Like many, but not Clarke himself, she hoped that Sir Marshal would continue in office after the annexation and believed that his doing so would guarantee fair dealing.¹⁴² By 16 January Harriette therefore accepted that the prior annexation of Zululand was desirable. Believing that this would accelerate both annexation and return, she was willing to make her attitude public. Hely-Hutchinson telegraphed the news to Ripon the following day and added that Escombe had informed him that there would be unanimous opposition in the colony to repatriation without annexation.¹⁴³

Once Harriette had expressed herself in favour of the prior annexation of Zululand to Natal, the colonial ministers were quick to make all use they could of her support. Robinson and Escombe discussed her attitude. On 18 January when Sir John Robinson presented the minute of the Natal ministers of the previous day, he informed the Governor that Harriette had told Escombe she thought Natal should annex Zululand before the Exiles returned, and that she had written to the Aborigines Protection Society on the matter.

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- 136. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P., C.150/216: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 14 Feb.1895.
 - 137. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 12 Nov.1897; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 30 July 1897.
 - 138. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to H. Escombe, copy, 6 Dec.1895; H.E. Colenso to S. Buxton, copy, 24 Apr.1895.
 - 139. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.46-49: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 6 Jan.1894; and ff.79-80: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, copy, 18 Jan.1895.
 - 140. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P., C.150/214a and b: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 11 Jan.1895.
 - 141. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 10 Sept.1896; H.E. Colenso to G. Johnson, 17 Mar.1896. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.105: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 13 Dec.1896.
 - 142. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.81-87: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 24 Jan.1895. *cf.* N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 30 Aug.1895. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P., C.150/214a and b: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 11 Jan.1895; C.150/216: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 14 Feb.1895.
 - 143. Africa South 471, p.42, no.44: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 17 Jan.1895.

Escombe corroborated the information.¹⁴⁴ Later, when Sir Marshal Clarke had been summoned from Zululand to help Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson cope with prevailing contention and uncertainty, Sir John Robinson told the Resident Commissioner that it was Harriette's attitude that had 'materially altered' the relationship between Natal and Zululand. Harriette had 'entirely changed the situation' by converting Escombe and this made the Natal ministry unanimous.¹⁴⁵ In 1895 Harriette relished the 'exquisite revenge' of making Sir John Robinson, arch-enemy of Cetshwayo, responsible for 'placing Dinuzulu in a position of authority'.¹⁴⁶ She joked about the way Robinson was 'getting into the same boat with her', and thus suggested that it was his views, not Escombe's, that had changed.¹⁴⁷ This 1895 comment implied too that it was Harriette who had drawn others to adopt her standpoint,¹⁴⁸ but by 1897 she was clear that the initiative had not been hers, for Escombe had invited her to adopt the same position as himself about Zululand.¹⁴⁹ Probably her later statement was nearer the truth, although by then her subsequent disappointments presumably made her want to forget how eager she had been in 1895 to work with the Natal ministry. By 1897 she recognised that she had been drawn into a 'fresh betrayal of the Zulus', and that Harry Escombe had 'failed'.¹⁵⁰

Harriette was eager because she trusted Escombe, and his trustworthiness in her eyes was underlined by his having gone on record as the advocate of a policy which would give Dinuzulu an important role in Zululand. He had declared himself in favour of a central position for Dinuzulu who, as Head *Induna*, should become the essential intermediary between the British government and the Zulu people and the lynch pin of the administration.¹⁵¹ Among the things Harriette did not know were the misgivings within the Natal ministry about the role which it was intended that Dinuzulu should play. This was a point which Sir John Robinson raised with Sir Marshal Clarke in their meeting on

144. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P., C.150/215 and 215a: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 18 Jan.1895.

145. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 23 Jan.1895. *cf.* Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.91-93: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 25 Jan.1895.

146. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P., C.150/216: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 14 Feb.1895.

147. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 9 May 1895.

148. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to S. Buxton, draft (not sent), 13 Feb.1897.

149. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 12 Nov.1897; H.E. Colenso to S. Buxton, draft (not sent), 13 Feb.1897.

150. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 2 Feb.1897; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 20 Jan.1897.

151. *Ibid.*, draft ms. of pamphlet, p.4; H.E. Colenso to S. Buxton, draft (not sent), 13 Feb.1897. K.C.A.L., Dinuzulu File 13680, no.17, mss in H.E. Colenso's script: memorandum on the attitude of the Natal government.

20 January 1895, and the Natal ministers were informed of the explanation of this intended role.¹⁵² At the time Harriette failed to realise how wide was the gap between her own attitude and that of the Natal ministers on a matter of such crucial importance.

When Ripon decided on 18 January to suspend the return of the Exiles, he had been told of Harriette's changed attitude, but this did not weigh much with him. It was the attitude and intentions of the Natal ministry that mattered more. He realised that, if Harriette had not been misreported, then she had been inadequately informed and he telegraphed his scepticism and hesitation to Hely-Hutchinson. He quickly suspected Natal intrigues, and expressed his surprise that Harriette had preferred these intrigues to trusting to the good intentions of the Secretary of State. He did not react as some in Natal, including Hely-Hutchinson, appeared to hope he would, *i.e.* conclude that he could allow Natal to incorporate Zululand because Harriette's approval of this step would quieten British humanitarian critics.¹⁵³

In fact, both Governor and ministers in Natal exaggerated the impact of Harriette's opinion in favour of annexation. They tried to persuade the imperial authorities that it was Harriette who was responsible for creating unanimity in the Natal ministry, but there is evidence that the unanimity existed beforehand.¹⁵⁴ All Harriette did was to make it easier for Escombe openly to align himself with his colleagues on the question. Natal ministers deceived themselves if they supposed that Harriette's championship of annexation would persuade Ripon to arrange the annexation of Zululand to Natal, and he did not then accept that Harriette was responsible for the delay in returning the chiefs.¹⁵⁵

Repatriation is Indefinitely Postponed

When Ripon sent his telegram on 18 January 1895 he had decided only to defer a return of the Exiles, not to cancel it, and he hoped the postponement would be short. His hope

152. Africa South 471, pp.68-69, enclosure in no.92: minute of a conversation between Sir John Robinson and Sir Marshal Clarke on the 30(sic - 20) Jan.1895, 23 Jan.1895.

153. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.88: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, secret and personal, 24 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52a: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret and personal, 24 Jan.1895.

154. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.81-87: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 15 Jan.1895; f.124: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 1 Mar.1895. John Robinson Papers, File 4, 6/9: J. Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, 8 Feb.1895. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 1 Mar.1895.

155. *Ibid.*, p.54, no.70: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 29 Jan.1895.

was strengthened by his receiving, on 22 January, Hely-Hutchinson's despatch reporting the deputation from Zululand, and by his knowing four days later that Mr Grey-Wilson, the Governor of St Helena, had told Dinuzulu of his intended return.¹⁵⁶ Grey-Wilson had not then known of the change of plan: Ripon's despatch to him about postponement was on its way to St Helena in the vessel originally chartered to take the chiefs back to Natal and Zululand; while Hely-Hutchinson's despatch prohibiting the embarkation of the chiefs on the *Umkusi* was too late for the ordinary steamship which left Natal on 16 January, and it was carried to St Helena by the *Swallow*, a British man-of-war specially despatched from the Cape.¹⁵⁷ It arrived in time to prevent the embarkation of the chiefs, but they were already packed and ready to leave and had sold many of their effects.¹⁵⁸

After his telegram temporarily suspending the return of the chiefs Ripon tried to persuade the Natal ministers that they were making a great mistake and should withdraw their objections to the Exiles' return.¹⁵⁹ For their part Natalians wanted to capitalise on Ripon's obvious desire to secure the Exiles' promised return to Zululand. They hoped to use it to extract from the Colonial Office further major concessions in regard to Zululand.¹⁶⁰

Ripon argued initially that they could not indefinitely postpone the return of the chiefs without breach of faith.¹⁶¹ Obviously not wishing himself to be criticised on this ground, he was equally sure that the Natalians would not want to be blamed either. To convince them that a breach of faith was involved Ripon told Hely-Hutchinson to inform his ministers confidentially of the arrangements that had been made for the return of the chiefs.¹⁶²

156. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.79-80: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, copy, 18 June 1895; Africa South 471, p.43, no.46: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 18 Jan.1895; p.44, no.55: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 28 Dec.1894; p.49, no.58: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram no.2, 26 Jan.1895.

157. *Ibid.*, p.47, no.53: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 24 Jan.1895.

158. *Ibid.*, p.80, no.107: Grey-Wilson to Ripon, secret, 5 Feb.1895.

159. *Ibid.*, p.54, no.69: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 29 Jan.1895.

160. *Ibid.*, p.55, no.73: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram 2, 29 Jan.1895.

161. *Ibid.*, pp.68-71, no.94: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, confidential, 31 Jan.1895, with enclosure 1, minute from Governor to Minister, 28 Jan.1895.

162. *Ibid.*, p.49, no.58: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 26 Jan.1895.

But the Natalians were not willing to agree to the return unless Ripon consented to the prompt annexation of Zululand to Natal. Prior annexation was preferred, and only if that were impossible would they settle for something less.¹⁶³ In their negotiations with the British government the Natalians tried to insist that the following were essential points. First, to appease a potentially indignant colonial electorate ministers wanted publicity for their previous efforts to obtain Zululand.¹⁶⁴ At the least such publicity would help to commit the Colonial Office to preferring Natal's claim to that of any other colony, if Zululand were to be transferred from direct imperial control, *i.e.* commit it to the probable eventual incorporation of Zululand in Natal.¹⁶⁵ Ripon agreed to publish this statement only on condition that the Natalians should give up their attempts to secure prompt annexation¹⁶⁶ and that they should maintain temporary secrecy about the projected return.¹⁶⁷

The Natal ministry would have liked to secure publication of much more of the correspondence, if not all of it.¹⁶⁸ This Ripon would not allow. He insisted on the right of the imperial government to decide what should be published, and when. He would concede only that, when Dinuzulu returned, the Colonial Office would present papers to the British parliament which had been selected with the needs and circumstances of the Natal government duly taken into account.¹⁶⁹

Second, to avoid jeopardising Natal's future interests the local ministry wanted an effective voice in the government of Zululand, even while it remained a crown colony. They suggested that the Natal government should be consulted before laws were made for Zululand; but Ripon refused to give a colonial ministry the power to block legislation in

163. John Robinson Papers, File 6/10: John Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, 8 Feb.1895.

164. *Ibid.*, File 4, 6/9: John Robinson to Hely-Hutchinson, 8 Feb.1895. Africa South 471, p.72, enclosure 2 in no.94, minute no.8: Natal ministers to Governor, 29 Jan.1895.

165. *Ibid.*, p.77, enclosure 1 in no.101: Governor to Ministers, 7 Feb.1895; enclosure 2 in no.101: Hely-Hutchinson to Sir John Robinson, 7 Feb.1895; p.57, no.78: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 1 Feb.1895.

166. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.107-112: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 9 Feb.1895. Africa South 471, p.59, no.82: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, secret and confidential, 5 Feb.1895; p.77, enclosure 2 in no.101: Hely-Hutchinson to Sir John Robinson, 7 Feb.1895; p.84, enclosure 1 in no.112: Hely-Hutchinson to Robinson, 13 Feb.1895; p.85, enclosure 3 in no.112: Hely-Hutchinson to John Robinson, 14 Feb.1895.

167. *Ibid.*, p.77, enclosure 1 in no.101: minute of Natal ministers to Governor, 7 Feb.1895; enclosure 2 in no.101: Hely-Hutchinson to John Robinson, 7 Feb.1895.

168. *Ibid.*, p.58, no.81: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram 3 Feb.1895.

169. *Ibid.*, p.59, no.82: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, secret and confidential, 5 Feb.1895.

an adjoining British crown colony. He would allow *ad hoc* consultation as matters arose, but would not limit the discretion of the Crown or its officials.¹⁷⁰

Third, to make quite sure of obtaining Zululand the Natal ministry wanted at this point to accelerate its incorporation. Annexation prior to repatriation was obviously preferred; but, if the chiefs were to return while Zululand was a separate crown colony, then annexation to Natal should come as soon as possible thereafter. Ripon's special statement on Zululand did not satisfy the local ministry on this point, and they put forward suggestions about Dinuzulu's return which were designed to safeguard their colony's position. These were that Dinuzulu was to be met by a Natal official who would escort him to Zululand, and that he should be told on arrival that Zululand was to be annexed to Natal as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made.¹⁷¹ In reply, Ripon was willing to have Dinuzulu met by a Natal official, providing it was made clear that he was under the authority of Sir Marshal Clarke, but he would not agree to the second suggestion. He saw that this amounted to a public promise of the speedy annexation of Zululand to Natal, which he had refused. Dinuzulu was thus to be told of the impending annexation but as a distant probability, not an immediate certainty; and Harriette was to be told of Ripon's statement of 6 July 1894.¹⁷²

Ripon virtually ended the prospect of reaching an agreement with Natal when he made it plain that he would not be manoeuvred into speeding up the annexation of Zululand to the colony. By early February 1895 he saw that the Natal ministers were putting too high a price on their agreement to the return of the Exiles.¹⁷³ Aggrieved and indignant that they had not been consulted about the initial secret arrangements, they voiced old fears

170. *Ibid.*, p.58, no.81: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 4 Feb.1895; p.59, no.82: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, secret and confidential, 5 Feb.1895; p.78, no.102: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 9 Feb.1895.

171. *Ibid.*, p.55, no.73: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 4 Feb.1895; p.59, no.82: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, secret and confidential, 5 Feb.1895; p.78, no.102: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 9 Feb.1895.

172. See above, p.315. Africa South 471, p.57, no.77: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 1 Feb.1895; p.58, no.81: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 3 Feb.1895; p.58, no.82: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, secret and confidential, 5 Feb.1895; p.77, enclosure 1 in no.101: Hely-Hutchinson to Natal ministers, 7 Feb.1895.

173. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, f.100: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 1 Feb.1895; f.101: Ripon to Governor, telegram, secret and personal, 5 Feb.1895; ff.107-109: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 9 Feb.1895; f.117: telegram (translation), Hely-Hutchinson to Chapelries, 11 Feb.1895. Africa South 471, p.59, no.83: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram (2), secret and confidential, 5 Feb.1895.

that Rhodes might oust them from Zululand or coerce them into a customs union, yet nevertheless claimed credit for their loyal co-operation in seeking a way out of an 'acute situation'.¹⁷⁴ But they persistently refused to do as Ripon requested. They would not keep separate the two issues of annexation and return.¹⁷⁵ By early February they had forced the Secretary of State to be quite explicit on the question of annexation, and to shift his ground in regard to the return of the Exiles to Natal. He would, he announced, prefer to abandon return rather than accelerate annexation, providing he could do this honourably or 'justifiably'. His final decision depended on what he heard from St Helena.¹⁷⁶

This explicit pronouncement was in fact an alteration of Ripon's stance. In allowing the possibility that he could cancel the return without breaking faith, Ripon withdrew his earlier insistence that cancellation would be a breach of faith for which the Natal government would be responsible. The Natalians now reasserted their earlier position: the annexation of Zululand to Natal should precede the return of the chiefs from St Helena.¹⁷⁷ A little later their fears of being blamed for a breach of faith were revived. When newspapers from St Helena arrived in Natal, they were found to contain a report of the non-return which stated that the return had been arranged by the Natal government. Though this was of course misleading, it threatened to implicate the Natal government. They promptly changed their standpoint yet again, and reverted to proposals they had put forward on 29 January: the return should be subject to agreed conditions, and should be followed by annexation as quickly as possible.¹⁷⁸ But Ripon now preferred to do no more than wait until he heard more fully from St Helena.¹⁷⁹

At the end of February the Colonial Office was obliged to explain its Zulu policy to the House of Commons. The Under-Secretary, S. Buxton, gave a fair summary. He ascribed the failure to effect the planned return of the chiefs to Natal objections and stressed that

174. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, f.94: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, secret and personal, 29 Jan.1895; f.95: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 30 Jan.1895; f.96: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 31 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.79, enclosure in no.102: Hely-Hutchinson to Ministers, minute, 7 Feb.1895.

175. *Ibid.*, p.54, no.69: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 29 Jan.1895.

176. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, f.100: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, copy, 1 Feb.1895. Africa South 471, p.59, no.83: telegram, secret and personal, 5 Feb.1895.

177. *Ibid.*, p.60, no.86: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram (1); p.61, no.88: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram (3), 11 Feb.1895.

178. *Ibid.*, p.75, no.99: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 25 Feb.1895 (received).

179. *Ibid.*, p.79, no.103: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, confidential, 1 Mar.1895.

it was the issue of Zululand which was the crux of the difficulty. While acknowledging that 'unquestionably' at 'some time or other' Zululand would be incorporated in Natal, Buxton repeated that the British government did not think the present moment an opportune time for the transfer.¹⁸⁰ From the Natal point of view here, at last, was some kind of public pledge that the Colonial Office regarded the annexation of Zululand to Natal as inevitable if distant. Not surprisingly Robinson wished to publicise the statement.¹⁸¹

Ripon waited until he knew how the chiefs in St Helena had reacted to the postponement of their embarkation before he decided on his final step. Dinuzulu, so Grey-Wilson reported, took the news quietly. He regretted only the sale of his horse and effects.¹⁸² Dinuzulu would have been more dismayed and protesting if the Zulu chiefs had not then cherished two hopes: that the delay in their return would be brief; and that the delayed return might secure for them permission and opportunity to visit Britain and to see the Queen. They wanted this visit very much. Grey-Wilson reported their urgent entreaties, while Ndabuko, Shingana, and Dinuzulu wrote a joint letter pleading for a visit.¹⁸³ Ripon knew these hopes were unlikely to be fulfilled: Marshal Clarke had recommended against the idea of allowing the chiefs to visit Britain; and Ripon was now postponing indefinitely the return he had hoped to accomplish.¹⁸⁴ He intended that the chiefs should be compensated for financial losses and that, in future, they should be given better treatment.¹⁸⁵

Reports of Zulu reaction to rumours of Dinuzulu's return confirmed the decision to drop repatriation. Excitement was reported at rumours that Britain intended to give Dinuzulu authority in the Vryheid district. This was the area where his strongest supporters - the abaQulusi - lived, but since 1888 it had been part of the S.A.R. Repatriation might

180. *Ibid.*, p.79, no.104: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram 1 Mar.1895.

181. *Ibid.*, p.80, no.106: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 4 Mar.1895.

182. *Ibid.*, p.80, no.107: Grey-Wilson to Ripon, secret, 5 Feb.1895.

183. *Ibid.*, pp.80-81, no.108: Grey-Wilson to Ripon, 12 Feb.1896 and enclosure, Exiles to Grey-Wilson, 12 Feb.1896.

184. *Ibid.*, pp.23-24, no.20: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 2 June, 1894, with enclosure 1 to Governor, secret minute.

185. *Ibid.*, pp.93-95, no.123: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, confidential, 4 Apr.1895.

therefore complicate Britain's dealings with the S.A.R.¹⁸⁶

Ripon's despatch which closed the episode again committed the imperial government to the view that, at some future date, Zululand would be incorporated into Natal. This had been public knowledge since Buxton made his statement in the House of Commons. What became quite evident later was that the transfer, when made, would include the territories of Zambane and Mbegisa.¹⁸⁷ The inclusion of these territories would not be particularly advantageous to Natal. They were poorer regions whose strategic importance in regard to railways had made them a bone of contention between Britain and the South African Republic. But, all in all, the Natal ministers could congratulate themselves that what they believed to be in Natal's future best interest in regard to Zululand had not been prejudiced. It had been publicly accepted that, however distant the prospect, the time would come when the colony incorporated Zululand; and the Natalians had demonstrated that, even though Zululand was a crown colony, their views on Zulu matters must be taken into account when imperial policy was decided.¹⁸⁸

The Indefinite Postponement of Return: Harriette's Role

The indefinite postponement of the return of the chiefs, which was finalised early in March 1895, was quite opposite to the outcome for which Harriette hoped; and it is necessary here to assess her role in the events between Ripon's temporary halting of the return on 18 January and the later cancellation of his plans. The story falls into two parts. First there is her telegram to the A.P.S. of 24 January 1895 in which she urged the annexation of Zululand to Natal prior to the return of the chiefs. Both the circumstances that led to her sending this telegram and its effect need explanation. Then there is the question of how significant her personality and influence were in the weeks that followed. Here, as in so many phases of the Colenso endeavour, it is important to see not only what Harriette intended and did, but also what use others wished to make of her attitude and actions.

186. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.134-35: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, private, 8 Mar.1895; ff.135-37: J.Y. Gibson (R.M. Nongoma) to M. Clarke, copy, 28 Feb.1895.

187. Africa South 471, p.99, no.133: Agent-General to Colonial Office, 20 Aug.1895.

188. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.149-47: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, private, 6 Apr.1895. Africa South 471, p.79, no.104: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 1 Mar.1895.

On 24 January 1895 Harriette sent the following telegram to Fox Bourne at the A.P.S., 'Tell Ripon, Courtney and other friends chiefs return better if Zululand first and at once annexed to Natal.'¹⁸⁹ When Harriette sent that telegram she was triply confident. She believed she had reasons for confidence. Hely-Hutchinson had suggested that she send it.¹⁹⁰ She trusted the intentions of the Natal ministry in regard to Zululand. She was confident of her own ability to sway the A.P.S. and she was confident of the influence of the Society on the Colonial Office. The Secretary of State was clearly in the forefront of her mind. Later, when Harriette looked back on the events of January 1895, her attitude to the telegram was more complex. There were times when it seemed a crucial turning-point, and she and Agnes recalled that the day they sent it was the anniversary of 'His Birthday'.¹⁹¹ There were times when she regretted the view it reflected.¹⁹² But there were also times when she realised that the telegram did not have the significance sometimes assigned to it by those less sympathetic to the uSuthu than she.¹⁹³

Evidence available suggests strongly that Harry Escombe coaxed Harriette into sending this telegram, and that, in so persuading her, he believed he was serving his own best interests as well as the interest of the Natal government.¹⁹⁴ Conversations between Harriette Colenso and Harry Escombe, which may have begun as early as 4 January, continued after the 17th. On that day Hely-Hutchinson telegraphed to Ripon that, according to Escombe, Harriette was 'strongly in favour of handing Zululand over to Natal before Dinuzulu returns'; that she had written to the A.P.S. on the subject; and that Escombe himself insisted that annexation should precede return.¹⁹⁵ Harriette's telegram of 24 January declared her attitude to friends in Britain far sooner than any letter. As mentioned, she urged Fox Bourne to tell allies of her conviction that the immediate annexation of Zululand to Natal should precede the return of the chiefs. In announcing her standpoint Harriette invited others to adopt the same view. The Prime Minister and the Governor of

189. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P. C.150/218: H.E. Colenso (from Durban) to Fox Bourne, 24 Jan.1895.

190. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 24 Apr.1895.

191. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 24 Jan.1896.

192. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 2 Feb.1897; cf. H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 30 July 1897.

193. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 2 Feb.1897.

194. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 17 Sept.1896, 7 and 20 Jan.1897.

195. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.91-93: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 25 Jan.1895. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P. C.150/214a and b: H.E. Colenso to Fox Bourne, 11 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.42, no.44: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 17 Jan.1895.

the colony knew very quickly that she had sent the telegram, and how it had been worded. Sir John Robinson read the text of the telegram over the telephone from Durban to Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson in Pietermaritzburg and Sir Walter was then able to inform Lord Ripon of it, by telegraph and letters. The Governor claimed not to have apprehended the first name - that of Ripon himself - to whom Harriette wanted her message directed.

It was hoped in Natal that Harriette's telegram would promote the interest of the colony. In the first place it left Ripon in no doubt about Harriette's attitude. Initially surprised by the report of what Escombe had told Hely-Hutchinson, Ripon had cabled a query suggesting that Escombe might have misrepresented Harriette.¹⁹⁶ A telegram from Harriette herself showed that he had not. Harriette Colenso did in fact approve of the prior annexation of Zululand to Natal. In addition, to have Harriette herself stress her point of view might encourage Ripon to draw two further inferences which the Natalians and the Governor hoped he would make. One was that Harriette Colenso was responsible for creating the unanimous opposition of the Natal ministry to a return of the chiefs which was not preceded by the annexation of Zululand to Natal.¹⁹⁷ The other was that Harriette's announced approval of prior annexation would dispel the opposition of British humanitarians and clear the way for Ripon to arrange the incorporation of Zululand by Natal.¹⁹⁸ In anticipating these things Natal politicians showed how naive was their grasp of imperial politics, for they tended to measure both Ripon and British humanitarians too small. Ripon would not, at this state, attribute to Harriette the importance Natalians claimed for her; while British humanitarians, though perplexed by Harriette's attitude, would not so easily give up their suspicion of the colony.¹⁹⁹

Though the Natal government did not get anything like the advantage for which they hoped, neither Harriette nor the Zulu benefited from her sending the telegram of 24 January 1895. Ripon had already decided on temporarily halting the return of the chiefs when Harriette sent this message. Given his reluctance to accelerate the annexation of Zululand to Natal, her urging this would not encourage him to resume the plans to return

196. Ripon Papers: Add.Mss.43563, ff.89-90: Hely-Hutchinson to Chapelries, 24 Jan.1895. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52a: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 24 Jan.1895.

197. *Ibid.*, p.47, no.52: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 23 Jan.1895.

198. *Ibid.*, pp.67-68, no.92: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 23 Jan.1895. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.81-87: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret and confidential, 18 Jan.1895.

199. N.A., Col.Coll: Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, 25 Jan.1895.

the chiefs. Arguably she would have done better to repeat the strong moral claims of the chiefs and to stress all the factors that made an early return desirable, thus strengthening Ripon's preoccupation with the danger of perpetrating a 'breach of faith'. As it was, Ripon realised that she was acting in ignorance; but such a demonstration of how well-meant representation might be vitiated by unavoidable ignorance would hardly have strengthened the claims of lobbyists like her. In addition Ripon deplored the way Harriette had evidently preferred to be involved in the intrigues of Natal to reliance on the Colonial Office.²⁰⁰ All in all her standing in the Colonial Office, which had improved with the change of government, was weakened.

Though Ripon would not do this officially, others in the Colonial Office made Harriette something of a scapegoat. When, on receipt of her telegram, Fox Bourne called at the Colonial Office he was told more than Harriette herself then knew, but told it in such a way as to put the blame for postponement on her.²⁰¹ This too was the experience of Leonard Lyell, the MP son of the old Colenso friend, Lady Lyell.²⁰² Probably Harriette Colenso weakened her own standing among British humanitarians generally by advocating the annexation of Zululand to Natal, for this was not a policy they favoured.²⁰³ Natal's 'native policy' was suspect; and, in addition, humanitarian imperialists, like John Mackenzie, saw in the strengthening - not the weakening - of the imperial factor the best means of safeguarding the interests of indigenous peoples.²⁰⁴

In the events between 18 January and 6 March there is one episode in particular which shows how even the Governor of Natal was willing to make Harriette a scapegoat. When, on 26 January, Ripon cabled to the Governor an exhortation for the Natal ministers to withdraw their opposition, he stressed his great reluctance to commit a breach of faith

200. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.79-80: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, copy, 18 June 1895. Africa South 471, p.47, no.52a: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 24 Jan.1895; p.48, no.55: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 24 Jan.1895; p.49, no.59: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 26 Jan.1897; p.57, no.76: Hely-Hutchinson, 31 Jan.1895 (received).

201. N.A., Col.Coll: Fox Bourne to F.E. Colenso, 6 Feb.1895; and to H.E. Colenso, 12 Feb.1895.

202. *Ibid.*, L. Lyell to F.E. Colenso, 5 Feb.1895.

203. *Ibid.*, Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, 25 Jan.1895.

204. J. Sillery, *John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland (1935-1899)* (Cape Town, 1971), pp.146-47, 155, 166-67 and see, for example, John Mackenzie Papers: John Mackenzie to Lord Knutsford, 10 July 1891 and 10 Aug.1889. R.I. Rotberg, *The Founder. Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power* (Johannesburg, 1988), pp.161, 271-72.

towards the chiefs and invited Hely-Hutchinson's observation on this point.²⁰⁵ Feeling himself called upon to suggest a way of cancelling the return of the chiefs without incurring moral blame, Hely-Hutchinson was cornered into a devious suggestion which also showed a desperate resourcefulness. He believed the only way they could avoid the charge of a 'breach of faith' was by implicating Harriette Colenso. Possibly prompted by Escombe, he took over John Robinson's argument. They could blame Harriette Colenso and thus exculpate both the Natal government and the Secretary of State. Because Harriette Colenso had expressed her approval of prior annexation, the Natal government had become solidly unanimous in opposition. It was she who had changed the situation and she who should be held responsible. Moreover, said Hely-Hutchinson, she had acted as the accredited agent and representative of Dinuzulu. Dinuzulu, according to the arguments of Hely-Hutchinson, was thus the author of his own misfortunes.²⁰⁶

Ripon at this stage gave the suggestion short shrift:

'Miss Colenso's reported change of opinion has no effect on my judgment, and I cannot throw responsibility on her in the way you recommend, nor can I regard her as competent to bind Dinuzulu.'²⁰⁷

He ignored a further Natal suggestion. Hely-Hutchinson reported that, according to Robinson and Escombe, Harriette intended persuading Dinuzulu to ask that Zululand be incorporated before he was 'sent home'. Hely-Hutchinson did not at first attach much importance to this 'No one can foresee what Miss Colenso will do', he commented. But he took it more seriously a little later.²⁰⁸ If she succeeded, so the Governor now argued, Ripon would be able to postpone repatriation 'for some considerable time', *i.e.* while annexation was being arranged and Dinuzulu's future reconsidered.²⁰⁹ The ingenuousness with which so contorted a proceeding was suggested underlines the moral insensitivity of Hely-Hutchinson and the politicians concerned. Dinuzulu had apparently made no such request, and so became more mistrustful of white Natal.²¹⁰

205. Africa South 471, p.49, no.57: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram (1), 26 Jan.1895.

206. *Ibid.*, p.52, no.64: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, 27 Jan.1895.

207. *Ibid.*, p.54, no.70: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 29 Jan.1895, but see Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.79-80: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, copy, 18 Jan.1895.

208. *Ibid.*, ff.115-16: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, 15 Feb.1895. Africa South 471, p.75, no.98: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram (2), secret and confidential, 25 Feb.1895 (received).

209. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, ff.130-31: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, private, 2 Mar.1895.

210. N.A., Col.Coll: Dinuzulu to H.E. Colenso, 7 Oct.1896.

If anything, Harriette saw herself at this time not so much as the agent of Dinuzulu as the representative of a Natal government which was well disposed to the Exiles. She believed she was acting with the approval of Escombe and in accordance with the wishes of the Governor, who was to communicate with her through the High Commissioner in Cape Town.²¹¹ When she left Durban, she and Agnes thought it possible that she might not need to go further than Cape Town and they were hoping for favourable news.²¹² But news did not in fact come quickly. In Cape Town Harriette received only a very short telegraphed account of how the arranged return had been suspended, and she was told on 7 February to keep this secret even from Dinuzulu.²¹³ This accorded with Ripon's earlier instructions for secrecy to ensure greater freedom of action,²¹⁴ though he had since changed his instructions. On 26 January he had authorised Hely-Hutchinson to use his own discretion about what he told Harriette.²¹⁵ It shows how many faces Hely-Hutchinson was wearing that he insisted that Harriette keep such vital news even from Dinuzulu, the man whose agent and representative he had claimed she was. The Governor had informed the Natal ministry officially of the situation on 28 January.²¹⁶ It was only when Harriette reached St Helena that she heard more, and realised how very close the return of the chiefs had been. Her first reaction was to blame those who had kept the arrangements secret, not least the Colonial Office: it ought not to have been secretive, and it ought not to have been dissuaded.²¹⁷ It took some time for her to acknowledge that she was herself also culpable, in that she ought to have refused to act in ignorance.²¹⁸

Her self-criticism was reluctant and, perhaps after all, too stringent. Those who seek to influence policy from outside cannot avoid being ignorant of official intentions. If Harriette was to act at all, she had to run the risks created by varied circumstances and

211. Africa South 471, p.74, enclosure in no.96: Governor to High Commissioner, 1 Feb.1895.

212. N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, Friday night (Feb?) 1895, postscript.

213. Africa South 471, p.74, enclosure in no.96: Governor to High Commissioner, secret, 1 Feb.1895; p.76, no.100: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, secret, 7 Feb.1895 with enclosure 1: High Commissioner to Governor, telegram, 7 Feb.1895 and enclosure 2: Governor to High Commissioners, telegram, 7 Feb.1895.

214. *Ibid.*, p.36, no.31: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 5 Nov.1894; p.35, no.29: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, secret, 30 Oct.1894; p.42, no.42: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 5 Jan.1895.

215. *Ibid.*, p.49, no.59: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 26 Jan.1895.

216. *Ibid.*, p.52, no.67: Hely-Hutchinson to Ripon, telegram, secret and confidential, 28 Jan.1895, (received).

217. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 30 Aug.1895; H.E. Colenso to G. Johnson, draft replies, c.17 Mar.1896; H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 2 Feb.1897.

218. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 2 Feb.1897.

factors, among them that of unavoidable guesswork. She had to risk making mistakes, being misrepresented, and mistiming her moves. If she were mistaken when she urged the prior annexation of Zululand to Natal, she was misrepresented when she was accused of creating the unanimity of the Natal ministry and of therefore being responsible for the non-return of the chiefs. It was sheer misfortune when, for example, her keenness to have Dinuzulu visit Britain worked out to his detriment: hopeful that a visit to Britain might yet come, he reacted calmly to the surprising news that he and his party were not after all to embark on the *Umkusi*.²¹⁹ He wrote out a petition to the Queen and waited patiently for Harriette so that he could consult her.²²⁰ Indeed, it is easy to trace how mistimed Harriette's moves were in regard to the ends she wanted to accomplish: she planned to visit St Helena when the chiefs were on the point of being repatriated;²²¹ she sent her telegram advocating prior annexation as a means of accelerating the return when Ripon had already decided on temporary postponement;²²² she left Cape Town for St Helena when he was thinking in terms of indefinite postponement;²²³ she arrived in Britain late in April, when Ripon had already abandoned his policy of repatriation and made it plain that he would not consent to immediate annexation.²²⁴

After the tragi-comedy of the 'return that did not happen' had played itself out, Ripon remained convinced that Natal ministers had attempted to coerce the Colonial Office and that they had exploited Harriette Colenso. While he conceded that the Natal ministers did not know that the return of Dinuzulu had actually been arranged when they 'started the hare' that annexation to Natal must precede the return, he was quite sure they had tried to use his own supposed eagerness to return Dinuzulu as 'an engine with which to force on the transfer to Zululand.' He referred, too, to the 'mysterious communications with Miss Colenso.' He believed that it was these communications which had induced Harriette to 'abandon her old policy' in the mistaken belief that she was hastening the return of the

219. *Ibid.*, Dinuzulu to (addressee not named), translation in H.E. Colenso's script, 13 June 1896; Dinuzulu (per Mubi Nondenisa) to Mjwaphuna, 27 Feb.1895. Africa South 471, p.80, no.107; Grey-Wilson to Ripon, secret, 5 Feb.1895.

220. *Ibid.*, p.81, enclosure in no.108: Exiles to Grey-Wilson, 12 Feb.1895. K.C.A.L., Dinuzulu File 13680; Dinuzulu to H.E. Colenso, Zulu letter with translation, 11 Feb.1895. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 1 Mar. (completed 11 Mar.) 1895.

221. See above, pp.326-27.

222. See above, p.340.

223. Africa South 471, p.76, enclosure 1 in no.100: High Commissioner to Governor, 7 Feb.1895.

224. *Ibid.*, p.93, no.123: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, confidential, 4 Apr.1895.

chiefs. Yet Ripon himself, now that the policy of the repatriation of the chiefs had been allowed to lapse, was prepared to employ the tactic of blaming Miss Colenso at least to the extent of using accusation to silence complaint. He had decided that 'Dinuzulu can wait' and, if Miss Colenso complained, he would simply have to point out that she had no-one but herself to thank.²²⁵

Harriette stayed some weeks in St Helena and arrived in Britain in April 1895.²²⁶ By then neither the introduction of Responsible government in Natal nor the 1892 change of government in Britain had brought great benefit or effective change for the uSuthu chiefs at St Helena or the Zulu people. At best there had been signs that good things were intended, at least from London: steps were taken to ensure that the future Guardian was a man of better calibre than the last; and Grey-Wilson was told to give the Exiles as much liberty as possible within St Helena and to meet their reasonable requests in an even more liberal spirit.²²⁷ Harriette still hoped for more substantial change. She was determinedly optimistic and refused to see how small were her chances of success. In the next two years her disappointments and disillusionment increased.

225. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43563, f.138: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, confidential copy, 8 Mar.1895.

226. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Exiles, 24 Apr.1895.

227. Africa South 471, pp.93-95, no.123: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, confidential, 4 Apr.1895; p.97, no.127: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, telegram, 24 May 1895; p.98, no.128: Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 24 May 1895.

CHAPTER EIGHT

HARRIETTE IN BRITAIN, 1895-1897

The Hurt - and the Hope - in Failure

Harriette was in Britain for most of the years 1895-1897. She left Natal at the end of January and, having visited the Exiles in St Helena for a month, arrived in Britain in April 1895. She stayed longer than expected, leaving Britain only in September 1897 to rejoin the Exiles and wait with them for repatriation. There was more delay in St Helena, which the Exiles left on Christmas eve 1897. Harriette travelled with them from the Island to Durban, then, into Zululand, to Eshowe (the chief magistrate's headquarters) and onto oSuthu near Nongoma in the Ndwandwe district, where Dinuzulu's mother, okaMsweli, lived. Harriette returned to Bishopstowe in May 1898.¹

What is quite clear during these years is that the Colensos operated from two centres - Natal and Britain - and that the partnership between Harriette and her sister Agnes was crucial. Harriette was free to go to Britain and to prolong her stay there because she knew that Agnes was an able and active representative of Colenso interests in Natal. In fact, after their mother's death at the end of 1893, Agnes was to Harriette what Harriette had been to their father, a devoted supporter. Friends and family appreciated, as Agnes did, that her self-assurance and strength grew in Harriette's absence. Moses Sibisi, the catechist of St Mary's, commented that Harriette's absence had made an *indoda* of her. Agnes quipped wryly about the vanity of men.² The sisters' letters show a close and interacting relationship, which was strengthened both by their differences and by what they had in common.³ There were differences - (it was Agnes who baked apple turnovers for the dying Langalibalele and tended the sick, for example) - but each sister was dedicated and protective to the other. Agnes often signed her letters 'Your child', sometimes wrote in loneliness that she was 'sister-sick' or 'Harry-sick' and once bantered that she expected Harriette, on her return, to drop everything she was carrying and 'cuddle me, your Archbishop.'⁴ On the other hand Agnes fussed over Harriette's health, referred to her

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1. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref: Box 145): Schedule of Harriette Colenso's movements in connection with the Velemu land dispute. This summarises her movements.
 2. *Ibid.*, A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 27 March and 2 Dec.1897.
 3. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 30 July 1896.
 4. *Ibid.*, A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 30 July 1897.

sister as 'little Hal' and 'my sweet', and was upset when Harriette tolerated smoke-filled rooms, addressed socialists, and travelled second class.⁵ She could offer her sister eloquent comfort:

'... You must not despair my treasure you and I too, are called to higher work than that, and the choice of road and guiding of that work is not in your hands. As I went down to Durban with Moses the refrain of what they had been singing in St M(ary)'s kept on ringing in my head and yet never worried me and I found out why to a "halleluya"(.). Of course it did not worry me, it was the key on wh. (sic) all the music of my life was pitched - "Hal" your own sweet name my love, while there frequently runs through my head without apparent rhyme or reason "Be of good cheer, o little flock".

Goodbye, Sweet Heart,
your own Child.'⁶

In Harriette's absence Agnes had many roles to play. For both sisters, during very difficult years, commitment to Colenso goals was total.⁷ Agnes was in charge of the mission and school work at ekuKhanyeni and in the outlying stations that she visited.⁸ She kept an eye on St Mary's, the native church in Pietermaritzburg. She maintained vehement opposition to Bishop Baynes. It was probably Agnes who wrote to the press as *Vigilans*.⁹ She certainly saw to the publication of her own correspondence with Baynes.¹⁰ Leaders of the black 'Colenso' churches had their *isivivane* meetings at Bishopstowe, and she rallied and encouraged them.¹¹ She was angry and distressed at the rent collection at Bishopstowe by the Curators.¹² She led Bishopstowe parties in the locust-beating outings.¹³ She was caught up in the loss and stress - and stench - of cattle disease and rinderpest. Having learned how to inoculate, she received the government certificate of competence, and she was spectator and co-sufferer in the ravages that the disease

5. *Ibid.*, A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 20 Mar.1897.

6. *Ibid.*, 27 Feb.1897. (The ampersands have been removed.) Moses Sibisi was the catechist of St Mary's Church in Pietermaritzburg.

7. *Ibid.*, 8 Jan.1897 ('their wedding day').

8. *Ibid.*, 27 Mar.1897; A.M. Colenso (A.H. Baynes) *Correspondence Between the Right Revd Bishop Baynes and Miss A.M. Colenso from December 7th 1896 to February 20th 1897* (Pietermaritzburg, 1897), p.1.

9. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 27 Dec.1895.

10. A.M. Colenso, *Correspondence*.

11. N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 8, 19, 16 and 30 Jan. and 20 Feb.1897. These are among the letters which reveal A.M. Colenso's involvement with the 'native' churches, i.e. congregations of African converts who adhered to the Church of England.

12. *Ibid.*, A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 14 Sept.1895.

13. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 18 Mar.1896.

wrought.¹⁴ She visited prisoners and appeared in court to help black people.¹⁵ When it was necessary, she was willing to dress herself up, and accept an invitation to a Government House 'at home', in honour of the visiting James Bryce and his wife, where she did her somewhat gauche best to cope with the small talk and the pleasantries that were required of her. She did not, however, attend the 1897 Jubilee reception.¹⁶

In Zulu affairs Agnes' role was to be 'the Bishopstowe-half' of Harriette, linking her sister with the world of Natal and Zulu politics as reflected in the newspapers, in conversations with Harry Escombe the Natal attorney-general, in Zulu messages, and in discussions with Mjwaphuna, the uSuthu 'confidential headman' at Bishopstowe.¹⁷

At first, Agnes, like Harriette, trusted Harry Escombe and pushed misgivings aside.¹⁸ Finding him affable and welcoming, Agnes called on him frequently when he was in Pietermaritzburg, kept him fully informed of Harriette's activities, asked his advice on legal and political matters, and monitored his attitudes. At his request, she went from bookshop to bookshop to buy a copy of *Trooper Peter Halket* for him.¹⁹ As Escombe knew, Agnes repeated to Harriette the gist of the conversations that she had with him.²⁰ At Bishopstowe the uSuthu headman, Mjwaphuna, linked the Exiles to their followers in Ndwandwe: messages, reports, and money came through him, supplementing the lines of official communication through magistrates, Resident Commissioner and Governor.²¹

The Colensos were given government permission to send a schoolmaster to the uSuthu. He was Mbulawu, a son of Langalibalele, who was formerly a messenger from the Colensos to the uSuthu.²² Though he stayed among them for some years, there was no official funding for him, and there is little firm evidence of his role. Bishopstowe received scholars from further afield too. A son of Zambane arrived there in 1895 when Saunders

14. *Ibid.*, A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 13 Aug. and 16 Sept. 1897.

15. *Ibid.*, 6 Feb. and 3 Apr. 1897.

16. *Ibid.*, 7 Nov. 1895 and 25 June 1897.

17. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. N.A., Col. Coll: 14 Mar. and 12 May 1895 and 10 Apr. 1897; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 25 June 1897.

18. *Ibid.*, A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 27 Feb. 1897.

19. *Ibid.*, 26 Sept., 16 Oct. and 1 Nov. 1895 etc and 10 Apr. 1897.

20. *Ibid.*, 12 May and 29 Aug. 1895.

21. *Ibid.*, 11 July 1895.

22. See above, p. 109. He went to oSuthu, but I have no information of his later achievements.

went up to the area of Zambane's rule to proclaim British authority.²³

It is difficult to assess how important Bishopstowe was in radiating information about the Exiles and influencing attitudes among the Zulu people in Zululand. Messengers to and from Bishopstowe and oSuthu in the Ndwandwe district certainly came and went²⁴ and, with Magema Magwaza Fuze working on the printing and compilation of *Inkanyiso*,²⁵ some Bishopstowe information was likely to appear in its columns. When rumours about the Exiles and their supposed imminent return circulated in Zululand, officials were quick to blame Bishopstowe,²⁶ but Bishopstowe was not the only source of information. There were officials, storekeepers, missionaries, mineworkers, labour agents, and returning migrant workers in Zululand²⁷ while the interaction between the abaQulusi living in the South African Republic and the people of Zululand was clearly important, although impossible to trace. In reacting to the news they received, from whatever source, both Dinuzulu's mother, okaMsweli, and his headman in the Ndwandwe, Mankulumana, were capable of individual initiative.²⁸ Nevertheless, though 'Bishopstowe' was not the only influence at work, the Bishopstowe line of communication was clearly very important. uSuthu leaders knew how devoted and dedicated Harriette was and, despite earlier disillusionment,²⁹ they may well have believed that she could accomplish more than was in fact attainable.

Throughout these years Agnes had the support of Katie Giles. True, Katie was lame, and her health caused concern: Agnes nursed her through mumps and worried that she might have breast cancer.³⁰ But Katie helped rather than hindered the Colenso effort. Her home in Pietermaritzburg, where she moved to Longmarket Street³¹ during these years,

23. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 9 Aug.1895.

24. M.M. Fuze, *The Black People and Whence They Came* (Pietermaritzburg and Durban, 1979), pp.132-33.

25. N.A., Col.Coll. (Old Ref. Box 149): A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, n.d., Sunday night (1898, int.ev.).

26. Ripon Papers, Add.Mss.43553 ff.15-16: Memorandum by E. Fairfield, 10 Oct.1892.

27. The varied population is attested in the records of the Resident Magistrates who *i.a.* supervised the working of the Gold Law and issued licences for storekeepers.

28. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

29. Note the cry of Melakanye: 'the Queen is up in the sky and the Zulus are on earth'. R.H.L., Br.Emp.S.18 A.S.P. C.131/3: H.E. Colenso to F.W. Chesson, 23 Feb.1886.

30. N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 27 Feb. and 11 July 1897 enclosing a private note to Robert. Information from Charles Swaisland.

31. N.A., Col.Coll: A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 16 Jan.1897, from 391 Longmarket Street.

like St Mary's church, was a Colenso base in the capital, and her friendship was constant. In addition Alice Werner visited Bishopstowe from late 1894 to 1896. Helped by the Colensos to put her Blantyre experience behind her,³² Alice planned to stay at Bishopstowe until Harriette returned, but, since her own mother and sister in Britain needed her, Harriette advised her to come 'home', and (with Frank's help) sent her money for the fare.³³ Once in Britain again, Alice made a new beginning. Journalism was an old activity and public speaking a new one: both were a prelude to her distinguished academic career. In the late 1890s Alice Werner's contributions to the *Speaker* were one way in which Harriette's ideas could reach a wider audience, and Alice,³⁴ like Harriette, published in *The Reformer* and addressed the South Place Ethical Society.³⁵ After Alice left, Agnes preferred to be on her own at Bishopstowe - '... no my love I cannot stand another white companion so don't hope it.'³⁶ Agnes' frequent letters, regular, loyal, and loving, sustained Harriette throughout her campaigning in Britain.

In this phase of the Colenso story Harriette's brothers had a lesser role. Frank and Robert remained in England, both settled in London. Frank's professional life was now happy, comfortable, and prosperous: earlier troubles were behind him.³⁷ At this stage Robert's career seems less fortunate, although he ran a practice and lectured to pupils at the Polytechnic.³⁸ But, whatever her brothers' domestic situations, Harriette enjoyed their hospitality and the pleasure of their children - Eothen, Sylvia, Irma and Nigel, the young children of Frank, and Eric ('Ekky' or 'Nondela') and Angela ('Angel'), the children of Robert and Emily.³⁹ Family affection and anxieties (Frank had typhoid in 1895) and joys (outing, birthdays, and a visit to Eric at school in Scotland) are the background to Harriette's visit.⁴⁰

32. See above, p.196.

33. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.92: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 20 Sept.1895; Dd.93: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 17 Apr.1896.

34. *Ibid.*, Dd.65: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 21 Sept.1893; Dd.88: 19 Apr.1895; Dd.95: 4 May 1896. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 24 Jan.1896.

35. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.102: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 26 Oct.1896; N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 9 Oct.1896.

36. *Ibid.*, A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, Apr.1896.

37. He had joined the staff of *The Eagle* - an insurance company; not to be confused with the name of the St John's College magazine. See above, p.6.

38. N.A., Col.Coll: R.J. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 25 Sept.1896.

39. See Appendix 1, Genealogical Table.

40. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 23 Aug.1895 and 16 July 1896.

In the unequivocally male-dominated society of the late Victorian middle-class it was important that Harriette, as sister, sister-in-law, and aunt, held a visible position in a network of extended family relations in which Frank and Robert were the male figures. This was an advantage for her, even though Harriette was not an exceptional or lonely figure as a spinster committed to a crusade. There were more and more women who took up public causes (including the issue of women's rights) and spoke on public platforms, while, with women outnumbering men since the Crimean War, the prominent and independent spinster was probably both more frequent and less socially disdained in the late Victorian decades than she had been in the past - or would be in the future.

During her second visit to Britain to champion the uSuthu Harriette was naturally in touch with other relations and friends. The Bunyons feature to some extent. Harriette visited them at 37 Phillmore Gardens. Aunt Eliza, the widow of Uncle Charles (who died in 1892), continued to disapprove of the ecclesiastical position of the Colensos but arranged that Harriette should meet Bishop Carter⁴¹ (the Church of the Province of South Africa Bishop of Zululand) and gave financial help to the Robert Colensos.⁴² There were social contacts with their cousins, Constance Bunyon, Frances Russell (née Bunyon), and Mabel Turner (née McDougall), and with the Frankland relations of Sophie, Frank's wife.⁴³ Bishop Colenso's political friends, John Westlake and Leonard Courtney, continued to have a role in Harriette's later efforts. Both were Cornishmen and Cantabridgians. Westlake, Professor of International Law at Cambridge, gave Harriette advice on ecclesiastical matters as well as politics and had criticisms of his own of the Jameson Raid.⁴⁴ His dictum that in international law the only rights of the uncivilised were those which were secured by the conscience of their 'civilised' rulers was not comforting, but it was one with which Harriette had to reckon. Harriette visited Leonard Courtney and his wife Kate frequently and appreciated his counsel. But Courtney, while he enjoyed great respect for moral integrity, exercised little political influence as failing eyesight, as well as a rigorous conscience, made him more and more an honoured but peripheral figure.⁴⁵ A visit to Sir George Cox was probably a sentimental venture and symbolic recognition

41. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 11 Oct. and 4 Dec.1895.

42. *Ibid.*, R.J. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 14 May 1894.

43. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 14 June 1895, 11, 18, 24 Oct. and 4 Dec.1895.

44. *Ibid.*, 12 May 1895 and Jan.1896.

45. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. See *i.a.* N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 9 May and 16 Aug.1895.

of his work on the Colenso biography.⁴⁶

Mrs K.M. Lyell, Harriette's mother's friend, remained a friend to Harriette and sent her welcome gifts of money as well as unwelcome strictures about the unpatriotic tone of Harriette's associates.⁴⁷ Certainly Mrs Lyell's MP son, Leonard,⁴⁸ was not a Colenso supporter, while a sister-in-law of Mrs Lyell, Mrs Pentz did not, it seems, introduce Harriette to the circle of ladies-in-waiting to the Empress of Germany, Queen Victoria's daughter.⁴⁹ What Mrs Lyell did do was introduce Harriette to Sir George Grey.⁵⁰ While High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir George had granted land to Colenso and had, as Magera remembered, visited Natal with Prince Alfred. Now in retirement, he had a high - if undeserved - reputation as the friend of native races, but he commanded no influence.⁵¹ He sent the Exiles gifts and tokens of goodwill.⁵²

Some friends who have an important role, whether simply as friends, or as friends with political connections, cannot easily be traced. Mrs Leigh Browne of Porchester Terrace and her daughter, Annie, were very important during Harriette's first visit and remained interested and supportive during the second. They introduced her to MPs and other influential people. The Brownes may have known the Colensos through the family of William Shaen, the friend and associate of Bishop Colenso, but the evidence is shaky.⁵³ Mrs and Miss Clark (Esther Clark) are more easily placed: they were the mother and sister of the young soldier whom Frances Ellen had nursed in Natal in 1878.⁵⁴ There was too Ethel Everest, whom Harriette visited, and who was ready to send livestock to Natal until Harriette decided she would not take them into the rinderpest.⁵⁵ In addition, Harriette was in touch with some Natal people who visited Britain while she was there, for example, Joseph Henderson, a prominent Church of England man, and K. Hathorn, the Colenso's lawyer in Pietermaritzburg.⁵⁶

46. *Ibid.*, 27 Dec.1895.

47. *Ibid.*, K.M. Lyell to H.E. Colenso, 27 Mar.(1897?).

48. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

49. N.A., Col.Coll: K.M. Lyell to H.E. Colenso, 22 Mar.1891.

50. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 11 Apr.1895.

51. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

52. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Sir George Grey, 10 Sept.1896.

53. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 14 June 1895 and 6 Mar.1896.

54. *Ibid.*, 18 June 1897.

55. *Ibid.*, 12 June 1896, Mar. and 16 Apr.1897.

56. *Ibid.*, 2 Oct.1896 and 14 May 1897.

In the course of her campaigning Harriette met a number of prominent women. Two striking features of these contacts is that a number of them were the notable daughters of eminent fathers and that, taken together, they cover a wide range of attitudes and outlooks. Harriette was in touch once more with Jane Cobden-Unwin whose father, Richard Cobden, was the spokesman for the Manchester school of anti-imperialism, and *laissez-faire*, and whose husband, T. Fisher Unwin, was the left-of-centre publisher who worked with his wife in some matters.⁵⁷ Jane Cobden-Unwin continued her father's work. She was, for example, the committed advocate of free trade in land.⁵⁸ Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner, whose periodical, *The Reformer*, published an article from Harriette in instalments, was similarly dedicated to her father's cause; in this case that of rational enquiry.⁵⁹ Mrs Aveling, the daughter of Karl Marx, presided over a socialist meeting that Harriette addressed.⁶⁰

What linked Harriette with other women was their interest in Africa. Alice Werner was a firm friend; Mary Kingsley a casual acquaintance. Harriette met the West African explorer, Mary Kingsley, whose respect for the people of West Africa inclined her to sympathise with Harriette's concern for the Zulu people of South Africa at least to the extent of suggesting that Harriette communicate with Leo Maxse of the *New Review*.⁶¹ Harriette, given an early copy of *Trooper Peter Halket* in February 1897 by Jane Cobden-Unwin, wife of the publisher, certainly met the Cronwright-Schreiners early in July 1897.⁶² Olive Schreiner's vehement attacks on Cecil Rhodes convinced Harriette that they were 'on the same side', although Olive Schreiner's concern for black people was not as sharply focused as Harriette's 'Zuluism'.⁶³ At the other end of the political spectrum was Flora Shaw, to whom Courtney introduced Harriette but for whose ideas she had no

57. *Ibid.*, 15 Nov.1895.

58. J. Cobden-Unwin campaigned against Chamberlain's 'Fair Trade' proposals in the early twentieth century. See bibliography.

59. H.E. Colenso, 'British Troubles in South Africa', published in instalments in *The Reformer*, Sept., Oct. and Nov.1897.

60. N.A., Col.Coll: J. Hill to H.E. Colenso, 15 Feb.1897.

61. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 9 Dec.1896 and M. Kingsley to H.E. Colenso, n.d. (1897) re visit of Mrs Leo Maxse. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

62. N.A., Col.Coll: O. Schreiner to H.E. Colenso, Monday -- (from Lower Belgrave Street); K.C.A.L. Col.Coll. Dd.118: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 2 Mar.1897.

63. See D. Hammond & A. Jablow, *The Africa that Never Was* (Illinois, 1992), p.105, for recent comment on Olive Schreiner's attitude to African people. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.92: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 20 Sept.1895.

sympathy and whom she regarded as one of those who were 'drunk with imperial power'.⁶⁴

Lesser women journalists than Flora Shaw, who interviewed Harriette, were or became authors with a number of publications to their credit. This was true of Sarah A. Tooley who interviewed Harriette for *The Humanitarian*.⁶⁵ Harriette met women involved in education. Canon Barnett and his wife presided over Toynbee Hall, the Universities Settlement experiment in class reconciliation and mutual illumination.⁶⁶ Miss Martineau wrote to Harriette from the Samuel Morley College,⁶⁷ and Miss Maitland presided at Somerville College (Oxford), which was distinctively tolerant in religious attitude and willing to receive the daughter of Bishop Colenso, though it could not guarantee her a large audience.⁶⁸

What helped Harriette most during her second visit was her friendship with the Rollo Russells, the son and daughter-in-law of Lord John Russell, who were interested in matters intellectual and scientific. The friendship seems to have begun at the dining table of Mrs Browne and to have developed further when Harriette lectured at Richmond. Though not Unitarians themselves, the Rollo Russells had numerous contacts among the Unitarians. Rollo was the uncle of Bertrand, later the renowned philosopher.⁶⁹

As far as the societies and associations with which Harriette worked are concerned, there are contrasts as well as similarities to notice in regard to her two visits. The Aborigines Protection Society continued to be important: but there was ambivalence and tension in Harriette's relations to the Society as in the past, certainly until 1897. She and H.R. Fox Bourne, secretary of the A.P.S., could not but differ about the relative importance of Zulu

64. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 20 Sept.1895 (enclosing copy L. Courtney to H.E. Colenso, 20 Sept.1895), 27 Sept.1895 and 9 Apr.1896.

65. *Ibid.*, S.A. Tooley to H.E. Colenso, 12 Dec.1896. The *Humanitarian* was a philanthropic journal. See *British Library Catalogue of Printed Books* for Tooley's publications, *i.e.* a history of nursing.

66. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. N.A., Col.Coll: Mrs Rollo Russell to H.E. Colenso, 7 May (1897?).

67. *Ibid.*, C. Martineau (whose father was cousin to Harriet Martineau) to H.E. Colenso, 18 Dec.1892.

68. *Ibid.*, Miss Maitland to H.E. Colenso, 30 Jan.(1897?).

69. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 6 Mar.1896. Mrs Rollo Russell's letters to Harriette are dated only by day and month.

issues.⁷⁰ In addition, each criticised the other for having a poorly-chosen ally. During her first visit Harriette criticised the A.P.S. for its temporary alliance with the British South Africa Company, *i.e.* Chartered Company.⁷¹ During her second visit Fox Bourne was very surprised that Harriette should advocate the annexation of Zululand to Natal, but did not oppose her. They did not quarrel permanently. In fact each acknowledged that an earlier judgment had been flawed: the Society was disillusioned by the Company, while Harriette lost her confidence in Natal.⁷²

One interesting contrast between the two visits is that Harriette in the later 1890s does not seem to have been as involved as earlier with Women's Liberal Associations. There were probably many reasons for this, but one was that Harriette decided that her commitments to the cause of the Zulu and her criticisms of the British role in Africa did not allow her to deflect attention to the question of women's rights, about which she did not feel passionately. She could not do that question justice, and it was folly to try.⁷³ There may well have been other reasons. These include the possibility that the Women's Liberal Federation was in as much disarray as the faction-ridden Liberal party itself; that it had its own causes of division in the problem of reconciling loyalty to the women's movement with loyalty to the Liberal party; and that the political circumstances of the years did not encourage the marshalling of the forces of the Women's Liberal Associations into the sort of effort they had made before the Liberal triumph in the election of 1892.⁷⁴ In addition, one of Harriette's keenest supporters, Ann Cowen, died in 1894.⁷⁵ Whatever the combination of reasons, it is the case that the W.L.A.s do not feature as strongly in Harriette's correspondence of the late 1890s and that Harriette appears to have had no role in the movement to advance the rights of women, which reached a high point in the parliament of 1897 where, however, it was talked out by Labouchere.⁷⁶

70. See above, pp.192-93 and below, pp.380-81.

71. See above, pp.190-91. N.A., Col.Coll: H.R. Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, 27 July 1891.

72. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 24 May 1895; F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 8 Feb.1895 enclosing letter from Fox Bourne; H.R. Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, 12 Feb.1895.

73. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to Miss Browne, 9 June 1896.

74. *Women's Herald*, 30 Apr. and 21 May 1892, for reports of contention over whether the franchise or party loyalty was the more important.

75. N.A., Col.Coll: Mr. Cowen to S.J. Colenso (copy in Sophie's script), 29 Jan.1894.

76. J. Kamm, *Rapiers and Battle Axes* (London, 1966), p.139; G. Shaw 'The Letters of Edmund Garrett to his Cousin, 1896-98, edited with an introduction' (M.A., University of Cape Town, 1983), p.171 fn.4; *Women's Herald*, 30 Apr. and 21 May 1892, for reports of dispute over the priority of party loyalty to the franchise question.

What is very evident is that Harriette found her audiences during her second visit in small radical groups, in Unitarian congregations, and in socialist circles. Her experience seems to indicate a general trend: that imperialism had become more pervasive and, therefore, anti-imperialist views moved more and more to the periphery. In common with the political groups on the extreme left, Harriette deplored government policies that caused or exacerbated suffering, the silence of the church that condoned wrongdoing, as well as the power to corrupt and the desire for profit of the moneyed interest, especially as reflected in the B.S.A., or Chartered, Company. In a decade in which imperialist clamour dominated, Harriette contributed to the minority voice of criticism and compassion.

In Britain Harriette had to adapt her aims and her methods to the changing circumstances. This meant two things. One was that her campaigning for the Zulus was simplified. She wanted the Exiles to be allowed to visit Britain as soon as possible and then to be returned to Zululand, where Dinuzulu, holding a recognised position of leadership and enjoying the support of Natal, would guide his people into a future in which fair dealing would be assured. Clearly there were ambiguities and grave risk of disappointment in such a programme, but at least Harriette was no longer involved in complicated and dull discussions about the rights and wrongs of the confrontations of 1888 and the anomalies and cruelties of the judicial proceedings that followed. The Exiles, she insisted, had been 'pardoned' by Ripon, and no longer needed that kind of vindication.⁷⁷ In addition she was no longer the vehement critic of local officials whose anti-uSuthu bias she deplored and whose pro-Zibhebhu inclinations and actions she thwarted. Osborn was gone.

The other feature of her campaigning is even more significant. Harriette widened her range of interest when she addressed the problem of the record of the B.S.A Company north of the Limpopo, and tried to apply her experience in presenting the Zulu point of view to the task of presenting the case for the Ndebele.⁷⁸ In many ways her condemnation of the B.S.A. Company and its policies has been vindicated by modern scholarship, but those who shared her views found it impossible in their own day to persuade most of their countrymen to think as they did. They lacked direct evidence, and there was too much

77. N.A., Col.Coll: Communication of H. Escombe to H.E. Colenso on the way in which this constitutional change could be effected, Apr.1890.

78. Note the titles of her later lectures and articles, for example, 'British Rights and Duties in South Africa' and 'The Problem of Races in Africa'.

prejudice, profit, and patriotism (of a kind) arrayed against them.⁷⁹

What she tackled bravely and simultaneously in her sermons, talks, and articles were the problems of interpreting contemporary history and of applying ethics to 'race relations', which were then seen by many in stark Darwinian terms of 'survival' and 'fitness', and caricatured as the clash between 'civilisation' and 'barbarism'. To follow Harriette's activities in Britain between 1895 and 1897 is to see clearly that she did not devote all her efforts to the Zulus: there was a wider 'field of labour' that claimed her attention and drew her into discussion of the broad question of Britain's role in Africa.

To present an adequate picture of her efforts it seems best to distinguish separate 'layers' of activity and to discuss each in turn. Harriette made representations to the Colonial Office, she sought out members of parliament, she issued pamphlets, she took whatever opportunities there were of reaching a wider audience through the printed word, and she welcomed invitations to platform and pulpit. What is interesting is that the narrower the audience Harriette addressed, the more specific the questions she discussed. In her dealings with the Colonial Office, a major theme in itself, almost all Harriette's representations, whether verbal or written, concerned the Zulus. There are some exceptions. She addressed the Colonial Office on the subject of the Ndebele in April and May 1896, but she explained to P.H. Wicksteed her reasons for not supporting a memorial on the Cretan Question in 1897, but the general trend - that she concentrated on Zulu questions in her direct approaches to the government - remains true.⁸⁰ When she approached MPs she asked help in regard to the Zulus, but she found that some wanted information from her about the area north of the Limpopo. She issued her own leaflets and pamphlets on the Zulu question, but she wrote letters to newspapers about the Ndebele and the articles that were published dealt with wider themes. It was these themes, the Ndebele and the broad question of Britain's role in Africa and the future of races there, that came to occupy a greater part in her sermons, talks, and lectures.

It is not easy to follow the pattern or to assess the impact of a campaign such as

79. See, for example, N.A., Col.Coll: Correspondence with J.E. Ellis, 1896 and 1897.

80. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.94: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 27 Apr.1896. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 8, 14 and 29 May 1896; Fairfield to H.E. Colenso, 12 May 1896 and R. Meade to H.E. Colenso, 8 June 1896; H.E. Colenso to P.H. Wicksteed, 15 Mar.1897.

Harriette's whose main purpose concerned a matter that was far from topical, and whose total effort was insignificant in comparison with, for example, Lugard's crusade for the retention of Uganda. For the Zulus (and for Natal) Harriette failed to secure the kind of immediate future she considered essential for firm stability and benefit to all. On the other issues her views were those of a small minority, and it was the lesser patriotism of the majority that was dominant. But there is another perspective. In the long view Harriette strengthened an ideal of genuine co-operation between Natal colonists and the Zulu people by articulating and advocating it, even at the risk of the disillusionment and disappointment she experienced. What is more, her comments and pleas for the Zulu people and for other victims of white expansion flowed into the currents of criticism which, in time, would effectively challenge the complacency of the imperialist and simplistically racist attitudes that prevailed among her contemporaries.

Her efforts, their failure, and her resilience are discussed below. The various layers of her effort are, as in Chapter Five, separate, but the order in which they are discussed differs. Since her 1895-1897 public campaigning was less closely linked to the lobbying of MPs than in the previous visit, it seems appropriate to deal first with her representations to the Colonial Office and then with her dealings with MPs before discussing her appeals to a wider public in print, on platform, and in pulpit.

Harriette and the Colonial Office. Ripon and Buxton

When Harriette began her representations to the Colonial Office in 1895 she was indignant at the discovery (made at St Helena) of how close the chiefs had come to repatriation in January,⁸¹ but she was also confident that it would not be difficult for her to achieve her goals for the *abaNtwana*. As she read the situation, the aborted return of January showed how close repatriation still was. All that was needed, so she believed, was the removal of misunderstanding and unmerited mistrust of Natal. Convinced as she then was that the 'new' Natal⁸² (*i.e.* Natal under Responsible government) was well-intentioned towards the Exiles and could be trusted in matters of race relations, she was sure that she could persuade the British government to agree to the request of the Natal ministry and allow

81. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 1 Mar.1895.

82. See *i.a. ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to H. Escombe, 28 Aug.1895, portion of letter copied by S.J. Colenso. H.E. Colenso, *Zululand. The Exiled Chiefs, Natal and the Colonial Office* (London, 1895), p.4.

the prior annexation of Zululand.⁸³ Her first pamphlet of 1895 rapped out in smart tabulated sequence the arguments supporting the contention and plea that a visit to England for the Exiles should be arranged.⁸⁴ Harriette believed she could influence the Colonial Office and backbench MPs, but she also thought so highly of the Natal ministers in early 1895 as to be confident that they would not be totally intransigent about the prior annexation of Zululand, once they realised that this would involve cheating the Exiles of a return already promised, announced, and arranged, the Natal ministers would not insist on the prior annexation of Zululand to Natal. A visit to England would compensate the Exiles for the disappointment and delay they had experienced. When Escombe was disquieted at reports of Zulu mistrust, Harriette insisted to him that the forbearance of black people should not be tried too far.⁸⁵ For the time being Harriette was glowingly content in the trustworthiness of Natal. She urged the prior annexation of Zululand to Natal, if that were possible, but - if it were not possible - then she urged the British government to repatriate the Exiles without annexation. In the meanwhile she wanted much better treatment for the *abaNtwana* at St Helena. They should receive every consideration for their health and comfort. They should be permitted complete freedom of communication. What is more, she urged very strongly that they be allowed their earnest request: to visit England.⁸⁶

On arrival in Britain Harriette stayed first with her brother Robert and then with Frank, and began her task of once more claiming justice for the uSuthu and their leaders, the St Helena Exiles. With advice from Emily, Robert's wife, Harriette chose a new gown - 'with Bishop's sleeves' - for formal and public occasions and then called at the Colonial Office.⁸⁷ Officials there had expected her for weeks and they knew they would have to deal with her keen persuasiveness. They could not give her what she wanted, but they did not wish to incur her criticism. One obvious tactic for Colonial Office officials to use was to encourage others to criticise Harriette and they did this, for example, with Fox Bourne, the secretary for the A.P.S. After an interview at the Colonial Office Fox Bourne believed that Harriette had helped to thwart the planned return of the *abaNtwana* (even though it

83. See above, Chapter Seven.

84. H.E. Colenso, *The Zulu Question in 1895* (already printed by 9 May 1895).

85. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to H. Escombe, 28 Aug.1895, portion of a letter copied by S.J. Colenso.

86. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 1 Mar.1895. See also *The Zulu Question in 1895*.

87. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 11 Apr.1886.

had been postponed before Harriette sent her cable).⁸⁸ It was also obviously desirable for the Colonial Office to show Harriette every politeness, and she was courteously received. In fact, Sydney Buxton was well disposed and cordial to Harriette. She saw him frequently, at the Colonial Office and in the House of Commons. In addition there was an interview with Ripon; and Harriette wrote to both men and began to submit her sequence of pamphlets.⁸⁹ After the 1895 change of government in Britain, permanent Colonial Office officials alleged that Ripon and Buxton grew irritated with Harriette, but she certainly kept on good terms with Buxton even after August 1895.⁹⁰

Buxton and Harriette differed over the attitude to Natal. Buxton realised that the Natal insistence on the prior annexation of Zululand to Natal was a protest against repatriation. Harriette, believing herself the trusted emissary of the Natal government, thought Buxton misjudged Natal. To her, 'prior annexation' indicated a preference, not an essential precondition. Buxton found Harriette confused. She thought him defensive. She was, however, enlightened by his remark that it was not the Colonial Office but the attitude of Liberal backbenchers that blocked repatriation. Buxton explained that backbench opposition to the incorporation of Zululand with Natal was strong, and that a revolt among the rank and file of Liberal MPs might topple the government.⁹¹

During the early months of 1895 Harriette appreciated Colonial Office courtesy, but she could not secure the major decisions, nor even a firm commitment to allow the Exiles to visit Britain. Ripon saw her, but responded a few weeks later to a written query from her that, while he was sorry for Dinuzulu's disappointment, he was not responsible for it. Buxton minuted favourably about a visit for the Exiles and certainly, while Ripon was in charge, there was no strident hostility towards Harriette among the Colonial Office officials. At worst they were indulgently amused. When Harriette sent Dinuzulu a photograph of the Secretary of State and remarked that Ripon was not as fierce in appearance as depicted, Ripon minuted that he was glad that he had 'smiled on Miss

88. *Ibid.*, F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 8 Feb. 1895. See above, Chapter Seven.

89. See below, pp. 412-16.

90. N.A., Col. Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 15 Nov. 1895; H.E. Colenso to S. Buxton, 18 Jan. and 28 July 1897.

91. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 11 and 25 Apr., 3 May and an undated slip, possibly to Escombe, 12 May 1895.

Colenso'.⁹² It was more important that Ripon and Buxton were, it seems, agreed on their - correct - assessment of the situation. They knew, as Harriette did not, that her trust in the Natal government was mistaken, and that she was being exploited by the colonial ministers. Harriette would have resisted this view in 1895, but her attitude had changed drastically by 1897.⁹³

To Ripon and Buxton it was clear that there was no easy way out of the impasse that had developed between the Colonial Office and Natal. At best, a change in the attitude or in the composition of parliament (if the Liberals gained strength in the elections) would help. In the meanwhile all they could do was keep on affable terms with Harriette, ensure generous treatment for the Exiles at St Helena, and keep in mind - as a strong possibility - the idea of a visit to England for the Exiles.⁹⁴ They could go no further, and the election in Britain, following the parliamentary defeat of the Liberals, swept them from office. Given the difficulties and the preoccupations of the weak and divided Liberal government, Harriette did well to keep the Colonial Office aware of the claims of the Exiles and to encourage goodwill to the Zulu people and the *abaNtwana*.

What Ripon did do was to allow concessions and encourage more generous treatment of the Exiles at St Helena. At last Harriette had her own men on the Island. Mubi Nondenisa travelled with her to St Helena, and remained there after she left for England. He was succeeded later by Magema Magwaza Fuze.⁹⁵ Communication with the Exiles was easier, but Harriette remained very quick to suspect interference and deliberate delay.⁹⁶ In addition, Nyosana, who had been with the Exiles on St Helena before, was allowed to return.⁹⁷ The change in guardian, with Madden assisted by Daniels (who now returned), replacing the tipsy Cressy - 'a child of Malimati' - was intended to be an

92. C.O.247/143/5268: H.E. Colenso to C.O., enclosing photographs for Exiles, 24 Mar.1893. Minute by Ripon, 2 Apr.1893.

93. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Chamberlain, 4 Dec.1896 and H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 2 Feb.1897.

94. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 30 Mar.1895 and H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 11 Apr.1895.

95. C.O.427/20/9132: Hely-Hutchinson to C.O., 2 May 1895. Minute by R.L. Antrobus, 8 June 1895. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 1 Mar.1895. Fuze, *The Black People*, pp.132-37.

96. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 12 Sept.1896.

97. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 12 Nov.1897.

improvement.⁹⁸ Harriette was sceptical of the improvement and she was probably right: Daniels fought with Mubi Nondenisa on St Helena and, later, in Zululand quarrelled with Dinuzulu.⁹⁹ Madden despised the indulgence shown to the Exiles at St Helena, and there was a row between him and Dinuzulu before the party left the Island. The then Governor, Sterndale, remonstrated with Dinuzulu over the episode and insisted that Dinuzulu should withdraw expressions which Sterndale considered 'ungentlemanly'.¹⁰⁰ In the meanwhile the Exiles, especially Dinuzulu, took part in the social life of the Island. Dinuzulu, Harriette was told, danced at Plantation House and looked 'a gentleman all over'.¹⁰¹ She heard how his music studies progressed and was assured by Sterndale when he returned to England on leave at the end of 1896, that 'Dinuzulu is a great favourite of us all.' It was revealing of attitudes that Sterndale allowed a photograph to be taken of himself in full dress shaking hands with Dinuzulu. Harriette was delighted: 'I could go on my knees and worship him'. In Natal Escombe was sour: he advised Agnes not to show such photographs too freely lest it antagonise the friends of Zibhebhu.¹⁰²

Harriette drew attention to complaints about the health of the Exiles.¹⁰³ She defended them from ill reports, and she took very seriously their protests against the revival of the old allegations that Dinuzulu was not the legitimate heir of Cetshwayo.¹⁰⁴ Harriette might have had private reservations about the quality of the civilisation that Dinuzulu was absorbing - 'If I had my way he would have been frisking it in his *mutsha* with occasional and ceremonial lapses into European costumes' - but she used his obvious eagerness and skill in learning to point to the inherent capacity of the Zulu people.¹⁰⁵ Because she did

98. For Madden and Daniels, see Appendix 2, Biographical notes. For descriptions of Cressy, see N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 30 Mar.1895, and H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 1 Mar.1895. For Colonial Office reservations about Madden, C.O.427/20/9132: Hely-Hutchinson to C.O., confidential, 2 May 1895. Minute by R.L. Antrobus, 8 June 1895. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 14 Feb.1896.

99. Fuze, *The Black People*, pp.133 and 137.

100. N.A., Col.Coll: A. Sterndale to H.E. Colenso, 22 Oct.1897.

101. See *i.a.* C.O.427/20/9132: Hely-Hutchinson to C.O., confidential, 2 May 1895. Minute by R.L. Antrobus, 8 June 1895.

102. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 16 July 1896; A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 28 May 1897. For a reproduction of the photograph, see J. Laband, *Rope of Sand: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century* (Johannesburg, 1995), plate no.76, facing p.369.

103. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 28 Nov.1895.

104. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.89: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 17 May 1895.

105. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 2 Oct.1896; H.E. Colenso, 'Problem of Races in Africa'; *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, July 1897.

not wish him to be alienated from his people, Harriette was anxious about the reports of his marrying St Helena women,¹⁰⁶ and about reports of his conversion.¹⁰⁷

To improve the lot of the Exiles at St Helena was the easiest way of showing Colonial Office goodwill to them, and this at least the Liberal ministry did. It authorised an increase in annual expenditure of £100.¹⁰⁸ Ripon and Buxton might have done more if the Liberals had stayed in power, but the government resigned after a parliamentary defeat and was resoundingly defeated at the polls.¹⁰⁹

Harriette and the Colonial Office under Chamberlain

Although Harriette had helped a Liberal candidate in the election of 1895¹¹⁰ she was not dismayed by the result. She counted up the number of MPs who would sympathise and 'by no means despaired of Mr Chamberlain'.¹¹¹ There were two reasons for encouragement. One was that the government in power was backed by a substantial majority. They would not need, or so it seemed, to worry about a backbench revolt, and this was a point which Marshal Clarke stressed when he wrote to Harriette. She was to discover later that a large majority meant, too, that a government might 'laugh and sneer' at complaints.¹¹² The other reason lay in Joseph Chamberlain's previous statements. Harriette knew that he had spoken out in favour of the uSuthu in 1888 in the House of Commons and that he had expressed sympathy privately since then. She published his parliamentary remarks in a leaflet so that others beside herself would know, and the copy sent to the Colonial Office would presumably remind Chamberlain himself.¹¹³ She discounted the warnings that there was no guarantee that Joseph Chamberlain in office would continue to hold the opinions he had expressed previously and held determinedly to her trust in him. In January 1896 Harriette wrote that she believed Chamberlain 'is going in the right direction.'¹¹⁴

106. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 2 Jan.1896.

107. *Ibid.*, 13 Mar.1896. See above, p.306.

108. C.O.247/148/9003: Zulu Estimates for 1896. Minute by H.W. Just, 19 May 1896.

109. R. Ensor, *England, 1870-1914* (Oxford, 1949), p.221.

110. N.A., Col.Coll: J. Cobden-Unwin to H.E. Colenso, 12 July 1895 and Wednesday (n.d.); D. Naoraji to H.E. Colenso, 20 July 1895.

111. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 5 and 25 July 1895.

112. *Ibid.*, M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 26 July 1895; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 21 Feb.1896.

113. *Ibid.*, 28 Feb.1896.

114. *Ibid.*, S. Buxton to H.E. Colenso, 27 July 1895; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 10 Jan.1896.

As the sequel was to show, these two factors, strong parliamentary backing for the government and Joseph Chamberlain's presumed sympathy, were much less decisive in determining the future of the Exiles than Harriette had hoped.

Especially after the Jameson Raid, Joseph Chamberlain's personal position in the government and in parliament was in some jeopardy, and he had to take into account the currents of parliamentary opinion, among them the humanitarian. He could not ignore the strong philanthropic indignation about the B.S.A. Company, its involvement in the Jameson Raid, and its record in the government of the black people beyond the Limpopo; but he could not capitulate to it either. The extreme humanitarian demand was for the cancellation of the Charter of the B.S.A. Company, a step which Chamberlain himself once contemplated. But, as Chamberlain had to realise after February 1896, when he met Rhodes, a threat to the Charter of the Company might provoke Rhodes into the full disclosure of all the 'missing telegrams' about the Jameson Raid which, if published, would expose and perhaps exaggerate Chamberlain's guilty foreknowledge of the conspiring and planning that preceded the Raid.¹¹⁵ Humanitarian indignation had to be manipulated, and manipulated it was. Indignation about the major cause of humanitarian concern in colonial affairs at the time, the B.S.A. Company and its dealings beyond the Limpopo, was checked, countered, ignored, and deflected.¹¹⁶ Ironically the question of the Zulu repatriation had a minor role in the management of humanitarian sentiment at the time when some were indignant that the work of the South African Committee was so inadequate. Chamberlain announced the repatriation of the Exiles on 19 July 1897 in a debate on Supply, a few days before the debate on the report of the South African Committee.¹¹⁷ There was not a great deal of humanitarian concern about Zululand and the Exiles, but it was enough to require careful handling by the Colonial Office. Parliamentary papers were carefully edited.

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115. For detailed discussion of these issues see J. Butler, *The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid* (Oxford, 1968); A. Porter, *The Origins of the South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism* (Manchester, 1980). The issues of responsibility and complexity are perpetually re-visited. The view that has guided my discussion of Joseph Chamberlain's handling of the Zulu issue is that he was less guilty of deliberate Machiavellianism in regard to the Raid than many allege, but more vulnerable to the 'blackmail' of Rhodes than he would have liked.
116. See, for example, Chamberlain to John Ellis, 19 Oct. 1897 quoted by J. Butler (ed). 'Sir Alfred Milner on British Policy in South Africa in 1897', *Boston University Papers in African History*, vol. 1 (1964).
117. *British Hansard*, 4th series, vol. 51, cols 499-506 and 1093-1180; Butler, *Liberal Party and Jameson Raid*, pp. 199-203.

Joseph Chamberlain's own attitude to the Exiles and their repatriation was also much less clear cut in its support than Harriette hoped when she remembered, and published, his pro-Uthmaniyah words of 1888.¹¹⁸ His attitude to South Africa had changed over the years, and he seems to have moved away from the straightforward belief that the imperial factor should protect the weaker races of South Africa.¹¹⁹ In 1888 he had been a member of the South African Committee that backed John Mackenzie, but in the later 1890s the imperialism he advanced was different.¹²⁰ He believed in the extension and strengthening of the British empire as a means of promoting prosperity and bringing about social betterment. A *British* South Africa was an essential part of this projected federation and, since white colonial opinion was essential to maintain British ascendancy in southern Africa and eventually to secure imperial federation, he was not prepared to alienate it. In this he had the backing of those in Britain who argued that colonial opinion merited every consideration.¹²¹ In South Africa relations were tense in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid when Chamberlain tried to coax and coerce the South Africa Republic into compliance with his interpretation of what were 'proper relations' between Britain and the Republic. In that context it was all the more crucial for the Colonial Office to have the backing of white colonists. In regard to Zululand and Natal, Chamberlain very much wanted to repatriate the exiled chiefs but he saw, too, that it was vital to work with the Natal ministry and not against it. In the end, he was prepared to pay so high a price for Natal's acquiescence in repatriation that the arrangements he accepted vitiated most of the advantages for the Zulu people of the return of the Exiles, whom some regarded as the national leaders: neither the land of the Zulu nor the status of Dinuzulu was secured.¹²²

With Chamberlain, as with Ripon, what was done in regard to Zululand would depend on the exigencies of his parliamentary pre-occupation and on the overall demands of South African policy. Though Harriette hoped the contrary, Chamberlain's parliamentary position

118. H.E. Colenso, *Mr Chamberlain on the Zulu Question in 1888*. This was circulated as a leaflet in 1895.

119. Chamberlain Papers, J.C.9/1/1/8: Chamberlain to Knutsford, 2 Oct. 1888.

120. J. Benyon, *Proconsul and Paramountcy in South Africa: The High Commission British Supremacy and the Sub-continent 1806-1910* (Pietermaritzburg, 1980), p.217.

121. Sprigg Papers, Ms.9676: Chamberlain to G. Sprigg, 20 July 1897.

122. See below, pp.395-99. *Zululand. Land Delimitation Commission (1902-1904). Reports of the Joint Imperial and Colonial Commissioners* (hereafter *Zululand. Land Delimitation Commission (1902-1904)*) (Pietermaritzburg, 1905), especially p.283. The delimitation proceeded, and there was no special recognition for Dinuzulu.

and his own views of the priorities of the South African situation did not in fact work decisively to the benefit of the Zulu Exiles.

Chamberlain came to office in the middle of 1895, but it was not until early in 1898 that the Exiles landed at Durban and proceeded to Zululand.¹²³ To explain this delay and the disappointment that surrounded their eventual return it is necessary to trace the phases through which Chamberlain's Zulu policy passed, to discover the way Harriette's representations affected Colonial Office policy-making in these episodes, and to notice how Harriette's attitude changed over the whole period from one of confidence in Natal to misgiving and mistrust.

Three phases in Colonial Office deliberations are discernible:

- (a) the phase of appraisal and definition of aims which ended after Harriette's interview with Chamberlain in December 1895,
- (b) the phase of seeking to have the chiefs repatriated independently of annexation, and
- (c) the final phase of 1897. In this period, Chamberlain realised that, if the chiefs were to be repatriated, then incorporation with Natal must be arranged and, what is more, if incorporation was to be arranged, then generous terms must be conceded to Natal.

These were all very anxious months for Harriette during which she made many representations to the Colonial Office. Here, through all the vigour of her earnest arguments and the detail of Colonial Office minutes, three related trends are apparent:

- (a) Harriette could and did initiate Colonial Office discussion of the Exiles. She reminded the Colonial Office that the Exiles existed, that they would have to return because their sentences would expire, that 'promises' had been made to them, and that it was, therefore, necessary for the Colonial Office to think about the problem of their return and how best it could be effected.
- (b) It is clear, however, that Harriette could not control the Colonial Office decisions. In each stage of policy-making what the Colonial Office did, fell short of what she hoped.
- (c) In the last months of her stay Harriette had little direct contact with the Colonial Office. She had to work through others who did, viz: Sir Marshal

123. See Chapter Nine. For an account of the arrival see K.C.A.L.: O. Siedle, letter to Killie Campbell, reminiscing about the return of the Exiles, 20 Nov. 1944.

Clarke and Harry Escombe. These two men differed from each other - and may not have liked each other - but Harriette could achieve little because neither had views that corresponded with hers.

Illustrations of her activity through these three phases are given below. Throughout these months Harriette was the consistent advocate of the return of the chiefs and believed emphatically that it would be in the best interests of all if Dinuzulu were to be returned to a position of trust and responsibility with the goodwill of Natal. An interview with Sir John Robinson in London dispelled Harriette's illusions about the Natal ministry and made her very anxious about the attitude of Harry Escombe. Her support for the Natal government was 'nullified'.¹²⁴ She no longer urged the British government to arrange the incorporation of Zululand into Natal. While accepting that the annexation was probably inevitable, she sometimes hoped that it might be avoided. What she emphasised even more than previously was the importance of securing for Dinuzulu a key position in the government of Zululand. She thought that this was far more important for the future of South East Africa than conciliating the hostile half of Natal. She would not sit down under what she had found to be a fresh betrayal of the Zulus, even though she had been drawn into it herself.¹²⁵

The Phase of Appraisal

Harriette was eager to present her case for the Zulus to the new Secretary of State, but she was advised to wait.¹²⁶ Instead, prompted by Buxton,¹²⁷ she approached E. Fairfield,¹²⁸ and a fractious interview followed. Fairfield was thoroughly opposed to allowing the Exiles to visit Britain, and Harriette countered his arguments vigorously.¹²⁹ Later Fairfield was annoyed when Harriette published in a pamphlet the arguments he had advanced, because he regarded their discussion as semi-confidential.¹³⁰ Though somewhat aggrieved that Chamberlain granted Fox Bourne an

124. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Chamberlain, 4 Dec.1895; H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Affairs: Correspondence with Sir John Robinson* (London, 1897).

125. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 20 Jan.1897 cf. H.E. Colenso to F. Blaine, 21 Jan.1897.

126. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 5 and 25 July 1895.

127. *Ibid.*, S. Buxton to H.E. Colenso, 15 Aug.1895.

128. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 16 Aug.1895.

129. *Ibid.*, 23 Aug.1895.

130. H.E. Colenso, *Memorandum in Reply to Certain Objections against a Visit to England* (London, 1895).

early interview,¹³¹ Harriette was pleased to hear that Chamberlain asked for information¹³² about the points that she raised in her letter of 20 August, in which she formally presented the Zulu case to the Secretary of State.¹³³

In her letter of August 1895 Harriette asked Chamberlain for an interview. She reminded him of a conversation they had had five years before. He had then indicated that, if he were Secretary of State, his decisions would be different from those of Knutsford. Now, Harriette argued, he was Secretary of State, and had the opportunity to act according to his convictions. Zulu affairs were, she urged, at a turning point, and prompt action was very desirable. It was important to associate Natal in the repatriation of the Zulu chiefs and thus improve relations between Natal and the Zulus. She hoped he would give permission for the Zulu Exiles to visit Britain because it would soon be too late to arrange for a visit in the warmer months. She enclosed a photograph of Dinuzulu and his uncles.¹³⁴

She called in at the Colonial Office and, having been invited to submit a statement of her case, sent in a copy of her pamphlet *Zululand, the Exiled Chiefs, Natal and the Colonial Office* which she had already sent in to Ripon.¹³⁵ The Colonial Office had two of her pamphlets at hand, viz. *The Zulu Question in 1895* and *Zululand, the Exiled Chiefs, Natal and the Colonial Office*.¹³⁶

Harriette's letter to Joseph Chamberlain of August 1895 coincided with a letter from Walter Peace, the Natal Agent-General.¹³⁷ She asked for attention to be paid to Zululand issues from the point of view of the Zulu Exiles. Peace asked it from the point of view of the colony of Natal. Although Chamberlain's subordinates in the Colonial Office thought that Zulu matters were now ripe for settlement¹³⁸ Chamberlain, who

131. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 23 Aug.1895.

132. *Ibid.*, 30 Aug.1895.

133. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to Chamberlain, 20 Aug.1895.

134. *Ibid.*

135. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to M. Clarke, 30 Aug.1895.

136. C.O.427/22/14682: H.E. Colenso to C.O., 20 Aug.1895. Marginal comments by Fiddes (n.d.) indicate a measure of scepticism about her arguments.

137. C.O.427/21/13283: Hely-Hutchinson to C.O., 2 July 1895. Minute by Fairfield, 22 Aug.1895 and 13984: Hely-Hutchinson to C.O., confidential, 15 July 1895. Minute by Fairfield, 15 Aug.1895.

138. C.O.427/21/13283, no.60: Hely-Hutchinson to C.O., 2 July 1895. Minute by Fairfield, 27 Aug.1895.

was thinking in terms of using Zululand as a 'lever' to effect the federation of Natal and the Cape, would not be hurried. Both Harriette and Walter Peace were told that the matter would be deferred until November.¹³⁹ Chamberlain indicated to Harriette, too, that he had decided against a visit to England from the Zulu chief 'at the present juncture'.¹⁴⁰ The Colonial Office reply certainly disappointed Harriette, but it may not have displeased Sir John Robinson. He criticised the letter Walter Peace had written on 20 August on the grounds that it exaggerated Natal's willingness to have the Exiles returned. The Natal government thought that the repatriation an 'undesirable step' in which it would acquiesce only on the conditions it had previously stipulated - *i.e.* prior annexation to Natal.¹⁴¹

During these months, and for 1896, Harriette enjoyed very courteous and affable treatment from the young H.F. Wilson, who was at the time Chamberlain's private secretary but later became legal adviser to the Colonial Office. The two families, the Wilsons and the Colensos, knew one another from the past. The private secretary's father was vicar at St Peter's Forncett (where Colenso had been vicar at St Mary's), and Harriette had by chance renewed acquaintance with the father on a train journey to Norwich.¹⁴² It may have been one of the private secretary's tasks to attend to the courtesies of the Colonial Office. If so, Wilson did well, being always accommodating, attentive, and affable¹⁴³ to Harriette until the end of 1896 when, at a time when the overworked Colonial Office was probably psychologically strained by the recriminations of the Jameson Raid, even his politeness suggested a little impatience.¹⁴⁴ Harriette considered her acquaintance with Wilson 'a small trump card'.¹⁴⁵ His courtesy to Harriette parallels under Joseph Chamberlain the consideration she received from Sydney Buxton under Ripon.

It was not surprising that Chamberlain should have decided to postpone decision about policy in regard to Zululand. There was much that was critical and uncertain in the South African scene that confronted him. In the months between August and November 1895,

139. C.O.179/192/14677: W. Peace, Agent-General, to C.O., 20 Aug.1895. Minutes by Chamberlain, 31 Aug.1895, by Fairfield and Meade, 3 Sept.1895.

140. N.A., Col.Coll: C.O. (H.F. Wilson) to H.E. Colenso, 7 Sept.1895.

141. W.C.L., Robinson Letterbook, pp.64-67: John Robinson to W. Peace, confidential, 21 Sept.1895.

142. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes. N.A., Col.Coll: H.F. Wilson to H.E. Colenso, 26 Nov.1895; Mrs Wilson (mother of H.F.) to H.E. Colenso, 9 Dec.1895.

143. See, *e.g.* N.A., Col.Coll: H.F. Wilson to H.E. Colenso, 30 Nov.1895.

144. *Ibid.*, 7 Nov.1896.

145. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 28 Nov.1895.

for example, he had to deal with the question of the annexation of the colony of Bechuanaland to the Cape, the ambitions of the B.S.A. Company to secure the control of Bechuanaland, and the counter representations of the visiting Tswana chiefs (who were backed by vigorous missionary opinion), and the Drifts Crisis between the Cape and the South African Republic which nearly came to armed confrontation. In south east Africa there were fears and tension in regard to the area of Tongoland, over which the British protectorate had only recently been proclaimed. At the same time, schemes for a revolt amongst the aggrieved *Uitlanders* in the South African Republic were openly discussed, and the plans for a supporting raid were being matured in semi-opaque secrecy.

What dominated the humanitarian scene during these months of waiting was the visit of the Tswana chiefs.¹⁴⁶ Harriette watched their progress with a suggestion of envy, much interest, and some scepticism. Since she was very much on her own, and regarded by some as a heretic, Harriette knew that she could not give the Zulu chiefs the sort of enthusiastic backing which the Non-Conformist lobbies gave to the Tswana. Setting aside misgivings, she visited them at their hotel and was pleased to find that one member of the party had Bishopstowe connections.¹⁴⁷ She attended a dinner for them given by her friend, Mrs Jane Cobden-Unwin, who looked to Harriette to deal with problems of etiquette.¹⁴⁸ She sent the Zulu Exiles an account from the *Review of Reviews*¹⁴⁹ about the Tswana visit. But she regarded their visit as a warning, as much as a precedent, for the visit she hoped to arrange for the Exiles. She was resolved to keep the Zulus off public platforms. It was not that she was afraid of their being 'spoilt'. She feared the disappointment they would experience afterwards.¹⁵⁰

Counselled patience by friends, Harriette waited until 31 October before reminding Fairfield that Chamberlain had promised an interview.¹⁵¹ Then, prompted by Buxton, Harriette asked Flora Shaw to act as intermediary and wrote herself to Chamberlain on 24

146. *Ibid.*, K. Lyell to H.E. Colenso, 12 Sept.1895. *South Africa* gave the visit much attention. *The Friend* applauded Khama viz. 'the righteousness of his cause against white wrong doing', p.683, 18 Oct.1895.

147. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.92: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 20 Sept.1895.

148. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 15 Nov.1895.

149. *Ibid.*, 1 Nov.1895.

150. *Ibid.*, 4 Oct.1895. H.E. Colenso, *Memorandum in Reply to Certain Objections*.

151. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 1 Nov.1895.

November.¹⁵² She asked for the interview she had been promised and again urged that the Exiles be allowed to visit Britain. There were two enclosures in this letter. One was a handwritten statement of the position as at November 1895. In this Harriette stressed the promises made to the chiefs. She argued that, since the Natal ministers had urged prior annexation when they were ignorant of these promises, they would now waive their request for prior annexation in favour of immediate repatriation because they recognised that promises must be honoured. Her second enclosure was a copy of the *Memorandum* she had printed in August to answer the objections that might be made to a visit to Britain of the chiefs. In her covering letter Harriette stressed the question of the health of the chiefs and drew particular attention to a troublesome growth in Dinuzulu's eye.¹⁵³

The Phase of 'Repatriation without Annexation'

The result of Harriette's November letter was that Chamberlain agreed to see her on 6 December 1895¹⁵⁴ and crystallised his preferred policy for Zululand. He proposed to repatriate the chiefs immediately, but to defer the question of incorporation. In addition, and in contrast to Ripon's approach, Chamberlain hoped to persuade Natal to accept this order of events. What is more, Chamberlain saw the question of incorporation as part of his overall policy of federation. Somewhat naively, Chamberlain wrote privately to Hely-Hutchinson that it would be 'personally very grateful' to him if the Natal ministers would accept his policy¹⁵⁵ and he again minuted in the Colonial Office files his intention to use the incorporation of Zululand in the process of federation - 'as a card in the federation of S. Africa'.¹⁵⁶

Harriette did not realise fully how strong was the Natal opposition to repatriation. Escombe's somewhat Delphic utterance earlier in the year that promises must be kept was not as reassuring as Harriette believed and hoped.¹⁵⁷ What the remark glossed was the existence of different promises that could arouse conflicting expectations - and fears - among Zulu people and white colonists. Zulu people were disquieted about reports of

152. *Ibid.*, S. Buxton to H.E. Colenso, 14 Nov.1895; H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 15 Nov.1895.

153. C.O.427/22/21092: H.E. Colenso to C.O., 24 Nov.1895 enclosing *Memorandum in Reply*.

154. N.A., Col.Coll: H.F. Wilson to H.E. Colenso, 26 Nov.1895.

155. Chamberlain Papers, J.C.10/7/7: Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, private, 30 Nov.1895.

156. C.O.427/22/21092: H.E. Colenso to Chamberlain, 24 Nov.1895. Minute by Chamberlain, 30 Nov.1895.

157. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 11 Apr.1895.

impending annexation,¹⁵⁸ while white colonists, certainly as represented by John Robinson, were opposed to repatriation.¹⁵⁹ Yet the imperial government was already committed to both repatriation and incorporation.¹⁶⁰ As Harriette sought to allay fears and encourage hopes, the main issues to be settled were these of timing, sequence and conditions.

Within a few weeks of Harriette's interview with Chamberlain hopes of a speedy federation in South Africa collapsed in the aftermath of the fiasco of the Jameson Raid.¹⁶¹ Since so many other issues claimed attention, the Natal ministers realised that they did not need to respond too positively to Chamberlain's initiative.¹⁶² He had not, however, abandoned the Zulu chiefs. He took up the issue again in February 1896,¹⁶³ and it may be that, in all the ensuing negotiations and announcements, Chamberlain was influenced by the desire to appease his critics by at least accomplishing one policy of which they approved.¹⁶⁴

Very possibly Harriette had a role here too. She made a point of keeping in touch with the Governors of St Helena when they were in Britain. She saw R.A. Sterndale¹⁶⁵ off when he left for St Helena to relieve Grey-Wilson, and welcomed Grey-Wilson (and later Sterndale himself)¹⁶⁶ on arrival in Britain on leave. Grey-Wilson was in touch with the Colensos, and dined with the Frank Colensos. He brought with him letters from the Exiles which repeated their request to visit Britain and which Harriette translated into better English. Grey-Wilson took these letters with him when summoned to the Colonial Office. There he discussed the Zulu Exiles, and Harriette was certainly impatient to meet him afterwards to find out what had happened.¹⁶⁷

158. H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Letters from St Helena*, pp.1 and 2, letter of Mubi Nondenisa, 22 Apr.1895.

159. W.C.L., Robinson Letterbook, pp.64-67: J. Robinson to W. Peace, 21 Sept.1895.

160. See above, Chapter Seven.

161. C.O.427/26/3993: H.E. Colenso to C.O., 21 Feb.1896. Minute by Fairfield, 16 Mar.1896.

162. Chamberlain Papers, J.C.10/7/10: Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 9 Jan.1896.

163. *Ibid.*, J.C.10/7/15: Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, 8 Feb.1896.

164. B.M. Nicholls, 'The Loneliness of an Anti-Imperialist White Zulu: Harriette Colenso in Britain 1895-1897' (unpublished conference paper, Oxford, 1996).

165. N.A., Col.Coll: R.A. Sterndale to H.E. Colenso, 28 Nov.1895.

166. *Ibid.*, 11 Aug.1896, 4 Mar, 13 Apr. and 19 May 1897. Harriette was invited to the wedding of Sterndale's daughter. Mrs Grey-Wilson to H.E. Colenso, 29 Apr.1895; Grey-Wilson to H.E. Colenso, 12 June and 13 July 1895, 5 and 23 Feb., and 30 May 1896. The February 1896 letters refer to the meetings with Chamberlain.

167. *Ibid.* Grey-Wilson to H.E. Colenso, 5 and 23 Feb.1896.

Shortly after his meeting with Grey-Wilson, Chamberlain took up again the question of repatriation. It is probably even more significant that he had seen Cecil Rhodes who, hastening to Britain to safeguard the Charter of the B.S.A. Company, implicitly threatened Chamberlain with the publication of the 'missing telegrams' which would compromise the Colonial Office by exposing official foreknowledge of the Jameson Raid.¹⁶⁸ This may well have encouraged Joseph Chamberlain to see in the question of Zulu repatriation a matter on which he could appease humanitarian sentiment. There was already hot indignation against the B.S.A. Company, and even more hostility would flare when the confrontations north of the Limpopo resumed at the end of March 1896 and focused attention there.¹⁶⁹ A few days after his meeting with Rhodes, Chamberlain wrote a private letter to Hely-Hutchinson. The letter warned Hely-Hutchinson that Chamberlain intended soon to address him officially on the question of the repatriation of the chiefs along the lines proposed by Ripon. Chamberlain pointed out also that this was a question on which he would shortly have to answer in parliament:

'It is impossible to believe that they are any longer a source of danger, and we do not stand very well after having made to them what they are entitled to consider a positive promise.'¹⁷⁰

The Colonial Office prepared a confidential print dealing with events in the recent past.¹⁷¹

In the meanwhile Harriette was busy. Eager as she had been to see Grey-Wilson, she was very distressed to find out that on one important point he and she differed. He had recommended that only Dinuzulu should be allowed to visit Britain.¹⁷² To Harriette this was unacceptable. She had a high regard for Ndabuko, which Escombe shared,¹⁷³ and she was in principle intent on keeping Dinuzulu's contact with the old tribal *mores* which Ndabuko seemed best to personify. She had already dealt with the disadvantages of separating Dinuzulu from his uncles in an earlier pamphlet.¹⁷⁴ Now she moved quickly

168. R.I. Rotberg, *The Founder. Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power* (New York and Johannesburg, 1988), p.547; Butler, *Liberal Party and Jameson Raid*, p.71.

169. *Ibid.*, p.84.

170. Chamberlain Papers, J.C.10/7/15: Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, 8 Feb.1896.

171. Confidential Print African 471.

172. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 21 Feb.1896.

173. *Ibid.*, 28 Feb.1896. H. Escombe & F.C. Dumat, *A Remonstrance on Behalf of the Zulu Chiefs* (London, 1889, reprinted Pietermaritzburg, 1908 and 1989), pp.69-74.

174. H.E. Colenso, *The Prospects of the Three Zulu Chiefs Still in Exile at St Helena*, confidential. Dated from the Grantully Castle, 12 Aug.1893.

to emphasise her view that a visit to Britain of Dinuzulu alone would be inadequate and might be harmful. It could not convey to the Exiles that reinstatement in good opinion which she hoped to achieve for them.

To counteract what she thought unwise in Grey-Wilson's suggestions, Harriette set out her own ideas in a letter to Mr H.F. Wilson, called at the Colonial Office to deliver her letter and to discuss the question with him, and then, after this discussion with the long-suffering private secretary, wrote again to debate the question of who should act as interpreter for the Exiles, if and when they came. Harriette made no secret of her willingness to undertake the role of interpreter and hoped to be allowed to summon Mubi Nondenisa (who spent some unhappy months at St Helena) to assist her in the task. She acknowledged that her suggestion might be premature, and Wilson halted the correspondence on the subject when he agreed with her. But Chamberlain postponed decision on the question of a visit to Britain for the Zulu chiefs.¹⁷⁵

When the Colonial Office officials wrote their minutes on Harriette's letter they reviewed the general situation in regard to Zululand and formulated their thoughts on what should now be accepted policy. They observed that federation was no longer practicable politics, and believed that the time had come to move forward on the question of repatriation. In his minute of 16 March Edward Fairfield recommended a two-step policy: they should announce the return, and then negotiate with Natal about annexation. Chamberlain agreed and had already written to Hely-Hutchinson in that spirit.¹⁷⁶ But, as Hely-Hutchinson's reply showed, the Natal ministers were grave and hesitant. They pointed to the anxieties of the Transvaal situation and the need to establish British control over Tongoland.¹⁷⁷ Then new disasters counselled caution: locusts and drought created scarcity, while fighting north of the Limpopo made everything uncertain.¹⁷⁸

In the Colonial Office, Just minuted, with a philosophical detachment easier for him than

175. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 21 and 28 Feb. and 6 Mar.1896. C.O.427/26/3993: H.E. Colenso to H.F. Wilson, 21 Feb.1896. Minutes by Fairfield, 16 Mar. and Chamberlain, 17 Mar.1896. C.O.427/26/4410: H.E. Colenso to H.F. Wilson, 21 Feb.1896. Minutes by Fairfield, n.d., and G.V. Fiddes, 29 Feb.1896.

176. C.O.426/26/3933: Minutes by Fairfield, 16 Mar.1896 and Chamberlain, 17 Mar.1896.

177. *Ibid.*, Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, private, 18 Mar.1896.

178. C.O.427/26/5283: H.E. Colenso to H.F. Wilson, 9 Mar.1896.

for the chiefs or their partisans, that the desire to make reparation to them for past wrongs seemed destined to remain unfulfilled, at least for the time being. Fairfield too thought that they should postpone their intended despatch on Dinuzulu: 'the convulsions of nature and of politics', he said, should be allowed to settle.¹⁷⁹ All the indications from Natal were that the ministers were not enthusiastic about repatriation, nor about annexation; but the course they least favoured was that of acquiescing in repatriation without annexation. It was the same dilemma that confronted them in 1895 but, in their view, with added reasons for caution.¹⁸⁰ In June 1896 Chamberlain announced in parliament that the return of the chiefs had been deferred.¹⁸¹ To add to the confusion, Carter, the Bishop of Zululand, opposed annexation to Natal.¹⁸²

Not surprisingly, Harriette drew very different conclusions from the adverse conditions that existed in South Africa. When she heard about scarcity in Zululand, she reported it to the Colonial Office, first in a conversation with Wilson,¹⁸³ then in writing. In her letter of 9 March 1896 Harriette quoted comments made by Agnes and by G. Mansel. She drew attention to the 'considerable funds' in the hands of the government of Zululand and urged timeous action to supply and distribute famine relief. The Colonial Office responded that Sir Marshal Clarke was aware of the situation and that some hundreds of pounds had been allocated for locust destruction and the distribution of food.¹⁸⁴ Harriette had not anticipated that famine conditions and upheavals in other parts of Africa would be used as an argument to block repatriation to Zululand. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons in June 1896 brought a quick protest from her which had an impact on Colonial Office thinking.¹⁸⁵ It triggered another round of exchanges between the Colonial Office and Natal.

179. C.O.427/26/3993: H.E. Colenso, 21 Feb.1896. See the later minutes by H.W. Just, 16 Apr.1896; by Fairfield, 8 May 1896; R. Meade, 9 May 1896; and Chamberlain, 13 May 1896. All indicated that the outbreak of the 'Matabele' troubles led to the postponement of repatriation.

180. *Ibid.*, Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, private, 18 Mar.1896. Chamberlain Papers, J.C.10/7/16: Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 15 and 22 Feb.1896; 10/7/23: Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 4 Apr.1896.

181. British *Hansard*, 4th series, vol.41, col.1059: 15 June 1896.

182. C.O.427/26/4451: Bishop of Zululand to C.O., 28 Feb.1896. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

183. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 6 Mar.1896.

184. C.O.427/26/5283: H.E. Colenso to H.F. Wilson, 9 Mar.1896 and C.O. to H.E. Colenso, 13 Mar.1896.

185. C.O.427/26/13874: H.E. Colenso to Chamberlain, 30 June 1896. Minutes by H.W. Just, 2 July 1896; E. Fairfield, 9 July 1896; R. Meade, 8 July 1896 and Selborne, 13 July 1896. British *Hansard*, 4th series, vol.41, col.1059: Chamberlain in answer to R. McKenna, 15 June 1896. See Appendix 2, Biographical notes.

In his reply to McKenna in June 1896 Chamberlain stated that he had intended to return the chiefs but that 'the circumstances of the year' had compelled delay. Harriette had a vigorous conversation with Wilson. She wanted to ascertain the correct text of the reply, and its interpretation. Then she challenged the inferences which the policy-makers had drawn from the 'circumstances of the year'. Locusts and rinderpest were reasons *for*, not *against*, repatriation. The Exiles would steady the people, and their return would be a reassuring sign of official goodwill towards the Zulu people. Chamberlain's reply might be adroit in regard to the House of Commons but it was not an adequate reply to her, or to the Zulu people. Asked about Natal's attitude, Harriette told Wilson of a telegram from Agnes to the effect that Natal was not at present pressing for annexation. Harriette spoke, too, of the delays over Magera's being allowed to proceed to St Helena.¹⁸⁶

Harriette wrote again to the Colonial Office in June 1896. She asked for speedy repatriation and a further interview with Chamberlain to obtain 'fresh instructions'.¹⁸⁷ She was optimistic. After her talk with Wilson she wondered whether there would be time to send Magera to St Helena.¹⁸⁸ Although Chamberlain refused to see her again, he was not unsympathetic. In fact, her letter helped stir the Colonial Office to make another attempt to bring about the repatriation 'by the end of the year' but, again, despite the suggestion of Fairfield that they act independently of Natal, they sought the co-operation of the colony.¹⁸⁹ Once more, then, there was postponement. Even Escombe, Harriette learned, favoured delay.¹⁹⁰ Hearing that Chamberlain was in America, Harriette wondered tartly, in August for how long he expected her to believe that he was striving to 'accomplish the chiefs' return'.¹⁹¹ By October, however, it looked as though there might be some action. Chamberlain returned from America, and it was known that Sir John Robinson, the Prime Minister of Natal, was on his way to England.¹⁹² That news did not immediately perturb Harriette. Although the Colensos had criticised the anti-uSuthu

186. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 12 and 26 June 1896.

187. C.O.427/26/13874: H.E. Colenso to Chamberlain, 30 June 1896. Minutes by Fairfield, 9 July 1896; Selborne, 13 July and Chamberlain, 14 July; Fairfield to H.E. Colenso, 26 Aug.1896.

188. See fn.185.

189. See fn.187, especially minute by Chamberlain, 14 July 1896 and Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, 26 Aug.1896.

190. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 20 Aug.1896, quoting H.E. Colenso to H. Escombe.

191. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to K.M. Lyell, 31 Aug.1896.

192. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 12 Sept. and 2 Oct.1896.

stance of Sir John Robinson in the past, Harriette a few months earlier had thought that he 'was getting into her boat' in regard to Zululand by supporting, as she believed, the policy of Escombe which was the course she advocated.¹⁹³ In October, after having been driven round Hampstead in a hansom with Wilson, Harriette wrote again to Joseph Chamberlain. She asked him to allow the chiefs a visit to England to compensate for the delay or, failing that, to grant Ndabuko leave of absence to make the visit at private expense. She intended to raise £100 in the 'least disreputable way' but, she feared, as she told Agnes, that there would be 'no such luck'.¹⁹⁴ In the meanwhile she continued to harass the Colonial Office which she accused of unnecessary delay about, and interference with, letters to and from St Helena.¹⁹⁵

Harriette's later letter of 16 October 1896 made it very likely that the Colonial Office would consult with Robinson on the question of a visit to Britain for the chiefs. By the end of October the Colonial Office knew that both Sir Marshal Clark and Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson now favoured a visit to Britain for the Exiles,¹⁹⁶ although Sir John Robinson did not.¹⁹⁷ After the first of his conversations with the Natal Premier Chamberlain rejected the idea with greater emphasis than previously and informed the Governor of this decision.¹⁹⁸

Sir John Robinson came to England at the end of 1896 as a sick man,¹⁹⁹ and his interviews with Chamberlain had to be postponed because of his illness. They took place in November 1896. What emerged from them was that agreement between Natal and Britain on the question of the Exiles and Zululand was not going to be easy. Sir John Robinson then forwarded to the Colonial Office a report of an interview he had with Dinuzulu at St Helena on 18 September 1896. The Governor, Grey-Wilson (who had resumed duty, taking over from R.A. Sterndale), Lady Robinson and Magema Magwaza

193. *Ibid.*, 9 May 1895.

194. *Ibid.*, 16 Oct. 1896.

195. *Ibid.*, C.O. to H.E. Colenso, 16 Nov. 1896.

196. C.O.427/25/2240: Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 2 Oct. 1896, with M. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson, 28 Sept. 1896.

197. C.O.427/25/24599: Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, secret, 6 Nov. 1896, enclosing copy of J. Robinson's Notes of Interview (with Dinuzulu at St Helena), including account of Robinson's conversation with Madden, the 'guardian' at St Helena.

198. C.O.427/25/2240: Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 2 Oct. 1896, with M. Clarke to Hely-Hutchinson, 28 Sept. 1896. Minute by Chamberlain, 4 Nov. 1896.

199. Chamberlain Papers, J.C.10/7/37: Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 19 Aug. 1896.

Fuze (as interpreter) were present. Dinuzulu's uncles, Ndabuko and Shingana, were not invited to the meeting. Sir John Robinson's account made clear his uneasiness about repatriation, his hostility to Dinuzulu, his fears that conflagration anywhere in southern Africa threatened confrontation everywhere, and his opposition to any proposal which in his view would strengthen Dinuzulu's position among his own people by giving him the support of official recognition. The St Helena boy who referred to Dinuzulu as 'The King of the Zulus' merited special - and hostile - mention in Robinson's report. For his part, Dinuzulu was clearly disappointed to hear nothing about plans for his return and puzzled by Sir John's reference to the Ndebele conflict as a reason for delaying a Zulu settlement. Each party to the conversations clearly had reservations about the other.²⁰⁰ Sir John kept his colleagues in Natal informed by sending them another copy of his report.²⁰¹

During their discussions in London, Chamberlain and Robinson explained to each other their views of the Zulu future. Chamberlain made it plain that he intended to repatriate the Zulu chiefs soon - very soon - and he attempted to take a strong line, arguing that this was after all an imperial, and not a colonial matter. Sir John expressed his uneasiness. At the second interview, for example, he approved what he had at first deplored: the strengthening of the imperial forces in South Africa. Chamberlain hoped to be able to induce Sir John to give up the Natal policy of insisting on the incorporation of Zululand to Natal as a *quid pro quo* for the repatriation of the Zulu chiefs, but in this he failed. Once more, however, there was to be delay, Sir John would inform his ministers of his conversations with Chamberlain and report their reactions.²⁰²

Sir John Robinson's visit to Britain at the end of 1896 is a turning point in the story of Harriette's dealings with the Colonial Office for two reasons, each of which was a sequel to the visit. The Colonial Office realised, from the Natal reaction to what Sir John had to say, that it would not be able to keep separate the two issues of annexation and repatriation. Harriette Colenso realised, with dismay and astonishment, that all the Natal ministers - including Escombe - were opposed to granting Dinuzulu the key and special

200. C.O.427/26/22918: Notes of Interviews: John Robinson and Dinuzulu and John Robinson and J. Chamberlain. H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Affairs*, p.9.

201. C.O.427/25/24599: Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, secret, 6 Nov.1896, enclosing copy of J. Robinson's Notes of Interview with Dinuzulu. See above, fn.197.

202. C.O.427/26/22918: Notes of Interviews. Minutes by H.W. Just, 14 Dec.1896, and Chamberlain, n.d.

position which, she believed, had been promised to him in the past and which, in her eyes, would be a crucial safeguard for all, black and white, in the future.²⁰³ Before the meeting, as Sir John postponed it for as long as possible, Harriette was irritated and contemptuous when he warned that he had been advised to avoid 'all excitement';²⁰⁴ but it was Harriette who was left distressed and distraught after the meeting. She lost papers, forgot an appointment with Mary Kingsley,²⁰⁵ worried Agnes by the depressed tone of her letters,²⁰⁶ and wrote to Alice Werner that she was 'picking up the bits and pieces of what is left of me after the Sir John Robinson skirmish'.²⁰⁷ But pick them up she did.

Harriette expressed and recorded her vigorous dissent from Sir John Robinson's views in her conversation and correspondence with him, and in the pamphlet she circulated, entitled *Zulu Affairs: Correspondence between H E Colenso and Sir John Robinson, Premier of Natal, December 1896 to January 1897*. She included in this pamphlet letters written to Sir John while he was in England and a long letter, dated 27 January 1897, which she posted after Sir John's return. This was answered by Harry Escombe, successor to Sir John Robinson as Premier of Natal. She wove into that letter a long excerpt from an earlier pamphlet in which she described the character of the uSuthu party and stressed Dinuzulu's claims to recognition. She had a dual purpose. She wanted to argue strenuously in favour of assigning to Dinuzulu a position that would recognise the cohesion and identity of the Zulu people, and she wished to announce and explain her change of view in regard to the annexation of Zululand to Natal.

Appalled at the way Robinson used blurred insinuation to allege that Ripon's proposals amounted to a plan to restore Dinuzulu to a position of 'supreme authority', Harriette argued strenuously that this was gross distortion. What Ripon intended was a wise recognition of the 'central position' (as she termed it) which Dinuzulu enjoyed in the esteem of his people, quite independently of whatever arrangements the white authorities might make. What is interesting in the views of Harriette Colenso and John Robinson is

203. H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Affairs*.

204. N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, n.d. (Dec.1896, int.ev.).

205. *Ibid.*, M. Kingsley to H.E. Colenso, 2 Dec.1896.

206. *Ibid.*, H.E. Colenso to A.M. Colenso, 20 Jan.1897; A.M. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 27 Feb.1897.

207. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.113: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 18 Jan.1897.

that each recognised in Dinuzulu this inherent and inherited claim to leadership, but each drew very different inferences from that perception. Sir John believed that the leadership of Dinuzulu must be checked and blocked. Harriette believed that it should be recognised and used to the mutual benefit of white and black. Any other course was, in her view, wrong, foolish, and dangerous.

Harriette forwarded her correspondence with Sir John Robinson to the Colonial Office in two instalments and stated, both to Sir John and to the Colonial Office, that the discrepancy between her views and those of the Natal ministry which she had now discovered 'completely and unavoidably nullified' her support for the Natal government.²⁰⁸ Her announcement was a little pompous. Amounting - as it did - to an admission of poor political judgment, it nevertheless won some sympathy in the Colonial Office for her predicament and disappointment, but it did not deserve respect for political acumen.

The Phase of Indirect Representation

In 1897 Harriette had little chance of influencing the Colonial Office by direct representation. If she was to have any impact, she would have to work through and in harmony with the two men who were received at the Colonial Office in 1897. Each commanded respect, though of a different kind and for different reasons. One was Sir Marshal Clarke, who had won golden opinions for his work in Basutoland and whose opinions in regard to Zululand were valued. The other was Escombe, who was, after Robinson's resignation at the beginning of 1897, the Premier of Natal, and a man who could not be ignored because he represented white colonial opinion. Clarke came on leave, the beginning of which was postponed until December 1896 because of the problems and difficulties about Zululand, where famine conditions obtained through most of 1896 - and where some officials mistrusted the uSuthu, doubted Clarke's wisdom and/or were uneasy about possible repercussions following the Exiles' return.²⁰⁹ While Clarke was in England (and Ireland), his leave was extended until midsummer 1897 for official reasons.

208. C.O.427/26/25182: Sir John Robinson to C.O., 7 Dec.1896, forwarding copies of correspondence. H.E. Colenso, *Zulu Affairs*, especially p.9; N.A., Col.Coll: H.E. Colenso to Chamberlain, 4 Dec.1896.

209. N.A., Col.Coll: M. Clarke to A.M. Colenso, 5 Nov.1896; M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 19 Nov.1896.

He applied for leave on private grounds, but the Colonial Office wanted his expertise and consulted him frequently. The London officials thought for a time that the Exiles might travel with Clarke when he returned to Zululand after his leave. Harriette guessed that this might be so but, because negotiations dragged on and on and Natal wanted delay, this did not happen.²¹⁰ Escombe came for the Jubilee, arrived in the middle of June, and stayed till the end of July. He took part in the consultations of Chamberlain with the Colonial premiers through which the Secretary of State hoped to move towards imperial consolidation, discussed Natal questions (and Zulu ones) at the Colonial Office, and took part in the Jubilee celebrations.²¹¹ His views in regard to Zululand were crucial. By now Harriette realised he would be 'fighting on the wrong side'.²¹² She was in touch with both men. Each disappointed her: Escombe because he was a convinced annexationist who had the white legislature and voters of Natal to please; Clarke because he had a realistic appreciation of the dilemmas of the Colonial Office and, finding his role in Zululand limited and uncertain, had his own career as imperial servant to consider. He made it plain that he would not stay on in Zululand after annexation to Natal.²¹³

Harriette's esteem for Sir Marshal Clarke was genuine and unchanged. When she advocated annexation at the beginning of 1895, she hoped that Sir Marshal would continue in office as Resident Commissioner and she continued to hope that he would stay on in Zululand at least temporarily after annexation. But Sir Marshal thought differently. He was from the beginning clear that the incorporation of Zululand in Natal would sever his connection with the country and he was always determined not to be involved in the dismantling of the administration he had created in Zululand which, he was sure, would follow annexation.²¹⁴ He realised, however, that annexation to Natal was inevitable and by 1897 he was ready to argue that it was better to expedite annexation than to postpone

210. C.O.427/25/2240: Hely-Hutchinson to C.O., confidential, 2 Oct.1896. Minutes by F. Graham, 30 Oct.1896 and R. Meade and Selborne, 3 Nov.1896. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.118: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 2 Mar.1897.

211. The collection of invitations, programmes and souvenirs in the papers of J.G. Sprigg is evidence of the hectic activity of a colonial premier during the Jubilee.

212. K.C.A.L., Col.Coll. Dd.121: H.E. Colenso to A. Werner, 9 June 1897.

213. N.A., Col.Coll: M. Clarke to A.M. Colenso, 26 July 1895, in which he regretted the cancelling of repatriation; M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 20 Oct.1895.

214. *Ibid.*, M. Clarke to H.E. Colenso, 26 July 1895; Lagden Papers: M. Clarke to G. Lagden, 21 Jan.1895.